


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The Political Economy of Firm Networks: CEO Ideology and Global Trade *

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Abstract

We examine how the political ideology of corporate leaders shapes cross-border firm networks. Exploiting changes in ideological alignment between U.S. firm CEOs and foreign governments around close foreign elections, we show that U.S. firms are more likely to terminate trade relationships with countries led by governments whose ideology becomes more distant from that of their CEOs. The impact is concentrated among CEOs holding strong political views, and is particularly pronounced for shorter trade relationships, suggesting ideological alignment is more relevant in more flexible and substitutable connections. Our findings highlight the role of ideology in shaping the formation and persistence of international firm networks.

Keywords: global trade, firm networks, political ideology, elections, political economy

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1 Introduction

Geopolitical tensions have been on the rise, disrupting the increasingly interconnected economic relationships between nations. A large academic literature examines the effects of government-imposed trade barriers, such as tariffs, sanctions, and industrial policies, on international trade (see, e.g., Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2022); Irwin (2020), and Juhász, Lane, and Rodrik (2024)). Much less is known about “private sanctions” (Hart, Thesmar, and Zingales (2023))—firms severing ties with countries for reasons beyond profit or government policy, such as the political ideology of their leaders. Understanding the role of leadership ideology is particularly relevant given rising political polarization of U.S. executive teams (Fos, Kempf, and Tsoutsoura (2025)) and the emerging evidence that partisanship and political ideology influence economic decisions, even in high-stakes professional settings (see Kempf and Tsoutsoura (2024) for a review). If leaders’ political views shape firms’ trade relationships, this could have important implications for the resilience of global supply chains, the diversification of economic ties, and the broader trajectory of globalization.

In this paper, we examine how the ideological alignment between corporate leaders and foreign governments influences the formation and persistence of firms’ global trade relationships. Identifying the causal effect of such alignment presents two main challenges. First, ideological similarity often coincides with other factors, such as geographic, linguistic, or cultural proximity. Second, changes in ideological distance may occur alongside shifts in trade policy, further complicating causal inference.

To address these challenges, we compile a novel dataset combining granular trade transaction data from S&P Global’s Panjiva database with U.S. CEOs’ political affiliations from voter registration records. Following Kempf, Luo, Schäfer, and Tsoutsoura (2023), we measure ideological distance between U.S. CEOs and foreign governments using party ideology scores from the Manifesto Project Database (Volkens, Lehmann, Matthieß, Merz, Regel,

and Weßels (2018)). We exploit close elections in foreign countries as a quasi-natural experiment, using them as an exogenous source of variation in ideological distance. This allows us to compare changes in trade patterns between Democratic- and Republican-led U.S. firms trading with the same country at the time of the same foreign election.

Our findings reveal that CEOs' political ideology significantly shapes firms' global trade networks. Specifically, firms whose CEO experiences an increase in ideological distance after a foreign election are 6 percentage points less likely to maintain trade ties with that country, compared to firms whose CEO experiences a decrease in ideological distance. This effect represents a 12% decline relative to the baseline trade probability and is present in both import and export relationships. Furthermore, the effect persists with similar magnitude (a 13.9% decline) when we include product category \times time fixed effects, thus comparing firms trading the same product and ensuring that shifts in demand or product-specific trade policies do not drive the results. In terms of the timing of trade adjustments, the decline in trade begins in the first six months after the election and persists for at least two years, with no evidence of pre-trends—consistent with the unexpected nature of close elections. We also find that the effect is stronger for shorter trade relationships, suggesting that firms sever ties more easily when partnerships are flexible and substitutable.

Additional tests support the interpretation that these effects are driven by CEOs' beliefs or preferences. Specifically, we posit that aligned and misaligned CEOs differ in their perception of the expected profitability of continuing trade relationships with a given country following the election. To test this channel, we conduct a within-supplier analysis comparing Democratic- and Republican-led firms trading with the same supplier in the same foreign country around the same election. This approach eliminates the possibility that the trade partners of Democratic- and Republican-led firms are differentially affected by the government change. Moreover, the effect holds for both small and large U.S. public firms, as well as for visible and less visible CEOs, making it unlikely that foreign governments are selectively targeting high-profile U.S. companies based on their CEOs' political

leanings. Consistent with a CEO preference or belief channel, we find that the effect is strongest among CEOs who are highly politically engaged, as indicated by their voter turnout, and among those with more extreme political views, as reflected by the ideologies of the candidates they support financially.

Finally, we explore how firms reshape their trade networks in response to shifts in ideological alignment. Rather than reallocating trade to other foreign countries, firms whose CEO experiences increased ideological distance reduce the total number of foreign trade partners and are less likely to form new relationships. This suggests that ideological distance does not simply redirect trade flows but instead contracts the breadth of firms' global supply chains, potentially reducing diversification and increasing exposure to country-specific shocks (e.g., Bonadio, Huo, Levchenko, and Pandalai-Nayar (2021)).

The rest of this study proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the related literature. Section 3 presents the data, sample construction, and summary statistics. Section 4 describes our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents our main results on how CEOs' ideological alignment with foreign governments influences their decision to engage in trade with a foreign country. Section 6 explores potential economic mechanisms and Section 7 provides evidence on how firms reshape their overall trade networks in response to shifts in political alignment with foreign countries. Section 8 concludes.

2 Related Literature

Our study contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it adds to the extensive body of work that examines the economic effects of trade frictions. Much of this literature has focused on tariffs and other government-imposed interventions, estimating the costs of protectionist policies (see, e.g., Irwin (2020) and Juhász, Lane, and Rodrik (2024) for reviews).¹ More recently, studies have analyzed the increase in protectionism, including

¹Beyond the effect of government-imposed interventions, the literature has established other non-government policy-related determinants in the decision to establish or terminate trade relationships, such as natural disasters (Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016); Boehm, Flaaen, and Pandalai-Nayar (2019); Carvalho,

the U.S.-China trade war (e.g., Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2022); Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019); Canayaz, Erel, Gurun, and Wu (2024); Cen, Cohen, Wu, and Zhang (2024)). By examining how corporate leaders’ political ideology shapes international economic exchange, our paper relates more closely to the emerging literature on “private sanctions” (Hart, Thesmar, and Zingales (2023)). This topic is particularly relevant given the growing political polarization of U.S. executive teams (Fos, Kempf, and Tsoutsoura (2025)), yet remains largely unexplored.² We address this gap by analyzing how CEOs’ political ideology influences the structure of firms’ global trade networks.

