ADDITIONAL SUPPLEMENT TO "EXPRESSIVE VOTING AND ITS COST: EVIDENCE FROM RUNOFFS WITH TWO OR THREE CANDIDATES"

Vincent Pons

Harvard Business School

Clémence Tricaud

CREST, Ecole Polytechnique

Appendix C. Robustness of the results to two special cases

Case 1: Second candidate dropouts

While the first candidate never drops out of the race in our sample, the second candidate drops out between the two rounds in 5.5 percent of the elections near the discontinuity. When the second candidate drops out of the race on the left of the discontinuity, the second round takes place but is uncontested, and the only candidate remaining in the race wins the election. When the second candidate drops out of the race on the right of the discontinuity, the third candidate remains in the race in all but one election, and the second round takes place between the candidates who placed first and third in the first round.

As shown in Table C1, the likelihood of the second candidate dropping out is not significantly affected by the presence of the third candidate. Moreover, we derive our main results restricting the sample to configurations where all three candidates have distinct political orientations (see Sections 4.3 to 4.5) and where, as a result, the second candidate almost never drops out (she does so in only 4 elections near the discontinuity or 0.4 percent of the cases).

In sum, our results are not driven by second candidate dropouts.

Table C1: Second candidate dropouts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome	Second candidate drops out			
3rd present	0.025	0.025	0.024	0.036
	(0.045)	(0.032)	(0.058)	(0.053)
Robust p-value	0.701	0.470	0.862	0.797
Observations	1,966	3,430	3,092	3,430
Polynomial order	1	1	2	2
Bandwidth	0.021	0.037	0.033	0.037
Band. method	MSERD	IK	MSERD	IK
Mean, left of the threshold	0.038	0.034	0.037	0.034

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is computed based on the robust p-value and ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. Each column reports the results from a separate local polynomial regression. The outcome is a dummy equal to 1 if the second candidate drops out of the race in the second round. The variable of interest (the presence of a third candidate in the second round) is instrumented by the assignment variable (whether the vote share of the third-highest-ranking candidate was higher than the cutoff). Separate polynomials are fitted on each side of the threshold. The polynomial order is 1 in columns 1 and 2, and 2 in columns 3 and 4. The bandwidths are derived under the MSERD (columns 1 and 3) and IK (columns 2 and 4) procedures.

Case 2: Fourth candidate qualifies and runs in the second round

In 22 races, or 1.2 percent of the elections near the discontinuity, the candidate ranked fourth in the first round also obtained a number of votes higher than 12.5 percent of the registered citizens and qualified for the second round. She decided to run in the second round in only 3 races close to the discontinuity, and in these cases, the third candidate always dropped out of the race.

When turnout is low, it is difficult for more than three candidates to reach the 12.5 qualification threshold. Restricting our sample to elections where turnout in the first round is lower than 58 percent enables us to get a subsample of elections where the fourth candidate never qualifies. As shown in Table C2, the impacts on our three main outcomes are robust in this sample: using our preferred specification, we find that the presence of the third candidate raises the share of candidate votes by 7.8 percentage points on average (compared with 7.2 for the whole sample), decreases the vote share of the top two candidates by 5.1 percentage points on average (compared with 6.9 for the whole sample), and decreases the probability that the top-two candidate ideologically closest to the third wins by 32.3 percentage points on average (compared with 19.2 for the whole sample). As on the whole sample, the first two coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. The third coefficient is not significant (p-value of 0.102) but large in magnitude.

In sum, our results are not driven by elections where the fourth candidate qualifies and runs in the second round.

Table C2: Main results in elections where the 4th candidate never qualifies

Outcome	(1) Candidate votes	(2) Vote share top 2 2nd round	(3) Closest cand wins
3rd present	0.078***	-0.051***	-0.323
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.149)
Robust p-value	0.000	0.007	0.102
Observations	285	359	191
Polynomial order	1	1	1
Bandwidth	0.008	0.010	0.012
Band. method	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD
Mean, left of the threshold	0.470	0.469	0.802

Notes: Sample includes only the elections with first round turnout lower than 58%. In column (3), the sample is further restricted to elections where the three candidates are from distinct political orientations, the candidate ideologically closest to the third is identified, and the strength of the third candidate is lower than that of each of the top two candidates (as in Section 4.5). Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is computed based on the robust p-value and ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. Each column reports the results from a separate local polynomial regression. In Columns (1) and (2), each outcome uses the number of registered voters as the denominator. In Column (3), the outcome is a dummy equal to 1 if the closest candidate wins the election. The variable of interest (the presence of the third candidate in the second round) is instrumented by the assignment variable (whether the vote share of the third-highest-ranking candidate in the first round was higher than the threshold). Separate polynomials are fitted on each side of the threshold. The polynomial order is 1, and the optimal bandwidths are derived under the MSERD procedure.

