

# Entrepreneurial Learning and Strategic Foresight \*

Aticus Peterson †

Strategy Unit

Harvard Business School

Andy Wu ‡

Strategy Unit

Harvard Business School

January 29, 2021

**Abstract.** We study how learning by experience across projects affects an entrepreneur’s strategic foresight. In a quantitative study of 314 entrepreneurs across 722 crowdfunded projects supplemented with a program of qualitative interviews, we counterintuitively find that entrepreneurs make less accurate predictions as they gain experience executing projects: they miss their predicted deadline to bring a product to market by nearly six additional weeks on each successive project. Although learning should improve prediction accuracy in principle, we argue that entrepreneurs also learn of opportunities to augment each successive product, which drastically expands the interdependencies beyond what a boundedly rational entrepreneur can anticipate. We find that in a subsequent project, entrepreneurs encounter more unforeseen interdependencies, and they sacrifice on-time delivery to address these interdependencies.

**Keywords:** Entrepreneurship, Learning, Experience, Complexity, Interdependency, Strategic Foresight, Prediction, Crowdfunding, Product Development

---

\*The authors gratefully acknowledge feedback from Daniel Albert, Juan Alcacer, Goran Calic, David Clough, Gary Dushnitsky, JP Eggers, Martin Ganco, Giovanni Gavetti, Sourobh Ghosh, Laura Katsnelson, Chengguang Li, Rory McDonald, Cynthia Montgomery, Jan Rivkin, Daniel Sands, Kouros Shafi, Eric Van den Steen, Bala Vissa, Maciej Workiewicz, and participants at the HBS Doctoral Student Seminar and HBS Strategy Unit Brown Bag Seminar. This research was made possible by financial support from the HBS Division of Research and Faculty Development. Jaeho Kim and Miaomiao Zhang provided excellent research assistance. Jeff Strabone provided copyediting support. All opinions expressed herein are those of the authors only, and all errors are the responsibility of the authors.

†Address: Wyss House 202N, 710 N Harvard St, Boston, MA 02134. Telephone: 1 (617) 300-0686. Email: [apeterson@hbs.edu](mailto:apeterson@hbs.edu).

‡Address: Morgan Hall 243, 15 Harvard Way, Boston, MA 02163. Telephone: 1 (617) 495-2795. Email: [awu@hbs.edu](mailto:awu@hbs.edu). Corresponding author.

# 1 Introduction

Strategic foresight is the ability to accurately predict the consequences of a strategy and in turn pursue a superior course of action to build competitive advantage (Ahuja et al., 2005; Gavetti & Menon, 2016). Heterogeneity in strategic foresight implicitly underlies many theories of competitive advantage (Csaszar & Laureiro-Martínez, 2018): by predicting the value that resources generate after being developed (Barney, 1986, 1991) and the attractiveness of potential opportunities (Porter, 1980), entrepreneurs with superior foresight can build competitive advantage. As such, understanding the antecedents of strategic foresight should shed critical light on the origins of competitive advantage (Csaszar, 2018), yet research on this topic has been sparse until recently. Recent studies find that individual cognition (Gary & Wood, 2011; Kapoor & Wilde, 2020) and organizational structure (Csaszar, 2012) are determinants of strategic foresight (Csaszar & Laureiro-Martínez, 2018). In particular, recent work emphasizes the specific importance of strategic foresight for entrepreneurs as they formulate strategy (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017; Ott et al., 2017).

Although an entrepreneur may need strategic foresight to build competitive advantage, the conditions that enable an entrepreneur to build strategic foresight are unclear, particularly as she learns from past experience (Nelson & Winter, 2002) and applies it to the next entrepreneurial opportunity (Gavetti, 2012). An extensive body of work on serial entrepreneurship documents how entrepreneurs can improve performance from venture to venture (e.g., Delmar & Shane, 2006; Gompers et al., 2010; Stuart & Abetti, 1990), but that improvement could arise from a variety of factors besides improved foresight. Through experience, a serial entrepreneur accumulates a multitude of advantages (Politis, 2005): resource access and relationships (Hsu, 2007; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013), management practices and routines (Dencker et al., 2009), opportunities (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Gruber et al., 2008), and knowledge about the consequences of past decisions (Minniti & Bygrave, 2001; Paik, 2014). Although most of this work does not specifically speak to whether experience improves the strategic foresight of the entrepreneur, it generally makes this implicit assumption. However, recent work bringing attention to the bounded rationality of entrepreneurs calls this untested