In this strand of the literature, two contemporaneous papers are closely related to ours. Ayyagari, Gao, and Ma (2025) measure bilateral relations between the U.S. and foreign governments based on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. They then examine how U.S. firms adjust their import decisions in response to changes in these bilateral relations, depending on whether their CEO is politically aligned with the U.S. administration. Their observed firm response likely reflects two effects: (i) ideologically driven differences in CEOs’ perceptions of the (risk-adjusted) profitability of foreign trade relationships, and (ii) the desire to strengthen political connections with the U.S. government by supporting its policies. In contrast, our paper focuses on identifying the ideological differences between CEOs and their effects on firms’ foreign trade relationships, without conditioning on whether the CEO’s ideology aligns with the U.S. administration.

The second contemporaneous paper is Charoenwong, Peng, and Wu (2025), which does not focus on CEO ideology but instead measures a firm’s political leaning using its Political Action Committee (PAC) donations. They find that greater ideological distance between a firm and a foreign country leads to reduced imports from that country. A key difference between their study and ours is that Charoenwong, Peng, and Wu (2025) do

Nirei, Saito, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2021)), ESG incidents (e.g., Koenig and Poncet (2022), Bisetti, She, and Zaldokas (2024)), terrorist attacks (Tan, Wang, and Zhang (2024)), equity ownership by trade partners (Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006)), and CEO turnovers (Intintoli, Serfling, and Shaikh (2017)).

²One notable exception is Chandler, Kim, Waddingham, and Hill (2023), who show that firms with Republican CEOs are more likely to enter foreign markets via acquisitions, whereas firms with Democratic CEOs are more likely to use strategic alliances.

not exploit close elections and find that the decline in imports begins six months before the election. In contrast, our analysis takes advantage of quasi-exogenous variation in ideological alignment induced by close elections and isolates the causal effect of CEO ideology on trade relationships.

Beyond global trade, a growing literature examines how political or ideological distance influences other forms of economic exchange. Duchin, Farroukh, Harford, and Patel (2022) find that the political distance between workforces affects M&A activity. Kempf, Luo, Schäfer, and Tsoutsoura (2023) show that ideological alignment with foreign governments shapes cross-border capital allocation by large U.S. institutional investors. Aiyar, Malacrino, and Presbitero (2024) show that geopolitical distance between countries affects foreign direct investment. Our paper thus also contributes to a broader understanding of how political ideology and polarization influence corporate decisions and firm outcomes (see Kempf and Tsoutsoura (2024) for a review).

3 Data

Our dataset combines trade transaction-level data from S&P Panjiva with information on the party affiliations of U.S. CEOs from voter registration records and party ideology scores and election data from the Manifesto Project Database. We describe each data source in more detail below.

3.1 Global Trade Relationships

We use S&P Panjiva to obtain transaction-level records of physical goods traded between U.S. firms and international trade partners via vessels between 2007 and 2021. Panjiva collects these data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) using Bills of Lading (BOLs). The records provide the names and addresses of the U.S. buyers or sellers, product descriptions, imputed Harmonized System (HS) codes based on these descriptions, ship-

ment dates, and the quantities imported or exported (measured in twenty-foot equivalent units, TEUs). For import records, Panjiva also provides the names and addresses of foreign sellers, while export records include only the destination country without information on the identity of the buyer. Flaaen, Haberkorn, Lewis, Monken, Pierce, Rhodes, and Yi (2023) offer a comprehensive description of Panjiva dataset.

We construct our sample following the approach in Smirnyagin and Tsyvinski (2022). For the import data, we match U.S. buyers in Panjiva with entities covered by the Capital IQ database via a cross-reference table provided by Panjiva, and then aggregate these entities to their ultimate parent company level, as outlined in Jain and Wu (2023). This allows us to attribute import transactions executed by multiple entities to the corresponding parent company. Next, we link these parent companies to Compustat using the crosswalk file provided by WRDS. We exclude shipments for which the supplier country is either unknown or the United States. For the export data, we proceed analogously by linking U.S. sellers to their parent companies in Compustat.

We classify products into product categories based on their 2-digit Harmonized System (HS) codes and will refer to these as “products” for brevity. Internet Appendix Table IA.1 provides the descriptions for the top 15 product categories by trading volume in our sample. In our robustness tests, discussed in Section 5.2 below, we show that our main results are similar if we use finer product categories, such as 4- or 6-digit HS codes.

We aggregate shipments at the U.S. firm \times product \times foreign country \times half-year level. To focus on the most relevant countries in a firm’s global trade network, we restrict the sample to the top five foreign countries in a given firm-product pair, defined based on the total import and export volume during the entire sample period. A detailed description of the data cleaning steps is provided in the Internet Appendix IA.A.1.

3.2 Ideological Distance

Measuring the ideological alignment between U.S. CEOs and foreign governments requires three ingredients: (i) data on foreign elections in countries where U.S. firms trade, (ii) information on U.S. CEOs' political party affiliations, and (iii) a measure of ideological distance between the party of the U.S. CEO and the ruling party abroad.

First, we obtain data on foreign elections from the Manifesto Project Database (MPD), which covers national lower-house elections in over 50 countries.³ The information provided by the MPD includes the election date and the vote shares of each party. For each election, we consider the party with the highest vote share as the winning party. To ensure accuracy, we cross-check election dates and winning parties against the Parliaments and Governments (ParlGov) Database (<https://www.parlgov.org/>).

Because Panjiva data span the years 2007 to 2021, we focus on elections taking place between 2009 and 2019 to capture at least two years of data before and after each election. After restricting to elections in countries where U.S. firms commonly trade, we obtain a sample of 137 foreign elections in 49 countries. About 57 of these elections involve a change of the victorious party. The average (median) margin of victory, measured as the absolute difference between the highest and the second-highest vote shares, is 11.4 (8.4) percentage points.

In addition to data on election outcomes, the MPD also provides a standardized assessment of the ideology of each political party, by coding parties' electoral manifestos. Using each party's election program, the MPD classifies each party's position across various policy dimensions—some of which are pre-assigned as right or left based on the left-right political spectrum outlined by Laver and Budge (1992).⁴ The approach uses publicly available pre-election documents and represents the most commonly used measure to gauge policy positions (Budge (2001)). Following Lowe, Benoit, Mikhaylov, and Laver (2011),

³See Volkens, Lehmann, Matthieß, Merz, Regel, and Weßels (2018) for a detailed description of the database.

