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- All HBS Web
(58)
- Faculty Publications (12)
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- 2024
- Working Paper
Modest Victims: Victims Who Decline to Broadcast Their Victimization Are Seen As Morally Virtuous
By: Nathan Dhaliwal, Jillian J. Jordan and Pat Barclay
What do people think of victims who conceal their victimhood? We propose that the decision to not broadcast that one has been victimized serves as a costly act of modesty—in doing so, one is potentially forgoing social support and compensation from one’s community. We... View Details
Dhaliwal, Nathan, Jillian J. Jordan, and Pat Barclay. "Modest Victims: Victims Who Decline to Broadcast Their Victimization Are Seen As Morally Virtuous." Working Paper, August 2024.
- Article
Emotional Acknowledgment: How Verbalizing Others' Emotions Fosters Interpersonal Trust
By: Alisa Yu, Justin M. Berg and Julian Zlatev
People often respond to others’ emotions using verbal acknowledgment (e.g., “You seem upset”). Yet, little is known about the relational benefits and risks of acknowledging others’ emotions in the workplace. We draw upon Costly Signaling Theory to posit how emotional... View Details
Keywords: Emotion; Costly Signaling; Interpersonal Trust; Emotional Valence; Interpersonal Relationships; Empathic Accuracy; Emotions; Relationships; Trust; Interpersonal Communication
Yu, Alisa, Justin M. Berg, and Julian Zlatev. "Emotional Acknowledgment: How Verbalizing Others' Emotions Fosters Interpersonal Trust." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 164 (May 2021): 116–135.
- Article
Signaling When Nobody Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment in One-shot Anonymous Interactions
By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically at stake, such that reputation... View Details
Keywords: Signaling; Morality; Trustworthiness; Anger; Third-party Punishment; Moral Sensibility; Behavior; Trust; Reputation
Jordan, Jillian J., and David G. Rand. "Signaling When Nobody Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment in One-shot Anonymous Interactions." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 118, no. 1 (January 2020).
- Article
Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games
By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
Why do individuals pay costs to punish selfish behavior, even as third-party observers? A large body of research suggests that reputation plays an important role in motivating such third-party punishment (TPP). Here we focus on a recently proposed reputation-based... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., and David G. Rand. "Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games." Journal of Theoretical Biology 421 (May 21, 2017): 189–202.
- May 2017
- Article
Experimental Evidence of Pooling Outcomes Under Information Asymmetry
By: William Schmidt and Ryan W. Buell
Operational decisions under information asymmetry can signal a firm's prospects to less-informed parties, such as investors, customers, competitors, and regulators. Consequently, managers in these settings often face a tradeoff between making an optimal decision and... View Details
Keywords: Behavioral Decision Research; Information Asymmetry; Signaling; Decision Choices and Conditions; Alignment
Schmidt, William, and Ryan W. Buell. "Experimental Evidence of Pooling Outcomes Under Information Asymmetry." Management Science 63, no. 5 (May 2017): 1586–1605.
- August 2, 2016
- Article
Uncalculating Cooperation Is Used to Signal Trustworthiness
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Martin A. Nowak and David G. Rand
Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an... View Details
Keywords: Social Evaluation; Experimental Economics; Moral Psychology; Cooperation; Reputation; Decision Making
Jordan, Jillian J., Moshe Hoffman, Martin A. Nowak, and David G. Rand. "Uncalculating Cooperation Is Used to Signal Trustworthiness." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 31 (August 2, 2016): 8658–8663.
- Article
Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom and David G. Rand
Third-party punishment (TPP), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal of... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom, and David G. Rand. "Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness." Nature 530, no. 7591 (2016): 473–476.
- 2016
- Working Paper
Paying (for) Attention: The Impact of Information Processing Costs on Bayesian Inference
By: Scott Duke Kominers, Xiaosheng Mu and Alexander Peysakhovich
Human information processing is often modeled as costless Bayesian inference.
However, research in psychology shows that attention is a computationally costly and potentially limited resource. We study a Bayesian individual for whom computing posterior beliefs is... View Details
Kominers, Scott Duke, Xiaosheng Mu, and Alexander Peysakhovich. "Paying (for) Attention: The Impact of Information Processing Costs on Bayesian Inference." Working Paper, February 2016.
- November 2015
- Article
Modularity and Intellectual Property Protection
By: Carliss Y. Baldwin and Joachim Henkel
Modularity is a means of partitioning technical knowledge about a product or process. When state-sanctioned intellectual property (IP) rights are ineffective or costly to enforce, modularity can be used to hide information and thus protect IP. We investigate the impact... View Details
Baldwin, Carliss Y., and Joachim Henkel. "Modularity and Intellectual Property Protection." Strategic Management Journal 36, no. 11 (November 2015): 1637–1655.
- June 2014
- Article
The Red Sneakers Effect: Inferring Status and Competence from Signals of Nonconformity
By: Silvia Bellezza, Francesca Gino and Anat Keinan
We examine how people react to nonconforming behaviors, such as entering a luxury boutique wearing gym clothes rather than an elegant outfit or wearing red sneakers in a professional setting. Nonconforming behaviors, as costly and visible signals, can act as a... View Details
Bellezza, Silvia, Francesca Gino, and Anat Keinan. "The Red Sneakers Effect: Inferring Status and Competence from Signals of Nonconformity." Journal of Consumer Research 41, no. 1 (June 2014): 35–54. (Finalist, 2017 Best Article Award for a paper published in JCR in 2014.))
- 2014
- Working Paper
Modularity and Intellectual Property Protection
By: Carliss Y. Baldwin and Joachim Henkel
Modularity is a means of partitioning technical knowledge about a product or process. When state-sanctioned intellectual property (IP) rights are ineffective or costly to enforce, modularity can be used to hide information and thus protect IP. We investigate the impact... View Details
Keywords: Modularity; Value Appropriation; Relational Contracts; Clans; Rights; Complexity; Intellectual Property
Baldwin, Carliss Y., and Joachim Henkel. "Modularity and Intellectual Property Protection." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 14-046, December 2013. (Revised June 2014.)
- January 2012
- Article
Paying to Be Nice: Consistency and Costly Prosocial Behavior
By: Ayelet Gneezy, Alex Imas, Amber Brown, Leif D. Nelson and Michael I. Norton
Building on previous research in economics and psychology, we propose that the costliness of initial prosocial behavior positively influences whether that behavior leads to consistent future behaviors. We suggest that costly prosocial behaviors serve as a signal of... View Details
Gneezy, Ayelet, Alex Imas, Amber Brown, Leif D. Nelson, and Michael I. Norton. "Paying to Be Nice: Consistency and Costly Prosocial Behavior." Management Science 58, no. 1 (January 2012): 179–187.