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- Article
Assent-maximizing Social Choice
By: Katherine A. Baldiga and Jerry R. Green
We take a decision theoretic approach to the classic social choice problem, using data on the frequency of choice problems to compute social choice functions. We define a family of social choice rules that depend on the population's preferences and on the probability...
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- January 2011
- Article
Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms
By: Marco Archetti, Francisco Ubeda, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry R. Green, Naomi E. Pierce and Douglas W. Yu
One of the main problems impeding the evolution of cooperation is partner choice. When information is asymmetric (the quality of a potential partner is known only to himself), it may seem that partner choice is not possible without signaling. Many mutualisms, however,...
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- 2009
- Other Unpublished Work
Choice-based Measures of Conflict in Preferences
By: Katherine Baldiga and Jerry R. Green
We propose a family of measures of difference between ordinal preference relations. The difference between two preferences is the probability that they would disagree about the optimal choice from a random available set. It is in this sense that these measures are...
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- 2009
- Chapter
On the General Relativity of Fiscal Language
By: Jerry R. Green and Lawrence Kotlikoff
A century ago, everyone thought time and distance were well defined physical concepts. But neither proved absolute. Instead, measures/reports of time and distance were found to depend on one's reference point, specifically one's direction and speed of travel, making...
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- 2007
- Working Paper
Choice, Rationality and Welfare Measurement
By: Jerry R. Green and Daniel A. Hojman
We present a method for evaluating the welfare of a decision maker, based on observed choice data. Unlike the standard economic theory of revealed preference, our method can be used whether or not the observed choices are rational. Paralleling the standard theory we...
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- July 2007
- Article
A Two-Person Game of Information Transmission
By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy L. Stokey
We consider a statistical decision problem faced by a two player organization whose members may not
agree on outcome evaluations and prior probabilities. One player is specialized in gathering information
and transmitting it to the other, who takes the decision. This...
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- 2006
- Working Paper
On the General Relativity of Fiscal Language
By: Jerry R. Green and Laurence J. Kotlikoff
- June 2005
- Article
Compensatory Transfers in Two-Player Decision Problems
By: Jerry R. Green
This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of a family of solutions to two-player quasi-linear social choice problems. In these problems the players select a single action from a set available to them. They may also transfer money between...
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- 2005
- Working Paper
Additive Rules for the Quasi-linear Bargaining Problem
By: Christopher P. Chambers and Jerry R. Green
We study the class of additive rules for the quasi-linear bargaining problem introduced by Green. We provide a characterization of the class of all rules that are e¢ cient, translation invariant, additive, and continuous. We present several subfamilies of rules: the...
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Keywords:
Econometric Models
- 2003
- Other Unpublished Work
Compensatory Transfers in Two-Player Decision Problems
By: Jerry R. Green
- spring 1995
- Article
On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation
By: Jerry R. Green and Suzanne Scotchmer
In markets with sequential innovation, inventors of derivative improvements might undermine the profit of initial innovators through competition. Profit erosion can be mitigated by broadening the first innovator's patent protection and/or by permitting cooperative...
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- Article
Non-verifiability, Costly Renegotiation, and Efficiency
By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
We study the implications of the non verifiability of information for the allocation of resources and the bearing of risk in a two party relationship. We consider a two step approach. In step one the two parties define a non contingent contract which will be executed...
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Keywords:
Negotiation
- Article
Commitments with Third Parties
By: Jerry R. Green
Observable irrevocable contracts between a principal and an agent have been suggested as a way in which the principal can enhance his payoff when playing a game against, or bargaining with, an opponent. It is shown that such beneficial agency relationships depend on...
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- Article
Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
Two parties may agree to a mutually binding contract that will govern their behavior after an uncertain event becomes known. As there is no agent who can both observe this uncertain outcome and enforce the contract, contingent agreements are precluded. However, the...
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- September 1990
- Article
Competition on Many Fronts: A Stackelberg Signaling Equilibrium
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
An economic agent, the incumbent, is operating in many environments at the same time. These may be locations, markets, or specific activities. He is informed of the particular conditions relevant to each situation. His action in each case is observable by another...
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- spring 1990
- Article
Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law
By: Suzanne Scotchmer and Jerry R. Green
The stringency of the novelty requirement in patent law affects the pace of innovation because it affects the amount of technical information that is disclosed among firms. It also affects ex ante profitability of research. We compare weak and strong novelty...
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- December 1988
- Article
Ordinal Independence in Non-Linear Utility Theory
By: Jerry R. Green and Bruno Jullien
Individual behavior under uncertainty is characterized using a new axiom, ordinal independence, which is a weakened form of the von Neumann-Morgcnslern independence axiom. It states that if two distributions share a tail in common, then this tail can be modified...
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Keywords:
Preferences