This article engages in a methodological experiment by using historical evidence to challenge a common misperception about internalization theory. The theory has often been criticized for maintaining that it assumes a hierarchically organized MNE based on knowledge flowing from the home country. This is not an accurate description of how global firms operate in recent decades, but this article shows it has never been true historically. Using longitudinal data on individual firms from the nineteenth century onwards, it reveals evidence of how entrepreneurs and firms with multinational activity faced by market imperfections changed the design of their headquarters and their organizational structures.
This chapter explores how business enterprises have been powerful actors in the spread of global capitalism between 1840 and the present day. Emerging out of the industrialized Western economies, global firms created and co-created markets and ecosystems through their ability to transfer a package of financial, organizational, and cultural assets, skills, and ideologies across national borders. They have been major drivers of trade growth, which they often organized within their own boundaries. They have been shapers of, as well as responders to, globalization waves. They were also actors in periodic de-globalization waves, mainly because they functioned as reinforcers of gaps in wealth and income rather than disrupters of them. They were disappointing institutions for knowledge and technology transfer. In recent decades, the domination of global markets by Western and Japanese firms have shifted to a situation in which they competed as equals with firms based in China, India, the Arab Gulf, and elsewhere in the non-Western world. This trend is likely to accelerate as the growing fragility of institutional structures in the United States and the European Union further weakens the competitiveness of firms based in those regions.
This chapter provides a new lens to the extensive debate among economists and economic historians concerning why the West grew rich and the rest of the world lagged behind as modern industrialization took hold in the 19th century. The literature has focused heavily on quantitative research on comparative income levels, especially GDP per capita and real wage levels as well as on broad brush explanations related to institutions, culture, and human capital development. This chapter argues that there needs to be closer engagement with the processes of how such factors translated into generating productive entrepreneurs and business enterprises. It explores in particular why the development of modern business enterprises in Africa, Asia, and Latin America lagged; how they started to emerge more successfully in the interwar years only to be set back by failed government policies after World War II; and how the second global economy from the 1980s provided many more opportunities for firms outside the West to catch-up with innovation and competitiveness.
See more research
Maria Fernanda Miguel joined Harvard Business School in 2013 as Executive Director for the Latin America Research Center (LARC). Her responsibilities include leading research activities for Spanish speaking countries in LATAM, and providing programmatic support to different areas of HBS including admissions, executive education, and immersion programs. Fernanda is based in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Prior to join Harvard Business School, Fernanda was a Senior Director and Leader for LATAM Business Development at Merck and senior consultant at McKinsey & Co., serving as global Practice Manager for the Business Technology Office Health Care Practice.
Fernanda holds a degree in economics from the Argentine Catholic University, an MBA from Harvard Business School, and a Master of Research from University of Bath.
Fernanda has been very active in non-profit activities, including fund rising at the Fundación Acción Hemato-oncologica – Argentine National Academy of Medicine, and acting as advisor to the Board of Directors of the Hospital Garrahan.