assumption into question altogether. Cognitive limitations constrain what an entrepreneur can learn from experience and use for effective judgement (Cassar, 2014; Cohen et al., 2019; Hallen & Pahnke, 2016). In an important study, Eggers & Song (2015) demonstrate that boundedly rational entrepreneurs may misattribute the sources of past performance and instead come away with the wrong takeaways from a past experience. Thus, it remains an open question whether entrepreneurs learn from experience to improve strategic foresight.

This study explores this open question for entrepreneurial strategy. Specifically, how does experience from executing past projects affect the accuracy of an entrepreneur’s strategic foresight on the subsequent project? Given that tackling complexity is a defining characteristic of the phenomenon of entrepreneurship and of strategy more generally (Csaszar, 2018; Leiblein et al., 2018; Nickerson & Argyres, 2018; Van den Steen, 2016), we take the view that accurate strategic foresight depends on whether the entrepreneur can anticipate the complexity in her strategy. There are two competing mechanisms through which experience can impact the accuracy of strategic foresight, depending on whether the experience addresses or exacerbates complexity. On one hand, experience increases the accuracy of strategic foresight if an entrepreneur learns about complexity that can apply to a future project (Ethiraj et al., 2005). On the other hand, experience decreases the accuracy of strategic foresight if an entrepreneur learns about opportunities to augment her project, which introduces additional complexity (Ethiraj et al., 2012). We argue that, when complexity increases rapidly across projects for a boundedly rational entrepreneur, the latter effect dominates the former. As a result, we theorize that as entrepreneurs gain experience across projects, they can introduce additional complexity that causes their strategic foresight to become less accurate.

In a study of 314 entrepreneurs across 722 crowdfunded hardware technology projects along with a program of qualitative interviews with serial crowdfunding entrepreneurs, we document a compelling set of empirical relationships consistent with the view of boundedly rational learning under complexity. In stark contrast to a simple model of learning, we find that entrepreneurs make less accurate predictions as they gain experience across projects: they miss their predicted deadline to bring a product to market by a wider margin on each successive project, even as they actually give themselves more time on later projects.

On average, an entrepreneur misses the deadline by nearly six additional weeks on each subsequent project, and this effect persists: the gap between the predicted deadline and actual delivery date continues to widen for later and later projects. The ratio between the delay and the predicted delivery time increases by 53 percentage points on each subsequent project.

To explain this intriguing pattern, we show that as entrepreneurs gain experience across projects, their future projects include additions that lead to more and more unforeseen interdependencies that they do not account for when making *ex ante* predictions. In addition to documenting these patterns in a quantitative analysis, our interviews provide a detailed view of how these mechanisms result in less accurate predictions. For example, one entrepreneur initially launched a Bluetooth LEGO brick for his customers to control motors and lights in their LEGO creations, e.g., a remote-controlled car. From this initial experience, the entrepreneur learned that it would be valuable for his next project to also add compatibility with LEGO sensors, e.g., the car could sense darkness to turn on a light. As the entrepreneur set the timeline for the subsequent product with more features, he did give himself more time than the previous product by setting the deadline further out. However, he did not give himself enough time: we show that even with a simple addition, entrepreneurs encounter an increasing number of unforeseen interdependencies during implementation, suggesting an increase in complexity beyond the ability of an entrepreneur to foresee. Despite having a working prototype when making his prediction, this LEGO entrepreneur failed to foresee how adding this feature would have major consequences for many steps in the manufacturing process, like requiring different, more sophisticated tooling. His original manufacturer was no longer able to produce the product, and he went through seven different manufacturers before finding one who could produce the updated brick. Of course, he then missed his predicted deadline.

