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    • All HBS Web  (176)
      • Faculty Publications  (21)

      Stochastic Trust Game Remove Stochastic Trust Game →

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      • November–December 2022
      • Article

      Can AI Really Help You Sell?

      By: Jim Dickie, Boris Groysberg, Benson P. Shapiro and Barry Trailer
      Many salespeople today are struggling; only 57% of them make their annual quotas, surveys show. One problem is that buying processes have evolved faster than selling processes, and buyers today can access a wide range of online resources that let them evaluate products...  View Details
      Keywords: Sales; AI and Machine Learning; Customers
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      Dickie, Jim, Boris Groysberg, Benson P. Shapiro, and Barry Trailer. "Can AI Really Help You Sell?" Harvard Business Review (November–December 2022): 120–129.
      • Article

      Does Observability Amplify Sensitivity to Moral Frames? Evaluating a Reputation-Based Account of Moral Preferences

      By: Valerio Capraro, Jillian J. Jordan and Ben Tappin
      A growing body of work suggests that people are sensitive to moral framing in economic games involving prosociality, suggesting that people hold moral preferences for doing the “right thing”. What gives rise to these preferences? Here, we evaluate the explanatory power...  View Details
      Keywords: Moral Preferences; Moral Frames; Observability; Trustworthiness; Trust Game; Trade-off Game; Moral Sensibility; Reputation; Behavior; Trust
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      Capraro, Valerio, Jillian J. Jordan, and Ben Tappin. "Does Observability Amplify Sensitivity to Moral Frames? Evaluating a Reputation-Based Account of Moral Preferences." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 94 (May 2021).
      • 2021
      • Working Paper

      Does Observability Amplify Sensitivity to Moral Frames? Evaluating a Reputation-Based Account of Moral Preferences

      By: Valerio Capraro, Jillian J. Jordan and Ben Tappin
      A growing body of work suggests that people are sensitive to moral framing in economic games involving prosociality, suggesting that people hold moral preferences for doing the “right thing”. What gives rise to these preferences? Here, we evaluate the explanatory power...  View Details
      Keywords: Moral Preferences; Moral Frames; Observability; Trustworthiness; Trust Game; Trade-off Game; Moral Sensibility; Reputation; Behavior; Trust
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      Capraro, Valerio, Jillian J. Jordan, and Ben Tappin. "Does Observability Amplify Sensitivity to Moral Frames? Evaluating a Reputation-Based Account of Moral Preferences." Working Paper, January 2021.
      • August 2020
      • Article

      Trust in State and Non-State Actors: Evidence from Dispute Resolution in Pakistan

      By: Daron Acemoglu, Ali Cheema, Asim I. Khwaja and James A. Robinson
      Lack of trust in state institutions is a pervasive problem in many developing countries. This paper investigates whether information about improved public services can help build trust in state institutions and move people away from non-state actors. We find that...  View Details
      Keywords: Dispute Resolution; Lab-in-the-field Games; Legitimacy; Motivated Reasoning; Non-state Actors; State Capacity; Trust; Conflict and Resolution; Information; Developing Countries and Economies
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      Acemoglu, Daron, Ali Cheema, Asim I. Khwaja, and James A. Robinson. "Trust in State and Non-State Actors: Evidence from Dispute Resolution in Pakistan." Journal of Political Economy 128, no. 8 (August 2020): 3090–3147.
      • 2020
      • Working Paper

      To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness

      By: Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Duke Kominers and Ran I. Shorrer
      Many economic-theoretic models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. Such assumptions introduce a conceptual problem, as results that rely on finiteness are often implicitly nonrobust; for example,...  View Details
      Keywords: Markets; Analysis; Game Theory
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      Gonczarowski, Yannai A., Scott Duke Kominers, and Ran I. Shorrer. "To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-127, June 2019. (Revised November 2020.)
      • August 28, 2018
      • Article

