Publications
Publications
Show Results For
-
All HBS Web
(523)
- Faculty Publications (51)
Page 1 of
51
Results
→
- March 2023
- Article
Not from Concentrate: Collusion in Collaborative Industries
By: Jordan M. Barry, John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
The chief principle of antitrust law and theory is that reducing market concentration—having more, smaller firms instead of fewer, bigger ones—reduces anticompetitive behavior. We demonstrate that this principle is fundamentally incomplete.
In many... View Details
In many... View Details
Keywords:
Antitrust;
Antitrust Law;
Antitrust Theory;
Law And Economics;
Collusion;
Collaboration;
Collaborative Industries;
Regulation;
＂Repeated Games＂;
IPOs;
Initial Public Offerings;
Underwriters;
Real Estate;
Real Estate Agents;
Realtors;
Syndicated Markets;
Syndication;
Brokers;
Market Concentration;
Competition;
Law;
Economics;
Collaborative Innovation and Invention;
Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms;
Game Theory;
Initial Public Offering
- February 2023
- Case
Roblox: Virtual Commerce in the Metaverse
By: Ayelet Israeli and Nicole Tempest Keller
In 2022, Roblox had 58.8 million daily active users, including over half of all children and teens under the age of 16 in the United States. Roblox, a free-to-use “co-experience platform”, allowed users to come together in immersive 3D experiences to socialize, work,...
View Details
Keywords:
Entertainment;
Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
Market Design;
Marketing;
Brands and Branding;
Marketing Channels;
Marketing Strategy;
Business Strategy;
Economics;
Economy;
Economic Systems;
Advertising;
Advertising Campaigns;
Digital Platforms;
Markets;
Price;
Innovation and Management;
Video Game Industry;
Video Game Industry;
Video Game Industry;
United States;
California;
North America;
South America;
Asia;
Europe
- 2021
- Article
Don't Get It or Don't Spread It: Comparing Self-interested versus Prosocial Motivations for COVID-19 Prevention Behaviors
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Erez Yoeli and David Rand
COVID-19 prevention behaviors may be seen as self-interested or prosocial. Using American samples from MTurk and Prolific (total n = 6,850), we investigated which framing is more effective—and motivation is stronger—for fostering prevention behavior intentions. We...
View Details
- October 2021
- Article
Changing Gambling Behavior through Experiential Learning
By: Shawn A. Cole, Martin Abel and Bilal Zia
This paper tests experiential learning as a debiasing tool to reduce gambling in South Africa, through a randomized field experiment. The study implements a simple, interactive game that simulates the odds of winning the national lottery through dice rolling....
View Details
- Article
Does Observability Amplify Sensitivity to Moral Frames? Evaluating a Reputation-Based Account of Moral Preferences
By: Valerio Capraro, Jillian J. Jordan and Ben Tappin
A growing body of work suggests that people are sensitive to moral framing in economic games involving prosociality, suggesting that people hold moral preferences for doing the “right thing”. What gives rise to these preferences? Here, we evaluate the explanatory power...
View Details
- 2021
- Working Paper
Does Observability Amplify Sensitivity to Moral Frames? Evaluating a Reputation-Based Account of Moral Preferences
By: Valerio Capraro, Jillian J. Jordan and Ben Tappin
A growing body of work suggests that people are sensitive to moral framing in economic games involving prosociality, suggesting that people hold moral preferences for doing the “right thing”. What gives rise to these preferences? Here, we evaluate the explanatory power...
View Details
- August 2020
- Article
Trust in State and Non-State Actors: Evidence from Dispute Resolution in Pakistan
By: Daron Acemoglu, Ali Cheema, Asim I. Khwaja and James A. Robinson
Lack of trust in state institutions is a pervasive problem in many developing countries. This paper investigates whether information about improved public services can help build trust in state institutions and move people away from non-state actors. We find that...
View Details
- December 2019
- Article
When Do We Punish People Who Don't?
By: Justin W. Martin, Jillian J. Jordan, David G. Rand and Fiery Cushman
People often punish norm violations. In what cases is such punishment viewed as normative—a behavior that we “should”or even“must”engage in? We approach this question by asking when people who fail to punish a norm violator are, themselves, punished. (For instance, a...
