Podcast
Podcast
Harvard Business School Professors Bill Kerr and Joe Fuller talk to leaders grappling
with the forces reshaping the nature of work.
- 29 Mar 2023
- Managing the Future of Work
Richard Reeves on gender equity, Part 1: Addressing male struggles
Brookings scholar Richard V. Reeves makes the case for tailoring school and employment opportunities to the realities of boys and men.
Joe Fuller: Gender, like race and class, has long been a third-rail issue in politics and business. Nuanced public debate is hard to come by, and policymakers have often taken a zero-sum approach in matters of education and employment. A close examination of the labor market, however, reveals troubling trends for America’s men. Most—particularly those without a college degree—earn less than their 1970s forefathers. Their academic attainment increasingly lags that of women, and one in six prime working-age males are out of work—one in eight permanently. But does the current polarized atmosphere preclude out-of-the-box solutions?
Welcome to the Managing the Future of Work podcast from Harvard Business School. I’m your host, Harvard Business School professor and visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, Joe Fuller. I’m joined by Richard Reeves, whose latest book is Of Boys and Men: Why the Modern Male Is Struggling, Why It Matters, and What To Do About It. Richard is a Senior Fellow in Economics at the Brookings Institution, where he directs the Boys and Men Project. In this first segment of our two-part episode, we’ll discuss how boys develop socially and neurologically, and ideas for promoting gender-equity—ranging from de-gendering professions like teaching and social work to the adoption of more father-friendly social and workplace policies. We’ll also talk about alternative learning models, like apprenticeship and work-based learning, that offer the promise of advancing boys’ interests. Welcome to the podcast, Richard. Richard Reeves: Thank you for having me on, Joe.Fuller: Richard, I was excited to talk to you, being an admirer of your historical work, but also particularly in response to your book Of Boys and Men, which was published this past year in 2022. Could you just start off by sharing with our audience, how would you define the present state of boys, of men, of masculinity? And why should it be a subject of concern?Reeves: Yeah, I mean, I have this view that all scholarship is at least partly autobiographical. I have three sons that I’ve raised in their 20s. And so worrying about boys is, like, that’s my job. But also, in my day job at Brookings, working on inequality issues, class issues, racial equality issues, I just kept stumbling across really strong evidence that many of those were overlapping with—to some extent explained by, or definitely in a relationship with—issues around gender. I knew that the economic prospects of many American men weren’t great, but I didn’t know that most American men today earn less than most American men did in 1979. I knew that there had been this big overtaking in education, but I didn’t know that the gap on U.S. college campuses today is bigger than it was in 1972, when Title IX was passed—just the other way around. That’s true throughout the education system. And I work on family issues, so I knew some of the family trends. But I didn’t know the extent to which we’d seen these kind of increases in fathers struggling to be in touch with their kids. And it’s worth saying, I think immediately, that all of this was really thrown into a much sharper light when I looked at it through the lens of both class and race. So I felt like a story about gender and sex was kind of being submerged in some ways by other debates. But also, there are other debates—around class inequality, for example, or race inequality—that really needed more of a gendered lens, because, actually, you see very different outcomes, for example, between working-class men and upper-middle-class men and women—and the same between Black men and Black women or Black boys and Black girls. So, just, you’re seeing these really different intersections, but gender is certainly one of them. And on many of those fronts, it is the boys and men who we have reason to be really concerned about.Fuller: Richard, one of the many things I enjoyed about the book is you’ve got consecutive chapters which speak to how you characterize liberals getting these phenomena wrong, followed by one about how conservatives get it wrong. What do you think are the biggest misconceptions people of either ideological end of the spectrum have? And then, let’s talk a little bit about where you think some solutions here lie.Reeves: Yeah, so I think that there is always a danger of this to “bothsidesism.” And I’m very aware that there’s an intellectual vanity risk here, too. But on the left, I think there has been a real reluctance to just engage with the issues that boys and men are having. There are deep problems, they’re specific to boys and men. So there can only be gender inequality that affects women and girls. That’s sort of baked into the work of the Gender Policy Council in the White House, World Economic Forum, et cetera. Secondly, the problem on the left is a tendency to individualize the problem, to just say, “Well, it’s a problem of toxic masculinity, it’s pathology.” I guess the other thing on the left is just a real discomfort with the idea that there are any biological differences at all between boys and girls or men and women. And that’s unhelpful in terms of the framing. And I understand the concern, but it’s not true. And that’s unhelpful. On the right, there’s