⁴We provide the full list of right and left policy positions in Internet Appendix Table IA.4.

we compute a party’s left-right ideology score by comparing the share of manifesto content devoted to right- versus left-learning policy categories.⁵

Second, to infer the political affiliations of U.S. CEOs, we begin with all CEOs of U.S.-headquartered firms covered in the S&P ExecuComp database between 2008 and 2018.⁶ We infer executives’ political affiliations from voter registration records, which we obtain from two sources, as in Fos, Kempf, and Tsoutsoura (2025). Specifically, we combine voter registration records obtained directly from the boards of election in California (Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Sonoma), Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts (Boston, Cambridge), North Carolina, New Jersey, New York (New York City), Ohio, and Texas, with commercial voter data from L2, Inc., which covers registered voters in all 50 states (and DC) going back to 2014. See Fos, Kempf, and Tsoutsoura (2025) for a detailed description of the two data sources.

The combined voter data contains identifying information, such as the voter’s name, date of birth, and mailing address, as well as the voter’s party affiliation at the time of a given election and an indicator for the election(s) in which the individual has voted. The elections covered are general and primary elections, and in some cases, municipal elections. Whenever possible, we infer political affiliation based on the voter’s registration status at a given point in time. When registration status is unavailable, we infer political affiliation based on the primaries in which the individual has voted. For example, if a voter has most recently voted in a Republican primary, we will classify her as Republican. For voters in L2, we backfill the first observed party affiliation in order to increase our data coverage prior to 2014.

We match CEOs to voters using their full names, age, and location, as described in more detail in Internet Appendix IA.A.2. Of the 4,383 U.S. CEOs in ExecuComp, we

⁵Specifically, the ideology score for party p is calculated as $Ideology_p = Ln(\frac{R_p+0.5}{L_p+0.5})$, where L_p and R_p represent the counts of quasi-sentences in the party p ’s manifesto assigned to left and right policy categories, respectively.

⁶We choose this time period because our election data spans the years 2009 to 2019 and we measure CEO ideology one year prior to the election, as we discuss in Section 4 below. We further exclude a small number of firm-year observations with multiple CEOs in the same year.

successfully match 3,182 to a unique voter in the the voter registration data.

Third, using the standardized left-right ideology scores for political parties from the MFD, we can measure the ideological distance between a given U.S. CEO’s political party and a foreign party as the absolute difference between the parties’ ideology scores.

3.3 Sample Construction

To construct our final sample, we proceed as follows. Our starting point is the set of U.S. firms covered in the Panjiva trade data, which can be linked to Compustat and are led by either a Republican or a Democratic CEO. Internet Appendix IA.A.3 provides a detailed breakdown of the number of U.S. firms remaining at each matching step. We then stack up the foreign election events covered in the MPD database in event time, and select all firm-product pairs with at least one trade with the foreign country during a four-year window around the election (i.e., nine half-year periods: four pre-election, one event period, and four post-election periods). Our main analysis focuses on close elections, defined as those in which the vote share difference is less than 5 percentage points, following Akey (2015) and Heitz, Wang, and Wang (2023).⁷ Our final sample covers 570 U.S. firms, which are run by 656 partisan CEOs and trade with 27 foreign countries around 40 close foreign elections. Internet Appendix Figure IA.1 reports the percentage of firm-year observations led by Democratic and Republican CEOs. The majority of CEOs are affiliated with the Republican party, with Republican CEOs accounting for about 78% of observations.

Table 1 reports summary statistics for our final sample. The average firm exchanges approximately 5.6 shipments with a given foreign country in a given product category and half-year. Firms trade with a small set of trading partners: the average firm trades with about 5.6 countries in the same product category, and imports from 7.7 suppliers. They also trade a limited set of products within each product category: firms trade an average

⁷In our robustness tests, discussed in Section 5.2 below, we show that we find similar results when we include non-close elections, or when we use alternative definitions of close elections, such as those with a vote share difference of less than 3 percentage points or with a vote share difference in the bottom quartile across all elections in MPD.

of 1.6 4-digit HS codes and 2 6-digit HS codes within the same 2-digit product category and trade country.

4 Empirical Strategy

This section describes the empirical framework used to identify the effect of CEOs' ideological alignment with foreign governments on firms' international trade relationships. We hypothesize that firms led by CEOs who are ideologically more distant to the party in power in a foreign country are more pessimistic about the expected economic benefits of trading with that country. Alternatively, CEOs may experience greater non-pecuniary disutility from engaging with foreign countries whose government they disapprove of. Whether through a belief or a preference channel, we predict that U.S. firms are less likely to establish or maintain trade relationships with a foreign country when their CEOs are more ideologically distant from the governing party.

Isolating the effect of ideological alignment is empirically challenging for at least two reasons. First, the ideological alignment between a Democratic or Republican CEO and the elected party in the foreign country may correlate with other measures of proximity, such as commonality of language, religion, or culture. For example, a Hispanic CEO might be more likely to engage in trade with Spanish-speaking countries, and he/she may also be more likely affiliated with the Democratic party.⁸ Second, the profitability of trade relationships with a foreign country may be directly affected by political events, such as elections or changes in bilateral political and regulatory relationships (e.g., Silvers (2021)). For example, if a newly elected party adopts a more hostile stance toward the United States, American firms may sever economic ties with that country to avoid obstacles like tariffs or stricter regulations.

Our empirical strategy addresses these challenges by comparing the trade behavior of

⁸For example, see <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/04/09/partisanship-by-race-ethnicity-and-education/>.

U.S. firms led by Democratic and Republican CEOs around the same foreign close election. Consider the following thought experiment: Two U.S. firms—one led by a Republican CEO and the other by a Democratic CEO—trade with partners in the Netherlands. Following the Dutch general election in 2010, the incumbent party Christian Democratic Appeal, led by Jan Peter Balkenende (classified as center to center-right in MPD), was succeeded by the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy under Mark Rutte (center-right, per MPD). As a result, the ideological distance to the ruling party narrows for the Republican CEO and widens for the Democratic CEO. We can therefore implement a difference-in-differences design that compares changes in each firm’s likelihood of maintaining trade relationships with the Netherlands before and after the election. This approach allows us to isolate the effect of the CEO’s ideological alignment from other time-invariant dimensions of proximity (e.g., cultural or linguistic) and to account for contemporaneous changes in trade policy, which should affect both U.S. firms equally. By focusing on close elections, we further mitigate concerns about selection effects due to anticipation of the election outcome.

