Popular acceptance of inequality due to innate brute luck and support for classical benefit-based taxation

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ABSTRACT
U.S. survey respondents’ views on distributive justice differ in two specific, related ways from what is conventionally assumed in modern optimal tax research. When expressing their preferences over allocations in stylized, hypothetical scenarios meant to isolate key features of the tax problem, a large share of respondents resist the full equalization of unequal outcomes due to innate brute luck that standard analyses recommend. A similar share prefer a classical benefit-based logic for taxes over the conventional logic of diminishing marginal social welfare. Moreover, these two views are linked: respondents who more strongly resist equalization are more likely to prefer the classical benefit-based principle. Though the Amazon Mechanical Turk survey population is not a representative sample of the U.S. population, robustness of these results across demographic traits and political views suggests that a large share of the American public holds views inconsistent with standard welfarist objectives.

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1. Introduction

According to novel survey evidence presented in this paper, the U.S. public’s views on distributive justice are at odds with key features of the normative view typically applied in modern optimal tax research. This evidence suggests that the conventional approach is likely to disappoint tax scholars, advisors, and policymakers who want their theoretical frameworks and recommended tax reforms to be consistent with the public’s underlying policy preferences. While this paper’s survey population—obtained through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform—is not a representative sample of the U.S. population, and while the scenarios with which I elicit respondents’ views are highly stylized, these findings are robust across demographic traits and political views, and the hypothetical scenarios’ clarity allows me to pose choices without the complications that beset more realistic examples. The results of this analysis can be organized into three main findings.

First, a large share of survey respondents resist full equalization of after-tax incomes even when conventional optimal tax analyses would strongly recommend it. In a hypothetical situation meant to mimic the tax policy problem, between 50% and 95% of respondents choose not to fully offset inequality due to innate brute luck (that is, luck that people start with and cannot avoid) even when there are neither efficiency costs of redistribution nor differences in desert across individuals. Though they are elicited in a highly simplified context, these choices suggest that the two reasons why conventional optimal tax analyses tolerate after-tax inequality—the importance of encouraging effort and the possibility that some people “choose” to have low incomes—are not the only reasons why survey respondents, and perhaps Americans in general, accept it.

The second finding offers a possible explanation of the first: a large share of survey respondents prefer an alternative logic for taxation than that which is typically used in optimal tax analyses. The conventional logic stems from the use of a social welfare function that exhibits diminishing marginal social welfare of income. When presented with two possible justifications for their choices in the tax problem, between 62% and 79% of respondents prefer, instead of this logic, one tied to a centuries-old idea that Richard Musgrave (1959) named classical benefit-based taxation (CBBT). Under CBBT, taxes are assigned based on the benefit a taxpayer obtains from the activities of the state, with benefit being measured by the state’s role in increasing the taxpayer’s economic opportunities. In addition to being Adam Smith’s first maxim of taxation, CBBT has a long history in public debate over taxes in the United States, from its use as a justification for the new personal income tax in 1913 to its use by presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Barack Obama to advocate for progressivity. In that context, finding support for CBBT among the
American public is natural, despite its absence from modern optimal tax theory.

The third finding of this paper is that the first two are linked, in that those respondents more willing to accept inequality due to innate brute luck are significantly more likely to prefer CBCT as an optimal tax principle. In other words, a large share of respondents appear to support—at least in part—the ideas that individuals are entitled to pre-tax incomes and that taxes ought to respect that entitlement. Advocates of benefit-based taxation stress exactly these ideas when asserting its normative appeal as a voluntary rather than coercive system, in that under benefit-based taxation a taxpayer funds social goods only to the extent that he or she benefits from them, paralleling the case of voluntary exchange in private markets.

These results therefore speak to a conceptual debate within optimal tax theory, and political philosophy, over whether pre-tax incomes have any moral significance for policy design. As formalized first by James Mirrlees (1971), modern optimal tax research typically adopts an objective put forth by John Harsanyi (1953, 1955); namely, to maximize a social welfare function that depends only on individual utility levels. Though such a consequentialist objective can in principle accommodate a wide range of judgments, almost all applications of it embrace what Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel (2002) deem “the right way, investigating outcomes rather than the distribution of [tax] burdens.” Under the standard approach, therefore, pre-tax incomes and taxes paid have no effect on welfare or relevance to optimal policy. In contrast, a large majority of respondents to this paper’s survey support CBCT, a principle that ignores after-tax incomes (i.e., “outcomes”) and defines optimality in terms of the relationship between pre-tax incomes and taxes paid.

It is important to clarify up front that the results of this paper are entirely consistent with there being some role for other principles in Americans’ appraisals of tax policy. In fact, nearly two-thirds of the respondents to this paper’s survey say they agree to some extent with the conventional logic for assigning taxes as well as with CBCT, echoing a large body of work across a range of fields that has shown it is common for individuals to use a mixture of criteria to make policy judgments. This paper is best seen as providing further support for the idea that models of optimal policy seeking to capture prevailing public priorities ought to use an objective characterized by normative diversity in general and that include the principle of CBCT in particular. In Weinzierl (2014, 2016), I formally develop mixed normative objectives and emphasize their consistency with the most general objectives assumed in modern optimal tax theory (i.e., in the work of Joseph Stiglitz (1987) and Iván Werning (2007), among others).