Appendix F. Impact on the top two candidates depending on voters' level of information

In this section, we estimate the impact of the presence of the third candidate on the top two candidates' vote share in districts where voters have more or less information. As in Section 4.4 and Appendix E, we restrict the analysis to elections of sample 1: all elections in which the top three candidates have distinct political orientations and the third candidate is either on the left or the right of both top two candidates, making one of them the candidate ideologically closest to the third. We first test whether the impact varies depending on the level of information. We then focus on high-information districts and run the same subsample analysis as in Section 4.4 and Appendix E to test whether the impact on the top two is affected by the gap between the strength of the third candidate and that of each of the top two candidates or by the closeness of the race in these districts. We proxy the level of information by election salience and media exposure.

Salience of the election

We first proxy the level of information by the salience of the race and compare the effects in local and parliamentary elections, the latter type of elections being the more salient. As shown in Table F1, the impact on the top two candidates' vote share is very similar in both types of races: the two coefficients are close in magnitude and while the effect on parliamentary elections is not significant in sample 1 (p-value of 0.105), it is significant at the 5 percent level in sample 2 (on which we focus to measure the effect on winner identity), as shown in Table F2. Focusing on parliamentary races, we find that the impact remains large even when the third candidate has very low chances of becoming a front-runner in the second round: all estimates are included between 5.1 and 11.6 percentage points across the four subsamples shown in Table F2. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect stays high in close elections, whether closeness is measured as the difference in vote shares between the top two candidates (Table F3, columns 2 and 3) or as the difference in strengths (Table F3, columns 3 and 4): all estimates are comprised between 5.5 and 9.2 percentage points.

Table F1 : Impact on the top two candidates in local vs. parliamentary elections

Outcome	(1) Vote share top 2 - 2nd round - Sample 1 Local elections	(2) Vote share top 2 - 2nd round - Sample 1 Parliamentary elections
3rd present	-0.059***	-0.069
	(0.015)	(0.033)
Robust p-value	0.001	0.105
Observations	273	210
Polyn. order	1	1
Bandwidth	0.012	0.012
Band. method	MSERD	MSERD
Mean, left of the threshold	0.474	0.601

Notes: Sample 1 includes the elections in which the top three candidates have distinct political orientations and the third candidate is either on the left or the right of both top two candidates, making one of them the candidate ideologically closest to the third. Column 1 (resp. 2) further restricts the sample to local (resp. parliamentary) elections. Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is computed based on the robust p-value and ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. Each column reports the results from a separate local polynomial regression. The outcome uses the number of registered voters as the denominator. The variable of interest (the presence of a third candidate in the second round) is instrumented by the assignment variable (whether the vote share of the third-highest-ranking candidate was higher than the cutoff). Separate polynomials are fitted on each side of the threshold. The polynomial order is 1, and the optimal bandwidths are derived under the MSERD procedure.

Table F2: Impact on the top two depending on the strength of the third candidate, in parliamentary elections

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Vote share top 2 - 2nd round			
	Parliamentary elections			
	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4
3rd present	-0.069	-0.077**	-0.051	-0.116**
	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.049)
Robust p-value	0.105	0.032	0.318	0.022
Observations	210	166	144	62
Polyn. order	1	1	1	1
Bandwidth	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.006
Band. method	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD
Mean, left of the threshold	0.601	0.614	0.617	0.625

Notes: Sample includes only the parliamentary elections. Sample 1 includes the elections in which the top three candidates have different political orientations and the third candidate is either on the left or the right of both top two candidates, making one of them the candidate ideologically closest to the third. Sample 2 includes the elections of sample 1 in which the third candidate's strength is lower than that of each of the top two candidates. Sample 3 (resp. 4) includes the elections of sample 2 with a difference of at least 5 (resp. 10) percentage points between the strength of the third candidate and the strength of each of the top two candidates. Other notes as in Table F1.

