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Publications

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  • All HBS Web  (14)
    • Faculty Publications  (4)

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    • All HBS Web  (14)
      • Faculty Publications  (4)

      Low-powered Incentives Remove Low-powered Incentives →

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      • 2020
      • Working Paper

      Incentive Power and Knowledge Sharing Among Employees: Evidence from the Field

      By: Wei Cai, Susanna Gallani and Jee-Eun Shin
      There is consensus, both in the literature and in practice, about knowledge sharing within organizations being a key determinant of success. However, organizations struggle to sustain employees’ engagement in knowledge sharing. One challenge lies in the fact that,...  View Details
      Keywords: Organizational Knowledge Sharing; Employee Driven Innovation; Innovation Appropriability; Contract Design; High-powered Incentives; Low-powered Incentives; Incentives; Pay-for-Performance; Rank-and-file; Employees; Knowledge Sharing; Innovation and Invention; Motivation and Incentives; Creativity; Performance
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      Cai, Wei, Susanna Gallani, and Jee-Eun Shin. "Incentive Power and Knowledge Sharing Among Employees: Evidence from the Field." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-015, August 2018. (Revised April 2020.)
      • March 2010
      • Article

      Interpersonal Authority in a Theory of the Firm

      By: Eric J. Van den Steen
      This paper develops a theory of the firm in which a firm's centralized asset ownership and low-powered incentives give the manager, as an equilibrium outcome, interpersonal authority over employees (in a world with open disagreement). The paper thus provides...  View Details
      Keywords: Theory; Assets; Ownership; Motivation and Incentives; Governance Controls; Power and Influence; Projects; Perspective; Employees
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      Van den Steen, Eric J. "Interpersonal Authority in a Theory of the Firm." American Economic Review 100, no. 1 (March 2010): 466–490.
      • 2007
      • Working Paper

      Interpersonal Authority in a Theory of the Firm

      By: Eric J. Van den Steen
      This paper develops a theory of the firm in which a firm's centralized asset ownership and low-powered incentives give a manager 'interpersonal authority' over employees (in a world with differing priors). The paper derives such interpersonal authority as...  View Details
      Keywords: Governance Controls; Employee Relationship Management; Managerial Roles; Motivation and Incentives; Boundaries; Theory
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      Van den Steen, Eric J. "Interpersonal Authority in a Theory of the Firm." Sloan School of Management Working Paper, No. 4667-07, July 2007. (Available at SSRN.)
      • 2006
      • Working Paper

      Too Motivated?

      By: Eric J. Van den Steen

      I show that an agent's motivation to do well (objectively) may be unambiguously bad in a world with differing priors, i.e., when people openly disagree on the optimal course of action. The reason is that an agent who is strongly motivated is more likely to follow...  View Details

      Keywords: Governance Controls; Employees; Wages; Measurement and Metrics; Outcome or Result; Performance; Agency Theory; Motivation and Incentives
      Citation
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      Van den Steen, Eric J. "Too Motivated?" Sloan School of Management Working Paper, No. 4547-05, April 2006. (Available at SSRN.)
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