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- October 2020
- Article
Collusion in Markets with Syndication
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery and Jordan M. Barry
Markets for IPOs and debt issuances are syndicated, in the sense that a bidder who wins a contract may invite losing bidders to join a syndicate that together fulfills the contract. We show that in markets with syndication, standard intuitions from industrial...
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Keywords:
Collusion;
Antitrust;
IPO Underwriting;
Syndication;
＂Repeated Games＂;
Markets;
Game Theory
- Article
The Price of Anarchy of Self-Selection in Tullock Contests
By: Hau Chan, David C. Parkes and Karim R. Lakhani
Crowdsourcing platforms operate by offering their clients the ability to obtain cost-effective solutions for their problems through contests. The top contestants with the best solutions are rewarded, and the submitted solutions are provided to the clients. Within the...
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- November 2019
- Supplement
Hapag-Lloyd AG: Complying with IMO 2020
By: Benjamin C. Esty, Mette Fuglsang Hjortshoej and Emer Moloney
A new environmental regulation known as IMO 2020 was creating what one industry analyst called “the biggest shakeup for the oil and shipping industries in decades.” According to the new regulation, all ocean-going ships would have to limit their sulfur emissions by...
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- November 2019
- Case
Hapag-Lloyd AG: Complying with IMO 2020
By: Benjamin C. Esty, Mette Fuglsang Hjortshoej and Emer Moloney
A new environmental regulation known as IMO 2020 was creating what one industry analyst called “the biggest shakeup for the oil and shipping industries in decades.” According to the new regulation, all ocean-going ships would have to limit their sulfur emissions by...
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- 2020
- Working Paper
Collusion in Brokered Markets
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
The U.S. residential real estate agency market presents a puzzle for economic theory: commissions on real estate transactions have remained high for decades even though entry is frequent and costs are low. We model the real estate agency market, and other brokered...
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- 2020
- Working Paper
To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness
By: Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Duke Kominers and Ran I. Shorrer
Many economic-theoretic models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. Such assumptions introduce a conceptual problem, as results that rely on finiteness are often implicitly nonrobust; for example,...
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- Article
Raiffa Transformed the Field of Negotiation—and Me
By: Max Bazerman
Howard Raiffa was a role model, friend, and inspiration. He transformed the field of negotiation, and he transformed my career. This brief article provides a recollection of how Howard revolutionized the field of negotiation and how those insights are now affecting...
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- March 2018 (Revised September 2020)
- Background Note
Short Note on Game Theory
By: Eric Van den Steen and Dennis Yao
This note provides a very concise (2 page) introduction to game theory.
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- Article
Games of Threats
By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
A game of threats on a finite set of players, N, is a function d that assigns a real number to any coalition, S ⊆ N, such that d(S) = -d(N\S). A game of threats is not necessarily a coalitional game as it may fail to satisfy the condition d(Ø) = 0. We show that analogs...
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- October 2017
- Article
Elevating Repositioning Costs: Strategy Dynamics and Competitive Interactions
By: Anoop R. Menon and Dennis Yao
This paper proposes an approach for modeling competitive interactions that incorporates the costs to firms of changing strategy. The costs associated with strategy modifications, which we term “repositioning costs,” are particularly relevant to competitive interactions...
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- Article
Howard Raiffa: The Art, Science, and Humanity of a Legendary Negotiation Analyst
Rightly known as the “father of negotiation analysis,” Howard Raiffa was my thesis advisor, colleague, and friend for over 30 years. The bulk of this article develops an account of his intellectual trajectory from game theory to statistical decision theory to decision...
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- Article
Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games
By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
Why do individuals pay costs to punish selfish behavior, even as third-party observers? A large body of research suggests that reputation plays an important role in motivating such third-party punishment (TPP). Here we focus on a recently proposed reputation-based...
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- Article
Statistical Physics of Human Cooperation
By: Matjaž Perc, Jillian J. Jordan, David G. Rand, Zhen Wang, Stefano Boccaletti and Attila Szolnoki
Extensive cooperation among unrelated individuals is unique to humans, who often sacrifice personal benefits for the common good and work together to achieve what they are unable to execute alone. The evolutionary success of our species is indeed due, to a large...
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- April 2017
- Article
The New Look of Deal Protection
By: Guhan Subramanian and Fernán Restrepo
Deal protection in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) evolves in response to Delaware case law and the business goals of acquirers and targets. We construct a new sample of M&A deals from 2003 to 2015 to identify four such areas of evolution in current transactional...
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- 2017
- Working Paper
Cooperative Strategic Games
By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
We examine a solution concept, called the “value," for n-person strategic games. In applications, the value provides an a-priori assessment of the monetary worth of a player's position in a strategic game, comprising not only the player's contribution to the total...
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Keywords:
Game Theory
- July 16, 2016
- Article
A Game Theoretic Model for Resource Allocation Among Countermeasures with Multiple Attributes
By: Elisabeth C. Paulson, Igor Linkov and Jeffrey Keisler
We study a strategic, two-player, sequential game between an attacker and defender. The defender must allocate resources amongst possible countermeasures and across possible targets. The attacker then chooses a type of threat and a target to attack. This paper proposes...
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- 2016
- Other Teaching and Training Material
Organizational Behavior Reading: Decision Making
By: Francesca Gino, Max Bazerman and Katherine Shonk
This Reading argues that decision making is systematically flawed and introduces methods to improve decision-making effectiveness. The Essential Reading section covers the rational decision-making model and three important ideas that challenge it: Herbert Simon's...
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- Article
Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom and David G. Rand
Third-party punishment (TPP), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal of...
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- 2016
- Chapter
Deriving an Optimally Deceptive Policy in Two-Player Iterated Games
By: Elisabeth Paulson and Christopher Griffin
We formulate the problem of determining an optimally deceptive strategy in a repeated game framework. We assume that two players are engaged in repeated play. During an initial time period, Player 1 may deceptively train his opponent to expect a specific strategy. The...
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