Publications
Publications
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- All HBS Web
(100)
- Faculty Publications (20)
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- July 2024
- Article
Acceptance of Automated Vehicles Is Lower for Self than Others
By: Stuti Agarwal, Julian De Freitas, Anya Ragnhildstveit and Carey K. Morewedge
Road traffic accidents are the leading cause of death worldwide for people aged 2–59. Nearly all deaths are due to human error. Automated vehicles could reduce mortality risks, traffic congestion, and air pollution of human-driven vehicles. However, their adoption... View Details
- 2024
- Conference Paper
Quantifying Uncertainty in Natural Language Explanations of Large Language Models
By: Himabindu Lakkaraju, Sree Harsha Tanneru and Chirag Agarwal
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used as powerful tools for several
high-stakes natural language processing (NLP) applications. Recent prompting
works claim to elicit intermediate reasoning steps and key tokens that serve as
proxy explanations for LLM... View Details
- October 2021
- Article
Communicating Resource Scarcity and Interpersonal Connection
By: Grant E. Donnelly, Anne V. Wilson, Ashley V. Whillans and Michael I. Norton
Consumers often cite insufficient time or money as an excuse for rejecting social invitations. We explore the effectiveness of these excuses in preserving interpersonal relationships. Six studies—including perceptions of couples planning their wedding—demonstrate that... View Details
- Article
Does Observability Amplify Sensitivity to Moral Frames? Evaluating a Reputation-Based Account of Moral Preferences
By: Valerio Capraro, Jillian J. Jordan and Ben Tappin
A growing body of work suggests that people are sensitive to moral framing in economic games involving prosociality, suggesting that people hold moral preferences for doing the “right thing”. What gives rise to these preferences? Here, we evaluate the explanatory power... View Details
- May 2021
- Article
Ideology and Composition Among an Online Crowd: Evidence From Wikipedians
By: Shane Greenstein, Grace Gu and Feng Zhu
Online communities bring together participants from diverse backgrounds and often face challenges in aggregating their opinions. We infer lessons from the experience of individual contributors to Wikipedia articles about U.S. politics. We identify two factors that... View Details
- 2021
- Working Paper
Does Observability Amplify Sensitivity to Moral Frames? Evaluating a Reputation-Based Account of Moral Preferences
By: Valerio Capraro, Jillian J. Jordan and Ben Tappin
A growing body of work suggests that people are sensitive to moral framing in economic games involving prosociality, suggesting that people hold moral preferences for doing the “right thing”. What gives rise to these preferences? Here, we evaluate the explanatory power... View Details
- Article
Trust: The Foundation of Leadership
By: Frances Frei and Anne Morriss
The authors contend that if leadership is about empowering others, in your presence and your absence, then trust is the emotional framework that allows that service to be freely exchanged. Based on their experiences advising individuals and organizations, their basic... View Details
Keywords: Trustworthiness; Authenticity; Empathy; Trust; Leadership; Competency and Skills; Behavior
- Article
Signaling When Nobody Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment in One-shot Anonymous Interactions
By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically at stake, such that reputation... View Details
Keywords: Signaling; Morality; Trustworthiness; Anger; Third-party Punishment; Moral Sensibility; Behavior; Trust; Reputation
- 2010
- Article
I May Not Agree With You, but I Trust You: Caring About Social Issues Signals Integrity
By: Julian Zlatev
What characteristics of an individual signal trustworthiness to other people? I propose that individuals who care about contentious social issues signal to observers that they have integrity and thus can be trusted. Critically, this signal conveys trustworthiness... View Details
- 2018
- Chapter
The Trust Imperative
By: Richard Edelman, Stephen A. Greyser, E. Bruce Harrison and Tom Martin
CHAPTER SUMMARY: Successful relationships depend on trust—trust between spouses, trust between parent and child, trust between enterprises and their stakeholders. This chapter focuses on the factors that build trust in organizations, as well as the forces that can... View Details
- Article
Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games
By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
Why do individuals pay costs to punish selfish behavior, even as third-party observers? A large body of research suggests that reputation plays an important role in motivating such third-party punishment (TPP). Here we focus on a recently proposed reputation-based... View Details
- 2016
- Article
Peer-to-Peer Markets
By: Liran Einav, Chiara Farronato and Jonathan Levin
Peer-to-peer markets such as eBay, Uber, and Airbnb allow small suppliers to compete with traditional providers of goods or services. We view the primary function of these markets as making it easy for buyers to find sellers and engage in convenient, trustworthy... View Details
- August 2, 2016
- Article
Uncalculating Cooperation Is Used to Signal Trustworthiness
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Martin A. Nowak and David G. Rand
Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an... View Details
- Article
Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom and David G. Rand
Third-party punishment (TPP), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal of... View Details
- January 26, 2016
- Article
Hiding Personal Information Reveals the Worst
By: Leslie K. John, Kate Barasz and Michael I. Norton
Seven experiments explore people's decisions to share or withhold personal information and the wisdom of such decisions. When people choose not to reveal information—to be "hiders"—they are judged negatively by others (experiment 1). These negative judgments emerge... View Details
- July – August 2011
- Article
Foundations of Organizational Trust: What Matters to Different Stakeholders?
By: Michael Pirson and Deepak Malhotra
Prior research on organizational trust has not rigorously examined the context specificity of trust nor distinguished between the potentially varying dimensions along which different stakeholders base their trust. As a result, dominant conceptualizations of... View Details
- 2010
- Working Paper
Agency Revisited
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F. Spulber
The article presents a comprehensive overview of the principal-agent model that emphasizes the role of trust in the agency relationship. The analysis demonstrates that the legal remedy for breach of duty can result in a full-information efficient outcome eliminating... View Details
- Article
How Implicit Beliefs Influence Trust Recovery
By: M. Haselhuhn, M.E. Schweitzer and A. Wood
After a trust violation, some people are quick to forgive, whereas others never trust again. In this report, we identify a key characteristic that moderates trust recovery: implicit beliefs of moral character. Individuals who believe that moral character can change... View Details
- Article
Trust and Incentives in Agency
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F Spulber
Contracts between a principal and an agent are not formed in a vacuum. Although formal contracts between a principal and an agent contain explicit incentives for performance, the relationship between a principal and an agent also involves implicit incentives. Three... View Details
- September 2004
- Article
Trust in Agency
Existing models of the principal-agent relationship assume the agent works only under extrinsic incentives. However, many observed agency contracts take the form of a fixed payment. For such contracts to succeed, the principal must trust the agent to work in the... View Details