Table F3: Impact on the top two depending on the closeness of the race, in parliamentary elections

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Vote share top 2 - 2nd round - Parliamentary elections				
	Sample 1	Distance12 (vote share)		Distance12 (strength)	
		≤10%	≤5%	≤10%	≤5%
3rd present	-0.069	-0.055	-0.057	-0.088**	-0.092**
	(0.033)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.029)	(0.042)
Robust p-value	0.105	0.566	0.437	0.015	0.040
Observations	210	122	64	183	68
Polyn. order	1	1	1	1	1
Bandwidth	0.012	0.010	0.011	0.020	0.014
Band. method	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD
Mean, left of the threshold	0.601	0.606	0.609	0.624	0.616

Notes: Sample includes only the parliamentary elections. Sample 1 includes the elections in which the top three candidates have different political orientations and the third candidate is either on the left or the right of both top two candidates, making one of them the candidate ideologically closest to the third. Column 2 and 3 include only elections where the difference in vote shares between the first and second candidates in the first round is lower than 10 and 5 percentage points, respectively. Column 4 and 5 include only elections where the difference in strengths between the first and second candidates is lower than 10 and 5 percentage points, respectively. Other notes as in Table F1.

Media exposure

We now proxy the level of information by media exposure, using three different measures: newspaper consumption and radio and TV news audience.

Data on local newspaper circulation were collected by Julia Cagé for her work on media competition and participation in France (Cagé, 2017). These data are available at the département-year level for 87 départements out of 101, excluding French territories overseas and the region "Ile-de-France", for each year in which an election of our sample took place.[1] For each département and election year, we computed the level of local newspaper consumption as the total number of newspaper copies in circulation divided by the total population.[2]

We collected data on radio and TV news audiences from Médiamétrie (http://www.mediametrie.fr), a company specialized in the measurement of media audiences in France. Data on radio news audience are available at the département-year level for 80 départements out of 101, excluding French territories overseas and the 16 least densely populated départements, for the years 2003, 2007, 2011, 2012, and 2015. The yearly radio news audience is measured as the percentage of the dé-

[1] Data are available up to 2014. We thus use 2014's values for the local elections held in 2015.

[2] Note that the two départements of "Corse" were merged together in the newspaper database, so both départements have the same value of newspaper consumption in each year.

partement population aged 13 and over who listened at least once to a radio news channel between 5am and 12am on a weekday.[3] For the six parliamentary elections held before 2003, we proxy the audience of each département using the 2003 data.

Data on TV news audience are available at the region-year level for 20 regions out of 27, excluding French territories overseas and the regions "Corse" and "Centre", for the years 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2015. The TV news audience is measured as the average percentage of the region population aged 4 and over who watched a news broadcast per minute during the first semester of the year.[4] For the elections held before 2010 (seven parliamentary elections), we proxy the audience of each region using the 2010 data.

Overall, we have a measure of newspaper consumption for 83.3 percent of our sample and a measure of radio news audience (resp. TV news audience) for 88.6 (resp. 91.2) percent of our sample. For each of these three measures of media exposure, we split our sample based on medians and terciles. We estimate medians and terciles separately for each election year, to control for time trends.

As shown in Table F4, the impact on the top two candidates' vote share is not smaller but actually slightly larger in high-information districts: estimates in districts above the newspaper, radio, or TV median are included between 8.6 and 11.2 percentage points (columns 2, 4, and 6), while estimates in districts below the median are comprised between 5.3 and 7.8 percentage points (columns 1, 3, and 5). Similarly, the impact is always larger in the third tercile than in the first (Table F5).

Focusing on districts above the median, whatever the measure of media exposure we use, the impact on the vote share of the top two candidates remains large across the four subsamples defined based on the gap between the strength of the third candidate and that of each of the top two candidates (Tables F6 to F8). For instance, in districts with radio news audience above the median (Table F7), the impact is as large as 7.2 and 9.3 percentage points in elections where the third candidate's strength is lower than that of each of the top two candidates by at least 5 and 10 percentage points, respectively (compared with 8.6 percentage points when we put no restriction on the strength of the third). Moreover, in these districts, the effect remains equally high even when the race is close in the first round, whether closeness is measured as the difference in vote shares or strengths between the first and second candidates (Tables F9 to F11).