In addition, to prevent confusion it is worth emphasizing that this paper is intended not to defend CBCT as a normative criterion but rather to establish and understand the roots of CBCT’s importance as a positive matter. As I have discussed elsewhere (Weinzierl, 2016, 2017), because CBCT addresses a number of the most powerful normative critiques of narrower versions of benefit-based theory and enjoys such a prominent place in public reasoning over taxes, it may merit further study from a normative perspective, but that is not the purpose of this paper.

This paper is closely related to a voluminous modern literature in political philosophy on the role of luck in economic outcomes, especially the so-called brute luck that is not the result of an individual voluntarily accepting risk. The influential “luck egalitarian” approach of, for example, G.A. Cohen (2011), closely resembles the normative perspective assumed by most of the recent work in optimal tax theory. That is, the objective function in modern tax theory is typically specified such that inequalities in outcomes across individuals due to factors for which individuals do not have responsibility are to be offset, while inequalities for which individuals are responsible are not to be offset (see Fleurybaey and Maniquet, 2006; Lockwood and Weinzierl, 2015). This paper’s survey evidence suggests that most members of the American public have not yet converted fully to luck egalitarianism, at least as concerns innate brute luck. Instead, they appear to have at least some affinity for the (very different) views of Nozick (1974) that “Whether or not people’s natural assets are arbitrary from a moral point of view, they are entitled to them, and to what flows from them.”

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the survey and the first main finding: resistance to full equalization of unequal outcomes due to brute luck. Section 3 introduces CBCT and then discusses the survey’s second main finding: support for CBCT as a principle of taxation. Section 4 shows that the first two findings are linked and comments on their interpretation. I refer to related research as results are presented. Section 5 concludes. In the Appendix, I provide a brief formal statement of the standard optimal tax model and features of the CBCT modification to it for reference.

### 2. Survey evidence showing popular acceptance of inequality due to innate brute luck in the United States

First, a note on the survey behind this paper’s evidence, which I have reproduced in full in the Appendix. I listed the survey on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (M-Turk) interface in six rounds during late 2015 and early 2016. Nearly 2500 respondents were paid $3.00 to complete the survey, which took approximately ten minutes. The main findings correspond to a small set of questions from the survey that I will describe below. In addition to those questions, respondents self-reported a set of demographic traits, completed a short arithmetic quiz, and answered a series of questions designed to measure their general political opinions. I discuss the relationship of the main results to these questions below, as well.

#### 2.1. Baseline result: resistance to full equalization

After respondents start the survey by entering their M-Turk ID number and agreeing to the terms of the survey, they see the screen shown in Fig. 1.

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1. I am not asserting that this link is causal, much less that I have demonstrated it is causal. Rather, these findings should be seen as two manifestations of a broader normative view at odds with the conventional approach.
2. Fleurybaey and Maniquet (2006) are an important exception, as they look beyond welfarism an construct a responsibility-centered egalitarian approach.
3. How to respond to the public’s normative reasoning is explored in the literature on reflective equilibrium, such as in Norman Daniels (1996).
4. “Choice” is of course a complicated concept, but in optimal tax theory it is usually represented through heterogeneity in utility functions. So, a person who puts a lower value on leisure may “choose” to work more than others. To some luck egalitarians, including perhaps Cohen, such preference differences ought to be offset. But to others, these preferences are qualitatively (and morally) distinct from what optimal tax theorists call “ability,” the capability of an individual to produce output. Ability is treated as brute luck in optimal tax models (though recent work on human capital, such as Stantcheva, 2017, complicates this assumption).
5. Importantly, the findings here do not imply that Americans accept inequality regardless of its cause. For example, unjust acquisition leading to inequality would be rejected by even those who fully embrace the libertarian view. Rhetoric in the 2016 U.S. presidential election emphasizing that “the system is rigged” is consistent with this reason for opposing inequality.
6. Respondents were required to be located in the United States and be high-performing (i.e., “Masters”) workers. The task was described as follows in the listing: “Choose the best outcome of scenarios involving money and give your opinions on economic policy.” M-Turk is a cost-effective and popular platform for surveys, with recent related examples being Saez and Stantcheva (2016), Kuziemko et al. (2015), and Weinzierl (2014). See Horton et al. (2011) for an analysis of the reliability of online labor markets for experiments in economics.
The respondents’ task is to enter an amount for “Person A pays” in the first text box. The amounts for “Person B pays,” “Person A ends up with,” and “Person B ends up with” fill in automatically.

This admittedly abstract hypothetical situation is designed to isolate the essential elements of the tax policy problem for society. In it, Person A and Person B have the chance to collectively invest in a project that yields a surplus of total output over total input. Those persons differ—due to innate brute luck—in the share of the output they will receive if the project is undertaken and in what they will receive if it is not. The survey respondent’s task is to assign to each person an amount to contribute to the project, where the contribution by either person may exceed the total cost of the project if the respondent wishes to provide a net transfer to the other person.

Thus, the main functions for the contributions by Person A and Person B are those of taxes in the real world: to fund socially productive activity and to determine the distribution of total surplus (output) across individuals, as in Musgrave’s (1959) famous delineation of the allocation and distribution branches of government. The respondent is not included in the situation directly, so he or she is implicitly put into the position of the disinterested observer or social planner.