This study makes three contributions. First, we build on recent work that highlights bounded rationality in entrepreneurial learning ([Cohen et al., 2019](#); [Eggers & Song, 2015](#); [Hallen & Pahnke, 2016](#)), and we extend it to encompass the challenge of complexity. We propose a theory of bounded rationality around complexity that can serve as an alternate

or at least more nuanced explanation for documented patterns of entrepreneurial failure and excess entry which prior literature views as overconfidence (e.g., [Camerer & Lovallo, 1999](#); [Cassar, 2010](#); [Chen et al., 2019](#); [Hayward et al., 2006](#); [Wu & Knott, 2006](#)). Second, we are among the first to leverage product crowdfunding as a setting to study the novel phenomenon of “serial-product entrepreneurship,” which has properties distinct from both traditional within-firm studies of organizational learning (e.g., [Rapping, 1965](#); [Thompson, 2001](#)) and between-firm studies of serial entrepreneurship (e.g., [Eesley & Roberts, 2012](#); [Paik, 2014](#); [Eggers & Song, 2015](#)). Third, this study provides a needed quantitative empirical examination of strategic foresight, which recent theoretical and qualitative case research puts forth as an essential but overlooked source of competitive advantage ([Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017](#); [Gavetti & Menon, 2016](#); [Ott et al., 2017](#)). In doing so, we put forth the notion that strategic foresight comprises multiple interdependent predictions. Entrepreneurs who encounter unforeseen challenges face a tradeoff between which initial predictions to fulfill and which to miss ([Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2009](#); [Talbot, 1982](#)). For instance, entrepreneurs may prioritize some predictions, like that of a new product feature, over other predictions, like that of a delivery date, when both cannot be achieved.

## 2 Theoretical Background

### 2.1 Complexity and Strategic Foresight

To unpack the potential effect of project experience on an entrepreneur’s strategic foresight, we need to first understand the role that complexity plays in this relationship.

Any given strategy that the entrepreneur might pursue, and needs to make predictions about, entails complexity. By complexity, we mean the full set of specific interdependencies that exist between the components (or tasks) in the execution of a particular strategy ([Simon, 1962](#)). Thus, the complexity of a given strategy is a function of the number of components and the dependencies between those components, which together determine the total number of interdependencies that make up the full complexity of a strategy.<sup>1</sup> Com-

---

<sup>1</sup>To better align with our empirical context, our terminology for interdependencies differs subtly from how it is described in the NK modeling tradition ([Levinthal, 1997](#); [Kauffman, 1995](#)). While what we describe as the number of components or features roughly maps to  $N$ , what we refer to as the number of interdependencies is distinct from  $K$ . The general notion of  $K$ , as the *level* of interdependence, is traditionally defined as the

plexity is not just an idiosyncratic characteristic of some strategies, but a core part of all strategies: across the board, recent efforts to formally define strategy specifically invoke complexity and interdependencies as first-order and necessary characteristics of what makes a course of action strategic at all (Leiblein et al., 2018; Van den Steen, 2016; Nickerson & Argyres, 2018; Csaszar, 2018). Prior work emphasizes that the complexity of a strategy can itself be a source of competitive advantage that limits imitation (Rivkin, 2000), such that an entrepreneur could justify a strategy with high complexity despite its associated difficulty.

The complexity faced by an entrepreneur launching a given project or venture arises from two categories of interdependencies that make most entrepreneurial strategies meaningfully complex. First, interdependencies exist intrinsically to the product design itself (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Ethiraj & Posen, 2014), e.g., a working electronics gadget prototype has interdependencies between the circuit board, sensors, motors, etc. Second, interdependencies also exist in the broader organization (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003), between individuals or teams within the entrepreneur’s organization, as well as between an entrepreneur and other organizations, e.g., an entrepreneur is interdependent with third-party suppliers in the sourcing, manufacturing, distribution, etc., of the product. Together, these make up a significant number of interdependencies that the entrepreneur will have to work through in execution. Thus, any entrepreneurial strategy for launching a new venture will be meaningfully complex. A recent review by Townsend et al. (2018) further emphasizes the core role of complexity in entrepreneurship, while also identifying the need to better understand how entrepreneurs deal with complexity in their context.