[3] We consider the following six radio news channels: Europe 1, France Bleu, France Inter, RMC, RTL, and Sud Radio.

[4] We consider the news broadcasts of the following four TV channels: TF1 ("le 13h" and "le 20h"), France2 ("le 13h", "le 20h", "JT Nuit", and "journal du matin"), France 3 ("12-13 edition des initiatives", "12-13 edition des régions", "12-13 édition spéciale régionale", "12-13 journal national", "12-13 journal regional", "19-20 journal national", "19-20 journal régional", "Edition Outre Mer", "Flash Infos", "Soir 3 edition régionale", and "Soir 3 le journal"), M6 ("le 1245" and "le 1945"), and Arte ("Arte Journal"). For 2015 and 2012, the first semester stretches from January 2 to May 28. For 2011, it lasts from January 3 to July 3, and for 2010, from January 4 to June 27.

The results are qualitatively similar when we run these subsample analysis on districts in the third tercile (results available upon request).

All in all, these results suggest that the impact on the vote share of the top two candidates stays large in high-information districts, and that it remains unaffected by the distance between the third and the top two candidates or by the closeness of the race in these districts.

Table F4 : Impact on the vote share of the top two candidates in districts above or below the median

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Vote share top 2 - 2nd round - Median					
	Newspaper		Radio		TV	
	Below	Above	Below	Above	Below	Above
3rd present	-0.053	-0.096***	-0.078***	-0.086***	-0.061***	-0.112***
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.024)
Robust p-value	0.130	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.006	0.000
Observations	264	239	239	263	350	295
Polyn. order	1	1	1	1	1	1
Bandwidth	0.011	0.017	0.011	0.016	0.017	0.015
Band. method	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD
Mean, left of the threshold	0.534	0.512	0.528	0.526	0.523	0.528

Notes: Column 1 (resp. 3, 5) includes only the districts with newspaper consumption (resp. radio news audience, TV news audience) below the median. Column 2 (resp. 4, 6) includes only the districts with newspaper consumption (resp. radio news audience, TV news audience) above the median. Other notes as in Table F1.

Table F5 : Impact on the vote share of the top two candidates in districts in different terciles

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Vote share top 2 - 2nd round - Terciles								
	Newspaper			Radio			TV		
	T1	T2	T3	T1	T2	T3	T1	T2	T3
3rd present	-0.046	-0.093***	-0.079**	-0.085**	-0.053	-0.104***	-0.048*	-0.094***	-0.120**
	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.044)
Robust p-value	0.294	0.001	0.043	0.012	0.117	0.002	0.100	0.001	0.022
Observations	197	230	130	168	234	148	219	171	184
Polyn. order	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Bandwidth	0.013	0.016	0.015	0.011	0.020	0.013	0.016	0.013	0.014
Band. method	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD
Mean	0.532	0.527	0.510	0.539	0.514	0.527	0.518	0.525	0.535

Notes: Column 1 (resp. 4, 7) includes only the districts with newspaper consumption (resp. radio news audience, TV news audience) in the first tercile. Column 2 (resp. 5, 8) includes only the districts with newspaper consumption (resp. radio news audience, TV news audience) in the second tercile. Column 3 (resp. 6, 9) includes only the districts with newspaper consumption (resp. radio news audience, TV news audience) in the third tercile. Other notes as in Table F1.

Table F6: Impact on the vote share of the top two candidates depending on the strength of the third candidate, in districts with newspaper consumption above the median

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Vote share top 2 - 2nd round			
	Newspaper consumption above median			
	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4
3rd present	-0.096***	-0.100***	-0.132***	-0.148
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.086)
Robust p-value	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.165
Observations	239	160	94	23
Polyn. order	1	1	1	1
Bandwidth	0.017	0.014	0.011	0.005
Band. method	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD
Mean, left of the threshold	0.512	0.528	0.545	0.623

Notes: Sample includes only the districts that are located in départements with newspaper consumption above the median in the year of the election. Other notes as in Table F2.

Table F7: Impact on the vote share of the top two candidates depending on the strength of the third candidate, in districts with radio news audience above the median

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Vote share top 2 - 2nd round			
	Radio news audience above median			
	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4
3rd present	-0.086***	-0.097***	-0.072	-0.093*
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.036)	(0.041)
Robust p-value	0.003	0.000	0.254	0.078
Observations	263	239	83	42
Polyn. order	1	1	1	1
Bandwidth	0.016	0.017	0.007	0.006
Band. method	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD
Mean, left of the threshold	0.526	0.535	0.565	0.610

Notes: Sample includes only the districts located in départements with radio news audience above the median in the year of the election. Other notes as in Table F2.