Importantly, however, this situation is also designed to neutralize two factors that complicate the tax policy problem in reality. First, the allocations to Person A and Person B are entirely due to innate brute luck, while the relative importance of luck and tastes in determining incomes—i.e., the role of “desert”—has inspired a long-standing and heated debate in both scholarly and public discussions of tax policy. Second, there is no effort exerted in this scenario, so there are no efficiency costs from redistribution. In the jargon of modern optimal tax theory, this scenario has one dimension of exogenous heterogeneity and inelastic labor supply.

Given this design, the optimal allocation according to the standard optimal tax objective (i.e., a social welfare function that is concave in income) is clear: full equalization. That is, Person A should pay $24,000, Person B should receive a transfer of $6,000, and each should end up with $36,000. With no preference heterogeneity and a concave social welfare function, equal after-tax incomes maximize welfare for a given amount of resources, and with inelastic effort the amount of resources is fixed.

Respondents are less egalitarian. Fig. 2 shows the 2037 responses to versions of this question for which the answer to “Person A pays $...” falls between $9,000 and $24,000. The mean is $16,772 with a standard deviation of $5,267. The modal response is the cost of the offer—$18,000—the choice under which payments are maximally progressive without providing a net transfer to Person B.

The most striking result from this question is that a large majority of respondents—more than 75%—stop short of full equalization of the net proceeds from the project even though redistribution is nontaxation and the gross proceeds are explicitly determined by innate brute luck. This result suggests that the two reasons emphasized in conventional optimal tax analyses for allowing inequality in after-tax incomes are unsatisfying as explanations for American skepticism toward redistribution. It may also suggest that Americans consider innate brute luck to be a “fair” reason for inequality.

A substantial share of respondents—42%—choose a point between full equalization of outcomes and proportional payments. A bit more than 24% choose to fully equalize the net incomes across individuals (A pays $24,000), as conventional optimal tax analyses would recommend, while 18% choose to allocate the costs of the project in proportion to each individual’s gross incomes (A pays $12,000). As is shown in the Appendix, proportional payments are optimal under CBT given the relationship (described in Fig. 1) between the gross proceeds when the offer is refused and accepted.

That more than two-fifths of respondents, including the median respondent, choose progressivity but not equalization is consistent with the idea that the typical respondent feels some affinity for the principles behind each of the more extreme choices.
Normative diversity of that kind has been documented by a large body of previous work outside economics and a few recent works within it (see Hochschild, 1981; Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1992; Feldman and Zaller, 1992; Weinzierl, 2014; Weinzierl, 2016; Saez and Stantcheva, 2016). It also appears in the second result of this paper, discussed below.

Further supporting these results are the respondents’ answers when they are asked “what do you think the typical American would say is the best outcome?” in the same tax scenario. The skepticism toward redistribution that respondents attribute to the typical American is even greater than what they express themselves. The mean response is only $14,735, and only 14% of respondents think that the “typical American” would choose full equalization in this situation, despite the lack of incentive costs or desert claims. 16% of respondents think the typical American would choose proportionality, while fully 29% think the typical American would split the costs of the offer evenly (i.e., A pays $9,000). Consistent with their own preferences, however, a substantial share of respondents (33%) think the typical American would choose an outcome between proportionality and full equalization.

As with any survey, the situation and question in Fig. 1 may risk misinterpretation by respondents. One potential concern is that the luck from a coin flip may be seen by respondents not as brute luck but as so-called “option luck:” that is, the luck one faces when voluntarily entering into a risky endeavor. Option luck is typically viewed as not meriting redistribution, even by luck egalitarians, so finding resistance to redistribution from Person A to Person B would not be surprising if respondents interpret the coin flip as inducing option luck. The survey question is carefully designed, however, to discourage this (mis)interpretation. As shown in Fig. 1, the coin flip is explicitly described as coming before the choice of whether to accept the offer, and the two persons have no ability to avoid the coin flip. The determination of who is Person A and who is Person B is, in other words, unavoidable and therefore “brute luck.” To reinforce this point, the differential luck due to the coin flip results in unequal allocations even if the two hypothetical persons refuse the offer. Therefore, the luck induced by the coin flip is independent of the choice whether to take up the offer or not.

A second, related concern is that the hypothetical persons’ ability to accept or refuse the offer may be seen by respondents as the ability to choose whether to take a risk or not, again prompting the interpretation of the inequality that results as due to option luck, not brute luck. As just noted, however, the inequality in allocations does not depend on whether or not the offer is accepted. In other words, the hypothetical persons take on no additional risk by accepting the offer.

A third, separate concern is that respondents will not think of the distributional choices in this scenario—with its abstract offer that persons can accept or refuse—in the same way that they would think of them in a real-world tax problem. To some extent, this possibility is the necessary tradeoff when trying to simplify a situation to isolate specific features, as this survey is intended to do. But there is another, perhaps more important, argument against this concern. The offer presented in the survey question is meant to represent the collective project of the market economy that makes possible modern levels of productivity. Though the translation of innate ability into market productivities is rarely modeled in modern tax theory, it is an essential component of the tax problem. By having respondents engage with it, we are able to ask them novel questions (in Section 3) about the underlying principles behind their distributive preferences.