To take this thought experiment to the data, we compute the change in firm f ’s CEO’s ideological distance to the ruling party in foreign country c around election e :

$$\Delta Distance_{fec} = |Ideology_{fec}^{CEO} - Ideology_{ec}^{Winner}| - |Ideology_{fec}^{CEO} - Ideology_{ec}^{Winner}|, \quad (1)$$

where $Ideology_{fec}^{CEO}$ denotes the left-right ideology score of firm f ’s CEO at the end of the year prior to election e in foreign country c , measured based on the most recent manifesto of the CEO’s political party. $Ideology_{ec}^{Winner}$ refers to the ideology score of the party that received the highest vote share in election e , measured using the party manifesto in election e . We define $Ideology_{ec}^{Winner}$ analogously, but with respect to election \underline{e} , that is the most recent election prior to election e . By fixing the CEO’s ideology score in a year prior to election e , the change in distance, $\Delta Distance_{fec}$, reflects only the outcome of the foreign election, not any subsequent shifts in the CEO’s ideological position. We then define $Distance Increase_{fec}$ as an indicator equal to one if $\Delta Distance_{fec}$ is non-negative, and

zero otherwise.⁹

Internet Appendix Table IA.2 provides examples that illustrate the computation of $\Delta Distance_{fec}$ for the 2010 general election in the Netherlands and for the 2012 election in France, respectively. As illustrated by the two examples, variation in our *Distance Increase* variable is generated only by elections in which Republicans experience an increase in ideological distance and Democrats experience a decrease, or vice versa. For example, the 2012 French election of the Socialist Party of François Hollande would not generate such variation, as both Republicans and Democrats experienced an increase in ideological distance following the election. About 45% of the close elections in our sample provide such identifying variation, and we report the full list of these elections in Internet Appendix Table IA.3. This feature implies that the variation we exploit is largely driven by elections involving parties that are not radically different from the two major U.S. parties. Finding an effect of CEO ideological alignment in this context is particularly interesting, as it suggests that even moderate shifts in foreign government leadership can trigger observable changes in trade patterns.

We then estimate the following regression:

$$Trade_{fcept} = \alpha_{ect} + \alpha_{fec} + \alpha_{pt} + \beta Distance\ Increase_{fec} \times Post_{ect} + \epsilon_{fpect}, \quad (2)$$

where $Trade_{fcept}$ is an indicator equal to one if firm f has imported or exported at least one shipment with the foreign country c in product category p in half-year t around election e . The indicator $Post_{ect}$ takes a value of one if half-year t falls in the post-election period (i.e., $\tau = 0$ to $\tau = +4$), and zero if it falls in the pre-election period (i.e., $\tau = -4$ to $\tau = -1$). We define the event window to span half-years $\tau = -4$ to $\tau = +4$ to avoid many

⁹Due to the small number of observations with exact-zero distance changes, our results are not sensitive regardless of the treatment of these observations. We prefer a binary treatment variable over a continuous measure in our baseline specification, given the recent literature highlighting issues with difference-in-differences designs with non-binary treatments and high-dimensional fixed effects (de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2020); de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2022)). Moreover, a binary treatment variable allows us to be agnostic about the exact functional form linking ideological distance to the propensity of maintaining trade relationships.

overlapping event windows, as the median time interval between parliamentary elections in a given country is four years. We stack our sample by country and election date, thus addressing concerns regarding differential weighting of events occurring earlier versus later in the sample period, as noted by de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2020), Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021), and Baker, Larcker, and Wang (2022). Due to some overlapping event windows, the unit of observation is a firm \times election \times product \times half-year rather than a firm \times country \times product \times half-year. We remove half-years in which a firm does not trade with any foreign country in a given product category and cluster standard errors at the firm \times country level.

By including election \times time fixed effects (α_{ect}), which subsume country \times time fixed effects, we are able to control for the direct macroeconomic impact of the election. Since our sample only consists of U.S. firms, these fixed effects also absorb potential time variation in the bilateral relations between the U.S. and foreign governing bodies. By including firm \times election fixed effects (α_{fec}), which subsume firm \times country fixed effects, we can control for any time-invariant differences in trade relationships across firm-country pairs. For example, we can rule out the possibility that firms consistently trade more with certain countries because of closer religious, ethnic, or cultural ties between corporate leaders and these countries, or because they already have well-established trading networks. Finally, we include product \times time fixed effects (α_{pt}) to control for time-varying, product-specific policy changes or demand shocks, such as the increased demand for minerals as a result of the rapid development of clean energy technologies during energy transitions.

To better understand the precise timing of the effects, we also estimate the following dynamic specification:

$$Trade_{fpect} = \alpha_{ect} + \alpha_{fec} + \alpha_{pt} + \sum_{\tau=-4}^{\tau=+4} \beta_{\tau} Distance\ Increase_{fec} \times D_{ect}^{\tau} + \epsilon_{fpect}, \quad (3)$$

where D_{ect}^{τ} stands for event-time dummies and all other variables are defined as above.

5 CEOs' Ideological Alignment and Foreign Trade

In this section, we examine the effect of CEOs' ideological alignment on their firms' foreign trade relationships. Section 5.1 presents the main results. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 discuss the results from our robustness and heterogeneity tests, respectively.

5.1 Main Results

We examine whether firms whose CEO experiences an increase in ideological distance are less likely to have an active trade relationship with the foreign country around a close election, relative to firms whose CEO experiences a decrease in ideological distance.

Table 2 presents the results from the estimation of equation (2). The coefficient of interest, $Distance\ Increase \times Post$, captures the effect of an increase in the CEO's ideological distance on the likelihood of trading with a foreign country. Across the various specifications, the estimates remain stable, suggesting that firms whose CEO experiences an increase in the ideological distance reduce the probability of trade with the foreign country in a given product category by 6 to 7 percentage points, relative to firms whose CEO experiences a decrease in the ideological distance. This effect corresponds to a 11.7% to 13.9% decline relative to the average probability of trade of 51% (see Table 1). To put this economic magnitude into perspective, we can compare our effect against firm responses to other economic and political shocks documented in the literature. For example, U.S. firms are about 4.5 percentage points more likely to terminate a trade relationship when their suppliers experience environmental & social (ES) incidents (Bisetti, She, and Zaldokas (2024)), and they are about 2.9 percentage points more likely to end relationships with suppliers located in areas following terrorist attacks (Tan, Wang, and Zhang (2024)). Thus, our effect is comparable or even larger than previously documented trade-relationship responses.

