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- Faculty Publications (7)
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- October 2020
- Article
Collusion in Markets with Syndication
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery and Jordan M. Barry
Markets for IPOs and debt issuances are syndicated, in the sense that a bidder who wins a contract may invite losing bidders to join a syndicate that together fulfills the contract. We show that in markets with syndication, standard intuitions from industrial...
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Keywords:
Collusion;
Antitrust;
IPO Underwriting;
Syndication;
＂Repeated Games＂;
Markets;
Game Theory
- 2020
- Working Paper
Collusion in Brokered Markets
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
The U.S. residential real estate agency market presents a puzzle for economic theory: commissions on real estate transactions have remained high for decades even though entry is frequent and costs are low. We model the real estate agency market, and other brokered...
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- 2019
- Working Paper
Collusion in Markets with Syndication
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery and Jordan M. Barry
Many markets, including markets for IPOs and debt issuances, are syndicated: each winning bidder invites competitors to join its syndicate to complete production. Using repeated extensive form games, we show that collusion in syndicated markets may become easier as...
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- 2016
- Working Paper
Collusion in Markets with Syndication
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Kominers and Richard Lowery
Markets for IPOs and debt issuances are syndicated, in the sense that a bidder who
wins a contract may invite losing bidders to join a syndicate that together fulfills the
contract. We show that in markets with syndication, standard intuitions from...
View Details
- Article
Analyzing Scrip Systems
By: Kris Johnson, David Simchi-Levi and Peng Sun
Scrip systems provide a nonmonetary trade economy for exchange of resources. We model a scrip system as a stochastic game and study system design issues on selection rules to match potential trade partners over time. We show the optimality of one particular rule in...
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- Article
Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags
By: Drew Fudenberg, Yuhta Ishii and Scott Duke Kominers
We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect...
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- Forthcoming
- Article
Not from Concentrate: Collusion in Collaborative Industries
By: Jordan M. Barry, John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
The chief principle of antitrust law and theory is that reducing market concentration—having more, smaller firms instead of fewer, bigger ones—reduces anticompetitive behavior. We demonstrate that this principle is fundamentally incomplete.
In many... View Details
In many... View Details
Keywords:
Antitrust;
Antitrust Law;
Antitrust Theory;
Law And Economics;
Collusion;
Collaboration;
Collaborative Industries;
Regulation;
＂Repeated Games＂;
IPOs;
Initial Public Offerings;
Underwriters;
Real Estate;
Real Estate Agents;
Realtors;
Syndicated Markets;
Syndication;
Brokers;
Market Concentration;
Competition;
Law;
Economics;
Collaborative Innovation and Invention;
Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms;
Game Theory;
Initial Public Offering