2.2. Robustness across respondent traits

The survey gathers several indicators of respondents’ personal traits. It asks about three demographic indicators: their age in four ranges (18–25, 26–40, 41–64, and 65+); race (white, black, or other); and gender (male, female). It also asks them to report their education level completed (some high school, high school graduate, some college, or college graduate). To obtain an estimate of their economic status, it shows them the current CBO income distribution (four lower quintiles and then four finer-grained quantiles within the top quintile) in a column chart and asks them for their household’s position in that distribution when they were 10 years old and 45 years old. Finally, it tests respondents’ numeracy with three multiple-choice arithmetic questions. The respondents are—as a group—slightly more likely to be male, substantially younger, more likely to identify as white, more likely to have a college degree, and have higher earnings (as adults, though not as children) than the U.S. population as a whole.

Table 1 shows the mean answer (to how much Person A should pay) among the respondents by their answers to these questions along with the standard errors and number of respondents in each group. The mean overall was $16,772.

The subgroup means are similar and typically not significantly different across answers to each question. The largest (and only significant) gaps appear in the numeracy and age categories, with respondents who give more correct answers to the arithmetic questions and older respondents having Person A pay more.

The survey also has respondents self-report several aspects of their political opinions. It asks them to describe their political perspective on economic issues (left-leaning or liberal, centrist or moderate, right-leaning or conservative, not sure); to say whether they strongly or somewhat oppose or support libertarianism with regard to economic issues (libertarianism is not explicitly defined); to say whether the government or individuals are responsible for people having their basic needs met; and to say whether they think that the “sacrifice” from paying taxes ought to be borne more by the rich than the poor or borne equally by everyone.

Table 2 shows the mean answer to how much Person A should pay among the respondents who chose each answer to these political opinion questions.

The differences across mean answers by political opinion are somewhat larger than across personal traits. As might be expected, respondents who identify with the political right, who think individuals ought to be responsible for meeting their basic needs, and who think the sacrifice from taxes ought to be borne equally (rather than
2.3. Robustness to variations in survey question

Here, I show how two (randomly-assigned) variations to the survey question from Fig. 1 provide further insight into the result just described.\(^{12}\)

2.3.1. The salience of payments versus outcomes

First, I show respondents only the payments made by each person or the amounts each person ends up with, rather than both (as in the benchmark setup). These variations help measure the extent to which elevating the salience of either aspect of the policy affects respondents’ moral judgments. For example, emphasizing after-tax incomes may make respondents more likely to equalize the amounts Person A and Person B end up with. This variation thereby links directly to the question of whether the public endorses the conventional approach’s assumption that only after-tax, not pre-tax, incomes ought to matter for policy.\(^{13}\)

Whether respondents are shown only the payments or only the outcomes, the main results of this section continue to hold, but these changes do have noticeable—and informative—effects. In both cases, a large majority of respondents choose less than full redistribution: 95% in the payments-only version and 65% in the outcomes-only version. Approximately two-fifths choose an amount for Person A to pay between $12,000 and $24,000: 43% and 40% respectively. However, support for the egalitarian outcome does shift with these variations on the benchmark. In the payments-only variation, 5% of the 120 respondents choose it (across all setups, 24% chose this outcome). Related, proportional payments (A pays $12,000) are chosen by 27% and 8% of respondents in the two variations (a statistically significant gap), compared to 18% across settings.

These results suggest that asking respondents to engage with both payments and outcomes (i.e., after-tax incomes) causes them to moderate the more extreme views they have if they consider only one or the other. For example, the mean amount Person A pays was $16,772 across all surveys. In contrast, this amount was $14,135 in the payments-only variation and $17,988 (a statistically significantly greater amount) in the outcomes-only variation.

2.3.2. Discrete versus continuous choices

Second, I modify the scenario in Fig. 1 to provide respondents with a discrete set of choices, each of which indicates the amounts that both persons pay (or receive) and end up with. In one variation, I provide four choices: Person A pays $9,000, $12,000, $18,000, or $24,000. In a second variation, I add two additional (intermediate) choices: Person A pays $15,000 or $21,000. In a third, I add two more (extreme) choices: Person A pays $6,000 or $27,000. Across these three versions, I obtain 266 responses.

These variations are intended to address two concerns. First, respondents to the setup shown in Fig. 1 may not consider the full

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\(^{12}\) I do not discuss the effects of minor wording and framing changes across the rounds of the survey that had negligible effects on the results. For example, replacing “have to pay” with “pay” in the text of the scenario from Fig. 1 may make the payments seem less compulsory, but that change had no noticeable effect on the results.

\(^{13}\) Note that the outcomes-only variation is similar to (and thus likely to be informative about) another possible treatment in which the total surplus ($72,000) is made explicit to the respondent. In both cases, the division of after-tax outcomes is the focus of the respondent’s task.
range of possible allocations when entering the amount Person A pays in the first text box. For example, respondents may default to having Person A pay $18,000 because it is the cost of the project, not understanding that A could be asked to pay more than the cost so as to fund a transfer to Person B. Second, though the three text boxes fill in automatically once the respondent chooses an amount for A to pay, the implicit mathematics behind Fig. 1’s setup may be too complicated for some respondents, causing them to default to simple numbers that don’t reflect their true opinions, such as having A pay the precise cost of the project.

Consistent with the first of these concerns, these variations reduce the concentration of answers at $18,000, but contrary to the second concern they increase the shares of respondents choosing the simplest options: full equalization of after-tax incomes and equal absolute tax payments. The modal choice in these variations—chosen by just under 50% of respondents—is Person A paying $24,000, the full equalization recommended by the conventional approach’s assumed normative view. The remaining respondents—just over 50%—continue to stop short of fully offsetting Person A’s luck-based advantage. In sum, these variations yield weaker versions of the overall results but leave intact the main finding that a large share of respondents resist costless redistribution.