Our strictest specification in column (3), with the full set of fixed effects, ensures that

our results are not driven by (i) any time-varying economic or political shocks associated with the election outcomes that could impact firms’ trade decisions, such as shifts in bilateral relations or changes in macroeconomic conditions in foreign countries (election \times time fixed effects); by (ii) any firm-specific preference to trade with certain countries within an election cycle, such as firms with strong cultural or political ties to a certain country trading more with that country (firm \times election fixed effects); by (iii) any time-varying, product-specific policy changes or demand shocks, such as the increased demand for minerals as a result of the rapid development of clean energy technologies during energy transitions (product \times time fixed effects).

To shed light on the timing of the effect, Figure 1 plots the coefficients β_τ from equation (3) for close elections. The omitted period is $\tau = -4$, meaning that all subsequent differences are measured relative to the difference at $\tau = -4$. The figure illustrates a decline in the likelihood of trade for CEOs with an increasing ideological distance, compared to those with a decreasing ideological distance, following the election. The declines starts in the half-year after the election and persists for at least two years. Importantly, there is no evidence of pre-trends in the period before the election. Internet Appendix Figure IA.2 repeats the same plot using all foreign elections (i.e., including non-close elections) and reveals a similar pattern. We also report the estimation of equation (2) using all foreign elections in the Internet Appendix Table IA.5.

5.2 Alternative Specifications

In Internet Appendix Table IA.6, we report the results of alternative specifications for our baseline regression reported in column (3) of Table 2. In Panel A, we show that our results are not sensitive to the definition of close elections used. We consider alternative definitions based on a vote share difference of less than 3 percentage points, or a vote share difference in the bottom quartile across all elections, following Julio and Yook (2016). In Panel B, we include election \times product \times time or (and) firm \times product \times election fixed

effects to address the concern that elections may lead to heterogeneous policy effects across different product categories and CEO ideology being correlated with the type of products firms trade. The inclusion of election \times product \times time fixed effects ensures that the differences in trade responses between ideologically distant and close firms are not driven by differential exposure to products that face different trade policies. The reduction in the number of observations reflects the difficulty of finding sufficient variation among firms trading in the same product at the same point in time during the same election cycle. Importantly, however, the economic magnitude of the results remains stable, implying that the inclusion of such fixed effects mainly impacts statistical power rather than the underlying economic effect.

In Panel C, we use alternative definitions of “product” based on 4-digit HS code or 6-digit HS code, which classify goods into finer product categories. In Panel D, we separately examine the effect of ideological distance on the likelihood of importing and exporting, respectively, and find a stronger effect for exports. We also find that our baseline effect is mainly driven by the extensive margin: firms that experience an increase in ideological distance are more likely to terminate trade relationships after the election. Although the effect on the intensive margin, measured by trading volume, is also negative, it is not statistically significant. Finally, our results are robust to clustering the standard errors by firm \times country and time, by product \times country, by firm and time, by firm and country, and by firm (see Panel E).

In Table 3, we examine which policy positions drive our results. Although CEOs may focus mainly on economic policies of a party, they may also consider social issues such as human rights when making trade decisions (Bisetti, She, and Zaldokas (2024)). To explore this question, we break down the policy positions in our left-right ideology score into economic, social, and other policies. Following Girardi (2020), we classify policies into economic policies based on the party’s stance on planned versus market economies using MPD variables *planeco* and *markeco*, which reflects the relative positions on support

for market regulation, economic planning, and government intervention versus support for free markets and minimal state intervention. Following Benoit and Laver (2007), we classify policies on issues such as human rights, democracy, national identity, and traditional morality as social policies. All other policies, including state-provided services (e.g., education) and protectionism, fall under “other policies.” A full list of policy categories is available in Internet Appendix Table IA.4. Our findings indicate that both economic and social policies of elected parties influence trade relationships, although economic policies play a more important role when examined jointly in a horse race specification.

5.3 Heterogeneity by Relationship Intensity

When a firm has established a strong relationship with its foreign trade partners, that relationship is likely to be less affected by shocks to ideological beliefs. We test this idea by examining how the intensity of a firm’s relationship with foreign partners influences our results. To do so, we augment our baseline specification in equation (2) by interacting the independent variables with an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a “short” relationship with a given foreign country in trading a product.

We measure relationship intensity by the share of active trading periods for a given product from the foreign country prior to the foreign election. The percentage of active trading periods is calculated by dividing the number of half-years in which the firm has traded with the foreign country for the product, by the total number of half-years in which the firm has traded the product globally before the foreign election. A “short relationship” is then defined as an indicator equal to one if the share of active trading periods falls below the median for each election or below 0.5, and zero otherwise.

Our results, reported in Table 4, indicate that when firms have a short relationship with a trade partner and experience an increase in ideological distance, they are more likely to terminate the trade relationship with that foreign country following the elections.

6 Economic Mechanism

So far, we have shown that the ideological alignment of CEOs with foreign political parties influences their propensity to maintain trade relationships with that country. We interpret our findings as evidence that political ideology shapes CEOs’ beliefs about the expected economic benefits of trading with a foreign country. For example, politically misaligned CEOs may be more pessimistic about the expected profitability or perceive greater political or economic risks. Alternatively, ideologically misaligned CEOs may experience a greater nonpecuniary disutility from engaging with foreign countries whose government they disapprove of. In this section, we perform additional tests to sharpen our interpretation that the economic mechanism operates via CEOs’ beliefs or preferences and discuss alternative explanations.

First, we provide more direct evidence on the underlying mechanism by examining the extent to which the strength of a CEO’s political views influences our main results. A CEO who is more politically engaged may behave more ideologically, as reflected in her economic perceptions and the propensity to maintain or terminate trade relationships. To test this idea, we measure CEOs’ political engagement based on their voter turnout. Specifically, we calculate the average number of quarters between the elections in which a CEO voted up until one year prior to the foreign election. CEOs are classified as “High Engagement” if the average number is below the median, implying that they vote frequently, and as “Low Engagement” otherwise. We augment our baseline specification in equation (2) by interacting the independent variables with the “High Engagement” indicator. The results, reported in column (1) of Table 5, suggest CEOs who are highly politically engaged indeed exhibit a stronger response to changes in ideological distance.