Table F8: Impact on the vote share of the top two candidates depending on the strength of the third candidate, in districts with TV news audience above the median

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Vote share top 2 - 2nd round			
	TV news audience above median			
	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4
3rd present	-0.112***	-0.105***	-0.129***	-0.143*
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.052)
Robust p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.072
Observations	295	314	179	47
Polyn. order	1	1	1	1
Bandwidth	0.015	0.020	0.016	0.007
Band. method	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD
Mean, left of the threshold	0.528	0.540	0.558	0.614

Notes: Sample includes only the districts that are located in regions with TV news audience above the median in the year of the election. Other notes as in Table F2.

Table F9: Impact on the vote share of the top two candidates depending on the closeness of the race, in districts with newspaper consumption above the median

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Vote share top 2 - 2nd round				
	Newspaper consumption above median				
	Sample 1	Distance12 (vote share)		Distance12 (strength)	
		$\leq$10%	$\leq$5%	$\leq$10%	$\leq$5%
3rd present	-0.096***	-0.101***	-0.077*	-0.158***	-0.222***
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.076)
Robust p-value	0.001	0.005	0.091	0.000	0.006
Observations	239	127	120	113	48
Polyn. order	1	1	1	1	1
Bandwidth	0.017	0.014	0.022	0.016	0.012
Band. method	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD
Mean, left of the threshold	0.512	0.520	0.528	0.526	0.518

Notes: Sample includes only the districts that are located in départements with newspaper consumption above the median in the year of the election. Other notes as in Table F3.

Table F10: Impact on the vote share of the top two candidates depending on the closeness of the race, in districts with radio news audience above the median

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Vote share top 2 - 2nd round				
	Radio news audience above median				
	Sample 1	Distance12 (vote share)		Distance12 (strength)	
		$\leq$10%	$\leq$5%	$\leq$10%	$\leq$5%
3rd present	-0.086***	-0.077*	-0.083**	-0.102**	-0.068
	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.050)	(0.068)
Robust p-value	0.003	0.056	0.015	0.037	0.257
Observations	263	176	136	112	77
Polyn. order	1	1	1	1	1
Bandwidth	0.016	0.015	0.018	0.013	0.016
Band. method	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD
Mean, left of the threshold	0.526	0.539	0.527	0.535	0.518

Notes: Sample includes only the districts that are located in départements with radio news audience above the median in the year of the election. Other notes as in Table F3.

Table F11: Impact on the vote share of the top two candidates depending on the closeness of the race, in districts with TV news audience above the median

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Vote share top 2 - 2nd round				
	TV news audience above median				
	Sample 1	Distance12 (vote share)		Distance12 (strength)	
		$\leq$10%	$\leq$5%	$\leq$10%	$\leq$5%
3rd present	-0.112***	-0.110***	-0.108***	-0.130***	-0.157***
	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.046)
Robust p-value	0.000	0.003	0.001	0.000	0.001
Observations	295	187	162	184	89
Polyn. order	1	1	1	1	1
Bandwidth	0.015	0.015	0.023	0.019	0.016
Band. method	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD	MSERD
Mean, left of the threshold	0.528	0.534	0.531	0.536	0.525

Notes: Sample includes only the districts that are located in regions with TV news audience above the median in the year of the election. Other notes as in Table F3.

Appendix I. Political orientations

Political labels are attributed by the French Ministry of Interior. Tables below show how we allocate each political label to one of our six political orientations for each election and year. The 1978 and 1981 parliamentary elections are shown together as the political parties competing in both elections were identical.