While the discrete choice versions of the survey clearly have advantages, these results make clear that there are countervailing considerations complicating their interpretation relative to the continuous, text-entry setup of Fig. 1. First, multiple-choice survey questions require less engagement by the respondent than text-entry questions (especially than those in which the interdependence of allocations is made clear by the amounts automatically adjusting), potentially causing respondents to choose quickly and without consideration. Second, any set of choices unavoidably introduces elements of framing, and (as the data suggest) listing the options may privilege those with “simple” features such as equal payments or equal after-tax incomes because they are easier to understand.

2.3.3. Interpretation

The results of this section show a robust resistance among a large share of survey respondents to equalizing outcomes even when the policy problem is unconstrained by the practical concerns of efficiency and desert that typically matter in taxation. One possible explanation is that respondents may disagree with the objective assumed in conventional optimal tax analyses. The next section turns to evidence on that possibility.

3. Preference for CBBT as a principle of optimal taxation

I now turn to the second novel finding of this paper: a widespread preference among survey respondents for a classical benefit-based logic for taxation over the conventional approach’s logic of diminishing marginal social welfare of income. First, however, I provide a primer on CBBT, as it and its formulation in the modern optimal tax model are not well known. The interested reader can find a brief formal treatment in the Appendix and a more thorough treatment, including additional analytical results and a discussion of the sharp contrast between CBBT’s past prominence and its present neglect in tax scholarship, in Weinzierl (2016).

3.1. Primer on CBBT

CBBT is the combination of two ideas: taxes ought to be based on the benefit an individual obtains from the activities of the state; and the best measure of that benefit is how much the state’s activities increase the economic opportunities (i.e., the income-earning ability) of the individual.

To solidify ideas, it may help to show how CBBT can be represented within the apparatus of modern tax theory. As in the standard setup, suppose a social planner chooses taxes and the level of public spending. Individuals are differentiated by ability \( w \), indexed with \( i \), and derive utility according to

\[
U(c_i, l_i) = u(c_i) - v\left(\frac{y_i}{w_i}\right),
\]

where \( c_i \) is private consumption for individual \( i \), \( y_i \) is \( i \)'s income, and \( \frac{y_i}{w_i} \) is work effort. Individuals take the tax system as given and maximize their own utility, yielding equilibrium consumption and income allocations \( \{c_i', y_i'\}_{i=1} \) and utility levels \( U_i' \).

To capture CBBT in this setup requires two novel steps. First, we make individuals’ heterogeneous income-earning abilities endogenous functions of both endowed ability and public goods spending. Formally,

\[
w_i = f(a_i, G),
\]

where \( i \in I \) now indexes endowed ability types \( a, G \geq 0 \) is the level of spending on public goods, and \( f(\cdot) \) is a differentiable ability production function. Second, we apply the method of Lindahl (1919) to determine the first-best optimal allocation under CBBT. That method has us consider a hypothetical scenario in which each individual \( i \) is assigned a share of total taxes to be paid, \( \tau_i \), and then allowed to choose the level of public goods provision that maximizes her utility subject to her personal budget constraint taking \( \tau_i \) as given. Lindahl defined optimal policy as that in which two conditions are satisfied: first, the personalized shares cause each type to prefer the same quantity of public goods; second, the cost of the public goods is fully covered by tax payments. In this way, individuals’ tax payments correspond to the benefits—in increased productive ability—they obtain from the public goods funded by taxes.

As mentioned in the Introduction, CBBT has played and continues to play a prominent role in American rhetoric on tax policy. An important example is the following statement by President Barack Obama, who in 2011 argued for increased progressivity of the income tax:

“As a country that values fairness, wealthier individuals have traditionally borne a greater share of this [tax] burden than the middle class or those less fortunate....it’s a basic reflection of our belief that those who’ve benefited most from our way of life can afford to give back a little bit more.”

Here, Obama argues that taxes ought to be based on benefit from “our way of life,” and he explicitly links that benefit to the taxpayer’s ability to pay. This combination of two classic principles of tax design (benefit-based and ability-based) into a “benefit-as-ability” based principle is a particularly succinct statement of CBBT. It recalls a more famous statement of it by Adam Smith (1776) as his first maxim of taxation: “The subjects of every state ought to contribute toward the support of the government, as near as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.”

The normative appeal of CBBT, according to its advocates, is due in part to its avoidance of coercive taxation. Of course, benefit as defined here is unobservable, so that the second-best CBBT tax system will be coercive in one sense. Nevertheless, CBBT’s supporters argue that there remains an essential difference between the benefit-based system and one that maximizes a consequentialist social welfare function. The goal of the former, but not the latter, is for an individual to pay an amount for the activities of the state that

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14 It is this step that lends, according to benefit-based taxation’s advocates, such a system a claim to being voluntary rather than coercive.

15 See the debate over the phrase “you didn’t build that” in the 2012 U.S. presidential election, as discussed in Weinzierl (2016).
is determined by his or her willingness to pay (i.e., marginal rate of substitution).

For the purposes of this paper, it is important to note that optimal taxes under CBBT do not depend on the distribution of after-tax incomes. Instead, they are defined by the relationship between individuals’ innate abilities and pre-tax incomes, in stark contrast to the conventional normative approach in optimal tax.