In columns (2) and (3) of the same table, we compute an ideology score for each CEO to measure the extent to which they possibly hold extreme political views. We use data from Stanford’s Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) (see Bonica

(2016)), which contains local, state and federal-level campaign contributions from individuals and organizations between 1979 and 2024. We proceed as follows. First, we match CEOs to their political contributions using their first, middle, and last names, as detailed in Internet Appendix IA.A.4. We are able to identify 514 CEOs in our sample (78.3% match rate). Second, we construct a continuous measure of each CEO’s political ideology based on the ideological positions of congressional members whom the CEO has financially supported. We use two scores to measure ideological positions, which are estimated using roll call voting records as in Poole and Rosenthal (1985). The first is the DW-Nominate score from Poole and Rosenthal (1985). Specifically, we use its first dimension, which is often interpreted as capturing economic liberalism versus conservatism. The second is the CF score provided in the DIME dataset. More negative values of these scores characterize more left-leaning (liberal) ideology, while more positive values indicate a more right-leaning (conservative) ideology. To determine the ideological score of a CEO, we calculate the weighted average ideology score of the recipients that the CEO has supported, with the weights proportional to the dollar amounts given to each candidate. Finally, we take the absolute values of each ideology score and classify CEOs as having “*More Extreme Views*” if their absolute weighted average ideology score is above the median, and as “*Moderate Views*” otherwise.

We augment our baseline specification in equation (2) by interacting the independent variables with the indicator for “*More Extreme Views*” based on the DW-Nominate score in column (2) and based on the CF score in column (3) of Table 5, respectively. The results suggest that our effects are primarily driven by CEOs with more extreme political views. Taken together, Table 5 provides more direct evidence to support our interpretation that the effect of a CEO’s ideological alignment with foreign governments indeed reflects ideological differences in CEOs’ perceptions.

Second, one potential concern is that foreign trade partners may avoid firms led by ideologically misaligned CEOs whose political affiliation is highly visible. To address this

concern, we use two proxies of a CEO’s visibility. The first proxy is based on CEOs’ prominence, which is defined by searching CEO names in the Notable Names Database (<http://www.nndb.com>) following Wintoki and Xi (2020). The website compiles individuals’ biographical information (including partisan affiliation) from publicly available and easily accessible online sources. It is reasonable to assume that CEOs included in the database are prominent and have a highly visible political ideology in the eyes of the public. We manually search CEO names in the database and define an indicator that is equal to one if the CEO is included, and zero otherwise. As a result, we identify 185 prominent CEOs in our sample.

The second proxy is based on firm size one year prior to the election, under the assumption that the public pays more attention to larger firms, making their CEOs’ information—including political affiliation—more salient. We define an indicator that is equal to one if the firm’s pre-election size is above the median and zero otherwise. As before, we then augment our baseline specification in equation (2) by interacting the independent variables with these two indicators and report the results in Table 6. Across both columns, we find no evidence that our effects differ significantly between highly visible and less visible CEOs, suggesting that foreign trade partners are unlikely to selectively target high-profile CEOs based on their political ideology.

Third, it is important to highlight that our main identification strategy already accounts for several alternative explanations. For example, our results cannot be explained by the direct impacts of elections on macroeconomic conditions in the foreign country that might influence the trade environment and make it more challenging for U.S. firms to conduct business. Likewise, our results are not driven by changes in the bilateral relations between the U.S. and foreign governments, such as the U.S. government imposing tighter trade regulations on adversaries than on allies. Furthermore, our findings cannot be explained by product-specific demand or supply shocks, such as trade restrictions on certain goods.

A potential remaining explanation is that differences in the maintenance of trade re-

relationships arise from how elections affect the trade partners of U.S. firms. For instance, U.S. firms with Democrat-leaning CEOs may be more likely to form relationships with left-leaning foreign firms. If a right-leaning party comes to power in the foreign country, it may implement trade policies that adversely affect left-leaning foreign firms. This could lead to more terminations of relationships by Democrat-led U.S. firms compared to Republican-led U.S. firms. To address this concern, we exploit the granularity of our data to analyze trade relationships with *the same foreign trade partner*. To do so, we expand our data from the firm \times foreign election \times product \times half-year level to the firm \times foreign election \times product \times supplier \times half-year level. This more disaggregated dataset allows us to compare how U.S. firms whose CEO experiences an increase versus a decrease in ideological distance adjust their trade relationships with *the same supplier* following the same election. Due to data availability, we focus on supplier relationships (i.e., imports). The results, reported in Table 7, reveal an effect that is very similar to our baseline specification.

7 Reallocation

Finally, we examine how firms reshape their trade networks in response to shifts in political alignment with foreign countries. One possible response is that CEOs experiencing increased ideological distance may reallocate their production and sales networks to other countries in order to minimize disruptions. However, trade reallocation is often costly and constrained by various frictions, such as the availability of suitable alternative partners. Finding reliable substitutes for existing trade relationships also takes time, and as a result, firms may instead reduce their foreign trade exposure altogether by shifting their networks back home. To assess which response dominates in our setting, we use the same difference-in-differences approach around close foreign elections as before, but we now change the dependent variable to measure the total size of the firm’s foreign trade network, or its propensity to form new relationships.

More specifically, we construct four measures of the size and concentration of a firm’s

trade network in a given product category. The results, reported in Table 8, indicate that an increase in ideological distance leads firms to contract their global trade networks, as indicated by the fact that they reduce the number of foreign countries and the number of foreign suppliers with which they trade (see columns (1) and (2)). Moreover, they are also less establish new foreign trade relationships (columns (3) and (4)).

In Internet Appendix Table IA.7, we provide additional evidence on the concentration of the firm’s foreign trade network, by computing a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on shipment volume, weight, or estimated value. We observe an increased HHI for ideologically more distant firms, suggesting that they consolidate their trade relationships and rely on fewer trade partners, consistent with the findings in Table 8. The fact that firms with increased ideological distance tend to concentrate their trade networks raises important implications. For example, these firms could be at higher risk of vulnerability to country-specific shocks and supply-chain disruptions going forward.

8 Conclusion

Rising geopolitical tensions have significantly disrupted the interconnected economic relationships between nations. While extensive literature focuses on government-imposed trade barriers such as tariffs, sanctions, and industrial policies, limited research has examined “private sanctions”, where firms voluntarily sever ties with countries for ideological reasons that extend beyond profit motives or government policies.

Using a novel dataset that combines granular trade transaction data from S&P Global’s Panjiva database with information on the political affiliations of U.S. CEOs, we investigate how the political ideology of CEOs shapes cross-border firm relationships. Exploiting changes in ideological alignment between U.S. firm CEOs and foreign governments around close foreign elections, we show that U.S. firms are more likely to terminate trade relationships with countries led by governments whose political ideology grows more distant from that of their CEOs. The effect is particularly pronounced among CEOs who hold strong

political views, indicating that CEO beliefs or preferences shape these decisions. Our findings highlight the role of ideology in shaping the formation and persistence of international firm networks.

