


Working Paper 24-011

The Irredeemability of the Past: Determinants of Reconciliation and Revenge in Post-Conflict Settings

Kristen Kao

Kristin Fabbe

Michael Bang Petersen



**Harvard
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This project is funded by the Riksbanken Jubileumsfond (The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences) Grant No. P19-0761:1, PI: Kristen Kao. This study has obtained Aarhus University Institutional Review Board Approval # 2021-61. We are grateful to Mara Vidali and Iman Abu Zueiter for technical assistance with the manuscript. Carlo Koos provided comments on an early version of experiment.

Funding for this research was provided in part by Harvard Business School.

The Irredeemability of the Past: Determinants of Reconciliation and Revenge in Post-Conflict Settings

Kristen Kao^{*}, Kristin Fabbe[†], Michael Bang Petersen^{‡§}

August 20, 2023

^{*}Docent, University of Gothenburg

[†]Associate Professor, Harvard Business School

[‡]Professor, Aarhus University

[§]This project is funded by the Riksbanken Jubileumsfond (The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences) Grant No. P19-0761:1, PI: Kristen Kao. This study has obtained Aarhus University Institutional Review Board Approval # 2021-61. We are grateful to Mara Vidali and Iman Abu Zueiter for technical assistance with the manuscript. Carlo Koos provided comments on an early version of experiment 2.

Abstract

In the aftermath of violent conflict, identifying former enemy collaborators versus innocent bystanders forced to flee violence is difficult. In post-conflict settings, internally displaced persons (IDPs) risk becoming stigmatized and face difficulties reintegrating into society. This work considers the role of moral disapproval and future social value in processes of post-conflict reconciliation with stigmatized IDPs. We run two conjoint experiments embedded within a large-N face-to-face survey across three areas of Iraq (n=4,592) experiencing the return of stigmatized IDPs, many of whom are suspected of having collaborated with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Immutable factors related to a stigmatized IDP's past behavior, namely the severity of a transgression and the volition behind it, are the strongest predictors of both reconciliation and revenge. Transitional justice mechanisms signaling the IDP's present and future redemption have little to no impact. Analyses employing cognitive and emotional statistical mediators further demonstrate that past behavior shapes justice intuitions because it simultaneously activates a past-oriented moral condemnation and a future-oriented heuristic assessment of the value and risks of associating with the stigmatized individual. This orientation towards past behavior is consistent irrespective of major individual differences including trust in the involved institutions, ISIS victimization, and ethnic identity. These findings highlight the mounting challenges involved in transitional justice in the aftermath of violent conflict and suggests that fact-finding missions are key to re-integrating the millions of displaced persons currently in Iraq and elsewhere.

1 Introduction

Violent conflicts such as civil wars, foreign aggression, and insurgent occupations raise difficult questions for the reestablishment of enduring peace when fighting ends. This is especially the case in conflicts that also involve mass displacement, as is the case in Syria, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Columbia, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In such instances, those who fought, those that collaborated with enemies, and those who fled to avoid violence altogether must eventually be reintegrated within local communities. Yet, as past research has shown, individuals can be reluctant to reconcile with those who have harmed them (Bakke, O’Loughlin, and Ward 2009; Kao and Revkin 2021), creating ‘pariah’ populations who are ostracized or targeted for revenge. Unless societies are willing to change their behavior towards these stigmatized individuals, the cycle of violence is likely to be reignited and peace will remain elusive (Littman and Paluck 2015).

What are the factors that shape individuals’ willingness to reconcile with stigmatized individuals at the local level and why? And if reconciliation—the formation of pro-social attitudes and behavior of former enemies towards one another within the same social space (Enright 1991)—is impossible, how can cycles of revenge be avoided?

This manuscript explores these questions through original survey experiments, run face-to-face with locally representative samples in Iraq (n=4,592). The context of the study is the aftermath of the occupation of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (also referred to below as *Daesh*).¹ At its strongest, ISIS controlled a significant portion of Iraqi territory, including 20 major Iraqi cities with a combined population of more than 5 million people. The group ruled for more than three years in some areas.

We are specifically interested in the predicament of more than a million displaced individuals in the battles against ISIS. IDPs from the areas ISIS took over are widely stigmatized as

1. *Daesh* is the Arabic acronym for the group and is how the group is called in Iraq.

“collaborators,” even if they never directly engaged in violence. As of July 2020, 1.3 million such Iraqis were displaced in a constellation of camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) spread across the country. The UNDP and other organizations working on the ground in Iraq have deemed the reintegration of this large population of IDPs as central to forging durable social cohesion and communal peace in Iraq today (Revkin 2021). As one of our focus group participants explained:

My brother is in the army and when ISIS entered, some of his friends who were policemen from Ramadi asked him to sponsor them to be able to run away to Baghdad for fear of ISIS. My brother, in turn, sponsored them and brought them to our area. People began to wonder who they were, how they came, and who brought them. My brother told [our community members] that he brought them due to their fear of ISIS because they were affiliated with the police and that he knew them very well, but [community members] did not accept them and threatened them, so they had to go to other areas.²

In post-conflict settings, the issue of “return”—even cases where IDP reintegration should be relatively easy—can become intractable. On the other end of the spectrum, studying IDP return in post-ISIS Iraq joins numerous other hard cases where accused criminals, extremists, fighters, and enemy collaborators must be reintegrated into the social fabric (Blair et al. 2021; Alteir 2021; Humphreys and Weinstein 2007; Rade et al. 2016; Tellez 2019), posing critical questions about the individual-level, psychological determinants of reconciliation and revenge towards stigmatized individuals.

We empirically study the conditions under which Iraqis are willing to forgive and reintegrate stigmatized IDPs into their communities. Our work identifies the involved psychological processes behind these preferences and advances a novel theory of how individual cognitions about the transgression severity of past behavior map onto processes of re-integration and

2. Focus group with males in Baghdad, 12/5/2022.

reconciliation, on the one hand, and desires for revenge, on the other. We also test whether or not redemption-signalling strategies practiced currently in post-conflict settings—including the disavowal of the extremist group, deradicalization programs, and endorsements from community elites—can increase respondents’ willingness to favor reintegration over revenge.

Theoretically, we assume that the primary goal of conflict resolution is reconciliation, a term that we employ as an umbrella concept for various aspects of post-conflict peace processes including the social, political, and economic reintegration of stigmatized individuals into local communities. As a separate factor, we study desires for retribution or vengeance. Finally, we are interested in whether or not policy interventions that signal redeemability can help increase support for the reintegration of stigmatized individuals (Burton et al. 2020).

Most post-conflict studies focus on just one of these outcomes at the national level or sometimes across sub-national communities; rarely do they study these processes simultaneously at the micro-level. Yet, reconciliation and revenge are two opposite sides of the equation for durable peace. Studies that have employed surveys at the individual level in post-conflict settings (e.g., Dyrstad et al. 2011; Dyrstad and Binningsbø 2019; Samii 2013) tend to be concerned with national-level peace processes rather than reintegration at the local community or personal level.³ The absence of evidence on the microfoundations of reconciliation and revenge constitutes a critical gap in the literature on post-conflict reconciliation, especially since national-level peace processes have been known to fail at the local level. Writing about the paradigmatic case of post-conflict reconciliation in South Africa, Wilson observed that “the inability to translate the national reconciliation project into local reconciliation resulted from the lack of any dispute-resolution mechanisms... to negotiate the return of former ‘pariahs’ to the community” (Wilson 2001).

To preview our results, we find that immutable factors related to a stigmatized IDP’s past

3. For notable exceptions of scholars working at the individual level see: (Hartman and Morse 2020; Kao and Revkin 2021; Godefroidt and Langer 2022).

behavior, namely the severity of their transgression and volition behind it, are the strongest predictors of both reconciliation and revenge. Identity factors associated with agency such as age and gender also matter. But attempts at redemption sought by a given IDP—including disavowals of the enemy group, completion of rehabilitation programs, gaining sponsorship of local leaders, or future plans to aid to the community—have minimal to null effects. Analyses employing cognitive and emotional statistical mediators demonstrate that past behavior shapes justice intuitions because they simultaneously activate past-oriented moral condemnation and future-oriented heuristic assessments of the value and risks of associating with the stigmatized individual, also reflected in the emotions of sympathy, fear and anger. Finally, and importantly, we demonstrate that the weight attributed to past behavior in re-integration decisions is not confined to particular groups or individuals. Past behavior is thus a powerful predictor of re-integration decisions across pre-treatment beliefs in the efficacy and strength of rehabilitation programs or the leaders running them, participants' sectarian identity, or previous experiences of ISIS victimization. In sum, these findings highlight the challenges involved in transitional justice and may motivate authorities and governments to, at least partially, re-orient efforts towards fact-finding missions that can uncover the reasons for displacement. Such efforts, however, do come with an inherent dilemma: While it will make it easier for many individuals to be re-integrated, it will make it more difficult for specific others who voluntarily took part in violence on behalf of enemy groups.

2 Why the past may powerfully shape decisions about revenge and reconciliation

Theories of transitional and restorative justice are future-oriented. Their legitimacy are premised on the assumption that people are willing to forgive past offenders, and reconcile with them, because of the possibility of dampening future social conflict or of generating

beneficial social relationships. Consistent with this, the psychological literature has repeatedly demonstrated that reconciliatory motivations are significantly enhanced in the face of indicators that suggest that offenders sincerely regret past wrong-doing (e.g., sincere expressions of remorse) and are able to contribute to community well-being in the future (Burnette et al. 2012; McCullough, Worthington Jr, and Rachal 1997; Petersen et al. 2012). In particular, reconciliation is facilitated by the perception that the offender is, first, a valuable future cooperation partner and, second, poses a low likelihood of repeat offending (Burnette et al. 2012). From this perspective, successful programs of transitional justice should specifically enhance such perceptions by either facilitating expressions of remorse (e.g., in meetings between offenders and victims) and/or enhancing the productive competencies of past offenders (e.g., through rehabilitation programs).