      Maintaining Trust When Agents Can Engage in Self-deception

      By: Andres Babino, Hernan A. Makse, Rafael Di Tella and Mariano Sigman
      The coexistence of cooperation and selfish instincts is a remarkable characteristic of humans. Psychological research has unveiled the cognitive mechanisms behind self-deception. Two important findings are that a higher ambiguity about others’ social preferences leads...  View Details
      Keywords: Behavioral Economics; Cognitive Neuroscience; Corruption; Cooperation; Self-deception; Trust; Behavior
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      Babino, Andres, Hernan A. Makse, Rafael Di Tella, and Mariano Sigman. "Maintaining Trust When Agents Can Engage in Self-deception." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 35 (August 28, 2018): 8728–8733.
      • Article

      Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games

      By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
      Why do individuals pay costs to punish selfish behavior, even as third-party observers? A large body of research suggests that reputation plays an important role in motivating such third-party punishment (TPP). Here we focus on a recently proposed reputation-based...  View Details
      Keywords: Direct Reciprocity; Evolution; Dispersal; Cooperation; Trust; Reputation; Game Theory
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      Jordan, Jillian J., and David G. Rand. "Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games." Journal of Theoretical Biology 421 (May 21, 2017): 189–202.
      • Article

      Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness

      By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom and David G. Rand
      Third-party punishment (TPP), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal of...  View Details
      Keywords: Third-party Punishment; Trustworthiness; Behavior; Trust; Game Theory
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      Jordan, Jillian J., Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom, and David G. Rand. "Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness." Nature 530, no. 7591 (2016): 473–476.
      • 2015
      • Working Paper

      The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games

      By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
      Building on the work of Nash, Harsanyi, and Shapley, we define a cooperative solution for strategic games that takes account of both the competitive and the cooperative aspects of such games. We prove existence in the general (NTU) case and uniqueness in the TU...  View Details
      Keywords: Economics; Game Theory
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      Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-071, March 2015.
      • 2014
      • Working Paper

      The NTU-Value of Stochastic Games

      By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
      Since the seminal paper of Shapley, the theory of stochastic games has been developed in many different directions. However, there has been practically no work on the interplay between stochastic games and cooperative game theory. Our purpose here is to make a first...  View Details
      Keywords: Strategy; Game Theory
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      Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "The NTU-Value of Stochastic Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-014, September 2014.
      • Article

      Analyzing Scrip Systems

      By: Kris Johnson, David Simchi-Levi and Peng Sun
      Scrip systems provide a nonmonetary trade economy for exchange of resources. We model a scrip system as a stochastic game and study system design issues on selection rules to match potential trade partners over time. We show the optimality of one particular rule in...  View Details
      Keywords: "Repeated Games"; Stochastic Trust Game; Dynamic Program; P2P Lending; Scrip Systems; Artificial Currency; Non-monetary Trade Economies; Marketplace Matching; Currency; Operations; Game Theory
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      Johnson, Kris, David Simchi-Levi, and Peng Sun. "Analyzing Scrip Systems." Operations Research 62, no. 3 (May–June 2014): 524–534.
      • May 2014
      • Article

      I'm Sorry About the Rain! Superfluous Apologies Demonstrate Empathic Concern and Increase Trust

      By: A.W. Brooks, H. Dai and M.E. Schweitzer
      Existing apology research has conceptualized apologies as a device to rebuild relationships following a transgression. As a result, apology research has failed to investigate the use of apologies for outcomes for which individuals are obviously not culpable (e.g.,...  View Details
      Keywords: Superfluous Apology; Apology; Benevolence-based Trust; Empathy; Stochastic Trust Game; Trust; Emotions; Societal Protocols
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      Brooks, A.W., H. Dai, and M.E. Schweitzer. "I'm Sorry About the Rain! Superfluous Apologies Demonstrate Empathic Concern and Increase Trust." Social Psychological & Personality Science 5, no. 4 (May 2014): 467–474.
      • Article

      Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags

      By: Drew Fudenberg, Yuhta Ishii and Scott Duke Kominers
      We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect...  View Details
      Keywords: "Repeated Games"; Folk Theorem; Private Monitoring; Observation Lag; Game Theory
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      Fudenberg, Drew, Yuhta Ishii, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags." Journal of Economic Theory 150 (March 2014): 487–514.
      • 2012
      • Working Paper