been on the biology thing a tendency to overstate the importance of biology and to say, “Yes, there are differences, and that’s why men won’t be nurses and women won’t be engineers,” or choose your pet example. Also a tendency to take the real problems of boys and men and weaponize them into grievances, partly because they’re being ignored by a lot of mainstream institutions. It’s pretty easy to convince people that, actually, the reason boys and men are struggling is because liberal elites hate them, especially if they’re working class. And so that’s led to us a reactionary populist response that I think is really, really unhelpful and kind of sometimes an exaltation to a world that’s long gone: when men knew their place, women knew their place, men worked in factories, women worked in the home, you could raise the family on one wage, et cetera, and everyone was married. And there’s sort of just a nostalgia for a world before the women’s movement was successful. And I just think that’s morally wrong and crazy from a policy point of view to think we can go back in that way. And so, in different ways, both sides just aren’t straightforwardly engaging with the problem, because there’s this sense that it’s a zero-sum game. You’ll either care about women and girls or boys and men. If the former, you’re on the left; the latter, you’re on the right. Whereas, in fact, actually we can think two thoughts at once. Most people are perfectly capable of thinking, “Oh there’s a bunch of problems. There is a problem that suicide rates among men are rising and three or four times higher than for women. It’s also a problem that there aren’t enough women on corporate boards, even though there’s been a big increase recently.”Fuller: Well, it certainly does seem that there’s a paradigm, where many people’s positions are rooted in traditional perspectives. But, of course, now we have a lot more data. We know, for example, that workforce participation for men has been dropping off at a very consistent rate for over 20 years. We know we have much more data about neural structures and behavioral patterns and cognitive psychology. So as you look at the landscape as it is and try to bring your father-of-sons-informed point of view, what are some things that you believe could improve outcome for boys, outcomes for boys and men, and maybe start getting some restoration of balance in the system?Reeves: Well, let’s start with education, because I know that’s also an area you are very interested in, too, and I’ve seen some of your work on community colleges recently. But if you take education, in the average U.S. school district, girls are almost a grade ahead in English, and they’re level in math. In poorer school districts, they’re a full grade ahead in English and about a third of a grade ahead in math. And of those getting the highest GPAs in high schools, two-thirds of them are girls; then getting the lowest, two-thirds of them are boys. So various ways in which I think the education system isn’t working as well for boys and men as it is for girls and women. So, three proposals: Number one is to start boys in school a year later, so-called “red shirting.” And so they’re a year older as they go through the school system, chronologically. And the reason to do that is because boys’ brains develop later. So, in adolescents, for example, girls’ prefrontal cortex—so you’ve mentioned some of the science on this—which is the bit of your brain that’s sometimes called the “CEO” of your brain, the bit of your brain has sort of the executive-functioning skills in there. I call it the “turn your chemistry homework in” bit of your brain, because it’s the bit of your brain that remembers that you have chemistry homework, brought the chemistry homework home, did the chemistry homework, took the chemistry homework into school, and turned the chemistry homework into the chemistry class that you’re aware you are enrolled in. That’s a whole bunch of steps, and it turns out that those skills are in this bit of the brain that develops between one and two years earlier in girls, and also predicts GPA. It’s interesting that, actually, in standardized tests, there’s not much of a gender gap, but you have to turn your chemistry homework in to get a good GPA. So just giving the boys that extra year, I think, would help. The second thing is more male teachers. We’re seeing fewer and fewer male teachers in our schools. We’re down to one in 10 elementary school teachers, fewer than one in four across K–12. And over the last few decades, you have just sort of seen fewer and fewer men in classrooms. And from what I can see, particularly in subjects like English and especially for certain boys—Black boys, for example—having male teachers really does seem to help. But we have fewer and fewer male teachers, so a massive recruitment drive for male teachers with scholarships, subsidies, et cetera. I don’t think we could just sit by and watch K–12 teaching become an enormously, entirely female profession without at least a debate about whether that’s a good or a bad thing. And the third thing, I think, that really does intersect, Joe, with some of your interests is around more vocational training. So I call for 1,000 new technical high schools, many more apprenticeships, alternative pathways to college. And those, on average, benefit boys and men more than women and girls. It’s not that there aren’t girls and women who benefit from them, but those applied-learning styles, et cetera, really help. And community colleges, for example, can actually really help provide some skills to help men get into the labor