View Details
- 2020
- Working Paper
Collusion in Brokered Markets
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
The U.S. residential real estate agency market presents a puzzle for economic theory: commissions on real estate transactions have remained high for decades even though entry is frequent and costs are low. We model the real estate agency market, and other brokered...
View Details
- 2020
- Working Paper
To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness
By: Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Duke Kominers and Ran I. Shorrer
Many economic-theoretic models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. Such assumptions introduce a conceptual problem, as results that rely on finiteness are often implicitly nonrobust; for example,...
View Details
- Article
Handshaking Promotes Deal-Making by Signaling Cooperative Intent
By: Juliana Schroeder, Jane L. Risen, Francesca Gino and Michael I. Norton
We examine how a simple handshake—a gesture that often occurs at the outset of social interactions—can influence deal-making. Because handshakes are social rituals, they are imbued with meaning beyond their physical features. We propose that during mixed-motive...
View Details
- August 28, 2018
- Article
Maintaining Trust When Agents Can Engage in Self-deception
By: Andres Babino, Hernan A. Makse, Rafael Di Tella and Mariano Sigman
The coexistence of cooperation and selfish instincts is a remarkable characteristic of humans. Psychological research has unveiled the cognitive mechanisms behind self-deception. Two important findings are that a higher ambiguity about others’ social preferences leads...
View Details
- 2017
- Chapter
High Stakes Negotiation: Indian Gaming and Tribal/State Compacts
By: Gavin Clarkson and James K. Sebenius
Although Indian tribes and the surrounding states were often bitter enemies throughout much of the history of the United States, recently tribes and states have been able to work cooperatively in a number of areas. In some instances, Congress has mandated such...
View Details
- June 2017
- Article
When Novel Rituals Lead to Intergroup Bias: Evidence from Economic Games and Neurophysiology
By: Nicholas M. Hobson, Francesca Gino, Michael I. Norton and Michael Inzlicht
Long-established rituals in pre-existing cultural groups have been linked to the cultural evolution of large-scale group cooperation. Here we test the prediction that novel rituals—arbitrary hand and body gestures enacted in a stereotypical and repeated fashion—can...
View Details
- December 2016
- Article
The Effects of Endowment Size and Strategy Method on Third Party Punishment
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Katherine McAuliffe and David G. Rand
Numerous experiments have shown that people often engage in third-party punishment (3PP) of selfish behavior. This evidence has been used to argue that people respond to selfishness with anger, and get utility from punishing those who mistreat others. Elements of the...
View Details
- August 2, 2016
- Article
Uncalculating Cooperation Is Used to Signal Trustworthiness
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Martin A. Nowak and David G. Rand
Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an...
View Details
- Article
Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom and David G. Rand
Third-party punishment (TPP), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal of...
View Details
- 2015
- Working Paper
The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games
By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
Building on the work of Nash, Harsanyi, and Shapley, we define a cooperative solution for strategic games that takes account of both the competitive and the cooperative aspects of such games. We prove existence in the general (NTU) case and uniqueness in the TU...
View Details
- 2014
- Working Paper
Tommy Koh and the U.S.–Singapore Free Trade Agreement: A Multi-Front 'Negotiation Campaign'
By: Laurence A. Green and James K. Sebenius
Complex, multiparty negotiations are often analyzed as principals negotiating through agents, as two-level games (Putnam 1988), or in coalitional terms. The relatively new concept of a "multi-front negotiation campaign" (Sebenius 2010, Lax and Sebenius, 2012) offers...
View Details
- October 2014 (Revised September 2017)
- Case
The National Football League and Brain Injuries
By: Richard G. Hamermesh and Matthew G. Preble
The National Football League (NFL) was both the most popular spectator sport in the U.S. and a major economic entity, taking in roughly $10 billion a year in revenue. However through the early twenty-first century, an increased understanding of the long-term effects of...
View Details
Keywords:
Employee Safety;
Safety;
Employees;
Sports;
Health;
Ethics;
Sports Industry;
United States