At the same time, it is clear that the perceived legitimacy of transitional justice programs is impeded by strong countervailing psychological forces. First, studies of retributivist motivations have consistently shown that people’s sense of justice is strongly oriented towards the past (Robinson and Kurzban 2006) and, in particular, the severity or condemnability of past wrong-doing (Kao and Revkin 2021). Severity is gauged as the level of costs intentionally imposed on others as “[s]evere transgressions tend to have, *ceteris paribus*, more enduring consequences than do less severe transgressions, whose effects may be relatively reversible” (McCullough, Fincham, and Tsang 2003). As acts become more condemnable—which may be the case with many of the acts committed during violent conflicts—the legitimacy of transitional justice programs is challenged. As one focus group participant elucidated when asked if a janitor working in the ISIS municipal building should be punished: “No, he is not an ISIS member, because he did not participate in killings, he just cleans up.”⁴ Second, this challenge may not just come from past-oriented, moral condemnation of offenders. Human cognition, also within the domain of moral decision-making, often operates via heuristics,

4. Focus group in Mosul with females, 12/8/2022.

i.e., fast and frugal “rules of thumb,” which, for example, can make predictions about the future depend on simple cues from the past (Gigerenzer and Engel 2006). When making decisions about forgiveness and reconciliation, these heuristics will prompt people, especially when making judgments under uncertainty, to rely on offenders’ past behavior when making future-oriented evaluations of their social value and the risk of interacting with them. In the context of criminal justice, more severe wrong-doing in the past has thus been found to lower perceptions of the future social value of the criminal, independently of, for example, present expressions of remorse (Petersen et al. 2012). Thus, from a psychological perspective, the severity of past wrong-doing not only constitutes something that needs to be corrected or restored through retribution but is also something that influences perceptions of the likelihood or benefits of successful reintegration. As such, the past will powerfully shape intuitions of justice, potentially to such an extent that it impedes transitional justice altogether. This is a central challenge for authorities involved in facilitating transitional justice, including authorities involved in the reintegration of former IDPs in Iraq. Figure 1 displays the multiple psychological pathways by which the past is expected to shape support for re-integration of IDPs in the Iraqi case.

As they are described in Figure 1, the pathways are highly cognitive, i.e., they relate to consciously held perceptions and beliefs about the IDPs. Yet, a burgeoning literature across psychology, political science, and criminology also finds that emotions such as fear, sympathy, anger also play a key role in determining responses towards those who harm us (e.g., Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2008; Druckman and McDermott 2008; Petersen 2011; Halperin 2016; Petersen and Laustsen 2020). Cognitive scholars term the affective side of revenge and forgiveness as having to do with ‘implicit cognition’ in that they are “not direct, deliberate, controlled, intentional self-assessments” (Nosek, Hawkins, and Frazier 2011: 153). For instance, one may engage in a cost-benefit analysis of offender’s potential value versus threat to the victim or the society in the future and decide on reparative or punitive strategies




Figure 1: The multiple pathways through which IDP behaviors are expected to shape support for their reintegration.

based on this calculation (Petersen et al. 2010, 2012; McCullough, Kurzban, and Tabak 2013). Such decisions may also occur more spontaneously on the basis of emotional processes, although there may be a substantial overlap between cognitive perceptions and felt emotions (Scherer 1999) including in the domain of justice (Petersen 2010). For example, prior research suggests that perceptions of condemnability are interlinked with expressions of anger (Haidt 2003); that perceptions of future social value are often tied to compassion and sympathy (Delton et al. 2018); and that emotions of fear co-occur with perceptions of risk (LeDoux 1998). Accordingly, the effects of past behavior on justice intuitions regarding IDPs, as described in Figure 1, may not only occur through cognitive pathways but also through the related emotional pathways of anger, sympathy, and fear.

3 Context

This study utilizes the setting of Iraq, which has endured numerous waves of conflict and is most recently struggling with issues of reconciliation, reintegration, and revenge after the military defeat of ISIS. ISIS rose from the remnants of the Islamic extremist group al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which was founded in 2004. In June 2014, after the group launched a successful offensive on the Iraqi cities of Mosul and Tikrit, its leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announced the formation of a Caliphate. ISIS committed widespread crimes and human rights abuses as they acquired territory and ruled over populations. The group also set up a functioning government, established its own rules of social conduct, and provided substantial services in the territories it controlled. Thus, in addition to ruling via violence and coercion, the group's governing strategy necessitated a civilian bureaucracy staffed by employees who generally did not engage in violence (Kao and Revkin 2021; Gerges 2017).

Both ISIS' advances and the subsequent war that led to its territorial defeat in 2017 created approximately 6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), 1.3 million of whom were still living in dire conditions in a network of makeshift IDP camps spread across Iraq in 2020 (Revkin 2021). A large number of the displaced—especially those who lived under the group, have spent time in IDP camps, or have family ties to ISIS—are assumed to be guilty by association if not direct collaborators with Daesh. The Iraqi government has taken a heavy-handed approach towards these perceived collaborators and they are viewed as 'pariahs' by much of Iraqi society (Amnesty International 2020). Indeed, a 2020 study of residents of Mosul and its environs found that punitive attitudes towards ISIS affiliates of all-stripes, as well as those merely associated with the group, were widespread. According to the research, 96.5% of respondents felt that even low-ranking members of ISIS must be held accountable, whereas far fewer indicated some willingness to grant amnesties or pardons, with only 22.5% wanting amnesty for those forced to work for ISIS and only 28.5% wanting

amnesty for the families of ISIS who were not themselves members (Al-Saiedi et al. 2020).

As we learned in preliminary focus groups for this study,⁵ even those with absolutely no affiliation to the group who had spent time in an IDP camp often faced difficulties returning to their home communities.⁶ We further heard of numerous instances of people who were wrongly accused of ISIS collaboration, sometimes with grave consequences for both them and their families. As one woman in Mosul told us, “many cases like this have happened... people fled for fear of ISIS or war, and when they returned, people accused them of being ISIS.”⁷ Moreover, nearly 4 years since ISIS’ defeat in 2017, many IDPs effectively have been barred from returning to their original communities because local elites and/or residents refuse to welcome them back by virtue of their ties with the Islamic state, whether perceived or real. Reports from the field reveal that a large number of displaced individuals have been actively identified as targets for revenge, sometimes even having their original homes marked with an “X” (Revkin 2021). In this context, IDPs worry that they will face stigmatization, social isolation, and even retributive violence should they attempt to return. Many communities, on the other hand, are hesitant to accept returnees for fear that they may have a connection to the extremist group.

Since the successful return and reintegration of these IDPs is central to durable reconciliation processes in post-ISIS Iraq, the case raises critical questions about what, if any, types of interventions can be made into the local community to facilitate reconciliation and reintegration. Currently a host of national and local level mechanisms are being experimented with on the ground in the hopes that they will make reconciliation and forgiveness more feasible. Local level mechanisms for return and reintegration currently include requirements that stigmatized individual disavow the extremist group and its aims, the use of local leaders as “sponsors” to support prospective returnees and guarantee security, consultation with lo-

5. See the appendix for more details on these focus groups.

6. Focus group with male respondents in Anbar, 12/9/2022.

7. Focus group with female respondents in Mosul, 12/8/2022.

cal peace committees made-up of community members, and cooperation with international donors and development agencies working on the ground (Revkin 2021). Recent research has found that both requests from local tribal or religious leaders and rehabilitation programs can increase the willingness to reintegrate stigmatized IDPs (Revkin and Kao 2022; Blair et al. 2021). Thus, the Iraqi context presents a “hard case” for the study of transitional justice techniques and tools for signaling redemption. Both ISIS’ extremist ideology and some of the atrocities for which the group is responsible—including the murder, rape, and enslavement of innocent civilians—are likely to make reconciliation challenging and bolster desires for revenge.

The current study focuses on three governorates in Iraq—namely, Al Anbar, Ninewa, and Baghdad—to provide a wide range of differing viewpoints. Parts of both Al Anbar and Ninewa were ruled by ISIS while other areas in these governorates escaped this fate. ISIS never captured any territory within the Baghdad governorate. Furthermore, while the city of Mosul in Ninewa and the capital city of Baghdad are quite diverse and urban, the environs surrounding Mosul and communities in Al Anbar are much less developed, more ethnically and religiously homogeneous, and tribally dominated. With regards to religious diversity, the study concentrates on the two largest sects in Iraq: Sunnis (69% of the sample) and Shias (31% of the sample). The sample was purposely skewed towards Sunnis, as the areas in which they live are the most likely to be experiencing reintegration of stigmatized IDPs.