market. And I think you just did a very nice piece of work looking at employer-community college connections and trying to find ways to make community college curricula more employment friendly. And I see that’s in the same vein of this work, which is to make the work kind of more immediately vocationally relevant. But pedagogically, it’s also about just that more applied-learning styles and everything else equals boys seem to benefit more from that. So an extra year, more male teachers, and more applied learning.Fuller: Well, that’s all very actionable. Have you gotten any pushback from other scholars or thinkers on any one of those? And what’s been their critique?Reeves: Yeah, I think least of all, actually, on the vocational side. The evidence for the effectiveness of technical high schools and apprenticeships is pretty good. And also, the evidence that it’s particularly good for boys and men is pretty good. So the pushback is not against the first, it is against the second. And so one of the reasons why some people on the left, especially, are a bit worried about apprenticeships is because they’re 90 percent male. Given that campuses are now 60 percent female, it seems to me that the fact that apprenticeships seem to be a bit more attractive to men should be seen as a feature rather than a bug. But I do think, because it’s so gender skewed, there’s some reluctance around it. On the male teachers, there’s pretty strong support for more male teachers of color. I think that there is still kind of a question as to how good is the evidence that male teachers, just per se, are good. And I think, with the evidence in terms of narrow academic outcomes, it’s still pretty small. We definitely need more evidence. But for my money, there’s actually a broader reason to have men in teaching other than just the kind of measurable effect on the standard deviation, say, on your English competency, which is, for a start, men in schools are more likely to be coaches. Secondly, they do seem to treat behavior problems differently. And third of all, they’re men. And so the mere fact of boys seeing men in those roles is important, I think. And I would say on red-shirting, the evidence here is just we need more evidence. Every single educator and principal I’ve mentioned it to has gone, “Hell, yeah.” Now, I’m not saying they’re right, necessarily, but it’s interesting that there’s maybe a bit of epistemic humility here, saying they actually do have lived experience. So it’s not the same as a really good randomized control trial with certain outcome measures, but there’s some truth in that reaction, too. So we’ll see. I’d say it’s been mixed so far. Fuller: Well, certainly as it applies to technical education, vocational education, there are a lot of opportunities for us to affect the lives of boys and young men favorably. Our research certainly indicates that, not merely CTE-type [career and technical education] programs and community colleges, but actually work-based learning in high school has a huge favorable impact. And very importantly, what it does, it provides them the opportunity to begin to develop what are called “social [skills]”—or sometimes, unfortunately, in the literature, “soft skills”—punctuality, the ability to communicate in a workplace setting, willingness to ask questions, ability to receive criticisms, skills many kids develop in the home an earlier age, but unfortunately that doesn’t happen in all homes—significantly affects someone’s employability and promotability if they’ve got decent-level social skills.Reeves: It’s super interesting. I was thinking both about the empirics on this, which I think are, you’re right. But just at a personal level, one of my kids was really struggling in high school and could barely get to class, struggling with grades. But he got an afterschool job, never missed a day, great feedback, learned what it was like to have to show up, have people counting on him to show up, there were people who cared if he showed up, people who knew when he showed up. And I was just looking at some data at the moment, back to this point about looking at race and gender. So looking at state-level on-time high school graduation rates. And so, for example, in Michigan, the percentage of Black boys who graduate high school on time—so within four years—is 60 percent. Something like two out of five Black boys in the state of Michigan are having to do another grade or catch up later or get a GED or whatever. So the counterfactual here—when we talk about alternatives like technical high schools, more work-based learning—is the current system. And the current system is so stratospherically failing.Fuller: And those failings, of course, also often show up at the front door of the community college, where students show up, they’re not ready for college-level work, they start using their credit hours to remediate language arts and mathematics deficits. And as often happens with people in their early 20s, life starts to happen. And only about a third of full-time students enrolled in associate’s degree programs finish that program within three years. And those are two-year programs. So that’s a 50 percent variation. And unfortunately, in a lot of community colleges, all the growth in curriculum has been in what are called “general studies,” which are more like, more plug-compatible with a four-year degree—more social studies, humanities—topics of great value, but not necessarily where you’d want those few credit hours that people are able to put in every year to take if their objective is to get steady decent-paying work.Reeves: And it overlaps with the