

Financing the Response to Climate Change: The Pricing and Ownership of U.S. Green Bonds^{*}

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Abstract

Estimates suggest that mitigating and adapting to climate change will cost trillions of dollars. We study green bonds, whose proceeds are used for environmentally sensitive purposes. After an overview of the U.S. corporate and municipal green bonds markets, we study pricing and ownership patterns using a simple framework that incorporates assets with nonpecuniary utility. We find that green municipal bonds are issued at a premium of several basis points to otherwise similar ordinary bonds, except when they are issued simultaneously with ordinary bonds, in which case a differential premium emerges on the secondary market. We also confirm the prediction that green bonds, particularly small or nearly riskless ones, are more closely held than ordinary bonds.

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1. Introduction

Climate change is accelerating. Since recordkeeping began in 1880, the last six years have been the warmest.¹ The rising temperature and increasing acidity of ocean water, rising sea levels and the retreat of ice sheets and glaciers, and the increasing frequency of droughts and floods all reflect a changing climate due to increasing atmospheric carbon levels.² One estimate suggests that keeping the world below the 2 degree Celsius scenario, a threshold viewed as limiting the likelihood of devastating consequences, will require \$12 trillion over the next 25 years (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2015), but simply adapting to foreseeable changes will also require extraordinary sums.

In the absence of a global carbon pricing scheme, bond markets will be central to financing the necessary investments. In this paper, we study the U.S. market for “green bonds,” which are an emerging category of bonds whose proceeds are used for an environmentally friendly purpose. Examples include renewable energy, clean transportation, sustainable agriculture and forestry, and energy efficiency. After reviewing the market and green bond characteristics, we set out and test predictions for pricing and ownership patterns. The stark facts of climate change alone are enough to motivate study of green bonds, but our framework and results also tie to broader themes in the socially responsible investing and taste-based asset pricing literatures.

Since the first green bond was issued in 2007 by the European Investment Bank (EIB), the market has expanded to include a variety of issuers, including supranationals, sovereigns, corporations, and U.S. and international municipalities. It is a small but increasingly well-defined

¹ https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/climate-monitoring/global/globe/land_ocean/12/201912.

² <https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/>.

area of the fixed income markets. Yet in spite of the general acceptance of the notion of a “green” bond, there is not yet a universally recognized system for determining the green status of a bond. Green bonds may be labeled and promoted as such by the issuer, such as the 2007 EIB issue; formally certified by a third party according to a set of guidelines; or, labeled green by a data provider, for example Bloomberg. We review the origins of the market and standards for identifying green bonds in the next section.

Our main sample includes 3,983 green U.S. municipal bonds issued between 2013 and 2018; we also provide descriptive statistics for 51 green U.S. corporate bonds issued between 2013 and 2018. Municipal bonds, at the cusip level, are typically far smaller than corporates; the total par outstanding for municipal green bonds and corporate green bonds is actually roughly the same as of the end of 2018, with \$28 billion in green municipal issuance and \$30 billion in green corporate issuance. On average, green municipals have slightly higher credit ratings and longer maturities than ordinary municipals and are more likely to be new money and backed by project revenue. Green corporate bonds resemble ordinary corporates.

Our analysis is organized by a framework featuring a subset of investors with a nonpecuniary component of utility, such as a sense of social responsibility from holding green bonds, in addition to standard portfolio mean and variance. In this framework, expected returns include the usual CAPM beta term plus a second term, reflecting demand for a security’s environmental attributes, which illustrates that securities with higher scores—such as green bonds—are priced at a premium and earn lower returns. The basic prediction is similar to those from the general equilibrium model of Henkel, Kraus, and Zechner (2001) and the taste-based framework of Fama and French (2007), and more recent models by Oehmke and Opp (2020), Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2020), and Pedersen, Fitzgibbons, and Pomorski (2019).

We confirm that green municipal bonds are priced at a premium, with a caveat. After-tax yields at issue for green bonds versus ordinary bonds are five to nine basis points below yields paid by otherwise equivalent bonds. Depending on specification, the estimates account for tax status and many other bond-specific characteristics, ratings-maturity-yield curve interactions, and even issuer fixed effects. On a bond with a 10-year duration, a yield difference of five basis points corresponds to a nontrivial 0.50 percentage-point difference in value.

The interesting caveat is that in a minority of cases in which green bonds are issued simultaneously with ordinary bonds, they are initially priced the same, as pointed out in contemporaneous work by Larcker and Watts (2020). Nonetheless, we find that even in the Larcker and Watts sample, a differential opens up in the secondary market. This suggests a tension between underwriting and institutional pressures to price green and ordinary bonds identically on the primary market versus underlying strong investor demand for green bonds.

Our framework also makes predictions for ownership concentration of green bonds. Green bonds should be held disproportionately by concerned investors willing to accept their returns which are slightly lower in equilibrium. This concentration increase will be greatest for small bonds, where tilting away from market weights is less consequential, and when the bond is nearly riskless, since risk aversion limits the extent to which concerned investors are willing to pursue a nonpecuniary benefit. Using institutional bond ownership data from eMAXX, we find support for these predictions as well.

The paper contributes to a growing body of work on green bonds. There are many issuer types one might study—supranationals, sovereigns, municipals, agencies, corporates, and others—and each differs in its target investor base, currency risks, and trading and institutional environment. See Flammer (2020) for a comprehensive analysis of international corporate green

bonds, with an emphasis on the motives behind them. So far, pricing results have been mixed. In a sample of international corporate green bonds, Flammer (2020) does not find a premium at the issue. Using secondary market prices, a green vs. ordinary bond matching procedure, and a sample that includes 135 large, investment grade green bonds of many categories and currencies, Zerbib (2019) finds a moderate green bond premium in some subcategories. Karpf and Mandel (2017) use secondary market yields in a larger sample of municipals. Quite in contrast to our own results, they find a green bond discount. Our sample is broader and our methodology is different, but to the extent they overlap, our results suggest this conclusion may be incorrect. Pricing in the U.S. municipals market is highly sensitive to tax features, as shown by Atwood (2003), and many of the bonds in the Karpf and Mandel sample were taxable on account of their association with special federal programs, so it would hardly be surprising that they traded at higher yields.³ And, as previously mentioned, we reconcile our results with those of Larcker and Watts (2020). In light of muni bond yield differentials measured in basis points, it is perhaps not surprising that both large samples and sensitivity to tax features and tranching can be important to the analysis.

Although green bonds are a new setting, the analysis fits into an existing literature on socially responsible investing. Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang (2008) survey the literature and conclude that a subset of investors is willing to accept lower financial performance to invest in funds that meet social objectives. Martin and Moser (2015) confirm this in an experiment, while Riedl and Smeets (2015) provide further corroboration using administrative and survey data from

³ The available practitioner research is also mixed. Shurey (2017) finds a green bond premium in a sample of 12 supranational, euro-denominated green bonds, but reports that “similar yield curves for other portfolios, including U.S. dollar denominated and corporate-issued green bonds do not consistently demonstrate a premium for green securities” (p. 2). Ehlers and Packer (2017) review green bond certification schemes and find a green bond premium at issuance in a sample of 21 green bonds collected across issuer and currency categories.

a sample of Dutch investors in mutual funds that have Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) mandates. Białkowski and Starks (2016) examine U.S. equity mutual funds with SRI mandates and conclude that inflows to those funds have been higher than inflows to comparable funds without similar mandates and that SRI flows are less sensitive to performance. Barber, Morse, and Yasuda (2020) analyze the flows of limited partner investments across venture capital funds and reach a similar conclusion.