Additionally, firms with increased ideological distance reduce the total number of foreign trade partners and are less likely to form new relationships, thus narrowing the scope of their global supply chains. This reduction in diversification increases firms' exposure to country-specific shocks, highlighting the broader economic implications of leadership ideology on international trade.

Overall, this study underscores the significant impact of political ideology on firms' trade relationships, emphasizing the importance to consider ideological factors in addition to economic and policy considerations when analyzing global trade dynamics.

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


Figure 1: **Cross-Border Trade around Foreign Close Elections**

The figure plots the difference in the likelihood of trading with the foreign country between U.S. firms that experience an increase versus a decrease in ideological distance around a foreign close election. We plot the coefficients β_τ from equation (3) for nine half-years around elections. The dependent variable is an indicator that is equal to one if the firm has either imports from or exports to the foreign country for the product and zero otherwise. We include election \times time, firm \times election and product \times time fixed effects. The corresponding 95% confidence intervals are based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm \times country level.

Table 1: **Summary Statistics**

The table reports summary statistics for our main dataset (close elections). The unit of observation is a U.S. firms \times foreign election \times product category \times half-year. All variables are defined in Appendix A.1.

	Count	Mean	SD	P25	Median	P75
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
No. of Shipments	29,467	5.63	32.75	0.00	1.00	2.00
Volume (TEU)	29,019	15.64	200.42	0.00	0.01	3.00
No. of New Trading Countries	29,467	2.14	2.58	1.00	1.00	3.00
No. of New Suppliers	22,148	3.98	8.76	1.00	1.00	4.00
No. of Trading Countries	29,467	5.58	8.12	1.00	3.00	6.00
No. of Suppliers	22,148	7.65	17.75	1.00	3.00	6.00
Trade Indicator	29,467	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.00
Import Indicator	22,148	0.47	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00
Export Indicator	9,436	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.00
Distance Increase	29,467	0.60	0.49	0.00	1.00	1.00
No. of 4-Digit HS Per Product-Cnt.	14,590	1.57	1.63	1.00	1.00	1.00
No. of 6-Digit HS Per Product-Cnt.	14,590	1.93	2.79	1.00	1.00	2.00

Table 2: **CEOs' Ideological Distance and Foreign Trade**

The table reports differences in the likelihood of trading by U.S. firms whose CEO experiences an increase versus decrease in ideological distance around a close foreign election. The unit of observation is a U.S. firms \times foreign election \times product \times half-year. *Distance Increase* is an indicator equal to one if the ideological distance between the CEO of the U.S. firm and the party in power in a foreign country increases after the election, and zero otherwise. *Post* is an indicator equal to one if half-year t falls in the post-election period ($\tau = 0$ to $\tau = +4$), and zero if half-year t falls in the pre-election period ($\tau = -4$ to $\tau = -1$). t -statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm \times country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable:	Trade Indicator		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Distance Increase \times Post	-0.061** (-2.34)	-0.071*** (-2.95)	-0.069*** (-2.67)
Controls	No	No	No
Election \times Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm \times Election FE	No	Yes	Yes
Product \times Time FE	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.034	0.193	0.261
N	29,445	29,222	28,864

Table 3: **Policy Dimensions**

The table repeats our main analysis in Table 2, after defining *Distance Increase* separately for positions on economic, social, and other policies. We use ideological distance based on economic policies in column (1), based on social policies in column (2), and based on other policies in column (3). The list of policy positions used to define ideology on economic, social, and other issues is presented in the Internet Appendix Table IA.4. In column (4), all measures are included simultaneously. *t*-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm \times country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

Dependent Variable:	Trade Indicator			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Distance Increase Econ. Policy \times Post	-0.078*** (-2.79)			-0.059* (-1.66)
Distance Increase Social Policy \times Post		-0.080** (-2.41)		-0.036 (-0.83)
Distance Increase Other Policy \times Post			0.016 (0.44)	-0.009 (-0.28)
Controls	No	No	No	No
Election \times Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm \times Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Product \times Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.261	0.261	0.260	0.261
N	28,864	28,864	28,864	28,864

Table 4: **Heterogeneity by Relationship Intensity**

The table augments our baseline specification in equation (2) by interacting the independent variables with an indicator that is equal to one if the firm has a less intense relationship with the given foreign country in trading a product, and zero otherwise. Relationship intensity is measured as the share of active trading periods for a given product with the foreign country prior to the election. For a given product, we divide the number of half-years in which the firm has traded with the foreign country by the total number of half-years in which the firm has traded with any foreign countries prior to the election. The indicator “Short Relationship” is then equal to one if the share of active trading periods is below the sample median for each election (in column (1)), or below 0.5 (in column (2)), and zero otherwise. *t*-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm \times country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

	Share of Active Trading Periods	
	Below Median (1)	Below 0.5 (2)
Distance Increase \times Post \times Short Relationship	-0.090*** (-2.86)	-0.130*** (-3.64)
Distance Increase \times Post	-0.022 (-0.55)	0.022 (0.52)
Post \times Short Relationship	0.389*** (14.87)	0.335*** (11.38)
Distance Increase \times Short Relationship	0.042 (1.57)	0.053 (1.57)
Short Relationship	-0.552*** (-25.48)	-0.553*** (-19.23)
Controls	No	No
Election \times Time FE	Yes	Yes
Firm \times Election FE	Yes	Yes
Product \times Time FE	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.338	0.330
N	28,167	28,167

Table 5: **Heterogeneity by CEOs’ Political Engagement**

The table augments our baseline specification in equation (2) by interacting the independent variables with indicators for highly politically engaged CEOs and CEOs with more extreme political views. In column (1), we measure the degree of CEOs’ political engagement by examining their voting frequency based on the voting data from L2. We compute the average number of quarters between elections in which a CEO has voted up until a year prior to the election, and classify CEOs as “High Engagement” if their average is below the median (i.e., they vote frequently), and “Low Engagement” otherwise. In columns (2) and (3), we compute an ideology score for each CEO using data from Stanford’s Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) (see Bonica (2016)), which contains local, state and federal level campaign contributions from individuals and organizations between 1979 and 2024. For each CEO, we compute a weighted average of the DW-Nominate score and the CF score of the recipients based on their contributions, with weights proportional to the dollar amounts donated to each candidate. We then take the absolute value of the two scores and classify CEOs as having “More Extreme Views” if their absolute ideology score is above the median, and as having “Moderate Views” otherwise. We present results using the indicator based on the DW-Nominate score in column (2) and based on the CF score in column (3). *t*-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm \times country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