3.1 Ethics

Research with post-conflict populations poses unique risks and that we considered seriously when designing this work. To ensure that our research design met high ethical standards, prior to our survey we conducted 12 qualitative focus groups in Iraq to assess Iraqis’ willingness to discuss potentially difficult topics—including their views about politics, their experiences with the Islamic state and the attitudes toward stigmatized IDPs—without ex-

periencing duress. Our focus groups revealed that although these topics sometimes provoked passionate responses, discussions of these themes openly are common-place in Iraqi society. These focus groups and the survey itself was implemented with the aid of a local research firm called IIACSS, which has extensive experience surveying Iraqis in the areas where we worked. Together with IIACSS staff, we ensured the cultural appropriateness, political acceptability, and personal sensitivity of the questions asked in the survey. IIACSS also conducted thorough in-person trainings with the enumerators to ensure their compliance with best practices, particularly concerning their own and respondents' safety through gaining informed consent, detecting signals of discomfort, and allowing participants to drop out of the survey at any time. These trainings were vetted and attended virtually by the project researchers. Questions regarding personal, family, or community experiences with violence were kept as minimal, brief, and as non-specific as possible. Particular care was also taken to follow all national regulations related to the COVID-19 pandemic and to train enumerators appropriately. IIACSS secured all the necessary security approvals from the Iraqi government as well as local security forces and leaders required for our research. In the rare instances when immediate security concerns prevented enumerators from entering certain sampling units to conduct surveys, IIACSS paused research until a new, safe, and comparable sampling unit for research could be identified. This study was carried out in accordance with an Institutional Review Board approved protocol from [redacted]. The response rate for our survey varied between 41% and 50%, with the highest response rate recorded in Baghdad and the lowest rate recorded in Ninewa. In addition to mentioning that scenarios were hypothetical and imaginary, participants were debriefed at the end of the interview as to the hypothetical nature of the vignettes. Participants were also provided with information for contacting IIACSS and the lead researcher on the project. All protocols were designed to be compliant with the European Union's General Data Protection Regulations.

3.2 Methods

To test our theoretical framework, we experimentally manipulate the identity characteristics of the IDP/transgressor, the severity of the transgression, and efforts towards redemption in order to map differing cognitive and emotional responses across two factorial vignette experiments. The creation of these vignettes were informed by detailed focus group discussions with men and women living in each of the three governorates (n=56). The experiments ask participants to consider scenarios in which an IDP seeks acceptance and resettlement into their community. If the hypothetical IDP will be the respondent's neighbor, the chances are much higher that the respondent will expect to have future interactions with this person, which closely aligns with our theoretical outcomes of interest.

Our experimental arms fall broadly into indicators of past culpability versus present or future redemption. The precise experimental components causally test factors that either previous research (e.g Kao and Revkin 2021; Kao 2022; Petersen et al. 2012) have identified as important to reconciliation or those that aid agencies on the ground are implementing currently to promote reconciliation and diminish revenge in Iraq.

On past culpability, we follow recent research on post-conflict reconciliation and construct scales of offense severity. In experiment 1, we varied how intimately the IDPs were connected to ISIS, ranging from engaging in combat themselves, being married to a combatant (limited to women), providing indirect support for ISIS by working in the governance institutions supporting the enemy group, or engaging at the minimum level of making tax payments to the group, which most residents of ISIS controlled territory were required to do.⁸ Volition behind engaging in these acts was also experimentally manipulated in experiment 1. The second experiment varied accusations of personal versus familial support for ISIS against a baseline of simply having fled the conflict.

In terms of identity characteristics, experiment 1 varies both the age and the gender of

8. This scale of intimacy with violence was adapted from (Kao and Revkin 2021).

the transgressor seeking reintegration; experiment 2 varies just gender. We examine age because the literature has shown that juveniles are assumed to have less agency, to be more easily influenced by those around them and authority figures, and less able to distinguish between right and wrong (Slobogin, Fondacaro, and Woolard 1999; Maio et al. 2008). We consider gender given that both Islamic and tribal traditions, which are strong in Iraq, tend to regard women as the weaker sex (Oweidi 1982; Weir 2007) and thus perhaps render them less threatening when it comes to reintegration. Academic scholarship finds that women are often perceived as being less blameworthy than men *ceteris paribus* (Honey 2017), although reports from Iraq have suggested that women can face a higher stigmatization penalty when they seek to reintegrate (International Crisis Group 2020).

With respect to possible acts of redemption, we study disavowals, deradicalization programs, signals of future plans to help the community, and gaining the sponsorship of a local leader to return.

Disavowing ISIS might help signal redemption in the present. In the literature, acts of humility in the form of apologies or actions have been shown to spur forgiveness in personal relationships (Davis et al. 2016). Disavowal is currently the most widely used mechanism for transitional justice in Iraq. Many IDPs seeking return are required to formally denounce ISIS in front of the community, a tribal leader, or the court, as well as deny allegiance to the group publicly (Aymerich 2020; Revkin and Kao 2022).

Deradicalization programs, although not currently part of the architecture for transitional justice in Iraq, are of interest because they provide transgressors with an opportunity to be psychologically rehabilitated, sending a present signal that they have shed any extremist or violent predilections and are worthy of redemption. Such programs are a widely used component of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) initiatives elsewhere and have been studied in other post-conflict contexts (Phayal, Khadka, and Thyne 2015; Humphreys and Weinstein 2007; Daly 2018). For our experiment, we varied the identity

of the actor running the deradicalization program (the UN or the Iraqi state). UN led DDR programs have been shown to improve the likelihood of reintegration in the context of Somalia (Gelot and Khadka 2022).

We study future plans to help the community because past research has shown that a criminal’s expected future benefit to society may lead to less retributive attitudes (Petersen et al. 2012). As our pre-survey focus groups and other studies in post-conflict settings reveal, a deep-seated concern potentially blocking reintegration is fear of recidivism, which might be alleviated by signaling that an IDP/transgressor has plans to be a productive and beneficial member of society in the future. For example, in one recent study, conciliatory actions taken by former Boko Haram fighters to show willingness in helping the police and military fight the rebel group were shown to increase reintegration (Godefroidt and Langer 2022).

In experiment 2 we also study the practice of sponsorship, or (*kafala*), which signals redemption based on assurances from a community leader that an individual no longer has ties to ISIS and will not harm the community in the future (Revkin 2021). Researchers have increasingly highlighted the role of traditional authorities and local actors in reconciliation processes (Asfura-Heim 2014; Gelot 2020; Blair et al. 2021; Revkin and Kao 2022). Sponsorship is widely used in Iraq and plays several roles in ongoing resettlement processes. First, through their authority, sponsors signal a guarantee of future peaceful and upstanding behavior on the part of the IDP. Second, sponsors play a future deterrent function, blocking retributive aggression against the IDP in the name of maintaining peace and upholding honor codes related to traditional authority (Aymerich 2020; Carroll 2011; Revkin 2021). The identity of the sponsor and his standing in the local community are thus critical. Our experiment varied the identity of a local sponsor (tribal leader, religious leader, security official) versus a baseline of an IDP having no sponsor.

In experiment 2, we manipulate aspects of the community context. We varied whether or not community has been consulted and agreed about the IDPs’ return. On the ground

in Iraq, Local Peace Committees have been formed at the community level to facilitate agreement and enhance local capacities to resolve conflicts and to improve social cohesion and trust (Revkin 2021). We also varied whether or not there is programming being offered by multilateral aid organizations, and whether or not that programming included funding or is limited to local training to facilitate reintegration processes.

During fielding, respondents were told that they would hear a hypothetical scenario about a person who is seeking to move into their neighborhood. The text of the vignettes read as follows with the randomized components shown in bold; these components are further detailed in Tables 1 and 2.

Experiment 1: Individual level factors *A **Gender** accused of joining Daesh when he/she⁹ was **Age**. During a comprehensive investigation, it was concluded that this Iraqi citizen **Volition Accusation** and that he/she did not engage in any other actions related to Daesh. This man/woman **Disavowal**. This man/woman **Rehabilitation**. He/she plans to **Future Contribution**.*

9. A single gendered pronouns showed in accordance with the gender dimension.

Table 1: Experiment 1. Randomized Attributes of the Individual

Dimension	Arms
Gender	-man -woman
Age	-15 -35
Volition	-was forced to -chose to
Accusation	-fight for Daesh -marry to a Daesh fighter -cook in the kitchens for the fighters of Daesh -clean the municipality run by Daesh -pay taxes to Daesh
Disavowal	-has publicly sworn on the Quran that s/he denounces Daesh, does not have any allegiance to the group, and has done no harm to your community. -has publicly denounced Daesh, denied any allegiance to the group, and affirmed that s/he has done no harm to your community. -wants to move to your neighborhood
Rehabilitation	-has gone through a UN deradicalization program -has gone through a state deradicalization program -has not gone through a rehabilitation program
Future Contribution	-help the police and military combat Daesh -start a business and hire locals to help run it -start a new life

Experiment 2: Community level factors *Imagine a [Gender] wants to resettle in your neighborhood after spending some years living in an internally displaced person camp. There are rumors that this [Gender] [Accusation]. [Disavow]. [Sponsor] is sponsoring his/her resettlement in your neighborhood. Residents in your area [Consultation] his/her resettlement. Currently, [Programming] communities accepting displaced Iraqis.*

Table 2: **Experiment 2. Randomized Attributes of the Community**

Dimension	Arms
Gender	-man -woman
Accusation	-personally supported Daesh -had a brother who supported Daesh -fled from Daesh to the camp
Disavowal	-This person denies allegiance to Daesh -This person wants to leave the camp
Sponsor	-Local tribal leaders -Local religious leaders -Local state security officials -No local leader in your community
Consultation	-have not been consulted about -have been consulted and are against -have been consulted and are in favor of -have been consulted and are divided regarding
Programming	-multilateral organizations are contributing funds to provide additional services like mental health support, legal assistance, and youth education in -multilateral organizations are offering trainings in mental health support, legal assistance, and youth education in -there is a lack of support to help

3.3 Outcome Questions

Our outcomes are broadly grouped around the concepts reconciliation and revenge. We employed principle component analysis (PCA) of a series of survey questions ascertaining an individual's likelihood of pursuing: 1) reconciliation comprising of reintegration in to the respondent's neighborhood,¹⁰ personal forgiveness, and dimensions of willingness to engage pro-socially with the target across economic, political, and social spheres; or 2) revenge: desires and efforts to hurt or punish someone who is deemed responsible for harming oneself or others (McCullough 2008: 21); (Aquino, Tripp, and Bies 2006: 654). The PCA confirms that items load well onto these two factors. Indices, combining multiple outcome items within these factors, were then created to capture tendencies towards reconciliation and revenge. The full process of these analyses and exact text of the outcome questions can be found in the SI File (pps. 3-5). This multi-dimensional understanding of the concepts of reconciliation and revenge represents an additional theoretical contribution of this study.