gender point, because you do—to the extent that they’re at the margins—you see differences between four- and two-year. And more men going maybe for the two-year option is that, because those completion rates are what they are. And a big contributor to the difference in college completion rates between men and women is that institutional difference, is that those men are going those two years and then not graduating.Fuller: Another issue which you raise in the book, which is quite interesting about the nature of so-called HEAL work—jobs in health, education, administration, and literacy—and how those careers have skewed more and more to women. But you take a very provocative position, that we need to be trying to open the aperture to get more men in those careers. Talk about this whole HEAL phenomena and how you think that might be part of the solution.Reeves: Yeah, so the term “HEAL” is one that my colleague, Isabel Sawhill, and I came up with a few years ago for a piece we did together. And it is sort of an attempt to look at these occupational categories that are more based around people, more around care, those sorts of professions. And we’re going to see more and more people in those professions over the coming years for sure. And what’s really striking is that, whereas in other occupations, we’ve seen a really a sharp decline in the degree to which they’re segregated by gender—so at a kind of highest-level—law, medicine, et cetera. But in other levels, too, we’ve just seen increasing numbers of women into certain jobs. And the obvious antonym here is STEM—science, technology, engineering, and math. Here are all these professions—so I’ve already talked about teachers, but nursing, social care workers, social workers, psychologists, counselors, substance abuse counselors, school counselors, et cetera—big professions. And there’s three reasons why I think we need to get more men in them. Number one is that actually there are jobs coming in those professions, so it would be great to get more men into them, because a lot of men need jobs, especially the middle-skills jobs. And secondly, there are labor shortages in some of those professions. So if you could just widen, to use your analogy, an aperture of, like, where are we, where’s the supply? So if we weren’t trying to solve labor market shortages with half the labor force, that might help. But thirdly, and I think perhaps most importantly, I would say now, is just for the users of those services, whether it’s boys in classrooms with male teachers, whether it’s elderly gentlemen in care homes who might want a male nurse or a male care worker to help them go to the bathroom, or a substance abuse, someone who is suffering from substance abuse who might want a male substance abuse counselor, or someone who wants psychologist. So what’s interesting about these professions is that almost everyone I’ve listed so far is becoming progressively more gender segregated. So social work, teaching, the lines all go down for male share. Psychology is maybe the most dramatic example, where it was gender parity in the 1980s; in the last 10 years, the share of psychologists who are male has dropped from 39 percent to 29 percent. And among psychologists under the age of 30, only 5 percent are male. The thing that strikes me most about it is that no one is really paying attention to those trends or seeing them as a problem, either for those professions or for the labor-market prospects of men or for the users of those services. And so, in just the same way we’ve thrown money and political capital and campaigning to get more women into STEM, I think we need a similar campaign to get men into HEAL, with subsidies, with scholarships, with really targeted marketing campaigns. It doesn’t happen by itself. It really does take effort. It did take effort to really break down, and we’ve still got further to go to get women into some of those male professions. So we shouldn’t just assume that, magically overnight, we’re going to be able to de-gender some of these HEAL professions. It’ll take work and money and effort. But right now, we’re doing nothing. And I don’t think nothing is a good response to those trends.Fuller: Well, certainly, a lot of those problems start with the growing dominance of women in all post-secondary levels of education—58 percent of current college enrollees, an absolute majority of all PhD students in the United States. So if you don’t start upstream and get more young men successfully through high school, you will not ever get those end outcomes you were talking to. One thing our research shows, I think quite definitively, is the way employers now structure the front end of their hiring processes using something called an “applicant tracking system,” which is AI based, really looks to your previous work experience in history and begins to typecast you as what you have been. In the labor market, by the time you get to be 25, 26, you will have opportunities that are very close to what you have done. And if that’s nothing or that’s low-wage, low-skilled work that you opted for because you stopped getting an education, it becomes kind of the mark of Cain or something, and you’re stuck with it.Reeves: So interesting. It’s sort of the equivalent of driving mostly using the rear-view mirror. I’m sort of thinking about this through the gendered lens just because of my current work, but this is of class and other factors, too. But it takes some people quite a lot longer to figure out where they’re going. I’m actually doing some work right now under the kind of working title, “Straight Line Women, Zigzag Men,” where