Experiments also suggest that some consumers integrate environmental benefits or positive social impact into their behavior. For example, Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Sequeira (2015) found that demand for the two most popular coffees in a U.S. grocery store chain rose by almost 10% when they carried a Fair Trade label versus a generic placebo label. Demand for the higher-priced coffee remained steady when its price was raised, but demand for the lower-priced coffee was highly elastic. Behavior might be very different in capital markets, of course. For instance, institutional investors are fiduciaries to the beneficiary while consumers act on their own behalf. In addition, consumption decisions might invoke identity and emotional responses that might not exist as strongly in investment decisions. Green bonds provide a novel setting to examine how capital markets treat environmental benefits.

Another body of related work has examined the stock returns of companies that have potentially negative social effects, such as those that produce alcohol, tobacco, or firearms, or that manage prisons or casinos. Hong and Kacperzyk (2009) suggests that “sin stocks” trade at a discount and display higher average returns. Statman and Glushkov (2009) caution socially responsible investors from fully excluding “shunned stocks” from portfolios for this reason, but the issue is not settled, with Blitz and Fabozzi (2017) for example attributing the outperformance of sin stocks to other characteristics. Bansal, Wu, and Yaron (2019) find that socially

responsible stocks tend to outperform during favorable economic times, as if socially responsible investing is a luxury good.

Our contributions relative to this prior work are to provide: a detailed academic introduction to the U.S. market for green bonds; a consistent framework to study both pricing and ownership patterns; and, a consistent set of empirical results in a comprehensive sample, including a reconciliation with recent results suggesting there is not a green bond premium. Clearly, the green bond market is just a first step toward addressing enormous problems. There is a commensurate need for further research on green bonds and other areas of climate finance.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the green bond market and the characteristics of green bonds versus ordinary bonds. Section 3 uses a simple model to develop the prediction that green bonds should price at a premium, then tests and confirms that prediction. Section 4 extends the framework to predict that green bonds should be held in greater concentration, then confirms that prediction and some finer ones. Section 5 concludes.

2. An Overview of U.S. Green Bonds

2.1. Historical Origins

The green bond market is young: The first bond labeled and marketed as a “green bond” was issued in 2007 by the European Investment Bank. But within only a decade, green bonds have been issued by most prominent issuer types. For instance, a benchmark example of a modern sovereign green bond is France’s \$10 billion bond from 2017. The first corporate green bonds were issued in 2013 by the French utility EDF, the Swedish property development company Vasakronan, Bank of America, and a solar subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway. The first

U.S. municipal bonds to use the green bond label in offering documents were issued by Massachusetts in 2013. The first sub-sovereign issuer outside of the U.S. was Gothenburg, Sweden, which issued SEK 500 million par value in 2013.⁴ Other recent international issuers include the Province of Ontario and Johannesburg, South Africa. Fannie Mae has pioneered green mortgage-backed securities, which pool mortgages made to finance environment-related investments.

The emergence of the green bond market occurred alongside the development of other services for issuers, regulators, and investors. In 2014, a consortium of investment banks established voluntary guidelines for the green bonds market. These “Green Bond Principles” are organized around four elements: the use of proceeds of the bond issue; the process for evaluating projects; the management of the proceeds; and, reporting and disclosure regarding the proceeds and the project financed.⁵ Third-party agents offer certification services for potentially green bonds, and the Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s ratings agencies have also developed criteria and indexes for this market. The first green bond ETF launched in 2017, and the second in 2018, further evidencing a maturing market.

2.2. *Identifying Green Bonds*

But what is a “green bond”? The category is not as well- defined as “S&P 500 stocks” but not as fuzzy as “junk bonds” or “growth stocks.” We use the CUSIP-level Bloomberg green bond tag as the first step for our sample of U.S. corporate and municipal bonds as an objective, replicable identification method that meets institutional standards. We also add municipal green bonds identified by Mergent. To avoid the difficulties of comparing bonds across disparate

⁴ http://unfccc.int/secretariat/momentum_for_change/items/9935.php.

⁵ <https://www.icmagroup.org/green-social-and-sustainability-bonds/green-bond-principles-gbp>.

institutional environments, we do not include supranationals or international corporate or government issues herein.

Bloomberg describes the task of identifying green bonds as follows: “There are many shades of green ... In addition, terminology often varies, with issuers using different titles to promote the environmental benefits of their bonds. While the use of proceeds often varies by bond as well, all issuers must commit to deploying 100% of bond proceeds for environmental sustainability-oriented activities in order for their bond to be identified as a labeled green bond” (Shurey 2016, p. 3). Bloomberg’s process is based loosely on the Green Bond Principles described above.

Specifically, Bloomberg takes into account issuer self-labeling as “green” and/or additional statements in the issuance documentation about the issuer’s intention to deploy funds toward environmentally friendly projects. Acceptable uses of funds include renewable energy, energy smart technologies, green infrastructure, clean transportation, sustainable water management, sustainable agriculture and forestry, pollution control, biodiversity conservation, climate change adaptation, and eco-efficient products.

We exclude municipal bonds issued under the federal Clean Renewable Energy Bonds (CREB) and Qualified Energy Conservation Bond (QECB) programs. We identify these by hand from offering statements. These bonds differ in several ways from the generic, self-labeled green bond. First, the label “green bond” was rarely even used in their offering documents. Second, these bonds were typically federally taxable, unlike most municipal bonds, which invites a potentially different investor base. Third, the federal government subsidized the municipal issuer’s interest payments as long as the proceeds were used for clean energy or energy conservation purposes, which broke the link between the issuer cost of capital and the investor’s

return at an even more fundamental level than taxes. Fourth, both programs were eliminated effective January 1, 2018 by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. In sum, while these bonds may be an interesting niche for climate finance researchers to study, they are a problematic source for insights about green bonds more generally.

In contrast to our sample of green municipal bonds, there are far fewer U.S. green corporate bonds. This is perhaps unsurprising given the imperative to isolate and designate proceeds exclusively for projects with the uses listed above. Several corporates do satisfy Bloomberg's requirements, however, and, occasionally, Bloomberg will tag a corporate bond as green, even if it is described as for general corporate purposes, if the issuer is a pure play in that "all the company's business activities fit solely within the list of accepted green activities" (p. 8).

2.3. *Sample, Market Size, and Growth*

The unit of observation is an individual bond, as identified by a CUSIP. Starting from the union of Bloomberg- and Mergent-based green bond CUSIPs (excluding the QECB/CREB municipal bonds), we require a full set of characteristics and initial yields data in order for a bond to enter the final sample. For corporate bonds, we use Bloomberg for those data items; for municipal bonds, we use Mergent. The Mergent data are from the Official Statements filed with the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. MSRB regulations require that filing with each municipal bond issue. We exclude floating rate bonds, which in any event are rarely green.

As the top panel of Table 1 indicates, our municipal bond sample, which begins with the Massachusetts green bonds in 2013, runs through the end of 2018 and includes 3,983 green bonds with sufficient characteristics and yields data. Municipal bonds are typically sold in issues that consist of multiple bonds; an issue is a set of bonds that are sold at the same time and are generally subject to the same bond indenture but may include both green and ordinary bonds

across a range of maturities. For example, all three green bonds of 2013 were issued by Massachusetts on the same day.

For comparison, we list ordinary municipal bond issuance dollar volume. Over the first six years of the U.S. municipal green bond market, labeled green bond issuance in our sample totaled \$28 billion, which contributed around 1.4% of the \$2 trillion of fixed-rate municipal bond dollar volume. In 2017, the fraction of dollar volume due to green bonds hit 2.8%, which fell back in 2018 even as the number of unique municipalities issuing green bonds continued to increase. In general, green bonds are a rapidly expanding but still modest segment of the municipal market.

The corporate bond sample also begins in 2013. It is immediately clear that there are far fewer U.S. corporate than municipal green bonds. Corporate bonds are much larger at the cusip level, so total dollar issuance volume is the same or even slightly greater, but relative to total corporate bond issuance the sum is still small: \$30 billion in corporate green bonds makes up only 0.3% of total corporate bond issuance over these six years.⁶ Green corporate bonds therefore remain a very small component of the U.S. corporate bond market. This is perhaps not surprising in light of the difficulty of ring-fencing corporate proceeds and reporting in the presence of unclear benefits.