3.4 Statistical mediators

To assess the theorized pathways displayed in Figure 1 and the related emotions, we assess three potential cognitive mediators and three potential affective mediators in Experiment 1. With regards to cognitive pathways, we asked about the (1) perceived condemnability of the IDP's past behavior; (2) the likelihood of that the IDP could become a productive member of the community in the future; and (3) the likelihood that the IDP would engage in acts of violence in the future. To assess related emotions, we asked about the extent to which the respondent's experienced emotions of (1) anger, (2) sympathy, and (3) fear towards the IDP. In Experiment 2, we assessed the same three emotional mediators but, because of the noted

10. The vignette mentions that the person wants to move back to the respondent's neighborhood because this is more closely linked with reconciliation than vaguely seeking reintegration somewhere in Iraq. If a former collaborator is a respondent's neighbor, the chances are much higher that the respondent will expect to have future interactions with this person.

ambiguity with regards to the relationship between the IDP and Daesh, we slightly altered the cognitive mediators for this experiment. Specifically, we did not assess condemnability as this is less clear in Experiment 2. Furthermore, given that there is no necessary association between the IDP and violence in Experiment 2, we broadened the cognitive assessment to more generalized risks of associating with the IDP rather than a more narrow focus on violence. Causal identification of mediation is notoriously difficult in situations, as here, where both the putative mediator and the outcome are observed, as both reverse causality between mediator and outcome and violations of sequential ignorability assumptions constitute significant challenges (Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010). Accordingly, we do not attribute a causal interpretation to the mediation results but simply assess the overlapping variance between the effects of the treatments on mediator and outcome, respectively. To this end, we rely on the KHB-method (Kohler, Karlson, and Holm 2011), which allows us to include multiple mediators simultaneously and, hence, assess which (if any) mediator shares most variance with the effect of the treatment on the outcome.¹¹

4 Results

The results across the two experiments emphasize that past—and therefore immutable—factors are the strongest determinants of attitudes towards reconciliation and revenge with stigmatized IDPs.¹² They are also robust to the use of both Romano–Wolf’s p -value corrections and Holm’s p -value corrections for multiple hypothesis testing (Romano and Wolf 2005; Clarke, Romano, and Wolf 2020).¹³ Neither personal attempts at signalling rehabilitation


11. The inclusion of multiple mediators also improves the likelihood that the sequential ignorability assumption is satisfied, as we directly include potential confounding mediators in the model. However, this does not remedy potential threats to causal identification from reverse causality.

12. We pre-registered our hypotheses at Open Science Framework [URL redacted]. All findings presented here were pre-specified, although not all of our pre-specified hypotheses found support.

13. The number of repetitions is 1,000 per scenario, and the number of bootstrap resamples in each case is 1,000.


nor external interventions have large or significant effects on reconciliation or revenge. All together, our analyses across two experiments render a rather large number of coefficients. Thus, we present our results graphically using coefficient plots with experimental arms shown on the vertical axis and point estimates with 95% confidence intervals displayed on the horizontal axis. Table 1 and Figures 3 and 4 in the SI file (pps. 6-8) presents regression output tables as well as marginal means outputs (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020) for those who prefer them.

Figure 2: Reconciliation Across Two Experiments



Note: OLS regression employed on full sample. Point estimates are depicted as circles with 95% confidence intervals (horizontal lines) from robust standard errors.

Figure 3: Revenge Across Two Experiments



Note: OLS regression employed on full sample. Point estimates are depicted as circles with 95% confidence intervals (horizontal lines) from robust standard errors.

Culpability Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that more severe offenses decrease the likelihood of reconciliation with and increase the likelihood of revenge against a stigmatized IDP. Reconciliation with taxpayers is statistically more likely compared to combatants (by 14 percentage points (pp)), $p < 0.00$, combatants' spouses (8 pp), $p < 0.00$), support staff for fighters (5pp, $p < 0.00$), and staff of the enemy bureaucracy (3 pp, $p < 0.01$). These results reinforce findings from earlier work (Kao and Revkin 2021) that culpability, as measured by intimacy with violence, is the most important factor for reconciliation with stigmatized individuals in post-conflict settings. Our study allows for the generalization of these findings from a more limited sample (1,458 of Sunni Arab residents of Mosul) to a larger, more diverse population. We build on this finding by demonstrating that tendencies towards revenge also increase significantly as a result of culpability but the finding is limited to more extreme differences: the most severe forms of engagement in terms of intimacy with violence (combatants by 6pp $p < 0.00$ and wives of combatants by 3pp, $p < 0.00$) drive vengeance.

The second experiment reinforces the importance of culpability. Reconciliation with those who are suspected of simply having fled ISIS are significantly different from zero at the 1% level when compared both to having a family member who supported ISIS (by 4 pp) and personal support for ISIS (by 14pp). Vengeance against IDPs who fled the enemy is significantly less likely ($p < 0.00$) than those accused of a familial connection to the group (by 4 pp) or personal support for the group (by 9pp).

Strengthening our findings on culpability, volition behind a stigmatized IDP's act of engagement with the extremist group is also a strong predictor of reconciliatory and vengeful tendencies. Volition reduces the likelihood of reconciliation by 7pp ($p < 0.00$) and augments that of revenge by 2pp ($p < 0.00$).

Characteristics of Stigmatized Individuals Other, immutable features of stigmatization determine our outcomes of interest. Male IDPs are less likely to be met with reconciliation and more likely to provoke revenge by about 2 to 4 pp ($p < 0.01$) across both experiments.

Younger offenders are likely to be treated with more leniency, though the effects are minimal (1-2pp, $p < 0.05$).

Community Factors Overall, the effects of community factors are more varied across our outcomes and are weaker than factors signaling culpability. A stigmatized IDP who plans to help state security institutions combat the enemy is more likely to achieve reconciliation (2pp, $p < 0.05$). Experiment 2 further demonstrates that non-state community elites like tribal or religious leaders can diminish support for revenge by about 3 pp ($p < 0.01$) and 2 pp ($p < 0.05$), respectively, when they act as sponsors for returnees compared to having no leader supporting reintegration; local security forces also have a negative effect on revenge by about 2pp but only at a 10% significance level. Finally, a community that is consulted and is against reintegration of an IDP may be more likely to seek vengeance (2pp, $p < 0.05$).

5 Discussion

The greatest effects on post-conflict reconciliation versus revenge are driven by features of IDPs that are immutable. Severity of offense is particularly strong. Other indicators of being culpable including volition of engagement with the enemy, being male in a society where males dominate the public sphere, and increased age (and therefore comprehensibility of right from wrong) all affect the likelihood of reconciliation and revenge.

Acts of redemption are much less impactful and vary across reconciliation versus revenge outcomes. Strengthening other recent findings from Nigeria, we find that IDPs who aid the state security apparatus in dismantling the enemy are more likely to gain reconciliation though the effect is much weaker than in that study (Godefroidt and Langer 2022). Further, sponsorship of local leaders may lessen the likelihood of revenge.

5.1 Statistical mediators


To assess how offense severity (and, potentially, other factors) translates into more support for revenge and less support for reconciliation, we examine the extent to which the measured mediators share significant overlapping variance with the effect of the experimental factors on the outcome variables. To this end—and because we need to assess multiple mediators simultaneously—we rely on the KHB mediation model (Kohler, Karlson, and Holm 2011), designed to decompose an association between an independent variable and an outcome variable into multiple confounding or mediating factors. We assess the cognitive and the emotional mediators in separate models, as they are expected to capture overlapping variance (accordingly, the combined percentages reported in Figure 4 may sum to more than 100 percent), and, for each set, we investigate potential statistical mediation between all experimental factors on both support for revenge and reconciliation. Only significant mediation results at the conventional .05-level for experimental factors that are mediated by both the cognitive and the emotional factors for both revenge and reconciliation are shown. Unsurprisingly, this is only the case for the experimental factors with the strongest main effects, i.e., the IDP being a fighter (rather than a taxpayer) in Experiment 1 and the IDP having fled Daesh (rather than being a supporter) in Experiment 2.¹⁴ Figure 4 displays the results and, specifically, the percentage of the experimental effect overlapping with a given mediator.