Strategic foresight—and the ability to make accurate predictions related to a potential strategy—depends critically on the entrepreneur’s ability to anticipate the complexity and specific interdependencies she will face when later implementing or executing on the strategy. An accurate strategic prediction requires accounting for the contribution of each component or task towards performance, but where the contribution of each task depends on the choices made in other tasks (Gavetti & Menon, 2016). A broad set of work emphasizes

---

dependencies that a single component  $n \in N$  has on other components in the system. However, when we refer to the overall project complexity or the (total) number of interdependencies in a project, we mean the sum of all interdependencies across all components, which is closer to  $N \times K$  rather than just  $K$ .

the importance of comprehending interdependencies for effective strategizing for product design (Pich et al., 2002) and organizational design (Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). In more recent work specifically characterizing the notion of strategic foresight, effective strategic foresight comes from being able to consider a breadth of complex information (Csaszar & Laureiro-Martínez, 2018), which guides the execution of interconnected activities (Ott et al., 2017).

We take the view that entrepreneurship can be characterized as strategic foresight under complexity. By construction, entrepreneurs pursue more cognitively distant opportunities and then iterate on those opportunities as they learn (Gavetti, 2012). Due to the high velocity of entrepreneurial markets, entrepreneurship requires operating in novel settings of interdependencies (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017), where the entrepreneur, or anyone else for that matter, lacks prior experience with the interdependencies to be faced. Given these novel interdependencies, associative thinking and simple models may not reflect reality (Csaszar & Laureiro-Martínez, 2018; Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017; Gavetti, 2012). Thus, entrepreneurs have a particularly difficult challenge in anticipating the complexity they might face, limiting their effectiveness in making accurate strategic predictions.

## 2.2 Experience and Strategic Foresight: Two Channels

Our theory focuses on whether an entrepreneur can learn by experience across projects in such a way to improve strategic foresight for executing a project. By experience, we mean an entrepreneurial firm's past exposure to the execution of tasks relevant to a given prediction; prior work demonstrates that entrepreneurial experience is most beneficial when directly relevant to future activities (Dencker et al., 2009; Dencker & Gruber, 2015; Stuart & Abetti, 1990). We identify two competing channels of learning through which past project experience might impact the accuracy of strategic foresight for a subsequent project.

**Learning about Past Complexity** On one hand, an entrepreneur can learn about interdependencies by experiencing them when executing past projects: this experience would thus increase the accuracy of strategic foresight. Prior studies show that both organizations and individuals can learn from repeating interdependent tasks (Edmondson et al., 2007; Lewis et al., 2005; Ethiraj et al., 2005). Furthermore, Denrell et al. (2004) show that learning

in complex systems is best facilitated when there is continuity of personnel, which is true by construction for serial entrepreneurship. In theory, if an entrepreneur and her organization execute the exact same project over and over again, she will have repeated instances of exposure to the interdependencies inherent to that project, because the full set of interdependencies that the entrepreneur must address for that project remain the same. With repetition, the entrepreneur should approach a full understanding of the system of interdependencies in the project. Improved knowledge of the interdependencies that she will face in execution means that there are fewer interdependencies that she overlooks in her mental model when she makes predictions prior to execution. Thus, this learning of interdependencies by experiencing them would enable more accurate strategic foresight for future projects.

A large body of research on entrepreneurial learning from experience points to the idea that executing projects exposes entrepreneurs to interdependencies, giving them knowledge they can apply to future projects. As Eisenhardt & Bingham (2017) put it, experience allows entrepreneurs to “learn more about their strategic playing field.” Baron & Ensley (2006) find that prototypes of experienced entrepreneurs are richer in content and account for more dimensions of performance than those of novice entrepreneurs, suggesting that experienced entrepreneurs consider more interdependencies.

