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- 2021
- Article
To Thine Own Self Be True? Incentive Problems in Personalized Law
By: Jordan M. Barry, John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
Recent years have seen an explosion of scholarship on “personalized law.” Commentators foresee a world in which regulators armed with big data and machine learning techniques determine the optimal legal rule for every regulated party, then instantaneously disseminate...
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Keywords:
Personalized Law;
Regulation;
Regulatory Avoidance;
Regulatory Arbitrage;
Law And Economics;
Law And Technology;
Law And Artificial Intelligence;
Futurism;
Moral Hazard;
Elicitation;
Signaling;
Privacy;
Law;
Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms;
Information Technology;
AI and Machine Learning
Barry, Jordan M., John William Hatfield, and Scott Duke Kominers. "To Thine Own Self Be True? Incentive Problems in Personalized Law." Art. 2. William & Mary Law Review 62, no. 3 (2021).
- September 2019 (Revised December 2022)
- Case
Cooking Down a Storm: Changing Culture at Pasta Serafina (A)
Plant management at Pasta Serafina, a pasta producer in the south of Italy, is struggling to contain employee absenteeism. While the misbehavior is concentrated in a minority of the workers, its effects impact not only the plant’s performance, but also the climate and...
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Keywords:
Absenteeism;
Moral Hazard;
Employees;
Behavior;
Problems and Challenges;
Organizational Culture;
Organizational Change and Adaptation;
Employee Relationship Management;
Performance Productivity;
Decision Making
Gallani, Susanna, Francesca Gino, and Raffaella Sadun. "Cooking Down a Storm: Changing Culture at Pasta Serafina (A)." Harvard Business School Case 120-013, September 2019. (Revised December 2022.)
- October 2015
- Teaching Note
1996 Welfare Reform in the United States
- Article
Behavioral Hazard in Health Insurance
By: Katherine Baicker, Sendhil Mullainathan and Joshua Schwartzstein
A fundamental implication of standard moral hazard models is overuse of low-value medical care because copays are lower than costs. In these models, the demand curve alone can be used to make welfare statements, a fact relied on by much empirical work. There is ample...
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Baicker, Katherine, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Joshua Schwartzstein. "Behavioral Hazard in Health Insurance." Quarterly Journal of Economics 130, no. 4 (November 2015): 1623–1667. (Online Appendix.)
- June 2015
- Case
1996 Welfare Reform in the United States
By: Matthew Weinzierl, Katrina Flanagan and Alastair Su
On August 22, 1996, U.S. President Bill Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)—a dramatic reform of the American system of economic assistance for the poor that, as its title suggested, attempted to...
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Keywords:
Welfare State;
Public Goods;
Moral Hazard;
Median Voter Theorem;
Poverty;
Welfare;
Public Administration Industry;
United States
Weinzierl, Matthew, Katrina Flanagan, and Alastair Su. "1996 Welfare Reform in the United States." Harvard Business School Case 715-030, June 2015.
- September–October 2013
- Article
The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring
By: Lamar Pierce and Michael W. Toffel
Governments and other organizations often outsource activities to achieve cost savings from market competition. Yet such benefits are often accompanied by poor quality resulting from moral hazard, which can be particularly onerous when outsourcing the monitoring and...
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Keywords:
Crime and Corruption;
Decision Choices and Conditions;
Corporate Accountability;
Governance Compliance;
Policy;
Management Practices and Processes;
Demand and Consumers;
Market Design;
Market Entry and Exit;
Market Transactions;
Service Delivery;
Service Operations;
Business Processes;
Organizational Structure;
Performance Effectiveness;
Performance Expectations;
Practice;
Transportation;
Transportation Industry;
Service Industry;
United States;
New York (state, US)
Pierce, Lamar, and Michael W. Toffel. "The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring." Organization Science 24, no. 5 (September–October 2013): 1558–1584. (Winner of the NBS Research Impact on Practice Award from the Academy of Management (AOM) and Network for Business Sustainability (NBS))
- Comment
Discussion of 'The Use of Management Control Mechanisms to Mitigate Moral Hazard in the Decision to Outsource'
By: Dennis Campbell
Campbell, Dennis. "Discussion of 'The Use of Management Control Mechanisms to Mitigate Moral Hazard in the Decision to Outsource'." Journal of Accounting Research 50, no. 2 (May 2012): 593–604.