As is clear, the results for Experiments 1 and 2 are highly consistent. First, the cognitive and emotional factors share significant variance with the effect of the IDP’s past behavior on respondents’ intuitions about transitional justice. The emotion of sympathy and the perception of the IDP being a productive community member are uniquely tied to support for reconciliation, whereas the perception that the IDP constitutes a future risk—and, to

14. In addition to the displayed factors, the effect of being a spouse to a Daesh fighter in Experimental 1 and having a brother who supported Daesh in Experiment 2 have inconsistently significant effects.

a lesser extent, the related emotion of fear—is tied to support for revenge. Anger and condemnation are linked to both reconciliation and revenge, although the mediating effect for revenge is stronger. All in all, the mediation results demonstrate that a reason why past behavior so strongly shapes justice intuitions is because this behavior simultaneously co-activates a past-oriented moral condemnation and a future-oriented heuristic assessment of the value and risks of associating with the offender. As such, the severity of the past offence impedes transitional justice by making it simultaneously: 1) more difficult for community members to forgive what has been done; and 2) less likely that they will believe it is beneficial to associate with the offender.

Figure 4: Affective and Cognitive Pathways to Reconciliation and Revenge Across Two Experiments



Note: KHB mediation of the effect of "Fighter" (relative to baseline) in Experiment 1 on top and of "Fled to Camp" (relative to baseline) in Experiment 2 on bottom, separated by mediator and outcome.

5.2 Moderators/Alternative Explanations

We ran several analyses to test the robustness of our findings against other drivers of reconciliation or revenge proposed in the extant literature. We pre-registered hypotheses that factors such as differential beliefs in the effectiveness of deradicalization programs or the leaders mentioned in the experiments, experience with violence or the rule of Daesh, or in-group/out-group identity with the IDP would act as potential moderators of our outcomes.

Effectiveness of Rehabilitation Programs and the Leaders Running Them Respondents who doubt the effectiveness of deradicalization programs or the leaders running them are unlikely to be affected by such programs. Confidence in the success of deradicalization programs¹⁵ to rehabilitate those accused of support for ISIS is highest when “capable leaders”—in the abstract—are said to run them (scoring a mean of 5.66 on a 10-point scale). Thus, mean confidence in rehabilitation efforts is diminished by mention of specific actors leading them. The baseline confidence in capable leaders running such programs is followed by the UN (5.34), local security forces (5.25), state officials (4.94), tribal leaders (4.53), and finally religious leaders (4.42).¹⁶ Paired sample, two-tailed t-tests show that differences between these actors and “capable leaders” running these programs is significantly different from 0 at the $p < 0.00$ level.¹⁷

We ran three tests for moderating effects of beliefs in the effectiveness of deradicalization programs in general as well as confidence in differing types of leaders on the success of such programs seen in our experiment. First, belief in capable leaders to run programs in the abstract does not significantly increase reconciliation nor decrease revenge when interacted

15. In the survey, deradicalization programs were defined for the respondent as programs for combating and dismantling the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve religious or political goals.

16. Religious leaders may generate less confidence, on average, because of ISIS’ manipulation of religion to justify its actions.

17. This finding is robust to employing non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests.

with our experimental arms on deradicalization programs. Thus, we find the effects of beliefs in the capability of deradicalization programs to successfully rehabilitate stigmatized IDPs in Iraq are not significantly different from zero across our experimental arms. A marginal means analysis (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020) reveals that respondents who have more confidence in capable leaders are more likely to reconcile with stigmatized IDPs *regardless* of which rehabilitation program experimental arm the respondent received. Second, we tested if confidence in *specific* leaders (i.e., the UN or the Iraqi state) to run deradicalization programs drives success of the experimental arm in which the respondent saw that leader running a program. When respondents received the experimental arms with UN specialists or Iraqi state leaders running the deradicalization program, high confidence in such leaders is not positively associated with reconciliation nor negatively associated with revenge. See SI file Table 2 (p. 11) and Figure 7 (p. 12).

Local Leader Sponsorship Sponsorship may rely to a certain extent on beliefs that a given leader has the power to enforce his will over the sponsored IDP and other members in the community. Particularly since our experiment finds that the effect of sponsorship is linked to the prevention of vengeance, consideration of the moderating effect of leader power is underscored. We probed the abilities of local leaders (i.e. tribal leaders, religious leaders, and state security forces) to enforce their decisions, run successful deradicalization programs, and ensure an accused Daesh supporter would be safe from violence if sponsored. Principal component analysis revealed that the creation of a single index of these questions for each type of leader was appropriate. The index is standardized to range between 0 and 1. Religious leaders are perceived as the least powerful at a mean of 0.37. Tribal leaders follow at a mean of 0.41. Local security forces are seen as the most powerful at 0.52.

We find that confidence in leaders' power does not affect the main outcomes of our experiment. For religious leaders, higher confidence is positively associated with reconciliation but does not affect revenge. In the two other cases (i.e. tribal leaders and state security

officials), confidence in the powers of different leaders to enforce their will do not significantly affect the average treatment effects of collaborator sponsorship on reconciliation or revenge. See SI file Table 3 (p. 13).

Social Identity While reconciliation and revenge can be theorized in terms of interpersonal relationships—as we have done here—in societies where members of different social identity groups have fought one another, a growing body of research in social psychology suggests that reconciliation and revenge primarily will be conceptualized as a group concern (Bakke, O’Loughlin, and Ward 2009). Applied to this situation, social identity theory (SIT) posits that one’s willingness to pursue forgiveness is determined by their group membership, as people tend to pass more lenient judgments on perpetrators from their in-group and more harsh judgements on perpetrators from out-groups (Roman 2014).

Given the salience of sectarian identities in the Iraqi context, we pre-registered a hypothesis that Iraq’s Sunni Muslims, who share some nominal in-group characteristics with ISIS (sectarian identity though not necessarily the group’s extremist ideology), will be more willing to reconcile and reintegrate stigmatized IDPs and less desirous of vengeance against them. We find support for these hypotheses. Interactions of our experimental arms with respondent sectarian identity demonstrate statistically significantly different weight being given to gender, type of act, and volition for reconciliation in experiment 1; volition for revenge in experiment 1; and gender for experiment 2 for the outcome of reconciliation. We do not see clear differences of sectarian identity on revenge for experiment 2. Although almost all of the effects of our experimental arms are not statistically distinguishable from zero when conditioned upon respondent sectarian identity, marginal means analyses reveal that Shias have a higher average tendency for revenge against stigmatized IDPs.¹⁸ See Figures 8 and 9 in the SI File (pps. 14-15).

Past Victimization by ISIS Social psychologists’ emphasis on transgression severity is

18. These findings are confirmed by F-tests ($p < 0.05$).

related to a growing body of work that examines the pro-social and anti-social effects of exposure to violence (Bauer et al. 2016), and especially whether or not it blocks the path to reconciliation and peace (Hall et al. 2018; Hirsch-Hoefler et al. 2016; Dyrstad and Binningsbø 2019; Bakke, O’Loughlin, and Ward 2009; Tellez 2019; Balcells 2012). We test for this moderator by exploring whether those who report being personally victimized by ISIS are any less likely to reconcile and any more likely to seek revenge. Although 41% of our sample reported having experienced the rule of Daesh, just 3% of the full sample blame Daesh for targeted violence against them. Unfortunately this group is too small to obtain precise estimates from. Heterogeneous effects analyses reveal that victimized respondents are more likely to pursue reconciliation when they see a stigmatized IDP has gone through a UN deradicalization program and less likely to do so when the IDP disavows ISIS on the Quran or hires locals in business. We suspect that misgivings about individuals who use Islam in any way that can be considered personally advantageous are experiencing a backlash from those who victimized by ISIS, a group that also used religion to its advantage. We interpret the finding on hiring locals to result from a dislike of seeing stigmatized IDPs in charge of others in the community. (See SI file Table 4 (p. 17).

Social Desirability Bias Finally, we consider the extent to which social desirability bias may have affected our results. We do not have strong priors about which way this sort of bias runs and it is likely to be idiosyncratic. On the one hand, some respondents may have felt the need to respond more harshly regarding the return of stigmatized IDPs to affirm their own opposition to ISIS. On the other hand, some participants may have felt pressure to demonstrate forgiveness of accused ISIS supporters and particularly in the case of women and youths. Other studies suggest that conversations concerning what should be done with individuals accused of joining ISIS are commonplace and conclude that sensitivity bias surrounding these issues is not a serious concern using sophisticated list experiments (e.g., Kao and Revkin 2021; Mercy Corps 2021). In this study, we pre-tested all of our

measures to ensure that they did not result in high proportions of refusals to answer and indeed, less than X % of our participants declined to answer any of our outcome questions. At the end of the interview, about 7% of our sample reported feeling uncomfortable in answering any one of the questions associated with ISIS. We re-ran our analyses dropping these participants out and found no substantial differences in our results. See SI File Table 5 (p. 18).

6 Lessons Learned

The promise of transitional justice is forward-looking: a brighter, conflict-free future in which individuals have moved on from the crimes of the past. Yet, the past holds a particular power in post-conflict contexts. As we have shown through a study of the reintegration prospects for stigmatized IDPs in the Iraqi case, people’s willingness to reconcile and their desire for revenge are both tightly linked to the severity of any past transgression and the volition behind it. When a past transgression was voluntary and severe—as in the case of choosing to fight for ISIS—the likelihood of reconciliation with the offender decreases, while desire for revenge against her increases significantly.

The power of past is activated through both cognitive and affective pathways. Cognitively, the severity and volition of an offender’s past transgression serves as both a past-oriented marker of moral disapproval and a heuristic for making future-oriented evaluations of their social value and the risk of interacting with them. Sympathy mediates the relationship between past behavior and reconciliation, fear mediates the relationship between past behavior and revenge, and anger mediates both reconciliation and revenge.