	Voting Frequency	Ideology	
	(1)	DW-Nominate (2)	CF Score (3)
Distance Increase \times Post \times High Engagement	-0.058* (-1.69)		
Distance Increase \times Post \times More Extreme Views		-0.119*** (-2.86)	-0.081** (-1.96)
Distance Increase \times Post	-0.029 (-0.92)	0.022 (0.54)	-0.018 (-0.49)
Post \times High Engagement	0.066** (2.56)		
Post \times More Extreme Views		0.101*** (3.43)	0.070** (2.28)
Controls	No	No	No
Election \times Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm \times Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Product \times Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.262	0.279	0.270
N	28,342	19,147	21,937

Table 6: **Heterogeneity by CEOs' Political Visibility**

The table augments our baseline specification in equation (2) by interacting the independent variables with indicators for highly visible CEOs. To measure CEOs' political visibility, we use two proxies: one based on the CEO's prominence and the other based on firm size. In column (1), the indicator "High Visibility" is equal to one if the CEO is included in <http://www.nndb.com> (i.e., a prominent CEO), and zero otherwise. In column (2), it is equal to one if the firm size at one year prior to the election is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. *t*-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm \times country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

	CEO Political Visibility	
	CEO Prominence (1)	Firm Size (2)
Distance Increase \times Post \times High Visibility	0.002 (0.06)	-0.010 (-0.29)
Distance Increase \times Post	-0.070** (-2.32)	-0.064** (-2.00)
Post \times High Visibility	-0.003 (-0.12)	0.007 (0.26)
Controls	No	No
Election \times Time FE	Yes	Yes
Firm \times Election FE	Yes	Yes
Product \times Time FE	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.261	0.261
N	28,864	28,851

Table 7: **Supplier-Level Analysis**

The table repeats the analysis from Table 2 using a more disaggregated dataset, with the unit of observation being a firm \times foreign election \times product \times supplier \times half-year. The independent variable is an indicator equal to one if the firm imports a shipment from a given supplier in a given product category and half-year, and zero otherwise. t -statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm \times country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

Dependent Variable:	Import Indicator		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Distance Increase \times Post	-0.069*** (-3.56)	-0.069*** (-3.56)	-0.072*** (-3.62)
Controls	No	No	No
Election \times Supplier \times Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm \times Supplier \times Election FE	No	Yes	Yes
Product \times Time FE	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.486	0.515	0.549
N	66,860	66,858	66,468

Table 8: **Reallocation of Trade Relationships**

The table examines changes in the size of firms' foreign trade networks as a function of whether their CEO experiences an increase versus decrease in ideological distance around a close foreign election. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variables are the number of trading partners that a firm trades with for a given product, measured as the number of countries in column (1) and the number of suppliers in column (2). In columns (3) and (4), we examine the number of newly added trading partners, measured as the number of new trading countries in column (3) and the number of new suppliers in column (4). We use Poisson regressions as suggested by Cohn, Liu, and Wardlaw (2022). All other specifications remain the same as in Table 2. t -statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm \times country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

Dependent Variable: No. of	Countries (1)	Suppliers (2)	New Countries (3)	New Suppliers (4)
Distance Increase \times Post	-0.082*** (-2.98)	-0.189*** (-3.11)	-0.068** (-2.32)	-0.167*** (-2.80)
Controls	No	No	No	No
Election \times Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm \times Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Product \times Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.508	0.662	0.295	0.568
N	28,864	21,443	28,748	21,350

A Appendix

A.1 Variable Definitions

Variable	Description
<i>Dependent variables</i>	
Trade Indicator	Equal to one if the U.S. firm has either importing or exporting activities from the foreign country for a given product during the given half year, and zero otherwise.
Import Indicator	Equal to one if the U.S. firm has importing activities from the foreign supplier for a given product at the half year, and zero otherwise.
No. of Countries	The total number of countries that a firm trades with for a given product.
No. of Suppliers	The total number of suppliers that a firm trades with for a given product.
No. of New Countries	For a given product, the number of new countries that a firm adds relative to the previous half-year.
No. of New Suppliers	For a given product, the number of new suppliers that a firm adds relative to the previous half-year.
<i>Main independent variables</i>	
Distance increase	Indicator equal to one if the change in the ideological distance between the firm’s CEO and the foreign country, as defined in equation (1), is non-negative, and zero otherwise.
Post	Indicator equal to one if the time period falls after a given election ($\tau = 0$ to $\tau = +4$), and zero otherwise.
<i>Other variables</i>	
Short Relationship	Equal to one if the U.S. firm has a less intensive relationship with the foreign country in terms of trading a given product. Relationship intensity is measured as the share of active trading periods for a given product with the foreign country prior to the election. For a given product, we divide the number of half-years in which the firm has traded with the foreign country by the total number of half-years in which the firm has traded with any foreign countries prior to the election. The indicator “Short Relationship” is then equal to one if the share of active trading periods is below the median for each election or below 0.5, and zero otherwise.

Continued on next page

Table A.1 – continued

Variable	Description
High Engagement	Equal to one if the CEO is highly politically engaged and zero otherwise. Political engagement is measured based on the CEO’s voting frequency. Up to one year prior to each foreign election, we compute the average number of quarters between U.S. elections in which a CEO has voted up until one year prior to the election, and classify CEOs as “High Engagement” if their average is below the median (i.e., they vote frequently), and “Low Engagement” otherwise.
More Extreme Views	Equal to one if the CEO is likely to hold more extreme political views. We compute the ideology score of each CEO using data from Stanford’s Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) (see Bonica (2016)), which contains local, state and federal level campaign contributions from individuals and organizations between 1979 and 2024. For each CEO, we compute a weighted average of the DW-NOMINATE score and the CF score of the recipients based on their contributions, with weights proportional to the dollar amounts donated to each candidate. We then take the absolute value of the two scores and classify CEOs as having “More Extreme Views” if their respective weighted score is above the median, and as having “Moderate Views” otherwise.
High Visibility	Equal to one if the CEO is highly politically visible and zero otherwise. We use two proxies for CEOs’ political visibility: one based on the CEO’s prominence and the other on firm size. The indicator “High Visibility” is equal to one if the CEO is included in http://www.nndb.com (i.e., a prominent CEO) and zero otherwise, or is equal to one if the firm size at one year prior to the election is above the sample median and zero otherwise.