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- 2021
- Working Paper
Does Observability Amplify Sensitivity to Moral Frames? Evaluating a Reputation-Based Account of Moral Preferences
By: Valerio Capraro, Jillian J. Jordan and Ben Tappin
A growing body of work suggests that people are sensitive to moral framing in economic games involving prosociality, suggesting that people hold moral preferences for doing the “right thing”. What gives rise to these preferences? Here, we evaluate the explanatory power...
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- 2021
- Article
Does Observability Amplify Sensitivity to Moral Frames? Evaluating a Reputation-Based Account of Moral Preferences
By: Valerio Capraro, Jillian J. Jordan and Ben Tappin
A growing body of work suggests that people are sensitive to moral framing in economic games involving prosociality, suggesting that people hold moral preferences for doing the “right thing”. What gives rise to these preferences? Here, we evaluate the explanatory power...
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- 2021
- Working Paper
Consuming Contests: Outcome Uncertainty and Spectator Demand for Contest-based Entertainment
By: Patrick J. Ferguson and Karim R. Lakhani
Contests that are designed to be consumed for entertainment by non-contestants are a fixture of economic, cultural and political life. In this paper, we examine whether individuals prefer to consume contests that have more uncertain outcomes. We look to...
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- 2020
- Working Paper
Don't Get It or Don't Spread It? Comparing Self-interested versus Prosocial Motivations for COVID-19 Prevention Behaviors
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Erez Yoeli and David Rand
Efforts to avoid COVID-19 infection may be seen as self-interested or prosocial. Using American samples from Amazon Turk and Prolific (total n = 6,850), we investigated which framing is more effective—and motivation is stronger—for fostering intentions to engage in...
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- December 2019
- Article
When Do We Punish People Who Don't?
By: Justin W. Martin, Jillian J. Jordan, David G. Rand and Fiery Cushman
People often punish norm violations. In what cases is such punishment viewed as normative—a behavior that we “should”or even“must”engage in? We approach this question by asking when people who fail to punish a norm violator are, themselves, punished. (For instance, a...
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- 2020
- Working Paper
Collusion in Brokered Markets
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
The U.S. residential real estate agency market presents a puzzle for economic theory: commissions on real estate transactions have remained high for decades even though entry is frequent and costs are low. We model the real estate agency market, and other brokered...
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- Article
Handshaking Promotes Deal-Making by Signaling Cooperative Intent
By: Juliana Schroeder, Jane L. Risen, Francesca Gino and Michael I. Norton
We examine how a simple handshake—a gesture that often occurs at the outset of social interactions—can influence deal-making. Because handshakes are social rituals, they are imbued with meaning beyond their physical features. We propose that during mixed-motive...
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- Summer 2018
- Book Review
Leslie Berlin, Troublemakers: Silicon Valley's Coming of Age
Leslie Berlin's book Troublemakers, is an engaging and insightful people-first exploration of the roots of Silicon Valley, from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. Berlin portrays seven individuals who played important roles at critical junctures in the...
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- Article
Games of Threats
By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
A game of threats on a finite set of players, N, is a function d that assigns a real number to any coalition, S ⊆ N, such that d(S) = -d(N\S). A game of threats is not necessarily a coalitional game as it may fail to satisfy the condition d(Ø) = 0. We show that analogs...
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- Article
Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility
By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo
We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-firm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new “Lone Wolf” theorem (Jagadeesan et al., 2017) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided...
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- Article
An Invitation to Market Design
By: Scott Duke Kominers, Alexander Teytelboym and Vincent P. Crawford
Market design seeks to translate economic theory and analysis into practical solutions to real-world problems. By redesigning both the rules that guide market transactions and the infrastructure that enables those transactions to take place, market designers can...
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Keywords:
Matching;
Trading;
Scrip;
Liquidity;
Efficiency;
Equity;
Allocation Rules;
Marketplaces;
Market Design;
Marketplace Matching;
Auctions
- 2017
- Chapter
High Stakes Negotiation: Indian Gaming and Tribal/State Compacts
By: Gavin Clarkson and James K. Sebenius
Although Indian tribes and the surrounding states were often bitter enemies throughout much of the history of the United States, recently tribes and states have been able to work cooperatively in a number of areas. In some instances, Congress has mandated such...
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- June 2017
- Article
When Novel Rituals Lead to Intergroup Bias: Evidence from Economic Games and Neurophysiology
By: Nicholas M. Hobson, Francesca Gino, Michael I. Norton and Michael Inzlicht
Long-established rituals in pre-existing cultural groups have been linked to the cultural evolution of large-scale group cooperation. Here we test the prediction that novel rituals—arbitrary hand and body gestures enacted in a stereotypical and repeated fashion—can...
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- January 2017
- Article
Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts that subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer/seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, substitutable preferences are sufficient to guarantee the...
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- August 2, 2016
- Article
Uncalculating Cooperation Is Used to Signal Trustworthiness
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Martin A. Nowak and David G. Rand
Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an...
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- August 2016
- Article
Independent Directors' Dissent on Boards: Evidence from Listed Companies in China
By: Juan Ma and Tarun Khanna
In this paper, we examine the circumstances under which so-called "independent" directors voice their independent views on public boards in a sample of Chinese firms. First, we ask why independent directors dissent, i.e. how they justify such dissent to public...
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- Article
Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom and David G. Rand
Third-party punishment (TPP), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal of...
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- 2015
- Article
Free at Last, Now What: The Soviet and Chinese Attempts to Offer a Roadmap for the Post-Colonial World
By: Jeremy Friedman
This article seeks to understand the motivations behind the People's Republic of China's attempt to present an alternative development model for the post-colonial world and challenge Soviet leadership in the international communist movement in mid-1960s. When the wave...
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- October 2014 (Revised September 2017)
- Case
The National Football League and Brain Injuries
By: Richard G. Hamermesh and Matthew G. Preble
The National Football League (NFL) was both the most popular spectator sport in the U.S. and a major economic entity, taking in roughly $10 billion a year in revenue. However through the early twenty-first century, an increased understanding of the long-term effects of...
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Keywords:
Employee Safety;
Safety;
Employees;
Sports;
Health;
Ethics;
Sports Industry;
United States
- Article
Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags
By: Drew Fudenberg, Yuhta Ishii and Scott Duke Kominers
We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect...
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