      How Short-Termism Invites Corruption—And What to Do About It

      By: Malcolm S. Salter

      Researchers and business leaders have long decried short-termism: the excessive focus of executives of publicly traded companies-along with fund managers and other investors-on short-term results. The central concern is that short-termism discourages long-term...  View Details

      Keywords: Business and Shareholder Relations; Public Ownership; Performance Expectations; Economy; Crime and Corruption; Ethics; Trust; Financial Services Industry; United States
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      Salter, Malcolm S. "How Short-Termism Invites Corruption—And What to Do About It." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-094, April 2012.
      • 2010
      • Working Paper

      Lawful but Corrupt: Gaming and the Problem of Institutional Corruption in the Private Sector

      By: Malcolm S. Salter
      This paper describes how the gaming of society's rules by corporations contributes to the problem of institutional corruption in the world of business. "Gaming" in its various forms involves the use of technically legal means to subvert the intent of society's rules in...  View Details
      Keywords: Crime and Corruption; Civil Society or Community; Competitive Advantage; Earnings Management; Trust; Law; Performance; Investment Funds; Private Sector; Behavior; Relationships; Goals and Objectives
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      Salter, Malcolm S. "Lawful but Corrupt: Gaming and the Problem of Institutional Corruption in the Private Sector." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11-060, December 2010.
      • September 2007
      • Case

      Nonverbal Communication: Distinguishing Truth and Lies

      By: Michael A. Wheeler
      This video-based coursework illuminates the importance--and difficulty--of judging whether people are trustworthy. Students can test their skills at assessing whether contestants in a high-stakes game show will cooperate or defect.  View Details
      Keywords: Nonverbal Communication; Competency and Skills; Moral Sensibility; Emotions; Trust
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      Wheeler, Michael A. "Nonverbal Communication: Distinguishing Truth and Lies." Harvard Business School Multimedia/Video Case 908-702, September 2007.
      • January 2005 (Revised March 2007)
      • Background Note

      Game Theory and Business Strategy

      By: Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Dennis A. Yao
      Provides a brief introduction to the application of game theory to business settings. Sets up and analyzes a minicase involving commitment.  View Details
      Keywords: Game Theory; Trust; Business Strategy
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      Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, and Dennis A. Yao. "Game Theory and Business Strategy." Harvard Business School Background Note 705-471, January 2005. (Revised March 2007.)
      • spring 1994
      • Article

      Unilateral Commitments and the Importance of Process in Alliances

      By: Ranjay Gulati, Tarun Khanna and Nitin Nohria
      How the partners in an alliance view their joint venture can have much to do with its success or failure. Each partner fears that the other will get the larger payoff by acting opportunistically while it cooperates in good faith. The result is that both partners choose...  View Details
      Keywords: Management Style; Partners and Partnerships; Joint Ventures; Management Practices and Processes; Alliances; Trust; Game Theory
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      Gulati, Ranjay, Tarun Khanna, and Nitin Nohria. "Unilateral Commitments and the Importance of Process in Alliances." MIT Sloan Management Review 35, no. 3 (spring 1994): 61–69.
      • 1978
      • Article

      On Stochastic Games with Stationary Optimal Strategies

      By: Truman F. Bewley and Elon Kohlberg
      Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling; Strategy
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      Bewley, Truman F., and Elon Kohlberg. "On Stochastic Games with Stationary Optimal Strategies." Mathematics of Operations Research, no. 3 (1978): 104–125.
      • 1976
      • Article

      The Asymptotic Solution of a Recursion Equation Occurring in Stochastic Games

      By: Truman F. Bewley and Elon Kohlberg
      Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling
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      Bewley, Truman F., and Elon Kohlberg. "The Asymptotic Solution of a Recursion Equation Occurring in Stochastic Games." Mathematics of Operations Research, no. 1 (1976): 321 – 337.
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