2.4. Uses of Green Bonds

Green bonds are defined by their environmentally-friendly uses. Table 2 shows the breakdown of uses by Mergent for green municipals. It also shows our own characterization of uses for green corporates based on offering documents and other sources.

⁶ Flammer (2020)'s U.S. sample, also drawn from Bloomberg, contains 194 corporate green bonds over the same time period. The difference reflects 140 "Solar Bonds" issued directly to investors by SolarCity, later bought by Tesla. To avoid skewing the summary statistics, we exclude these, as they were not rated and small by corporate bond standards.

The most popular uses for municipal green bonds proceeds—aside from the “general purpose” label that is applied in cases where there are many categories of use or they are insufficiently described in offering documents—include public power, mass transit, multi-family housing, education (e.g., energy-efficient school buildings and dormitories), and water and sewer projects. In no category are labeled green bonds a majority of municipal issuance between 2013 and 2018, however. Intrinsically environmentally-sensitive uses, such as pollution control and mass transit, are still overwhelmingly financed by bonds without the green label, although more than a quarter of mass transit bonds did use the label.

Green corporate bonds are most commonly used in the context of renewable energy. Energy-efficient retrofits or green facilities are another common use.

2.5. *Bond Characteristics*

Table 3 presents bond-level summary statistics. Panel A begins with the municipal sample. For each of S&P, Moody's, and Fitch, we record the bond rating at issuance on a common scale. We translate the other agencies' ratings to the S&P scale and then to an ordinal numerical scale, with “1” assigned to the top rating of AAA, “2” to the next highest rating of “AA+”, and so forth. BBB-, the lowest S&P rating considered investment grade, is a “10” on this scale. When any agency reports an enhanced rating, we use it, on the assumption that the bond yield on issuance will reflect the ratings enhancement as well as the municipality's own credit quality. We take the maximum available rating of as many as all three ratings agencies. In some cases, Mergent does not report a bond rating from any of the three. In those cases, we use Mergent's "header" rating for the bond, with the same procedure, putting the header ratings on a common scale, using enhancement when it is reported, and taking the maximum of as many as three ratings. The median rating for both green and ordinary muni bonds in our sample is AA..

Green municipal bonds also have longer maturities. The difference between the mean maturities is 1.66 years. Green bonds are less likely to be identified by Mergent as being sold with third-party insurance or other credit guarantees. Green bonds are slightly more likely to be federally taxable; recall we exclude the taxable CREB/QECB program bonds. They are equally likely to be subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax, and somewhat less likely to be subject to state tax.

Green bonds are larger and, on average, part of larger bond issues than ordinary bonds, a fact that may owe something to the fixed costs of green status. They are less likely to be bank-eligible, a category of bonds where commercial banks are allowed to deduct 80 percent of the interest cost incurred in order to own the bond. These bonds are legally required to be small and have other restrictions that may be difficult to square with green status.

Green bonds are much more likely to be new money bonds as opposed to being used to refund existing bonds. They are much less likely to be general obligation bonds, meaning that their security consists of a claim on the issuer's tax revenue and not merely to the revenue generated by a specific project. To repeat, whether a bond is labeled green is based on its use of proceeds, not its backing. Green bonds are slightly more likely to be callable.

Some labeled green bonds are certified by third parties as conforming to a green bond standard. Issuers may pay for certification to highlight the bond to investors as a green bond; an interesting question is whether certification is associated with pricing or ownership patterns above and beyond those associated with the general green bond label.⁷ Such effects could arise because the issuer engages the third-party verifier in the pre-issuance phase (there would be little benefit to the issuer to pay to certify the bond as green after it is floated); certification then

⁷ <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2016/10/25/green-bonds-take-root-in-the-u-s-municipal-bond-market/>

enables the issuer and underwriters to market the bond as certified in their roadshow. To provide ex post reconciliation, after the bond issuance and the allocation of proceeds, the verifier must confirm that the bond aligns with the post-issuance requirements of, for example, the Climate Bond Standard.⁸

In our sample, 18.2% of green municipal bonds are certified by a third party, most often Sustainalytics, and subsequently registered with the Climate Bonds Initiative as conforming to the Green Bond Principles. We refer to such bonds as “CBI certified.” Certification is a recent but growing practice. All of the certified bonds registered with the CBI were issued in 2016 or after, and they involve only nine issuers, some quite prolific.

We concentrate on the after-tax yield at issue to allow prices to be measured on the yardstick most relevant to the tax-sensitive municipal bond market. We also consider Mergent’s pre-tax yields from the offering statement in a robustness check. We combine data from multiple sources to compute after-tax yields.⁹ Green and ordinary bonds have different characteristics and any pricing effects due to the green label are likely to be small, so we report yield summary statistics simply to give perspective on muni yields in general and defer conclusions until we have careful controls for maturity, rating, issue month, and so on.

⁸ For details on the process, see: <https://www.climatebonds.net/standards/certification/get-certified>. The cost of the third-party certifier/verifier—in our sample, usually Sustainalytics, but sometimes a Big 4 firm, environmental consultancy, or environmental NGO—is negotiable; anecdotal evidence suggests that it falls between \$10,000 and \$50,000 depending on issuance size. If the issuer chooses, it can engage a certifier for ongoing evaluations. Registration of the bond with the Climate Bonds Standard Board requires a further fee equal to one-tenth of a basis point of the bond principal.

⁹ Federal tax rates come from the Tax Policy Center. The marginal tax rate used is the tax rate prevailing at the highest income levels in that year. Post-2013 tax rates include the 3.8% ACA surcharge. State tax rates come from the Taxsim model of the National Bureau of Economic Research; the state rate used is also the rate applicable to top income levels. We then calculate a pre-tax and after-tax yield as the internal rate of return on each bond’s cash flows before and after taxation, respectively. In cases where our calculated pre-tax yield differs from that reported by Mergent, we reset the after-tax yield to the Mergent yield from the official statements minus the difference between our calculated pre-tax and after-tax yields.

Corporate bond-level statistics are presented in Panel B. Credit ratings of green corporate bonds do not differ significantly from those of ordinary bonds. Green corporates exhibit slightly larger size but are, in the main, similar to ordinary corporate bonds. We report yields for completeness, but their characteristics are too diverse to draw conclusions from unconditional summary statistics. The simple takeaway of our brief exploration of U.S. corporate green bonds is that there are still far fewer of them than U.S. municipal green bonds; see Flammer (2020) for a comprehensive study of an international sample of corporate green bonds.

3. Pricing Green Bonds

3.1. Asset Prices with a Nonpecuniary Clientele

We start with a relatively standard asset pricing framework to understand how a clientele for green bonds (or, generically, a non-financial objective) affects prices and portfolio choice.

The model reproduces the central asset pricing effect in Henkel, Kraus, and Zechner (2001), Fama and French (2007), Pedersen, Fitzgibbons, and Pomorski (2019), Oehmke and Opp (2020), Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2020), among others. Henkel et al. and Oehmke and Opp develop general equilibrium models where firms and investors are jointly optimizing. Like Pedersen et al. and Pastor et al., we focus solely on the investor's problem, assuming that some investors have explicit preferences for a project's environmental score. In contrast, in Oehmke and Opp, investors care only about the ultimate environmental consequences of firm investment, irrespective of their own individual portfolio allocations. Pastor et al. also introduce a hedging motive for systematic climate risks. We reach the same prediction for equilibrium returns (equivalently, the costs of capital) as these papers, in a simpler, less "complete" setting.

Our treatment is closest to Fama and French, who examine the effect of investor biases and tastes on asset prices, also taking firm behavior as exogenous. A leading example of “tastes” in their model is socially responsible investing. Neither paper investigates ownership concentration, as we do later herein. Also, both of these papers use calibrations to examine the potential impact of tastes on asset prices, as well as corporate behavior in the case of Henkel et al., and compare these calibrations to moments in the data. We take predictions to the municipal green bond market, directly examining pricing and ownership patterns.