While there exists evidence for CBBT playing a role in elite rhetoric and thinking on tax policy, no direct evidence on its appeal to the public has been gathered. I turn to that evidence next.

3.2. Survey evidence of support for CBBT

Immediate after respondents make their choices in the hypothetical tax-like situation described in Section 2, the screen shown in Fig. 3 asks them to consider the reasoning behind their choices.

The first of the two reasons refers to the logic of diminishing marginal social welfare of income applied in conventional optimal tax analyses, while the second reason refers to the CBBT principle. After respondents make their choice on the question in Fig. 3, the survey asks about the strength of their opinions on both reasons. Specifically, respondents are asked whether they strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree with each of the reasons in Fig. 3.

In response to this question, 70% (s.e. 1.0%) of the respondents prefer the classical benefit-based justification to the conventional one. Moreover, Table 3 shows, nearly 70% of the 30% who prefer the conventional logic state that they either agree or strongly agree with CBBT, bringing the total share of respondents expressing support for CBBT to over 90%. In contrast, less than half of those who prefer CBBT express agreement with the conventional logic.

These results suggest that, when reasoning over tax policy, Americans are more comfortable with the logic of CBBT than with the logic typically applied in modern optimal tax analyses.

3.2.1. Robustness to survey design

Changes to the overall survey design (as described in Section 2) and to the wording of this question generate variation around the 70% overall figure, but the share of respondents preferring CBBT lies between 62% and 79% in all versions. The smallest share (62%, s.e. 3.0%) is obtained in the discrete options version described in Section 2.3.3. The largest shares are obtained in either the outcomes-only version described earlier (78%, s.e. 3.8%), or in a version that excludes the phrase “didn’t do anything to deserve ending up” and replaces it with “ends up” in the first option in Fig. 3 (79%, s.e. 2.3%).

3.2.2. Robustness across respondent traits

Tables 4 and 5 summarize support for CBBT across self-reported demographic traits and political views. Statistical analysis in Section 4 will largely support these simple cross-tabulations, though with some suggestive exceptions.

These patterns—none of the differences across answers is statistically significant—suggest that support for CBBT is largely universal, consistent with both the substantial support it receives among those respondents who prefer the conventional logic and its use by elite political figures in the United States.

4. Link between results: the moral significance of pre-tax income

In this section, I show that the two previous sections’ findings are linked: that is, respondents who more strongly resist equalization of unequal outcomes due to innate brute luck are more likely to prefer the classical benefit-based logic for taxation. After presenting evidence of this linkage, I discuss one potential interpretation of it that relates to the debate over whether pre-tax incomes ought to be considered morally relevant for tax design, and I address a few interpretive questions.

Visual evidence of this linkage is shown in Fig. 4, which gives the share of respondents preferring the CBBT principle (and 95% confidence intervals) for six ranges of answers to how much Person A should pay.

This figure shows a substantial (and statistically significant) decline in the share supporting CBBT as affinity for redistribution rises. This pattern holds across variations of the survey questions, including in the discrete choice versions described in Section 2.3.3 (where support for redistribution was greater).

Table 6 presents the results of a simple regression analysis revealing that this relationship between resistance to redistribution and support for CBBT is sizeable and statistically significant.

Calculating marginal effects for these results implies that a $1,000 decrease in “Person A pays” is associated with an increase of 1.1 percentage points in the likelihood that the respondent prefers the CBBT logic (the mean value is 71%). Extrapolating this effect across

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
<th>Widespread support for CBBT over conventional logic.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CBBT logic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred logic</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion on logic if not preferred</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat agree</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat disagree</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expressing agreement</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The final row is a sum: e.g., 0.91 is the share preferring CBBT (0.70) plus the share of those preferring the conventional logic who either strongly or somewhat agree with CBBT (0.30*(0.11+0.59)).
Equal Sacrifice and benefit-based taxation was hinted at in Feldstein support CBBT. The conceptual relationship between the principle of sacrifice being borne equally (rather than more by the rich) are more likely to respond to those who believe the “sacrifice” from paying taxes ought to be borne equally. 

This is discussed at greater length in Weinzierl (2016). Innate inequality due to (at least) most Americans, in contrast, at least partially endorse the view that individuals, inequality due to brute luck is unacceptable unless proven otherwise and therefore not the proper object of redistribution.

The only other significant relationship in Table 5 shows that respondents who believe the pre-tax income’s moral significance and the burden of proof for desert.

One way to interpret the linkage between respondents’ views of luck-based inequality and CBBT relates to a current debate in both optimal tax theory and political philosophy over whether pre-tax incomes are relevant to optimal tax policy. Murphy and Nagel (2002) forcefully argue that they are not: “Pretax income, in particular, has no independent moral significance. It does not define something to which the taxpayer has a prepolitical or natural right, and which the government expropriates from the individual in levying taxes on it.”