In the case we studied, techniques for the implementation of transitional justice that are designed to repair past-wrongs through rehabilitation or the disavowal of past behavior have no significant impact on the likelihood of reconciliation or revenge. Present-oriented pro-

grams that focus on community consultation about the offender’s reintegration and promises by the offender to contribute to the social good in the future through either business activities or joining the fight against extremist groups, while precisely estimated, also appear to matter very little in our study.

One potential limitation of the study is that it lacks a temporal component. “Time heals”, as the popular saying goes, and scholars have rightfully noted the importance of taking time seriously in the study of forgiveness and reconciliation (McCullough, Fincham, and Tsang 2003). Nonetheless, the similarity of our results in this larger study to those found by Revkin and Kao three-years prior in 2018 (Revkin and Kao 2022), especially our shared findings about the importance of the volition behind any act of collaboration, suggest that time has not had a particularly ameliorative effect in the Iraqi case.

While our research suggests that many of the common approaches to transitional justice may lack the ability to overcome the power of the past, they do point to several possible ways in which such reintegration programming can be used to diminish revenge cycles. First, given peoples’ preoccupation with the severity of past transgressions and the volition behind them, legal programming for fact-finding missions can be helpful in distinguishing the actual willing participants in violence from coerced collaborators and innocent bystanders, as the latter groups are much more likely to be welcomed back into communal life. “Clearing the names” of the innocent and reinforcing the notion that association is not tantamount to guilt can cultivate a climate where communities are open to at least some IDPs returning. Second, programs designed to improve IDPs’ ability to make a productive future contribution to society and to help them refrain from violence will, at the very least, not harm reintegration prospects. Third, psychological programming that aims to promote sympathy and diminish anger, while taking care not to create a sense of “rewarding” transgressors, and using local leaders to help staunch the cycles of revenge both hold promise for the active cultivation of a positive reintegration climate.

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SI Materials for “The Irredeemability of the
Past: Determinants of Reconciliation and
Revenge in Post-Conflict Settings”

Kristen Kao, Kristin Fabbe, Michael Bang Petersen

August 20, 2023

Survey Description

Six pre-survey focus groups were conducted in Iraq between December 5-12, 2021. The focus groups with a total of 56 Iraqis were conducted in the provinces of Baghdad, Anbar, and Ninewa. Baghdad provides a very diverse, mostly urban setting where the Islamic State never ruled. Anbar is largely rural, dominated by Sunni tribes, and has some areas where the Islamic State ruled and others where it did not. Finally, Ninewa is a mix of urban and rural areas and is somewhat diverse with many areas having been ruled by the Islamic State at some point. The participants were recruited as randomly as possible, yet seeking diversity in terms of ages and education levels. A quality control was done to make sure respondents did not know each other previously. Women and men were interviewed separately. The focus groups were recorded and then English transcripts as well as the recordings in Arabic were provided to the researchers by the local partners on the ground (IIACSS). All focus groups were moderated by a local research assistant, who was trained in part by the researchers. Consent was gained for participation in the groups and anonymity of respondents was ensured. For details, see Figure 1.

Age	Occupation	Ethnicity	Family Income (IQD)	Education	Marital Status	Province	Gender	Date
38	Teacher	Shia	600,000-799,999	Bachelors	Married	Baghdad	Male	12/5/22
38	Teacher	Muslim	less than 600,000	Bachelors	Married	Baghdad	Male	12/6/22
30	Employed	Muslim	600,000-799,999	Bachelors	Married	Baghdad	Male	12/7/22
31	Employed	Muslim	600,000-799,999	Bachelors	Married	Baghdad	Male	12/8/22
26	Self-employed	Muslim	1,000,000 and more	Diploma	Single	Baghdad	Male	12/9/22
24	Self-employed	Muslim	600,000-799,999	Bachelors	Single	Baghdad	Male	12/10/22
40	School Principal	Muslim	800,000-999,999	Bachelors	Married	Baghdad	Male	12/11/22
40	Teacher	Shia	1,000,000 and more	Bachelors	Married	Baghdad	Male	12/12/22
21	Self-employed	Shia	less than 600,000	Highschool	Single	Baghdad	Male	12/13/22
29	Barber	Shia	less than 600,000	Highschool	Single	Baghdad	Male	12/14/22
33	Not working	Sunni	less than 600,000	Finished Secondary	Married	Mosul	Female	12/8/22
26	Student	Muslim	600,000-799,999	Master	Married	Mosul	Female	12/9/22
29	Student	Muslim	less than 600,000	Some Secondary	Married	Mosul	Female	12/10/22
30	Housewife	Sunni	800,000-999,999	Bachelors	Married	Mosul	Female	12/11/22
20	Not working	Sunni	799,999-800,000	Finished Secondary	Single	Mosul	Female	12/12/22
27	Student	Muslim	600,000-799,999	Some University	Single	Mosul	Female	12/13/22
21	Daily Worker	Sunni	less than 600,000	Finished Secondary	Divorced	Mosul	Female	12/14/22
25	Not working	Muslim	less than 600,000	Bachelors	Single	Mosul	Female	12/15/22
23	Student	Sunni	600,000-799,999	Some University	Single	Mosul	Female	12/16/22
35	Not working	Muslim	less than 600,000	Bachelors	Married	Mosul	Female	12/17/22
20	Student	Sunni	less than 600,000	Secondary	Single	Ninawa	Male	12/9/22
22	Student	Sunni	less than 600,000	Some Secondary	Single	Ninawa	Male	12/10/22
23	Not working	Muslim	less than 600,000	Some Secondary	Single	Ninawa	Male	12/11/22
38	Part Time	Sunni	600,000-799,999	Some Secondary	Married	Ninawa	Male	12/12/22
24	Student	Muslim	600,000-799,999	Some University	Single	Ninawa	Male	12/13/22
30	Part Time	Sunni	600,000-799,999	University	Single	Ninawa	Male	12/14/22
28	Student	Muslim	less than 600,000	Some University	Single	Ninawa	Male	12/15/22
26	Not working	Muslim	less than 600,000	University	Single	Ninawa	Male	12/16/22
31	Part Time	Sunni	less than 600,000	University	Married	Ninawa	Male	12/17/22
21	Full Time	Sunni	less than 600,000	High School	Single	Ninawa	Male	12/18/22
25	Part Time	No Answer	600,000-799,000	University	Single	Baghdad	Female	12/6/22
29	Not working	Sunni	1,000,000 and more	University	Married	Baghdad	Female	12/7/22
33	Not working	Sunni	No answer	University	Married	Baghdad	Female	12/8/22
36	Full-time	Shia	600,000-799,000	University	Married	Baghdad	Female	12/9/22
40	Full-time	Shia	1,000,000 and more	Some University	Married	Baghdad	Female	12/10/22
19	Student	Shia	800,000-999,999	Some University	Single	Baghdad	Female	12/11/22
27	Not working	No Answer	800,000-999,999	High School	Single	Baghdad	Female	12/12/22
30	Not working	Shia	1,000,000 and more	University	Single	Baghdad	Female	12/13/22
24	Student	Sunni	1,000,000 and more	Bachelor	Single	Anbar	Female	12/12/22
40	Teacher	Sunni	800,000 -999,999	Secondary	Married	Anbar	Female	12/13/22
25	Not working	Sunni	less than 600,000	Bachelor	Single	Anbar	Female	12/14/22
28	Teacher	Sunni	1,000,000 and more	Bachelor	Married	Anbar	Female	12/15/22
21	Student	Sunni	1,000,000 and more	Secondary	Single	Anbar	Female	12/16/22
26	Student	Sunni	800,000 -999,999	Secondary	Single	Ramadi	Female	12/17/22
23	Full time	Sunni	600,000-799,999	Secondary	Married	Ramadi	Female	12/18/22
27	Full time	Sunni	1,000,000 and more	Bachelor	Married	Anbar	Female	12/19/22
36	Housewife	Sunni	less than 600,000	Secondary	Married	Anbar	Female	12/20/22
20	Daily worker	Sunni	1,000,000 and more	Secondary	Single	Anbar	Male	12/9/22
29	Daily worker	Sunni	less than 600,000	High School	Married	Anbar	Male	12/10/22
30	Full-time	Sunni	600,000-799,999	Primary	Single	Anbar	Male	12/11/22
30	Teacher	Sunni	600,000-799,999	Primary	Married	Anbar	Male	12/12/22
26	Not working	Sunni	600,000-799,999	Secondary	Single	Anbar	Male	12/13/22
26	Teacher	Sunni	less than 600,000	Bachelor	Married	Anbar	Male	12/14/22
27	Student	Sunni	less than 600,000	Bachelor	Married	Anbar	Male	12/15/22
24	Student	Sunni	less than 600,000	Bachelor	Single	Anbar	Male	12/16/22
40	Not working	Sunni	less than 600,000	Secondary	Married	Anbar	Male	12/17/22

Figure 1: Focus Group Participants

The survey was run in the three Iraqi governorates of Ninewa, Baghdad, and Al Anbar from April 23, 2022 to July 4, 2022. The mean survey length was 44 minutes. The participation rates were 50% in Baghdad, 47% in Al Anbar, and 41% in Ninewa. A total of 104 enumerators worked in this project, being supervised by 8 supervisors and 3 auditors. Fieldwork was completed through face-to-face interviews in respondents' households. All interviews were conducted in strict adherence to the sampling plan. A multi-stage probability-based sample was drawn, using residential listings from Iraq's 2014 Population Census with updates that IIACSS has made on household lists based on the field work we have carried out over the last four years in addition to the formal updates/prognoses on the census that were published by the ministry of Planning in Iraq and the Central Statistical Organization Iraq (CSO).