I’m basically just kind of looking at, if you look at this, what you see is that, just like I’ve already mentioned: the high school graduating-on-time thing, huge gender gaps there; enrolling straight into college from high school, big gender gaps there; staying in college, college completion, gaps there; leaving a parent’s home, big gap there; buying your own gap year, into the labor market. Gap, gap, gap, gap, gap. And, actually, college “stopping out” is much, much higher for men than women. And so, if you take a good example of this, let’s put some data in this college completion. So there’s about a 10-percentage-point gap in college enrollment—and here I’m just talking about four-year colleges. So I think the same would, I think, be roughly true for two years. But four-year colleges. But then, conditional on enrolling, what are the completion rates? Well, women are 10 percentage points more likely to have graduated four years later. They’re six percentage points more likely to have graduated six years later, and four percentage points more likely 10 years later. So there is a bit of a catch up—the gap gets smaller—but there’s a massive gap at four years. So the impression you get here is, like, in Europe, you see a road is just dead straight, and the Romans would build them dead straight because they could march their troops, and they could march much more quickly from place A to B. And so the image I’ve got in my head is of young women, in particular, just being more like that. They’re like on a Roman road. Whereas the guys, a bit more zigzaggy. A little bit more like on the country road somewhere, like drive, I’m going to go that way. I’m going to go that way, just take longer to land. So if it turns out that, by the time you’ve landed, your fate has basically been cast, then that’s potentially a bigger problem for men, because it just takes them longer to get there, anyway. And the prefrontal cortex is still trying to catch up until the mid-20s. And so, again, it’s one of my arguments, to give them an extra year before starting school and stuff is just because there’s this developmental gap that was invisible under conditions of sexism. It didn’t matter that women were developmentally more advanced when we didn’t let them do anything, right? They didn’t go to college, anyway, so it didn’t matter. But now that we’ve taken away those external unfair constraints, what we’re seeing is this developmental gap showing up in a way that has basically been invisible before.Fuller: It does bring us back to something you mentioned earlier, which is having approaches or seeking to develop new approaches that are universally applicable just doesn’t rise to the realities, that we have a population that segments by everything from capability to interest to their capacity to drive down the Roman road versus requiring going up the zigzag of a mountainside, and that we need to accept the fact that the definition of “programs” does not have to include that it can accommodate everyone equally and is designed for everybody equally, just as long as it has an affirmative prospect for the population it’s seeking to serve. Are there any countries you think, Richard, that have elements of things we should be doing more of or countries you’re drawn to as understanding this problem and the way you’re trying to cause our listeners to understand it?Reeves: Yeah, there’s some signs of movement in a few countries. I mean, my analogy sometimes is that “human capital first” determining everything in the labor market after is a bit like a high jump. Sometimes, I think, the opportunity structure of the U.S. is kind of more a high jump than hurdles. So it’s like, “If you make it over, what did you clear? If you hit the labor market with a four-year degree? Boom!” Right? You’re going to do pretty darn well, especially now. And if you don’t, tough. So it’s very determined by what happens early because of these way these institutions work. And it should be more hurdles, it should be more like, “Oh, you kicked that one over. But yeah, you got over that one. And then you made it up at the end.” And I know there’s some of an area you’re interested in as well, but there’s the role of internal labor markets in companies. What happens to people in their 20s and 30s? This whole idea of “game over by 25,” effectively, I think you are right, that it actually underpins a lot of anxiety among policymakers for trying more innovative things, because we don’t have time for that. We’ve got to get them in the best possible shape before they make the one run at the high jump. It’s interesting that the smallest gender gap in tertiary education across the OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] countries was in countries where there was more emphasis on vocational forms of tertiary education. And that feels totally intuitive to me. If you’ve got this system that does accommodate more pluralism in your pathways, then it’s probably going to end up serving boys and men better. Whereas if you have this unitary structure, which is traditional education, everything else [being] equal, you’re going to get a big gender gap. And that does seem to map. So I really like some of the work that those countries have historically done—not that it’s immediately transferrable. At a kind of more general level, you’ll see in Australian schools, there are these boys’ reading clubs. Just an attempt to have these, sort of, to get past the stigma around reading, which is huge. There’s the “men’s sheds” movement, which is about trying to create more men’s community in Australia. But most top-of-my-mind right