Respondents to this paper’s survey appear to disagree with Murphy and Nagel’s view. A majority effectively grant Person A some entitlement to a purely luck-based advantage, bestowing on pre-tax incomes a moral relevance it is denied by a conventional welfarist objective. Consistent with that position, respondents more willing to accept inequality due to innate brute luck also prefer to assign taxes based on CBBT, a principle that seeks to implement a more “voluntary” tax system and defines optimality in terms of the relationship between pre-tax incomes and taxes paid. In other words, a large share of this paper’s survey respondents appear to put some of the burden of proof for desert on the opposite side of where luck egalitarian political philosophers do. For luck egalitarians, inequality due to brute luck is unacceptable unless proven otherwise and therefore should be offset. Our results suggest that most Americans, in contrast, at least partially endorse the view that inequality due to (at least innate) brute luck is acceptable unless proven otherwise and therefore not the proper object of redistribution.

The idea that pre-tax incomes and taxes are morally relevant to the public sharply contradicts the standard approach, this paper is part of a recent body of work finding evidence for it. A large literature has demonstrated the existence of an endowment effect, in that individuals exhibit loss aversion over initial holdings. Remarkably, Charité et al. (2015) find evidence that people are willing to give moral force to this psychological phenomenon. They demonstrate that M-Turk respondents are less likely to equalize random allocations across individuals if those individuals know the results of the randomization (as they do in this paper’s survey) than if they do not. Charité et al. interpret this finding as evidence that “individuals, placed in the position of a social planner, do in fact respect the reference points of others.” This possibility provides another way to interpret this paper’s evidence on distributional preferences. In other recent work, Saez and Stantcheva (2016) find “...evidence showing that both disposable income and taxes paid matter and hence that subjects are neither pure utilitarians (for whom only disposable income matters) nor pure libertarians (for whom only taxed paid matter).” In the formal terms of their analysis, the marginal social welfare weight that the public appears to grant to an individual, which determines the optimal allocation for that person, depends positively on the taxes that person pays. Almas et al. (2016) have Norwegians and Americans make distributional choices and find that “A significantly larger share of the Americans choose according to a libertarian fairness view (which considers both inequalities due to luck and inequalities due to a difference in productivity

4.1. Pretax income’s moral significance and the burden of proof for desert

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Inc as child</th>
<th>Inc as adult</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>25–39</td>
<td>40+</td>
<td>≤A.B.</td>
<td>A.B.+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs</td>
<td></td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>1051</td>
<td>1626</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political position</th>
<th>Libertarianism</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Dist. of sacrifice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>Opp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 4. Share of respondents choosing CBBT, by their response to “Person A pays”.

18 Weinzierl (2014) presents evidence for the role of Equal Sacrifice in public views of tax policy, and Scheve and Stasavage (2016) present extensive evidence on the importance of Equal Sacrifice as a principle guiding tax policy across a range of countries over the last century.
as fair).” Finally, Weinzierl (2014, 2016) has shown evidence that two unconventional principles, J.S. Mill’s (1871) principle of Equal Sacrifice and CBBT, both capture an aspect of public reasoning over tax policy in which pre-tax incomes are relevant to optimal policy. In fact, some moral philosophers also resist that claim that pre-tax incomes are morally irrelevant. Brennan (2005) writes: “The problem with Murphy and Nagel’s argument, as I see it, is that it takes an entirely defensible claim—namely that individuals do not have an incontestable moral claim to their individual gross incomes—and replaces it with a much stronger claim—that they have no moral claim to their individual incomes at all...I think there is a middle turf. I think it’s obvious that there’s a middle turf.” This paper’s evidence suggests that a large share of Americans agree.

4.2. Interpretative questions

The results in this paper raise a number of interpretive questions. Here, I address a few of them.

First, would respondents choose differently if the hypothetical situation in Fig. 1 had put the unlucky person in a much worse absolute position? In particular, would respondents be more likely to make a net transfer to Person B in that case? These questions highlight an important point. If putting Person B in a state that mimics poverty were to likely yield more support for net transfers from Person A, such a result would be entirely consistent with the conclusions above. As noted, the choices of respondents, both over equalization and their preferred principle of taxation, reinforce the evidence from a wide range of sources that most people balance competing normative principles when making judgments such as these. If Person B were put in a dire position, the force of the egalitarian principles in most people’s calculations would increase dramatically, so respondents having Person A pay more would not imply general support for equalization of brute luck.

Second, what if the resistance to equalization reflects empathy with loss aversion (as in Charité et al., 2015), so that respondents’ hesitancy to take away from Person A and give to Person B can be explained with a conventional utilitarian logic? Though this possibility may seem like a challenge to this paper’s conclusions, it can be seen as another way to state them. The evidence presented here shows that survey respondents are willing to grant that pre-tax incomes have some moral significance and, therefore, that individuals have some justifiable claims with regard to them. This willingness means that a reshuffling of those pre-tax incomes would change the set of claims respondents would grant to individuals. Such a change seems illogical to someone convinced that what matters (from a moral perspective) are after-tax incomes—after all, how could a random reassignment of pre-tax incomes change the optimal assignment of outcomes? But respondents are not convinced that what matters are after-tax incomes; in fact they seem to hold the view that even entirely luck-based pre-tax incomes are reasonable starting points for the determination of taxes (after all, they endorse CBBT as a principle of tax design). So long as respondents view pre-tax incomes as meaningful, explaining their responses as reflecting empathy with loss aversion is simply one way of describing the judgments this paper’s results highlight.