-GPS tracking to monitor the correct application of sampling methodology and verify locations of sampling units.

-Regular monitoring of fieldwork to verify sample progress and conduct quality control checks.

-Automatic interview filtering based on duration, fake GPS locations, or a script-specified filter. Live tracking.

-Time analysis of dates, start times, end times, and duration to verify proper administration of questionnaires.

-Interviews were also checked for the frequency of don't know and refusal to answer responses. Interviews with high "don't know" or refusal frequencies were checked to see what might have drawn these types of responses.

Mediator Measures

Our post-treatment questions tackle major pathways through which responses to our outcome questions are likely to be influenced: emotional reactions to our experimental arms, threat perceptions, and consideration of the future benefit of this person to the community.

Experiment 1

1. How much does this person make you feel the following emotions?
[*Fear, Anger, Sympathy, Shame*]

2. In your opinion, how likely is it that this person could someday become a productive member of your community or Iraqi society more broadly in the future? *(10-point likelihood scale)*
3. In your opinion, how likely is it that this person may engage in violence or collaborate with violent groups in the future? *(10-point likelihood scale)*
4. How condemnable do you find the act of being a **Type of Cooperation**? *(10-point scale from not at all to completely)*

Experiment 2

1. Considering this Gender's resettlement in your neighborhood, how much do you feel each of the following emotions toward this displaced person? [*Fear, Anger, Sympathy, Shame*]
2. Imagine this **gender** is resettled in your neighborhood. How worried are you about what **he/she** was going to do next? *(10-point worried scale)*
3. Imagine this person is resettled in your neighborhood. How likely do you think it is that **he/she** could someday become a productive member of your community in the future? *(10-point likelihood scale)*

Moderator Measures

Experiment 1

To what extent do you agree that deradicalization programs for combating and dismantling the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve religious or political goals which are run by capable leaders can be effective for rehabilitating those accused of working with Daesh?

If someone accused of helping Daesh was to undergo a deradicalization program, how much confidence in the following actors would you have to run it successfully?

- United Nations specialists
- Iraqi state officials

Experiment 2

Please think about how powerful the following actors are in your area. In general, how able are these actors to get their decisions enforced in your neighborhood (either through force or social sanctioning or other means)?

- Local tribal leaders
- Local religious leaders
- Local state security officials

If someone accused of helping Daesh was to undergo a deradicalization program, how much confidence in the following actors would you have to run it successfully?

- Local state security forces
- Local tribal leaders
- Local religious leaders

If someone accused of helping Daesh was to gain sponsorship to resettle in your community from each of the following actors, how much confidence would you have in the actor's ability to guarantee that the collaborator will not be attacked by your community members?

- Local Iraqi state security forces
- Local tribal leaders
- Local religious leaders

Outcome Indices

Introduction to questions with 10-point scales: Now we would like to ask you about the important actors in your community. Your responses for these questions are recorded on a 10 point scale. For example, if the question is about agreement, then on this scale of 1 to 10, 1 means you disagree completely, 5 means you are unsure but disagree more than you agree, 6 means you are unsure but agree more than you disagree, and 10 means you agree completely. There are no right or wrong answers, as people have different opinions on these topics. Please be as honest as possible.

Experiment 1

1. This person now wants to move into your neighborhood. How much do you agree that this person should be allowed to move into your neighborhood? (*10-point likelihood scale*)

2. How much do you agree with the following statement: “I forgive this person for what he did.” (*10-point agreement scale*)
3. How much do you agree with the following statement: “I’d avoid this person.” (*10-point agreement scale*)
4. How likely would you be to hire this person if he had specialized skills you were in need of and could not get elsewhere? (*10-point likelihood scale*)
5. How likely would you be to buy goods from this person if he was offering them for a reasonable price even though you could get the goods elsewhere? (*10-point likelihood scale*)
6. How much do you agree that this person should continue to be allowed to vote in elections? (*10-point agreement scale*)
7. How much do you agree that this person should be allowed to hold a public office if he was nominated to one? (*10-point agreement scale*)
8. I would like you to choose the type of punishment you deem as appropriate for this person. I have ordered the following punishments in terms of least harsh to most harsh. *5-point punishment scale including: amnesty (least harsh), Mandatory community service (rebuilding public structures, etc.) for 1 year, imprisonment for 1 year, imprisonment for 15 years, capital punishment (Most harsh)*
9. Regardless of the punishment you chose, how much money do you think this person should be forced to pay to victims of Daesh? *Continuous scale of Iraqi dinars*
10. How much do you agree with the following statement: “I want to see this person hurt and miserable.” (*10-point agreement scale*)
11. How much do you agree that this person’s family should be punished for his actions in some way? (*10-point agreement scale*)

Experiment 2

The outcome questions for this experiment are listed below. Note that items in bold are brought in from the experiment and are therefore randomized components. Our main outcomes are measures of expected reintegration and reconciliation.

1. How likely are you to support this person's resettlement to your neighborhood? (*10-point likelihood scale*)
2. How likely do think other members of your community would be to support this **gender**'s resettlement to your neighborhood? (*10-point likelihood scale*)
3. Imagine this **gender** is resettled in your neighborhood. How likely do you think it is that **his/her** presence will cause disagreements between people in your community? (*10-point likelihood scale*)
4. Imagine this **gender** is resettled in your neighborhood. How likely do you think it is that **he/she** will be ostracized by people in your community? (*10-point likelihood scale*)
5. Imagine this **gender** is resettled in your neighborhood. How likely would local businesses be to hire **him/her** if **he/she** had specialized skills that were in need and could not be found elsewhere? (*10-point likelihood scale*)
6. Imagine this **gender** is resettled in your neighborhood. How likely do you think it is that **he/she** will be violently attacked by people in your community? (*10-point likelihood scale*)

Distributions of the outcome variables are displayed in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Distribution of Outcome Indices

Below we present coefficient tables for reconciliation and revenge across the two experiments and marginal means plots of our main results. Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) of Experiments 1 and 2 on Reconciliation and Revenge are displayed in Table 1.

Table 1: AMCEs of Profile Features on Likelihood of Reconciliation and Revenge Experiment 1

	Reconciliation 1	Revenge 1	Reconciliation 2	Revenge 2
Male	-0.0296** (0.0090)	0.0153** (0.0058)		
35 Year Old	-0.0210** (0.0078)	0.0131** (0.0051)		
Fighter	-0.1394*** (0.0139)	0.0641*** (0.0094)		
Spouse	-0.0774*** (0.0144)	0.0350*** (0.0095)		
Cook	-0.0512*** (0.0111)	0.0108 (0.0071)		
Janitor	-0.0319** (0.0112)	-0.0019 (0.0070)		
Voluntary	-0.0700*** (0.0079)	0.0217*** (0.0051)		
Disavows on Quran	-0.0023 (0.0096)	-0.0023 (0.0062)		
Disavows ISIS	-0.0091 (0.0095)	0.0080 (0.0062)		
UN Program	-0.0004 (0.0096)	-0.0012 (0.0062)		
Iraqi Program	-0.0101 (0.0096)	0.0097 (0.0062)		
Help Police	0.0193* (0.0096)	-0.0083 (0.0062)		
Hire Locals	-0.0080 (0.0095)	0.0086 (0.0062)		
Anbar	0.0120 (0.0098)	0.0073 (0.0062)	0.0215* (0.0095)	-0.1055*** (0.0090)
Ninawa	0.0291** (0.0095)	-0.0167** (0.0062)	0.0048 (0.0094)	-0.1690*** (0.0087)
Male			-0.0206** (0.0076)	0.0359*** (0.0072)
Supporter			-0.1365*** (0.0093)	0.0926*** (0.0089)
Brother Supporter			-0.0416*** (0.0095)	0.0396*** (0.0088)
Wants to Leave Camp			-0.0071 (0.0076)	-0.0006 (0.0072)
Tribal Leader			0.0086 (0.0108)	-0.0266** (0.0100)
Religious Leader			0.0039 (0.0107)	-0.0219* (0.0103)
Security Official			-0.0029 (0.0108)	-0.0175 (0.0103)
Against			-0.0105 (0.0110)	0.0191 (0.0104)
In Favor			0.0127 (0.0107)	-0.0010 (0.0102)
Divided			0.0076 (0.0106)	0.0030 (0.0102)
Development Funds			0.0125 (0.0093)	-0.0060 (0.0089)
Development Training			0.0085 (0.0094)	-0.0033 (0.0088)
R-squared	0.0518	0.0309	0.0517	0.1017
N	4592	10 4592	4592	4592

Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses below.

Figure 3: Marginal Means for Reconciliation





Figure 4: Marginal Means for Revenge



Robustness Checks

Balance

Balance is of concern to our experiments. For experiment 1, respondent gender is not balanced on the volition arm, respondent age is not balanced on the fighter arm or gender arm, and respondent education is not balanced on the fighter or janitor arms. For experiment 2, respondent gender is not balanced on the security official arm. To address concerns with balance, we run our main analyses including controls for respondent gender, age, and education. We do not find meaningful differences on our substantive outcomes when these controls are included in our models. See Figures 5 and 6.