There are two groups of investors, each facing a one-period portfolio choice problem. Both groups have a common risk aversion parameter γ and common expectations for security returns \mathbf{r} and risk Σ . They choose a vector of portfolio weights \mathbf{w} in each security. Group 1 investors are mean-variance maximizers while Group 2 investors also care about environmental ratings (or another nonpecuniary attribute). That is, some securities have positive environmental scores $e > 0$, and Group 2 investors obtain extra utility from holding them. Without loss of generality we assume the overall average e is zero. Specifically, the two groups solve:

$$\text{Group 1: } \max \mathbf{w}'_1 \mathbf{r} - \frac{\gamma}{2} \mathbf{w}'_1 \Sigma \mathbf{w}_1$$

$$\text{Group 2: } \max \mathbf{w}'_2 \mathbf{r} + \mathbf{w}'_2 \mathbf{e} - \frac{\gamma}{2} \mathbf{w}'_2 \Sigma \mathbf{w}_2$$

Note that Group 2’s objective function resembles how ESG mandates are implemented in practice. In particular, if Group 2 investors require that their portfolios maintain a minimal average environmental score, this is equivalent to imposing a linear constraint of the form $\mathbf{w}'_2 \mathbf{e} \geq k$ and leads to the same maximization problem as above. Also, this formulation accommodates not only so-called positive screening, where extra utility is gained by holding (for example)

green bonds, but also negative screening, where extra utility is lost by holding (for example) fossil fuel or sin stocks, by appropriately flipping signs and redefining e .¹⁰

The two groups have capital of a_1 and a_2 , respectively, and the market clears. Because we are also interested in ownership concentration in a following section, we stipulate that Group 1's capital comes from a_1 individuals each with \$1, and likewise Group 2's capital comes from a_2 individuals each with \$1. We express this as:

$$\frac{a_1}{a_1 + a_2} \mathbf{w}_1 + \frac{a_2}{a_1 + a_2} \mathbf{w}_2 = \mathbf{w}_m$$

where \mathbf{w}_m is the market portfolio, a vector of weights in each security equal to its market values as a fraction of the total market value of all securities.

We start with the uninteresting case where a_2 is equal to zero, so that there are only Group 1 investors, which have no environmental preference. They choose weights, given common return and risk expectations, and these representative investor weights must equal market weights for the market to clear:

$$\mathbf{w}_1 = \frac{1}{\gamma} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1} \mathbf{r} = \mathbf{w}_m$$

We can use this equation to compute the expected return of the market as a whole, which allows us to substitute the market Sharpe ratio for the inverse of risk aversion γ , leading to the familiar Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) formula:

$$\mathbf{r} = \frac{r_m}{\sigma_m^2} \boldsymbol{\Sigma} \mathbf{w}_m = \boldsymbol{\beta} r_m$$

¹⁰ In the case of e measured by a green bond indicator, the $e > 0$ designation is at the extreme because the score is binary and green bonds are comparatively rare. This means that a z-scored green flag will contain many small negative scores and relatively few very positive ones in order to preserve zero mean and unit standard deviation.

Now, we add Group 2 investors, who have an environmental preference, to the mix. Their portfolio weights are simply

$$\mathbf{w}_2 = \frac{1}{\gamma} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1}(\mathbf{r} + \mathbf{e})$$

Since the average environmental score is mean zero, we can make the same substitution for γ using market clearing. The CAPM then holds up to a small twist:

$$\mathbf{r} = \frac{r_m}{\sigma_m^2} \boldsymbol{\Sigma} \mathbf{w}_m = \boldsymbol{\beta} r_m - \frac{a_2}{a_1 + a_2} \mathbf{e}$$

Prediction 1: *Securities with positive environmental scores (such as green bonds) have lower expected returns.*

When some investors have an additional nonpecuniary preference for a security, they bid up its price. We test this prediction next.

3.2. Main Yield Regressions

To test the prediction that green bonds sell for a premium, we regress after-tax yields on green bond indicators and controls in Table 4. We consider a variety of fixed effects to control for maturity, rating, and market conditions at the time of issuance. In some specifications we use maturity-rating-issue month interaction fixed effects, thus taking account of twists in the credit curve, and even issuer fixed effects. In all specifications we also include size decile categories both for the size of the bond cusip itself and for the total value of all bonds brought by that issuer on that day, the presence of insurance, tax features (as a further precaution, since we are already directly measuring after-tax yield at issue), bank qualification status, new money, general

obligation collateralization, optionality features, and use of proceeds. These controls account for most of the variation in after-tax yields at issue.

All specifications in Table 4 are consistent with green bonds selling for a moderate premium, holding characteristics and the yield and credit curves equal. Green bonds are issued at after-tax yields around five to nine basis points lower than those of ordinary bonds, controlling for bond and credit market characteristics. To put this in perspective, consider that the average after-tax yield for AAA ordinary bonds in our sample is 2.06%. The average after-tax yield for an ordinary bond rated BBB-, which is the lowest investment-grade rating and nine notches lower than AAA, is 3.03%. This works out to about an 11-basis-point increase per ratings notch. A coefficient of five or six basis points thus suggests that green bonds are priced as if they were about “half a notch” more highly rated.

Of course, the green label is not assigned to a bond at random; no natural experiment is available. Given that the regressions control for use of proceeds, maturity-rating-issue month fixed effects, collateral type, and even issuer fixed effects, the most straightforward explanation is simply that there is a clientele willing to pay a modest premium to hold green bonds over essentially similar municipal bonds. The premium would be too small to attract arbitrage activity, in light of realistic transaction costs, and perhaps is too small to be readily apparent to many market participants. As we show next, there is further texture that qualifies and sharpens these results.

3.3. *Additional Yield Regressions*

We choose the last specification, with issuer and maturity-rating-month fixed effects, as providing a baseline five-basis-point coefficient. Our first robustness exercise shows that the green bond dummy coefficient is almost identical for pre-tax issue yields. Karpf and Mandel

(2017) report that green bonds had higher (not lower) pre-tax yields at issue. However, many of the green bonds in their sample are not standard, labeled green bonds but taxable CREB and QECCB subsidy bonds to which Bloomberg attached the same green bond flag. Tax effects alone would easily overwhelm a modest green bond premium. In any case, in a sample unconfounded by these bonds, the tax adjustment does not matter. Both pre-tax and after-tax, there appears to be a small premium on labeled green bonds.

In the next exercise, we consider CBI certification. The first CBI certified bonds in the sample appear in 2016. In an early version of this paper, based on data through 2016, we found that CBI certification was associated with an incremental green bond premium. The additional two years of data shows that that effect has not persisted. In data through 2018, CBI certification is not associated with a pricing benefit that is incremental to labeled green bond status and whatever certification effect may have become embedded in the issuer's fixed effect as it repeatedly issued CBI certified bonds. An interesting possibility is that investors may have come to accept self-labeling green bonds by U.S. municipalities as sufficiently credible; in the absence of widespread abuse, early concerns about "greenwashing," once addressed by certification, may have faded.

We study ownership patterns of green and ordinary bonds later in the paper. The required ownership concentration data is available for only a small portion of the sample, so we confirm that the green bond effect in initial yields is present in both the ownership sample and the non-ownership sample.

3.4. The Case of Bundled Green and Ordinary Offerings

In contemporaneous work, Larcker and Watts (2020) point out that tranches of green bonds are sometimes bundled with tranches of ordinary bonds—in our sample, about one-third of

green bonds, 1,360 out of 3,983, are issued on the same day as ordinary bonds. In such cases, a given green bond may be able to be matched to an ordinary bond, with identical credit characteristics and maturity. In a sample of 640 green-ordinary bond matched pairs from bundled issues, Larcker and Watts find there is no premium at issue on the green bond. Typically, the green and ordinary bonds are issued at the same yield, which is consistent with their interviews of market participants. This is a compelling stylized fact to be reconciled with our results.