Third, how are these results consistent with the value most individuals evidently place on insurance? After all, one of the most familiar justifications for tax policy that offsets innate inequality is that it provides insurance for otherwise uninsurable risk. The debate in political philosophy over this argument is vast, but for the purposes of this paper the important point is that most survey respondents appear to be at least somewhat hesitant to embrace the insurance analogy when it comes to innate risk—that is, risk at the “starting point”—contrary to the arguments not only of Harsanyi but also, famously, of John Rawls (1971). Instead, they appear to treat such risk, even though it is clearly brute luck and therefore outside the control of individuals, as just or at least not unjust, consistent with the counterarguments of Nozick (1974).

5. Conclusion

The main contribution of this paper is to present new survey evidence of ways in which a large share of Americans—arguably a majority—are ambivalent toward key features of the normative framework that has been generally adopted by modern optimal tax analyses. Important caveats apply: this evidence is drawn from a particular, non-representative sample, and the survey’s design reflects many specific choices that may affect the results. Nevertheless, to the extent that these findings indicate sincere normative diversity in most people’s attitudes toward distributive justice, and to the extent that optimal tax theorists want their models to be consonant with public priorities for taxation, researchers ought to consider capturing that ambivalence in their work, as well.

These results raise many questions that will require substantial time and further study to answer. Do respondents’ answer reflect their considered preferences or their gut reactions that would change if they gave more time to the questions? Would “education” in these issues change their preferences? Do respondents’ stated preferences for these hypothetical scenarios translate into votes for specific policies and policymakers? Exploring these questions will further improve our understanding of popular reasoning on distributive justice.

Appendix A

A.1. Conventional optimal tax model

The standard modern optimal tax model, modified to allow for preference heterogeneity, has the following structure.20

A population of individuals differ in two unobservable ways, income-earning ability $w \geq 0$, and preferences for leisure $\theta \geq 0$, jointly distributed according to the density $f(w, \theta)$. Each individual

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19 One way in which empathy with loss aversion would be morally distinct is if it continued to apply in a situation where advantages were acquired unjustly, an open and interesting question for future research.

20 This follows Mirrlees (1971), Saez (2001), and Lockwood and Weinzierl (2015).
has utility of after-tax income $c$ and pre-tax income $y$ that depends on the product of $w$ and $\theta$ according to the utility function $u(c(y,w,\theta))$.

A tax authority specifies bundles of pre-tax and after-tax income to maximize a function of individual utilities. The authority’s normative judgments may depend on $w$ and $\theta$, not just the product $w\theta$. The objective is:

$$\max_{\{c(w,\theta), y(w)\}} \int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty G(U(c(w,\theta), y(w,\theta)), w, \theta) f(w, \theta) \, dw \, d\theta, \quad (2)$$

where $G(\cdot)$ is assumed to be an increasing and concave function of utility. The tax authority faces a feasibility constraint:

$$\int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty (y(w,\theta) - c(w,\theta)) f(w, \theta) \, dw \, d\theta \geq 0, \quad (3)$$

and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints that guarantee individuals choose labor supply optimally:

$$U(c(w,\theta), y(w,\theta), w, \theta) \geq U(c(w',\theta), y(w',\theta), w, \theta), \quad \forall w, w', \theta, \theta'. \quad (4)$$

To solve for the optimal tax policy, Eq. (2) is maximized subject to Eqs. (3) and (4).

A.2. CBBT optimal tax model

Section 3.1 shows how to modify this conventional setup to find the first-best optimal allocations under CBBT, which I call a First-Best Lindahl Equilibrium. The feature of these allocations most relevant to this paper is the taxes paid by each individual. To characterize those taxes, I first define a key elasticity term:

**Definition 1.** Define the Hicksian partial elasticity of complementarity between public goods and endowed ability, $\theta^{G\alpha}_i$, as:

$$\theta^{G\alpha}_i = \frac{f_{\alpha}(a_i, G)}{f_G(a_i, G) f_{\alpha}(a_i, G)}, \quad (5)$$

at a given $G$.

The Hicksian partial elasticity of complementarity captures the degree to which public goods and endowed ability magnify each other in determining income-earning ability. If $\theta^{G\alpha}_i \leq 0$, endowed ability and public goods are not complements in the production of income-earning ability. If $\theta^{G\alpha}_i \in (0, 1)$ the elasticity of income-earning ability with respect to the level of public goods spending is positive but decreasing in endowed ability; if $\theta^{G\alpha}_i > 1$, the elasticity of income-earning ability with respect to the level of public goods spending is increasing in endowed ability.

As shown formally in Weinzierl (2016), this elasticity of complementarity determines the progressivity of tax rates under CBBT. If $\theta^{G\alpha}_i > 1$, so that those high in endowed ability benefit more than proportionally from the activities of the state, average tax rates are progressive (i.e., they increase in endowed ability). If $\theta^{G\alpha}_i < 1$ taxes are regressive, and if $\theta^{G\alpha}_i = 1$ taxes are proportional to income. This last case, which Smith (1776) appears to endorse, obtains if we assume a multiplicative form for the ability production function, i.e., $f(a_i, G) = h(a_i, G)$ for some functions $h(a_i)$, $g(G)$. In that case, the flat tax rate on income equals the elasticity of income-earning ability with respect to public goods spending. For example, if $g(G) = g^1$ for some $\gamma > 0$, then the CBBT-optimal tax policy is a uniform tax rate of $\gamma$. Note that the setup of the scenario in Fig. 1 implies that the ability production function $f(a_i, G)$ takes this multiplicative form.

**Appendix B. Supplementary data**

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.09.007.

**References**


