Strategy

- October 1, 2022
- Article
Applying Human-Centered Design Principles to Digital Syndromic Surveillance at a Mass Gathering in India: Viewpoint

By: Ahmed Shaikh, Abhishek Bhatia, Ghanshyam Yadav, Shashwat Hora, Chung Won, Mark Shankar MD, Aaron Heerboth, Prakash Vemulapalli, Paresh Navalkar, Kunal Oswal, Clay Heaton, Sujata Saunik, Tarun Khanna and Satchit Balsari
- October 1, 2022
- Article
Applying Human-Centered Design Principles to Digital Syndromic Surveillance at a Mass Gathering in India: Viewpoint

By: Ahmed Shaikh, Abhishek Bhatia, Ghanshyam Yadav, Shashwat Hora, Chung Won, Mark Shankar MD, Aaron Heerboth, Prakash Vemulapalli, Paresh Navalkar, Kunal Oswal, Clay Heaton, Sujata Saunik, Tarun Khanna and Satchit Balsari
- 2021
- Working Paper
Dynamic Pricing Algorithms, Consumer Harm, and Regulatory Response

By: Alexander J. MacKay and Samuel Weinstein

Pricing algorithms are rapidly transforming markets, from ride-sharing apps, to air travel, to online retail. Regulators and scholars have watched this development with a wary eye. Their focus so far has been on the potential for pricing algorithms to facilitate explicit and tacit collusion. This Article argues that the policy challenges pricing algorithms pose are far broader than collusive conduct. It demonstrates that algorithmic pricing can lead to higher prices for consumers in competitive markets and even in the absence of collusion. This consumer harm can be initiated by a single firm employing a superior pricing algorithm. Higher prices arise from the automated nature of algorithms, impacting any market where firms price algorithmically. Thus, pricing algorithms that are already in widespread use may allow sellers to extract a massive amount of wealth from consumers. Because this consumer harm arises even when firms do not collude, antitrust law cannot solve the problem. This Article looks to the history of pricing innovation in the early twentieth century to show how government can respond when new pricing technologies and strategies disrupt markets. It argues for pricing regulation as a feasible solution to the challenges non-collusive algorithmic pricing poses, and it proposes interventions targeted at when and how firms set prices.
- 2021
- Working Paper
Dynamic Pricing Algorithms, Consumer Harm, and Regulatory Response

By: Alexander J. MacKay and Samuel Weinstein

Pricing algorithms are rapidly transforming markets, from ride-sharing apps, to air travel, to online retail. Regulators and scholars have watched this development with a wary eye. Their focus so far has been on the potential for pricing algorithms to facilitate explicit and tacit collusion. This Article argues that the policy challenges pricing...
- January 2022
- Case
Walmart Goes Global (A)

By: Juan Alcácer
- January 2022
- Case
Walmart Goes Global (A)

By: Juan Alcácer

About the Unit

The Strategy unit studies firms as competitors in an economic landscape. Key issues include: the development and effectiveness of firm strategy at both a business and corporate level; the analysis of the competitive environment; and the sustainability of strategy over time.

Our research, course development, and teaching draws on multiple disciplines, including economics, sociology, and political science, and focuses on both domestic and global competition. The objective of the work is to generate findings and develop concepts that will help managers improve their strategic decisions while advancing the state of knowledge in the academic study of strategy and related disciplines.

Recent Publications

Applying Human-Centered Design Principles to Digital Syndromic Surveillance at a Mass Gathering in India: Viewpoint

By: Ahmed Shaikh, Abhishek Bhatia, Ghanshyam Yadav, Shashwat Hora, Chung Won, Mark Shankar MD, Aaron Heerboth, Prakash Vemulapalli, Paresh Navalkar, Kunal Oswal, Clay Heaton, Sujata Saunik, Tarun Khanna and Satchit Balsari

October 1, 2022 |
Article |
Journal of Medical Internet Research

Citation

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Dynamic Pricing Algorithms, Consumer Harm, and Regulatory Response

By: Alexander J. MacKay and Samuel Weinstein

2021 |
Working Paper |
Faculty Research

Pricing algorithms are rapidly transforming markets, from ride-sharing apps, to air travel, to online retail. Regulators and scholars have watched this development with a wary eye. Their focus so far has been on the potential for pricing algorithms to facilitate explicit and tacit collusion. This Article argues that the policy challenges pricing algorithms pose are far broader than collusive conduct. It demonstrates that algorithmic pricing can lead to higher prices for consumers in competitive markets and even in the absence of collusion. This consumer harm can be initiated by a single firm employing a superior pricing algorithm. Higher prices arise from the automated nature of algorithms, impacting any market where firms price algorithmically. Thus, pricing algorithms that are already in widespread use may allow sellers to extract a massive amount of wealth from consumers. Because this consumer harm arises even when firms do not collude, antitrust law cannot solve the problem. This Article looks to the history of pricing innovation in the early twentieth century to show how government can respond when new pricing technologies and strategies disrupt markets. It argues for pricing regulation as a feasible solution to the challenges non-collusive algorithmic pricing poses, and it proposes interventions targeted at when and how firms set prices.

Keywords: Competition Policy; Regulation; Algorithmic Pricing; Dynamic Pricing; Economics; Law And Economics; Law And Regulation; Competition

Citation

Read Now

The Professional Pledge

By: Ashish Nanda

January 2022 |
Technical Note |
Faculty Research

Citation

Educators

A Note on Contextual Intelligence

By: Caroline M. Elkins, Tarun Khanna, Vikram S. Gandhi, Karen G. Mills and Leonard A. Schlesinger

January 2022 |
Module Note |
Faculty Research

Citation

Apple Inc. in 2020 – Select Market Data

By: David B. Yoffie

January 2022 |
Supplement |
Faculty Research

Supplment to HBS Case Apple Inc. in 2020.

Citation

Mobileye 2021: Robotaxi and/or Consumer AV?

By: David B. Yoffie

January 2022 |
Teaching Note |
Faculty Research

The Mobileye 2021 case is a strategy case developed for the Strategy & Technology course, which is a second year elective at Harvard Business School. The primary purpose of the case is to teach the framework, “Look Forward, Reason Back,” which is described in David Yoffie and Michael Cusumano’s book, Strategy Rules: Five Timeless Lessons from Bill Gates, Andy Grove, and Steve Jobs (HarperBusiness 2015).