now is, just in terms of the debate about this issue, as I’ve been really struck by just the transformation in the last few years in the U.K. The U.K. has an all-party parliamentary group on boys and men as a real active discussion of a male-health strategy, some kind of ministerial role. And there was debate on International Men’s Day in Parliament. And I happened to be, well, I was deliberately there for that debate. And I remember when that was started in 2015. And the Labour Party, in particular, people on the left were just eye-rolling about that. It was seen as completely ridiculous to have a debate on International Men’s Day. This time around, substantive debate, good contributions from all sides. And the Labour Women and Equalities Minister made a brilliant speech talking about education gaps, talking about her husband, et cetera. She was then interrupted, and someone—another Labour MP—said, “What about violence against women?” And she said, “That’s a huge problem, and we’re debating that next week, and I encourage you to attend, but”—and here I’m going to quote her, verbatim, this is Yasumin Qureshi, she said, “But gender equality is not a zero-sum game. We can both attend to problems of violence against women and some of the problems of our boys and men and not have to choose between the two.” This is from the Labour benches of Parliament. And Scotland set specific targets to reduce the gender gap in their colleges, to narrow the gender gap as an act of public policy. So things are starting to move, I would say.Fuller: One thing I write about quite a bit, as you may know, is the role of employers of the private sector in trying to remediate these problems. Have you given any thought to the role companies can play? This is a podcast from the Harvard Business School, so we’ll have, I hope, a number of executives listening. So perhaps we can encourage one or more of them to be a bit innovative.Reeves: Yeah, I’m really struck by the evaluations of career academies, which are kind of small high schools which partner with employers and kind of provide internships and stuff. Very good outcomes for the boys that went to them. And about the only policy intervention—improved earnings, et cetera—didn’t really do much for college completion, but that wasn’t the point. The point was actually to provide alternatives to college completion. These partnerships can be really powerful. And given the failures of the current educational system, particularly powerful for boys and men. And so I think that’s number one. I think number two—and again, I think we’re overlapping a bit in some of our interests here—but the internal labor market, just how are you attending to your internal labor market? Are you putting kind of ceilings in place? Given the big gender gap in college-going, that could have gendered effects, too, in terms of upward mobility, particularly during those 20 years in the middle. And the last thing is the role of employers in helping mothers and fathers to be able to balance work and home. This is obviously an issue as old as, well, it’s been around many decades, but I think increasingly it’s impinging on fathers. And so I think that creating what I refer to in the book as “father-friendly employment” is a big mission for companies now. And I think there are a few things—obviously offering paid leave, et cetera—but secondly, creating a culture where people actually use it, as opposed to being available. And that takes leadership and example. But also just the way you structure those critical years. And here I’m thinking more about white-collar jobs, but kind of late 20s into the 30s—what Claudia Goldin, your colleague at Harvard, calls these “greedy jobs” that just require you to just give so much to the job just as you are raising young kids. So there’s this just horrible, horrible kind of situation we’ve created, where careers are most demanding when home life is also most demanding. And then we wonder why so many parents, who are right now disproportionately women, are kind of struggling with that. But creating pathways—like something, there’s the mommy track. You put someone on the mommy track, and she gets left behind. Or there’s the career track, right? I’m on a plane, I’m working 60 hours a week, I’m billing the clients. Or I’m on the mommy track. And I think what we actually need is what I would call something like the “normal people track.” Because most couples are dual owners now, Increasingly, fathers don’t want to just be absent and sending the paycheck home. Increasingly, mothers want to be able to be mothers but also work. And so creating different pathways, which I know some companies are trying to do, but until… I really think this is a looming crisis for them—for fathers, in particular. But I deliberately call it “father-friendly employment,” because I think, if you achieve that, you’ll create parent-friendly and, therefore, women-, mother-friendly employment. But you’ve off the bat said, “We’re not just talking about mothers,” which I think would hugely help with gender equity as well.Fuller: In part two we'll talk about the changing role of working fathers and the impact of Covid on work-life balance. We'll also delve into distance learning, which may be a bad fit for boys, and remote work, which offers potential benefits. We hope you enjoy the Managing the Future of Work podcast. If you haven’t already, please subscribe and rate the show wherever you get your podcasts. You can find out more about the Managing the Future of Work Project at our website hbs.edu/managingthefutureofwork. While you’re there, sign up for our newsletter.