Our theorizing here only focuses on the learning about interdependencies that comes about from actual experience with execution, independent of heterogeneity in the quality of that execution. The entrepreneur still needs to run through the motions of executing the project, which still exposes her to the interdependencies and gives her the knowledge she can take to future projects.<sup>2</sup> While our theorizing here intentionally remains agnostic to heterogeneity in the performance of past experience, Section 5.1 leverages empirical findings to post hoc theorize that experience with underperformance in past project execution may

---

<sup>2</sup>We also consider an alternative and important behavioral mechanism of performance feedback, whereby past success or failure relative to aspiration levels may affect future behavior (e.g., Levinthal & March, 1993; Greve, 2003, 1998; Joseph & Gaba, 2015; Eggers & Song, 2015; Cho & Clough, 2015). Appendix Section A.8 further details this theoretical perspective and presents associated empirical tests evaluating the effect of experiencing success or failure on a past fundraising *campaign*—as opposed to our main focus of *project* execution—by raising more than or less than the desired amount of money from customers, respectively.



be beneficial for making a more accurate future prediction.<sup>3</sup>

**Learning about Opportunities to Increase Complexity** On the other hand, project experience exposes an entrepreneur to opportunities to add new features to her next project, which increases the complexity by expanding the set of interdependencies faced by the entrepreneur: this experience risks decreasing the accuracy of strategic foresight. The entrepreneurship literature highlights how entrepreneurs identify opportunities to innovate in ways that emerge endogenously from their experience (Alvarez & Barney, 2007, 2010). Prior experience with project execution brings opportunities to an entrepreneur in two key ways. First, an entrepreneur discovers new opportunities (Shane, 2000) when her experience exposes her to new information about customer needs and ways to serve the market. Second, an entrepreneur creates new opportunities (Venkataraman, 2003) through an enactment process (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006) where in the course of prior experience, she may devise new ways of combining preexisting knowledge. Both these scenarios lead to new opportunities largely proximate to prior experience, involving incremental improvements to the prior pursuits.

Acting on these new opportunities by making even just incremental additions to the product changes the system of interdependencies, increasing the complexity by adding new, previously unencountered interdependencies (Anderson, 1999). The most promising new entrepreneurial opportunities are often in the areas with significant new and previously unencountered interdependencies (Gavetti, 2012). However, operating in a new and larger system of interdependencies is unfavorable for overcoming the challenge posed by complexity. To eventually execute on the opportunity requires additional inventive effort towards alleviating the constraints posed by the new interdependencies (Ethiraj, 2007). Thus, to make predictions about the opportunity, the entrepreneur would have to be able to account for those interdependencies. In this way, gaining new knowledge through experience could even exacerbate the challenge of complexity and, as a result, increase the number of ways strategic foresight could be inaccurate (Townsend et al., 2018).

To conceptually pinpoint the net effect of project experience on strategic foresight,

---

<sup>3</sup>In our empirical context, the primary performance dimension for which an entrepreneur can experience success or failure on past *project* execution is the accuracy of their prediction of delivery time on the past project.

we now need to identify which of these two channels dominates.

### 2.3 Dominance of Increasing Complexity Over Learning

We contend that—under certain conditions common to entrepreneurial settings—the increase in complexity from learning about opportunities to add to a subsequent project can dominate the learning about previously encountered interdependencies in past projects. In short, new complexity can outweigh the benefits of experience. The argument follows from assumptions we can make about the shapes of two theoretical relationships, described here and visually illustrated in Figure 1. First, the *Project Complexity* curve is the relationship between experience and the total number of interdependencies in a project opportunity pursued at a given level of experience. Of these total interdependencies in a project, some will be ex ante known to the entrepreneur, which we refer to as the *Foreseen Interdependencies*. The remainder will be unknown to or unanticipated by the entrepreneur, which we refer as the *Unforeseen Interdependencies*. Second, the *Learning* curve is the relationship between experience and the set of *Foreseen Interdependencies* that the entrepreneur is aware of ex ante, prior to executing a given project. When the *Project Complexity* curve is above the *Learning* curve, then the entrepreneur will not be able to foresee all the interdependencies in a given project; the difference between the two curves represents the *Unforeseen Interdependencies* that will be overlooked in her prediction process and impair her strategic foresight.