Generally speaking, the matching approach is well-suited to address any lingering doubts about unmeasured differences in risk. However, it spotlights other potential concerns. Most obviously, the decision to bundle green and ordinary bonds is endogenous. An issuer in the matched sample has decided on a green bond, but also decided that in this case it should be bundled with an ordinary bond, with a conjoined offering document and marketing effort. In our sample, when green and ordinary bonds are issued simultaneously, Mergent typically reports the same use of proceeds code for both, underscoring the close connection. It is an open question whether the young green bond primary market would receive green and ordinary bonds issued simultaneously, under the same underwriting arrangement and offering document, as it receives the majority of green bonds, which are issued on their own. The underwriter of a bundled issue may focus marketing efforts on socially responsible investors and try to cross-sell the ordinary bonds, for instance, stressing the similarities.

To reconcile the absence of an issue-day premium on green bonds in bundled offerings with the full-sample regression results, we start with the last column of Table 5. The regression specification potentially allows us to go a step further, since the presence of ordinary and green bond issues that aren't bundled together allows us to assess yields on bundled issues in a more complete way. The estimates confirm that green bonds bundled with ordinary bonds are indeed

priced identically—in particular, *both* appear to be priced at a premium to typical ordinary municipal bonds. Relative to all bonds and controlling for many bond characteristics and credit market and issuer fixed effects, a bundled green bond is priced at a premium of 4.5 to 6.3 basis points, depending on whether one includes the insignificant point estimate for how green bonds are priced when bundled with ordinary bonds, while a bundled ordinary bond is priced at a similar premium with a point estimate of 5.5 basis points. This is consistent with the bundled ordinary bond receiving extra attention from “Group 2” or socially responsible investors that might otherwise not be interested; we return to this possibility in our ownership analysis below.

Secondary market data shed further light on the market reception of bundled green bonds. To the extent that bundling affects primary market pricing, driving green and ordinary bond prices together on the issue date, it should be irrelevant once each bond is seasoned and can trade individually. In other words, if there is indeed a modest but robust green bond premium, then it should eventually appear even among the bundled green bonds on the secondary market.

We test this using the sample of bundled green and ordinary issues in Larcker and Watts (2020), kindly provided by the authors. We collect transaction data from the MSRB website through December 2018. We compute the difference in reported transaction yields on days in which both the green bond and the matched ordinary bond trade at least once.¹¹

Table 6 confirms that bundled green bonds indeed move to lower yields relative to their matched ordinary counterpart. Relative to the average yield difference prevailing in the first month of the bundled offering—often zero, since the first-month transactions include the initial placement—the bundled green bond trades at a 2.5 basis point lower yield, on average.¹² For

¹¹ If a bond trades multiple times in a day but all trades are within 50 basis points, we average the reported yields together.

¹² By way of explanation, the 1,103 trading-day sample in the first column include trading data on 192 of 640 possible matched pairs. For a match to be included in the analysis, we require at least one day within

trades that occur within six months after the issue, the drop in the yield differential settles down to around five basis points.

In summary, the Larcker and Watts (2020) result does not challenge the existence of a green bond premium, but it does lead us to identify an interesting qualification. In the typical case, when green municipal bonds are not issued alongside ordinary bonds, there is a small but robust premium of several basis points at the issue date, controlling for various characteristics and fixed effects. This is our basic large-sample regression result. When green municipal bonds are issued bundled with ordinary bonds, on the other hand, there is no green bond premium at the issue date, but a modest one nonetheless emerges on the secondary market.

4. Ownership Concentration of Green Bonds

4.1. Ownership with a Nonpecuniary Clientele

Coming back to the framework used to study pricing, we can examine ownership patterns by substituting expected returns into each group's first-order condition. These are neatly summarized as deviations from market weights:

$$\text{Group 1: } \mathbf{w}_1 = \mathbf{w}_m - \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{a_2}{a_1 + a_2} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1} \mathbf{e}$$

$$\text{Group 2: } \mathbf{w}_2 = \mathbf{w}_m + \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{a_1}{a_1 + a_2} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1} \mathbf{e}$$

As is intuitive, Group 2 investors, with their environmental objective, overweight securities with positive environmental scores and vice-versa. The magnitude of the overweights are a function of the environmental score and the relative size of Group 2. When Group 2 is small and the environmental score is extreme, the overweights are material. Market clearing requires Group 1

the first month where both sides of the match trade and, as a comparison, at least one day after the first month (and before the end of 2018) where both sides of the match trade. In the second column, the comparison trade(s) must occur within six months of the issue date.

investors to do the opposite. They underweight securities with a positive environmental score because their equilibrium expected returns are lower, for reasons that are not related to risk.

We can also compute the concentration of holdings. To simplify notation, define the vector $\tilde{\mathbf{e}} = \mathbf{\Sigma}^{-1}\mathbf{e}$. In the case of uncorrelated returns, the elements of $\tilde{\mathbf{e}}$ are simply equal to a security's environmental score divided by its return variance, or $\tilde{e}_i = \frac{e_i}{\sigma_i^2}$. This is the risk-adjusted environmental score. Because investors are risk averse, risk reduces the extent to which the score influences portfolio choice.

We measure ownership concentration using the familiar Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the sum of the squared percentage holdings. For security i ,

$$HHI_i = \frac{1}{c_i^2} \sum_{s=1}^{a_1} \left(w_{mi} - \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{a_2}{a_1 + a_2} \tilde{e}_i \right)^2 + \frac{1}{c_i^2} \sum_{s=1}^{a_2} \left(w_{mi} + \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{a_1}{a_1 + a_2} \tilde{e}_i \right)^2$$

where c_i is a constant equal to the total market value of security i . Holding constant total capital at $a_1 + a_2$, this sum is minimized when the risk-adjusted environmental score is zero or when there are no investors with an environmental preference so that a_2 is equal to zero. In both cases, the holdings are constant across all investors, and hence concentration is minimized. As the number of investors becomes large, this total approaches zero. By contrast, holding constant the proportions of investor types, the sum is maximized at extreme levels of the risk-adjusted environmental score. The derivative of HHI with respect to \tilde{e}_i is:

$$\frac{2}{\gamma^2 c_i^2} \frac{a_1 a_2}{a_1 + a_2} \tilde{e}_i$$

HHI is a parabola with a minimum at zero—concentration is minimized for a security with a neutral environmental score. Securities with extreme scores, whether favorable or unfavorable, have higher ownership concentration.

Although green bonds are difficult to short in practice, we have not precluded short positions here for simplicity, so the HHI is not bounded in the usual way. But, one can see that with two investor types, it is possible to get to maximum concentration even without short positions. For example, suppose that there is a single individual in Group 2 with environmental preferences, so that a_2 is equal to 1, and that the risk-adjusted environmental score is large enough to make the optimal weight in Group 1 exactly equal to zero. This is an example of maximal concentration: a single investor holds the entire capitalization of the security.

To build further intuition, consider the case where $a_1 = a_2 = a$. Since we have assumed that each investor has one dollar in order to discuss ownership concentration, in equilibrium the total number of investors N equals the total capitalization of all securities C , i.e., $N = a_1 + a_2 = 2a = C$. After some algebra, this allows us to write equilibrium concentration more intuitively:

$$HHI_i = \frac{1}{N} + \left(\frac{1}{2\gamma \left(\frac{c_i}{c} \right)} \right)^2 \tilde{e}_i^2$$

The HHI parabola rests at its theoretical minimum value of $1/N$, the uniform ownership that would obtain if investors were homogenous or if the risk-adjusted environmental score is zero. Concentration then rises as the risk-adjusted score moves away from zero in either direction. Here, we can also see that the effect of environmental scores is stronger when the security has a smaller weight in the market portfolio and when risk aversion is low, so that Group 1 investors are willing to tilt their portfolios more aggressively in response to differences in price and Group 2 in response to differences in environmental benefits.