1978 and 1981 parliamentary elections	
Political label	**Political orientation**
Divers Droite	Right
Divers Gauche	Left
Ecologistes	Other
Extrême Droite	Far-right
Extrême Gauche	Far-left
Parti Communiste Français	Left
Parti Socialiste	Left
Rassemblement Pour la République	Right
Union pour la Démocratie Française	Right
Non Classés	Other
Indépendants	Other

1988 parliamentary elections	
Political label	**Political orientation**
Communiste	Left
Divers Droite	Right
Ecologistes	Other
Extrême Droite	Far-right
Extrême Gauche	Far-left
Front National	Far-right
Majorité Présidentielle	Left
Radical de Gauche	Left
Régionalistes	Other
Rassemblement Pour la République	Right
Parti Socialiste	Left
Union pour la Démocratie Française	Right

1993 parliamentary elections	
Political label	**Political orientation**
Communiste	Left
Divers	Other
Divers Droite	Right
Extrême Droite	Far-right
Extrême Gauche	Far-left
Front National	Far-right
Gestion Ecologie	Other
Majorité Présidentielle	Left
Radical de Gauche	Left
Régionalistes	Other
Rassemblement Pour la République	Right
Parti Socialiste	Left
Union pour la Démocratie Française	Right
Europe Ecologie les Verts	Left

1997 parliamentary elections	
Political label	**Political orientation**
Communiste	Left
Divers	Other
Divers Droite	Right
Divers Gauche	Left
Ecologistes	Other
Extrême Droite	Far-right
Extrême Gauche	Far-left
Front National	Far-right
Parti Radical Socialiste	Left
Rassemblement Pour la République	Right
Parti Socialiste	Left
Union pour la Démocratie Française	Right

2002 parliamentary elections	
Political label	**Political orientation**
Communiste	Left
Chasse, Pêche, Nature et Traditions	Right
Divers	Other
Démocratie Libérale	Right
Divers Droite	Right
Divers Gauche	Left
Ecologistes	Other
Extrême Droite	Far-right
Extrême Gauche	Far-left
Front National	Far-right
Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire	Far-left
Lutte Ouvrière	Far-left
Mouvement National Républicain	Far-right
Mouvement Pour la France	Right
Pôle Républicain	Left
Radical de Gauche	Left
Régionalistes	Other
Rassemblement Pour la France	Right
Parti Socialiste	Left
Union pour la Démocratie Française	Center
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire	Right
Europe Ecologie les Verts	Left

2007 parliamentary elections	
Political label	**Political orientation**
Communiste	Left
Chasse, Pêche, Nature et Traditions	Right
Divers	Other
Divers Droite	Right
Divers Gauche	Left
Ecologistes	Other
Extrême Droite	Far-right
Extrême Gauche	Far-left
Front National	Far-right
Majorité présidentielle	Right
Mouvement Pour la France	Right
Radical de Gauche	Left
Régionalistes	Other
Parti Socialiste	Left
Union pour la Démocratie Française -Mouvement Démocrate	Center
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire	Right
Europe Ecologie les Verts	Left

2011 local elections	
Political label	**Political orientation**
Autres	Other
Communiste	Left
Divers Droite	Right
Divers Gauche	Left
Ecologistes	Other
Extrême Droite	Far-right
Extrême Gauche	Far-left
Front National	Far-right
Majorité présidentielle	Right
Nouveau Centre	Right
Modem	Center
Parti de Gauche	Left
Radical de Gauche	Left
Régionalistes	Other
Parti Socialiste	Left
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire	Right
Europe Ecologie les Verts	Left

2012 parliamentary elections	
Political label	**Political orientation**
Alliance Centriste	Center
Autres	Other
Centre pour la France	Center
Divers Droite	Right
Divers Gauche	Left
Ecologistes	Other
Extrême Droite	Far-right
Extrême Gauche	Far-left
Front de Gauche	Left
Front National	Far-right
Nouveau Centre	Right
Parti Radical	Right
Radical de Gauche	Left
Régionalistes	Other
Parti Socialiste	Left
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire	Right
Europe Ecologie les Verts	Left

2015 local elections	
Political label	**Political orientation**
Communiste	Left
Divers	Other
Debout la France	Right
Divers Droite	Right
Divers Gauche	Left
Extrême Droite	Far-right
Extrême Gauche	Far-left
Front de Gauche	Left
Front National	Far-right
Modem	Center
Parti de Gauche	Left
Radical de Gauche	Left
Parti Socialiste	Left
Union Centriste	Center
Union pour la Démocratie	Right
Union des Démocrates et Indépendants	Right
Union de Gauche	Left
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire	Right
Europe Ecologie les Verts	Left

References

CAGÉ, J. (2017): "Media Competition, Information Provision and Political Participation: Evidence from French Local Newspapers and Elections, 1944-2014," *CEPR Discussion Paper 12198*.