— INSERT FIGURE 1 CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF EXPERIENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCIES. —

Under the assumptions detailed below—at least a linearly increasing project complexity curve and a concave learning curve—we theorize that experience in past projects has a negative relationship with the accuracy of an entrepreneur’s strategic foresight for a subsequent project.

**Increasing Project Complexity** Even when an entrepreneur makes merely incremental additions to a previous project, complexity increases. Adding a new feature requires adding one or more tasks interdependent with some or many tasks in their system of activities (Ethiraj et al., 2012).<sup>4</sup> As a result, each new feature added must increase the total number of

---

<sup>4</sup>Our study focuses on hardware technology projects that force the entrepreneur to integrate components at some level: if there were no interdependencies, there would be no opportunity for value creation by the entrepreneur as the raw inputs could just be purchased separately by customers with no loss of value.

interdependencies in the project (Casti, 1994; Daft & Lewin, 1990). The overall theoretical argument follows from the minimum baseline premise that the total number of interdependencies increases at least linearly, which assumes that the entrepreneur would have to add at least one component or task in a subsequent project and the addition should be at least as interdependent as other components that already exist in the prior project.

That said, we posit that in most entrepreneurial ventures involving nascent projects, complexity can increase faster than linearly, well above the minimum assumption needed for the theory to hold. First, it can be the case that an entrepreneur adds multiple features or tasks in a subsequent project, particularly for a nascent entrepreneur improving on a sparse project far from a dominant design. Second, for projects with highly interdependent components, the addition of a single component can lead to a faster-than-linear increase in the total number of interdependencies; at the extreme, the number of interdependencies can increase geometrically.<sup>5</sup> While both these conditions vary based on context, entrepreneurs engaged in launching a new product—particularly a new hardware technology as in our empirical context—likely meet both of these conditions. The next section describes how these assumptions hold in context. Product development entails highly interdependent components and tasks (Ulrich et al., 2020), meaning that the entrepreneur faces a complex system that is inherently nonlinear (Anderson, 1999; Townsend et al., 2018). This cascade of new interdependencies can grow rapidly and may outpace the comparatively incremental discovery of interdependencies encountered in past experience.

Thus, as an entrepreneur gains experience across projects and implements new features for a subsequent project, demonstrating strategic foresight requires that the entrepreneur navigate more complexity, and perhaps substantially more, than previously faced.

**Bounding Learning** As the entrepreneur takes on more complexity, bounded rationality limits the potential benefits of learning about interdependencies from prior experience by placing an upper bound on the amount of knowledge about interdependencies that the entrepreneur can practically contemplate and utilize. Ultimately, we propose an implica-

---

<sup>5</sup>For instance, a project with  $X$  components that are all interdependent with one another would have  $X(X-1)$  total interdependencies, a function geometrically increasing in  $X$ .

tion aligned with the traditional perspective on learning (Kauffman, 1995; Rapping, 1965; Thompson, 2001), which consistently documents diminishing returns to learning with increasing experience. That said, we make a distinct argument consistent with the view of strategic foresight as the ability to anticipate interdependencies and following from assumptions in recent literature characterizing the associated mental models.

At an individual level, boundedly rational entrepreneurs are only able to consider a finite subset of interdependencies (Csaszar, 2018; Hallen & Pahnke, 2016; Simon, 1955). However, vast layers of interdependencies may need to be considered to predict the true outcome (Brunswik, 1952; Simon, 1955). The numerous permutations of possible interdependencies make it difficult for entrepreneurs to accurately (and often even satisfactorily) anticipate the actual system of interdependencies (Townsend et al., 2018).