Prediction 2: *Securities with positive environmental scores (such as green bonds) have more concentrated ownership, particularly for those with low total market values and low risk.*

Again, this is based on a symmetric effect. If there were a set of particularly non-green securities that could be measured sensibly on the same spectrum, they will also be held in greater concentration. This observation may be useful in the sin stocks context. In our empirical setting of municipal bonds, however, the situation is simpler. There is a small set of green bonds, with “high” environmental scores, and a large set of ordinary bonds, with scores near zero.

4.2. *Ownership Data*

Bond ownership data are from the Thomson Reuters eMAXX database, used by Manconi, Massa, and Yasuda (2012) and others, which includes fixed income positions of thousands of U.S. and international insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual funds. Insurance company holdings are based on NAIC disclosures; mutual fund holdings are based on SEC disclosures; and pension fund holdings are disclosed voluntarily.

Our ownership sample is based on twelve quarters of reported holdings of municipal bonds from the first quarter of 2014 through the last quarter of 2016. Ownership summary statistics are in Table 7. Most smaller bonds do not appear in eMAXX because they are owned entirely by retail investors or small institutions; nonetheless, we documented earlier that the main regression result involving offering yields holds within the sample of bonds for which we have ownership data. There are 495 green and 69,180 ordinary bonds that appear in eMAXX and have other data required to be included in our earlier analyses. For these bonds, a majority of par amount outstanding is owned within eMAXX: The green bonds have a mean of 61.5% of par amount outstanding held within eMAXX and ordinary bonds have a similar mean of 58.8% ownership within the database.

We use HHI as a more formal estimate of ownership concentration that maps into the analytical framework. We estimate concentration under the assumption that the distribution of holdings is the same across unobserved investors outside the eMAXX database as those we observe within it. In light of this approach, we require at least 25% of a bond's par outstanding to be reported within eMAXX to balance coverage against measurement error in the calculation of HHI. We use ownership data from the first quarter for which this level of bond ownership is available. Since eMAXX-reporting institutions often buy municipal bonds at the issue date and hold for long periods, often to maturity, most of our ownership data reflect the cross-section of holdings that prevails within one quarter of the issue date. HHI can be calculated for 395 green bonds and 56,137 ordinary bonds. Green bonds do display a higher average HHI than ordinary bonds, at 0.56 versus 0.52, but this is simply an unconditional average.

We use certain strings in the fund name in eMAXX to identify owners with a known orientation toward socially responsible investing.¹³ This restrictive definition of green fund ownership undercounts the number of bondholders that consider social objectives, but nonetheless shows that green bonds are indeed much more likely to be held by concerned investors. For the average green bond in this subsample, 15.5% of par outstanding can be associated with a socially responsible fund through the fund's name. In contrast, for the average ordinary bond in this subsample, only 0.6% can be associated with a socially responsible fund. This is clear evidence that the green bond label is explicitly recognized by concerned investors.

4.3. *Main Ownership Regressions*

¹³ The substrings are: CALVERT, CATHOLIC, CHURCH, CLEAN, DOMINI, ENVIRON, ESG, FAITH, GREEN, IMPACT, KLD, PARNASSUS, SOCIAL, SRI, WALDEN.

Our regression tests involving green bond ownership concentration are in Table 8. For consistency, we include the same controls and fixed effects as in the yield regressions, although maturity-rating-issue month fixed effects seem less necessary here.

The main concentration prediction receives consistently strong support. Green bonds are held in greater concentration, controlling for various bond characteristics and fixed effects. HHI is on the order of 0.06 to 0.10 higher for green bonds, which can be viewed in the context of the sample's unconditional average HHI around 0.50 as reported in the previous table. The inclusion of issuer fixed effects increases the coefficient somewhat, consistent with investors discriminating within issuers for their green versus ordinary bonds.

There are many distributions of ownership across investors that will generate a typical interior level of HHI. As one potential example to illustrate an HHI difference of 0.10, suppose two investors each owned half the par outstanding (remember that par amounts for individual muni bonds can be small) and all remaining investors held zero. This is an HHI of 0.50. Now, if one investor instead held 72% of par outstanding and a second held the remainder—in the logic of the model, perhaps the first investor paid a premium to accumulate this position—the HHI would be 0.60. This may clarify the magnitude of the coefficients in Table 8.

4.4. Additional Ownership Regressions

Further ownership regressions are in Table 9. All specifications include issuer fixed effects and maturity-rating-issue month fixed effects, a baseline drawn from the last column of the previous table. We start by showing that ownership concentration is also higher for bonds that are present in the portfolios of eMAXX institutions that are explicitly linked to green or socially responsible investing. This is again consistent with such bonds being targeted by a identifiable subset of investors. This variable remains highly significant alongside the green bond

indicator, demonstrating that the green label is not the only criterion that makes a concentrated position in a particular cusip desirable to socially responsible investors.

The model predicts that concentration of green bonds should be particularly high when the bond is relatively small and low risk, therefore presenting only mild tradeoffs for investor-level portfolio weights or disutility due to risk aversion. To test this, we denote a green bond cusip as “small” if it is not in the top decile (alternatively, top quintile) of the bond size distribution. Almost all green bonds are investment grade, so risk, like size, is a relative concept in this market. We denote a bond as “safe” if its rating is AAA (alternatively, AAA or AA+), which is the modal municipal green bond rating. The goal is simply to split the sample into roughly equal parts, not to capture fine notions of size or risk.

The results generally support these predictions. AAA-rated, effectively riskless green bonds have an HHI around 0.16 higher than other bonds, controlling for various combinations of fixed effects, while green bonds that are not in the top size decile have an HHI of 0.06 higher, though this is not statistically significant. When the risk and size criteria are relaxed slightly, both low risk and small green bonds display statistically and economically elevated concentration. The coefficient on the green bond flag largely disappears after including these interactions; the concentration effect appears to be driven, as predicted, by smaller and safer green bonds.

The next specification suggests that CBI certified green bonds are held in greater concentration. This contrasts with our earlier finding that certification is not associated with a clear pricing benefit, at least for post-2016 issues.

In the last specification provides more evidence that investors appear not to discriminate as clearly between an issuer’s green and ordinary bonds when they are issued simultaneously.

Ordinary bonds issued bundled with green bonds *also* see a statistically significantly elevated concentration. Note that this pattern is very consistent with the pricing of such bundled issues in Table 5. There, we observed that when an ordinary bond is issued bundled with a green bond, the ordinary bond also received somewhat better pricing, as if some “Group 2” investors also became interested in it.

Overall, the ownership results are generally consistent with the yield findings and a simple analytical framework. A subset of investors appears to sacrifice some yield to hold labeled green bonds. Green bonds are held disproportionately by these investors. Ownership is particularly concentrated in smaller and riskless green bonds. The yield and concentration effects are clearest when issuers separate their green and ordinary bond issues.

5. Conclusion

Climate change is now and will continue to be an urgent challenge, and the market for green bonds is an important and growing channel for municipalities and corporations seeking to finance interventions to reduce carbon emissions. In this paper, we study the U.S. green bond market, with a focus on green municipal bonds that complements Flammer’s (2020) focus on corporate green bonds.

We start with a history and overview of the U.S. green bond markets and basic green bond characteristics. A simple asset pricing framework that incorporates an investor preference for nonpecuniary attributes—in our application, a preference for green versus ordinary bonds—predicts that green bonds will sell for a premium. Controlling for numerous fixed and time-varying factors, we confirm that municipal green bonds are issued at a premium, with yields lower by several basis points, except when they are issued alongside ordinary bonds in which case the premium emerges on the secondary market. A related prediction is that green bond

ownership is more concentrated, with a subset of concerned investors holding them at higher weights, particularly when the par value is low or the bond is especially low risk. The data also support this prediction. Overall, it appears that a subset of investors sacrifices a small amount of yield to hold green bonds.