Figure 5: AMCEs for Reconciliation with Respondent Controls





Figure 6: AMCEs for Revenge with Respondent Controls



Confidence in Leaders and Deradicalization Programs

As discussed in the main text, the effect of high confidence in deradicalization programs run by capable leaders on programs described as being run by different leaders compared to a baseline of no such program is not statistically distinguishable from zero for reconciliation nor revenge. Similarly, we also do not find deradicalization programs to be significantly more successful in promoting reconciliation or diminishing revenge when confidence in UN or Iraqi State leaders to run such programs is high. See Table 2 and Figure 7. An F-test confirms that the slope for confidence in UN officials to run deradicalization programs and seeing a UN run program in the experiment is not statistically different from that of seeing no program.

Table 2: Heterogeneous Effects of Confidence in Leaders and Rehabilitation Arm in Experiment 1

	Reconciliation	Revenge
UN Deradicalization Program \times Confidence Capable Leaders	0.0227 (0.0197)	0.0100 (0.0130)
Iraqi Deradicalization Program \times Confidence Capable Leaders	0.0011 (0.0198)	0.0214 (0.0129)
UN Deradicalization Program \times Confidence UN Officials	-0.0071* (0.0034)	0.0021 (0.0022)
Iraqi Deradicalization Program \times Confidence State Officials	-0.0010 (0.0034)	0.0012 (0.0022)
UN Deradicalization Program	0.0416+ (0.0225)	-0.0247 (0.0151)
Iraqi Deradicalization Program	0.0319 (0.0227)	-0.0083 (0.0152)
Confidence Capable Leaders	0.0589*** (0.0141)	-0.0187* (0.0091)
Confidence UN Officials	0.0117*** (0.0024)	-0.0021 (0.0015)
Confidence State Officials	0.0035 (0.0024)	0.0020 (0.0016)
R-squared	0.0844	0.0356
N	4552	4552

Note: + 0.10 * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. OLS regression employed. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses below.




Figure 7: Confidence in deradicalization programs run by capable leaders does not differentially condition the effects of rehabilitation arms run by different types of leaders on reconciliation or revenge

Variations in Local Leaders' Power

As discussed in the main text, belief in leaders' power to enforce their decisions increases reconciliation for religious leaders only. Revenge is not affected by confidence in capable leaders. See Table 3.

Table 3: Heterogeneous Effects of Leaders' Power on Sponsor Arm in Experiment 2

	Reconciliation	Revenge
Tribal Leader \times Powerful Tribal Leaders	-0.0015 (0.0049)	0.0012 (0.0044)
Religious Leader \times Powerful Religious Leaders	0.0109* (0.0047)	-0.0001 (0.0046)
State Official \times Powerful State Officials	0.0020 (0.0043)	-0.0042 (0.0040)
Tribal Leader	-0.0311 (0.0286)	0.0070 (0.0271)
Religious Leader	-0.0232 (0.0283)	-0.0033 (0.0272)
State Official	-0.0006 (0.0291)	-0.0148 (0.0281)
Powerful Tribal Leaders	0.0031 (0.0034)	0.0063* (0.0030)
Powerful Religious Leaders	0.0026 (0.0034)	0.0022 (0.0032)
Powerful State Officials	0.0046 (0.0031)	0.0061* (0.0028)
R-squared	0.0706	0.1159
N	4573	4573

Note: $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. OLS regression employed. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses below.

0.1 Social Identity

Figure 8 provides a visual view of these findings. The point estimates of the AMCEs for Sunnis, marked in circles, are to the right of those for Shias, marked in triangles, indicating higher tendencies toward reconciliation. Figure 9 shows the opposite relationship for revenge with Sunnis less likely to pursue vengeance than Shias, although much more strongly for the second experiment. These findings are confirmed by F-tests ($p < 0.05$).

See Figures 8 and 9.

Figure 8: Marginal Means of Sunnis (circles) Versus Shias (triangles) for Reconciliation





Figure 9: Marginal Means of Sunnis (circles) Versus Shias (triangles) for Revenge



Exposure to Violence at the Hands of ISIS

Results of victimization are described in the main text. We only include outcomes for Experiment 1 as none of the heterogeneous effects were significant in for Experiment 2. See Table 4.

Table 4: Heterogeneous Effects of Victimization for Experiment 1

	Reconciliation	Revenge
Victimized	-0.0042 (0.0836)	0.0635 (0.0558)
Male	-0.0283** (0.0092)	0.0169** (0.0058)
35 Year Old	-0.0226** (0.0079)	0.0135** (0.0052)
Fighter	-0.1414*** (0.0141)	0.0637*** (0.0095)
Spouse	-0.0788*** (0.0146)	0.0385*** (0.0097)
Cook	-0.0520*** (0.0113)	0.0111 (0.0071)
Janitor	-0.0341** (0.0113)	-0.0008 (0.0071)
Voluntary	-0.0690*** (0.0080)	0.0226*** (0.0052)
Denounced Daesh on Quran	-0.0027 (0.0097)	-0.0033 (0.0063)
Denounced Daesh	-0.0057 (0.0097)	0.0067 (0.0063)
UN Deradicalization Program	-0.0042 (0.0097)	-0.0003 (0.0063)
Iraqi Deradicalization Program	-0.0126 (0.0097)	0.0094 (0.0063)
Help police and military	0.0189 (0.0097)	-0.0077 (0.0063)
Hire Locals in Business	-0.0041 (0.0096)	0.0067 (0.0063)
Victimized × Male	-0.0304 (0.0544)	-0.0621 (0.0361)
Victimized × 35 Year Old	0.0649 (0.0465)	-0.0196 (0.0332)
Victimized × Fighter	0.0428 (0.0766)	0.0214 (0.0553)
Victimized × Spouse	0.0214 (0.0764)	-0.0942 (0.0523)
Victimized × Cook	0.0263 (0.0632)	0.0143 (0.0448)
Victimized × Janitor	0.0273 (0.0665)	-0.0240 (0.0441)
Victimized × Voluntary	-0.0300 (0.0462)	-0.0375 (0.0305)
Victimized × Denounced Daesh on Quran	-0.0084 (0.0552)	0.0351 (0.0371)
Victimized × Denounced Daesh	-0.1205* (0.0535)	0.0337 (0.0341)
Victimized × UN Deradicalization Program	0.1456** (0.0528)	-0.0345 (0.0368)
Victimized × Iraqi Deradicalization Program	0.0957 (0.0546)	0.0088 (0.0402)
Victimized × Help police and military	0.0050 (0.0572)	-0.0223 (0.0394)
Victimized × Hire Locals in Business	-0.1223* (0.0520)	0.0595 (0.0367)
Anbar	0.0116 (0.0098)	0.0070 (0.0062)
Ninawa	0.0282** (0.0096)	-0.0177** (0.0062)
R-squared	0.0565	0.0348
N	4592	4592

Note: $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. OLS regression employed. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses below.

Social Desirability Bias

Outcomes of Experiments 1 and 2 without participants who reported being uncomfortable answering questions about ISIS are displayed in Table 5. Our main results reported in the main text are robust to analysis of this subsample.

Table 5: AMCEs of Profile Features on Likelihood of Reconciliation and Revenge Among Comfortable Participants Only

	Reconciliation 1	Revenge 1	Reconciliation 2	Revenge 2
Male	-0.0324*** (0.0095)	0.0153* (0.0059)		
35 Year Old	-0.0217** (0.0081)	0.0121* (0.0052)		
Fighter	-0.1407*** (0.0144)	0.0626*** (0.0097)		
Spouse	-0.0756*** (0.0151)	0.0343*** (0.0099)		
Cook	-0.0480*** (0.0117)	0.0112 (0.0073)		
Janitor	-0.0305** (0.0117)	-0.0009 (0.0072)		
Voluntary	-0.0741*** (0.0082)	0.0223*** (0.0053)		
Disavows on Quran	-0.0022 (0.0100)	-0.0026 (0.0064)		
Disavows ISIS	-0.0101 (0.0100)	0.0099 (0.0064)		
UN Program	0.0003 (0.0100)	-0.0038 (0.0064)		
Iraqi Program	-0.0095 (0.0100)	0.0070 (0.0065)		
Help Police	0.0194 (0.0100)	-0.0079 (0.0064)		
Hire Locals	-0.0070 (0.0099)	0.0107 (0.0065)		
Anbar	0.0271** (0.0103)	0.0016 (0.0064)	0.0369*** (0.0098)	-0.1187*** (0.0093)
Ninawa	0.0299** (0.0099)	-0.0151* (0.0064)	0.0066 (0.0098)	-0.1667*** (0.0090)
Male			-0.0213** (0.0079)	0.0333*** (0.0075)
Supporter			-0.1323*** (0.0097)	0.0935*** (0.0093)
Brother Supporter			-0.0403*** (0.0097)	0.0428*** (0.0091)
Wants to Leave Camp			-0.0083 (0.0079)	-0.0017 (0.0075)
Tribal Leader			0.0107 (0.0112)	-0.0256* (0.0104)
Religious Leader			0.0046 (0.0111)	-0.0187 (0.0107)
Security Official			-0.0041 (0.0113)	-0.0141 (0.0106)
Against			-0.0141 (0.0114)	0.0219* (0.0107)
In Favor			0.0143 (0.0111)	-0.0026 (0.0106)
Divided			0.0037 (0.0110)	0.0047 (0.0106)
Development Funds			0.0082 (0.0097)	-0.0018 (0.0093)
Development Training			0.0070 (0.0098)	-0.0011 (0.0092)
R-squared	0.0554	0.0298	0.0521	0.1042
N	4207	4207	4207	4207

Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses below.