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- January 2021
- Article
Chain Stability in Trading Networks
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky and Alexander Westkamp
We show that in general trading networks with bilateral contracts, a suitably adapted chain stability concept (Ostrovsky, 2008) is equivalent to stability (Hatfield and Kominers, 2012; Hatfield et al., 2013) if all agents' preferences are fully substitutable and...
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- 2020
- Working Paper
Of Learning and Forgetting: Centrism, Populism, and the Legitimacy Crisis of Globalization
By: Rawi Abdelal
Every order is a bargain with disappointments and trade-offs. Thus is every order an unstable equilibrium. The first era of globalization, circa 1870–1914, created both international prosperity and domestic instability. That instability was fully realized during the...
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- January 2020
- Teaching Note
Chile: Unrest in the Copper Nation
By: Laura Alfaro and Sarah Jeong
For decades, Chile enjoyed the stability of being the world’s largest producer of copper. Keynes would have advised that this period of growth would have been the time for the government to save, that “the boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity at the...
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- November 2019
- Other Article
Corrigendum to "Multilateral Matching"
By: Keisuke Bando, Toshiyuki Hirai, John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We identify an error in the claim by Hatfield and Kominers (2015) that every stable outcome in the setting of multilateral matching with contracts is efficient. We then show that the result can be recovered under a suitable differentiability condition.
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- May 2017
- Article
Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We introduce a framework of matching with flexible allotments that can be used to model firms with cross-division hiring restrictions. Our framework also allows us to nest some prior models of matching with distributional constraints. Building upon our recent work on...
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- 2016
- Article
The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet as a Financial-Stability Tool
By: Robin Greenwood, Samuel Gregory Hanson and Jeremy C. Stein
We argue that the Federal Reserve should use its balance sheet to help reduce a key threat to financial stability: the tendency for private-sector financial intermediaries to engage in excessive amounts of maturity transformation—i.e., to finance risky assets using...
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- January 2017
- Article
Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts that subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer/seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, substitutable preferences are sufficient to guarantee the...
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- Summer 2016
- Article
Open Content, Linus' Law, and Neutral Point of View
By: Shane Greenstein and Feng Zhu
The diffusion of the Internet and digital technologies has enabled many organizations to use the open-content production model to produce and disseminate knowledge. While several prior studies have shown that the open-content production model can lead to high-quality...
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- 2017
- Working Paper
The Importance of Unemployment Insurance as an Automatic Stabilizer
By: Marco Di Maggio and Amir Kermani
We assess the extent to which unemployment insurance (UI) serves as an automatic stabilizer to mitigate the economy's sensitivity to shocks. Using a local labor market design based on heterogeneity in local benefit generosity (defined as the percentage of household...
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- May 2016
- Article
Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities: Theory
By: Scott Duke Kominers and Tayfun Sönmez
We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by...
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- Article
An Evaluation of Money Market Fund Reform Proposals
U.S. money market mutual funds (MMFs) are an important source of dollar funding for global financial institutions, particularly those headquartered outside the U.S. MMFs proved to be a source of considerable instability during the financial crisis of 2007–2009,...
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- 2015
- Working Paper
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may
demand multiple contracts but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce
three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity,...
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- 2015
- Working Paper
Full Substitutability
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky and Alexander Westkamp
Various forms of substitutability are essential for establishing the existence of
equilibria and other useful properties in diverse settings such as matching, auctions,
and exchange economies with indivisible goods. We extend earlier models' canonical
definitions of...
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- Article
Multilateral Matching
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We introduce a matching model in which agents engage in joint ventures via multilateral contracts. This approach allows us to consider production complementarities previously outside the scope of matching theory. We show analogues of the first and second welfare...
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- February 2015
- Article
Location Choices under Strategic Interactions
By: Juan Alcacer, Cristian Dezso and Minyuan Zhao
The literature on location choices has mostly emphasized the impact of location and firm characteristics. However, most industries with a significant presence of multi-location firms are oligopolistic in nature, which suggests that strategic interaction among firms...
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- 2014
- Working Paper
Hidden Substitutes
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
In this paper, we show that preferences exhibiting some forms of complementarity
in fact have an underlying substitutable structure. Specifically, we show that some
preferences that are not substitutable in the setting of many-to-one matching with
contracts become...
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- Summer 2014
- Article
When Does a Platform Create Value by Limiting Choice?
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Hanna Halaburda
We present a theory for why it might be rational for a platform to limit the number of applications available on it. Our model is based on the observation that even if users prefer application variety, applications often also exhibit direct network effects. When there...
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Keywords:
Platform Governance;
Direct Network Effects;
Indirect Network Effects;
Complements;
Tragedy Of The Commons;
Equilibrium Selection;
Coordination;
Foresight;
Strategy;
Value Creation;
Technology Platform;
Balance and Stability;
Decision Choices and Conditions;
Consumer Behavior;
Software;
Network Effects
- April 2014 (Revised February 2015)
- Case
Saudi Arabia: Finding Stability after the Arab Spring
By: Richard H.K. Vietor and Hilary White
In 2015, King Salman of Saudi Arabia was juggling several balls as the kingdom's new monarch. At home, there were pressures for liberalization, from women and youth, and pressures for more conservative religious observance and policy from the Muslim "ulema." His...
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- 2013
- Article
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
By: Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
Accommodating couples has been a long-standing issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. This article's main...
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- Article
Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky and Alexander Westkamp
We introduce a model in which agents in a network can trade via bilateral contracts. We find that when continuous transfers are allowed and utilities are quasi-linear, the full substitutability of preferences is sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes...
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