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Table 1. Issuance of U.S. green and ordinary bonds. Data on municipal bonds come from Mergent and data on corporate bonds come from Bloomberg. See text for details of sample construction. Floating-rate bonds are excluded. Dollar values are nominal par issuance amounts.

Year	<i>Green</i>		<i>Ordinary</i>	
	Unique Bonds	Unique Issuers	\$ (M)	\$ (B)
Panel A. Municipal				
2013	3	1	100	286
2014	298	15	2,166	290
2015	550	31	3,493	368
2016	882	40	7,241	399
2017	1,242	53	10,526	372
2018	1,008	55	4,443	289
Total	3,983	195	27,969	2,004
Panel B. Corporate				
2013	3	2	2,500	1,489
2014	5	4	2,070	1,477
2015	13	7	7,070	1,679
2016	8	5	5,320	1,626
2017	10	8	5,130	1,787
2018	12	10	7,925	1,538
Total	51	36	30,014	9,596

Table 2. Issuance of U.S. green and ordinary bonds by use of proceeds. Based on data from Mergent, with green bonds identified using data from Bloomberg and Mergent. Dollar figures are par value issued. Issuance covers 2013 through 2018.

Use	<i>Green</i>			<i>Ordinary</i>
	Unique Bonds	Unique Issuers	\$ (M)	\$ (M)
Panel A. Municipal				
Agriculture	0	0	0	266
Airlines	0	0	0	281
Airports	0	0	0	63,503
Bridges	0	0	0	8,811
Civic/Convention Centers	0	0	0	8,843
Correctional Facilities	0	0	0	8,022
Courts	0	0	0	2,352
Economic Development	33	2	17	11,357
Fire Station/Equipment	14	1	45	1,971
Flood Ctl/Storm Drain	57	3	62	3,018
Gas	0	0	0	13,978
General Purpose	863	38	4,403	598,113
Government/Public Buildings	20	1	69	9,564
Higher Education	244	16	1,397	187,388
Hospitals	49	5	933	111,050
Industrial Development	0	0	0	2,380
Irrigation	0	0	0	405
Land Preservation	0	0	0	130
Library or Museums	0	0	0	3,224
Malls/Shopping Centers	0	0	0	10
Mass/Rapid Transit	254	8	5,873	21,195
Multi-Family Housing	286	3	1,074	38,463
Multiple Public Utilities	0	0	0	15,742
Nursing Homes	0	0	0	3,737
Office Bldg	0	0	0	563
Other Education	0	0	0	7,347
Other Healthcare	9	2	247	33,243
Other Housing	35	1	85	8,990
Other Public Service	0	0	0	972
Other Recreation	0	0	0	2,745
Other Transportation	92	4	1,232	46,568
Other Utilities	0	0	0	1,976
Parking Facilities	0	0	0	2,571
Parks/Zoos/Beaches	31	2	55	5,322

Table 2. (Continued)

	<i>Green</i>			<i>Ordinary</i>
	Unique Bonds	Unique Issuers	\$ (M)	\$ (M)
Pension Funding/Retirement	0	0	0	5,472
Police Station/Equip	0	0	0	740
Pollution Control	75	2	97	10,625
Primary/Secondary Education	139	12	411	381,046
Public Power	215	14	652	57,399
Redevelopment/Land Clearance	0	0	0	14,444
Retirement Centers	0	0	0	7,410
Sanitation	25	1	170	1,330
Seaports/Marine Terminals	0	0	0	11,754
Single Family Housing	0	0	0	33,625
Single/Multi-Family Housing	0	0	0	2,592
Solid Waste	43	3	51	6,507
Stadiums/Sports Complex	0	0	0	8,505
Student Loans	0	0	0	4,082
Telephone	0	0	0	77
Theaters	0	0	0	296
Toll Road and Highway	0	0	0	61,838
Veterans	0	0	0	1,344
Water and Sewer	1,499	38	11,096	170,430
Total	3,983	156	27,969	2,003,615
Panel B. Corporate				
(Not Green)				9,595,560
Green Buildings	10	10	4,695	
Low Emission Vehicles	1	1	705	
Renewable Energy	40	18	24,615	
Total	51	29	30,014	9,595,560

Table 3. Characteristics of green and ordinary bonds. Data on municipal bond characteristics come from Mergent. Corporate bond characteristics are from Bloomberg. P-values for test of differences in means are calculated using a one-variable regression model, with standard errors adjusted for issuer-level clustering. The municipal sample runs from 2013 to 2018 issuance and includes 3,983 green bonds and 653,939 ordinary bonds with complete data on all characteristics. The corporate sample runs from 2013 to 2018 issuance and includes 51 green bonds and 20,362 ordinary bonds with complete data on all characteristics except yield; yield data are for 43 green bonds and 8,873 ordinary bonds.

Variable	<i>Green</i>				<i>Ordinary</i>				<i>Diff</i>	
	Mean	Median	Min	Max	Mean	Median	Min	Max	Mean	P-Value
Panel A. Municipal										
Rating (AAA=1)	2.90	3.00	1	14	3.74	3.00	1	21	-0.83	(<0.001)
Maturity (Years)	11.55	10.63	0	35	9.89	8.97	0	35	1.66	(<0.001)
Insured (Yes=1)	0.070	0.00	0	1	0.172	0.00	0	1	-0.10	(<0.001)
Taxable (Yes=1)	0.076	0.00	0	1	0.058	0.00	0	1	0.02	(0.418)
Taxable AMT (Yes=1)	0.015	0.00	0	1	0.012	0.00	0	1	0.00	(0.800)
Taxable State (Yes=1)	0.023	0.00	0	1	0.088	0.00	0	1	-0.07	(<0.001)
Bond Size (\$M)	7.0	2.2	0.1	408	3.1	0.7	0.1	12,850	3.96	(<0.001)
Bank Qualified (Yes=1)	0.035	0.00	0	1	0.333	0.00	0	1	-0.30	(<0.001)
New Money (Yes=1)	0.677	1.00	0	1	0.477	0.00	0	1	0.20	(<0.001)
General Obligation (Yes=1)	0.140	0.00	0	1	0.469	0.00	0	1	-0.33	(<0.001)
Callable (Yes=1)	0.531	1.00	0	1	0.468	0.00	0	1	0.06	(<0.001)
Puttable (Yes=1)	0.001	0.00	0	1	0.002	0.00	0	1	0.00	(0.002)
CBI Certified Green (Yes = 1)	0.182	0.00	0	1	0.000	0.00	0	0	0.18	(0.011)
Pre-Tax Yield	2.44	2.48	0	6	2.32	2.34	0	12	0.13	(0.012)
After-Tax Yield	2.34	2.35	0	6	2.24	2.25	0	10	0.10	(0.056)
Panel B. Corporate										
Rating (AAA=1)	8.45	8.00	1	15	9.34	9.00	1	21	-0.89	(0.261)
Maturity (Years)	10.08	9.08	2	31	9.74	7.99	0	35	0.34	(0.812)
Bond Size (\$M)	399.7	350.0	0	2,250	277.2	4.4	0	9,000	122.5	(0.070)
Pre-Tax Yield	4.02	4.00	1	6	4.55	4.19	0	15	-0.53	(0.109)

Table 4. Offering yields of municipal bonds. Ordinary least-squares regressions of after-tax bond yields at issue in basis points on green bond indicators and other bond characteristics and fixed effects described in Table 3. After-tax yields are calculated using Mergent, Tax Policy Center, and NBER data. “Green” is a dummy variable for bonds that Bloomberg or Mergent tag as labeled green bond, excluding QEGB/CREB program bonds. T-statistics clustered by issuer are reported in brackets.