- 2010
- Working Paper
Agency Revisited
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F. Spulber
The article presents a comprehensive overview of the principal-agent model that emphasizes the role of trust in the agency relationship. The analysis demonstrates that the legal remedy for breach of duty can result in a full-information efficient outcome eliminating...
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Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Daniel F. Spulber. "Agency Revisited." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-082, March 2010.
- 2009
- Working Paper
An Ounce of Prevention: The Power of Public Risk Management in Stabilizing the Financial System
By: David A. Moss
The magnitude of the current financial crisis reflects the failure of an economic and regulatory philosophy that had proved increasingly influential in policy circles over the past three decades.
This paper suggests (1) that contrary to the prevailing wisdom,... View Details
Keywords:
Financial Crisis;
Financial Institutions;
Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms;
Risk Management;
Business and Government Relations;
Balance and Stability
Moss, David A. "An Ounce of Prevention: The Power of Public Risk Management in Stabilizing the Financial System." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-087, January 2009.
- Article
The Role of Lockups in Initial Public Offerings
By: Alon Brav and Paul A. Gompers
In a sample of 2,794 initial public offerings (IPOs), we test three potential explanations for the existence of IPO lockups: lockups serve as (i) a signal of firm quality, (ii) a commitment device to alleviate moral hazard problems, or (iii) a mechanism for...
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Keywords:
Initial Public Offering;
Quality;
Moral Sensibility;
Compensation and Benefits;
Venture Capital;
Problems and Challenges;
Stock Shares;
Going Public
Brav, Alon, and Paul A. Gompers. "The Role of Lockups in Initial Public Offerings." Review of Financial Studies 16, no. 1 (Spring 2003).
- September 2001
- Background Note
Financial Reporting Environment, The
Provides a framework for understanding the role of financial reporting and various intermediaries as mechanisms for reducing both adverse selection and moral hazard problems in capital markets. Financial reports reduce adverse selection by providing basic information...
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Keywords:
Financial Reporting;
Financial Statements;
Capital Markets;
Venture Capital;
Corporate Disclosure;
Conflict of Interests
Healy, Paul M., Amy P. Hutton, Robert S. Kaplan, and Krishna G. Palepu. "Financial Reporting Environment, The." Harvard Business School Background Note 102-029, September 2001.
- 1999
- Chapter
The Moral Hazard of Insuring the Insurers
By: Brian J. Hall and James G. Bohn
Hall, Brian J., and James G. Bohn. "The Moral Hazard of Insuring the Insurers." In The Financing of Catastrophe Risk, edited by Kenneth A. Froot. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
- June 1997 (Revised November 1998)
- Case
Sky Air, Inc.
By: Paul A. Gompers
Concerns a fictitious airline company and examines the moral hazard situation that results within a firm. Provides an opportunity to discuss corporate governance and contracting under uncertainty.
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Keywords:
Ethics;
Corporate Governance;
Contracts;
Risk and Uncertainty;
Air Transportation Industry
Gompers, Paul A. "Sky Air, Inc." Harvard Business School Case 297-110, June 1997. (Revised November 1998.)
- spring 1995
- Article
Moral Hazard in Repeated Professional Partnership
By: V.G. Narayanan
Keywords:
Partners and Partnerships
Narayanan, V.G. "Moral Hazard in Repeated Professional Partnership." Contemporary Accounting Research (spring 1995).
- 1995
- Article
Moral Hazard and Management Control in Just-in-time Settings
By: M. Alles, S. Datar and R. Lambert
Alles, M., S. Datar, and R. Lambert. "Moral Hazard and Management Control in Just-in-time Settings." Journal of Accounting Research 33 (1995): 177–204.
- Forthcoming
- Article
Are Bankruptcy Professional Fees Excessively High?
By: Samuel Antill
Chapter 7 is the most popular bankruptcy system for U.S. firms and individuals. Chapter 7 professional fees are substantial. Theoretically, high fees might be an unavoidable cost of incentivizing professionals. I test this empirically. I study trustees, the most...
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Antill, Samuel. "Are Bankruptcy Professional Fees Excessively High?" Review of Financial Studies (forthcoming). (Pre-published online September 14, 2024.)
- Research Summary
Behavioral Hazard and Public Policy
It is well recognized that people overuse low-value medical care due to moral hazard—because copays are lower than costs. Now Professor Schwartzstein has introduced the concept of “behavioral hazard” to explain the opposite: people underuse high-value care because... View Details