Variable	<i>Offering Yield</i>			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Green	-9.4 [-6.87]	-7.4 [-6.00]	-6.9 [-3.17]	-4.8 [-3.09]
R-Squared	0.87	0.93	0.91	0.96
Adjusted R-Squared	0.87	0.93	0.91	0.96
N	657,803	653,990	657,566	653,723
Fixed Effects				
Maturity	Yes		Yes	
Rating	Yes		Yes	
Month	Yes		Yes	
Maturity x Rating x Month		Yes		Yes
Issuer Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Additional Fixed Effects (all specifications)	Bond Size Decile, Issue Size Decile, Insured, Taxable, Taxable AMT, Taxable State, Bank Qualified, New Money, General Obligation, Callable, Puttable, Use of Proceeds			

Table 5. Offering yields of municipal bonds: Additional regressions. Ordinary least-squares regressions of bond yields at issue in basis points on green bond indicators and other bond characteristics and fixed effects described in Table 3. The first column is a baseline specification of after-tax yield at issue from Table 4, Column 4, where after-tax yield is calculated using Mergent, Tax Policy Center, and NBER data. “Green” is a dummy variable for bonds that Bloomberg or Mergent tags as green. The second column uses pre-tax yield as a dependent variable. The third column allows for a differential effect for green bonds that are certified and registered with the Climate Bonds Initiative. The fourth and fifth column splits the sample according to whether we have ownership concentration data. The sixth column allows for a differential effect of green and ordinary bonds in cases where both types of bonds were issued by the same issuer on the same day. All specifications include issuer fixed effects, maturity-rating-month interactions, and bond characteristics fixed effects. T-statistics clustered by issuer are reported in brackets.

Variable	<i>Offering Yield</i>					
	Base	Pre-Tax Yield	Certification	Ownership Data Sample	Ownership Data Missing	Bundled Issue Types
Green	-4.8 [-3.09]	-4.6 [-2.91]	-5.4 [-3.01]	-8.0 [-2.01]	-4.3 [-2.92]	-6.3 [-2.99]
Green X CBI Certified			3.0 [1.09]			
Green X Ordinary Also Issued Today						1.8 [0.67]
Ordinary X Green Also Issued Today						-5.5 [-3.25]
R-Squared	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.97	0.96	0.96
Adjusted R-Squared	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96
N	653,723	653,840	653,723	52,494	597,503	653,723

Table 6. Secondary Market Pricing. Ordinary least-squares regressions of the difference in traded bond yields between matched green and ordinary bonds in basis points on time since the issue date: Yield on the traded green bond minus the yield on the traded ordinary bond. The sample consists of daily observations with at least one transaction in green and one transaction in ordinary is recorded on the same trading day of a pair of bonds matched by maturity, issuer, and issue date, from a set of 640 such matched pairs provided by David Larcker and as analyzed in Larcker and Watts (2020). See text for details. T-statistics are reported in brackets.

Variable	<i>Traded Yield Difference</i>	
	After First Month	Month by Month
Month > 1 After Issue	-2.5 [-2.38]	
Month 2		-0.9 [-0.45]
Month 3		-8.3 [-3.59]
Month 4		-3.3 [-1.92]
Month 5		-6.1 [-2.72]
Month 6		-4.4 [-1.39]
R-Squared	0.26	0.35
Adjusted R-Squared	0.11	0.17
N	1,103	550
Fixed Effects		
Match Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes

Table 7. Ownership of green and ordinary municipal bonds. Data are based on combining Mergent data on bond characteristics with Bloomberg data identifying green bonds and eMAXX data on institutional ownership of individual bonds. eMAXX Ownership is the percentage of bond par value accounted for by eMAXX-reporting institutions and is reported below for 495 green and 69,180 ordinary bonds that appear in eMAXX and have other required data. Green Fund Ownership is the percentage of bonds owned by a fund that has some green or social investing orientation as defined by the fund having any of the following strings in its name: CALVERT, CATHOLIC, CHURCH, CLEAN, DOMINI, ENVIRON, ESG, FAITH, GREEN, IMPACT, KLD, PARNASSUS, SOCIAL, SRI, WALDEN. HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, calculated as the sum of the squared values of ownership shares. Higher values reflect more ownership concentration, with a value of 1 reflecting a single owner owning all of the bond and 0 reflecting infinite dispersion of ownership. When eMAXX-reporting owners hold less than the total par outstanding, HHI is calculated assuming that the distribution of ownership shares in that universe match what is observed within the eMAXX universe. We require at least 25% eMAXX Ownership to calculate HHI; HHI and Green Fund Ownership are calculated for 395 green and 56,127 ordinary bonds. Standard errors for differences are clustered by issuer.

Variable	<i>Green</i>				<i>Ordinary</i>				<i>Diff</i>	
	Mean	Median	Min	Max	Mean	Median	Min	Max	Mean	P-Value
eMAXX Ownership	61.5%	66.6%	0.1%	100.0%	58.8%	58.7%	0.0%	100.0%	2.6%	(0.365)
HHI	15.5%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.6%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	14.9%	(0.090)
Green Fund Ownership	0.56	0.50	0.03	1	0.52	0.44	0.00	1	0.04	(0.198)

Table 8. Ownership concentration of municipal bonds. Ordinary least-squares regressions of HHI on green bond indicators and bond characteristics and fixed effects described in Table 3. T-statistics clustered by issuer are reported in brackets.

Variable	<i>HHI</i>			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Green	0.06 [1.81]	0.06 [1.79]	0.10 [2.37]	0.10 [2.81]
R-Squared	0.24	0.35	0.43	0.53
Adjusted R-Squared	0.24	0.24	0.39	0.40
N	56,519	53,658	55,447	52,494
Fixed Effects				
Maturity	Yes		Yes	
Rating	Yes		Yes	
Month	Yes		Yes	
Maturity x Rating x Month		Yes		Yes
Issuer Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Additional Fixed Effects	Bond Size Decile, Issue Size Decile, Insured, Taxable, Taxable AMT, Taxable State, Bank Qualified, New Money, General Obligation, Callable, Puttable, Use of Proceeds			

Table 9. Ownership concentration of municipal bonds: Additional regressions. Ordinary least-squares regressions of HHI on green bond indicators and other bond characteristics and fixed effects described. The first column is a baseline from Table 8, Column 4. “Green” is a dummy variable for bonds that Bloomberg or Mergent tags as green. The second column adds Green Fund Ownership, the percentage of bonds owned by a fund that has some green or social investing orientation according to string matches on its name. The third and fourth columns allows for differential effects for green bonds that are safe or small par issued. The fifth column allows for a differential effect of green bonds that are certified and registered with the Climate Bonds Initiative. The sixth column allows for a differential effect of green and ordinary bonds in cases where both types of bonds were issued by the same issuer on the same day. All specifications include issuer fixed effects, maturity-rating-month interactions, and bond characteristics fixed effects. T-statistics clustered by issuer are reported in brackets.

Variable	HHI					
	Base	Green Fund Ownership	Safe and Small	Safe and Small (v2)	Certification	Bundled Issue Types
Green	0.10 [2.81]	0.09 [2.93]	0.02 [0.47]	0.02 [0.38]	0.09 [2.12]	0.15 [2.73]
Green Fund Ownership		0.66 [13.46]				
Green X Rating=AAA			0.16 [2.50]			
Green X Rating=AAA or AA+				0.12 [2.02]		
Green X Bond Size Decile<10			0.06 [1.19]			
Green X Bond Size Decile<9				0.19 [3.23]		
Green X CBI Certified					0.11 [1.73]	
Green X Ordinary Also Issued Today						-0.07 [-1.03]
Ordinary X Green Also Issued Today						0.05 [1.86]
R-Squared	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53
Adjusted R-Squared	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40
N	52,494	52,494	52,494	52,494	52,494	52,494