Due to bounded rationality, entrepreneurs operating in complex systems rely on simplified mental models that only account for a subset of the total interdependencies. Describing this simplification process, Eisenhardt & Bingham (2017) detail entrepreneurs' use of simple models, Csaszar (2018) compares different simplified representations of complexity, and Gavetti (2012) outlines the necessity of associative thinking. Although the frameworks proposed in these studies make some distinctions about the precise mechanisms and implications of a simplified mental model, the broad consensus of this work is that, due to bounded rationality, entrepreneurs tend towards simplifying the system of interdependencies in making judgments. By definition, these simplified models are incomplete. Furthermore, due to the cognitive constraints on the number of interdependencies a boundedly rational entrepreneur is able to consider (Simon, 1990, 1969), these models will be less complete in more complex systems. As entrepreneurs implement increasingly complex successive projects, the portion of the total interdependencies the boundedly rational entrepreneur is able to foresee decreases. In other words, expanding the total number of interdependencies increasingly penalizes the accuracy of an entrepreneur's strategic foresight. This penalty can be particularly acute for organizational interdependencies (Hannan et al., 2003); the entrepreneur generally has less visibility and less learned expertise about organizational processes (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000; Sommer & Loch, 2004), as opposed to the interdependencies within

the product itself.

In summary, our conceptual model as illustrated in Figure 1 distinguishes between two opposing channels of learning from entrepreneurial experience across projects affecting the ratio of unforeseen to foreseen interdependencies. If unforeseen interdependencies increase relative to foreseen interdependencies, strategic foresight becomes increasingly impaired. Experience leads entrepreneurs to learn about the system of interdependencies related to their experience, which could improve the entrepreneur’s strategic foresight by increasing the number of foreseen interdependencies. However, experience also leads entrepreneurs to learn about new opportunities to add features, which introduce new interdependencies that increase the total number of interdependencies in a project. We argue that the latter effect dominates the former: when the learning curve representing foreseen interdependencies does not keep up with that increase in complexity—i.e., when the project complexity curve is steeper than the learning curve—an entrepreneur ultimately faces an increasing number of unforeseen interdependencies. The expected net effect is that the strategic foresight of entrepreneurs becomes increasingly impaired with increased experience across projects.

### **3 Hypothesis Development**

From this conceptual viewpoint, we now develop a series of hypotheses situated in our empirical context: hardware technology entrepreneurs engaging in product crowdfunding on Kickstarter. In particular, we consider entrepreneurs serially crowdfunding across multiple distinct projects of the same subtype. Keeping as many characteristics fixed as possible across projects should, in principle, keep experience gained on a past project relevant to the next project, which is ideal for reaping the benefits of learning (Cassar, 2014; Dencker & Gruber, 2015; Eesley & Roberts, 2012; Eggers & Song, 2015; Toft-Kehler et al., 2014). In other words, we seek to maximize the potential for learning from past projects to improve predictive ability by studying entrepreneurs who stay close to their past project experience.

The predictions that crowdfunding entrepreneurs make serve as plausible proxies for assessing strategic foresight. In general, strategic foresight requires deciding between options which, in turn, necessarily requires making strategic predictions about each specific option.

For example, [Csaszar & Laureiro-Martínez \(2018\)](#) measure strategic foresight by comparing strategic predictions about distinct opportunities. Instead of evaluating strategic foresight by ex post assessing entrepreneurs on their ex ante choice across distinct alternatives, we focus on entrepreneurs as they ex ante make predictions on a single project and ex post assess whether those predictions were accurate or not. By intentionally focusing our empirical design in this way, we gain greater visibility towards more granular aspects of strategic foresight, enabling more precise empirical study.

On most platforms for product crowdfunding, including our empirical context of Kickstarter, entrepreneurs are ex ante required to make public predictions about the product specification they will produce and the date on which they will deliver that product. These predictions are fixed at the start of the fundraising window and cannot be changed after the fact. Predicting the product specification they will deliver and the date on which they will deliver it captures knowledge the entrepreneur has about future interdependencies she believes are relevant to the project. The crowdfunding setting also fixes several key aspects of strategic foresight, which is helpful for identification. For example, the platform standardizes the point from which each entrepreneur makes predictions—by requiring a working prototype prior to fundraising ([Kickstarter PBC, 2020](#))—as well as the method of solicitation and communication. Given these structural advantages, prior work by [Csaszar & Laureiro-Martínez \(2018\)](#) use the crowdfunding setting to measure the strategic foresight of the investor. We now use this same setting to measure the strategic foresight of the entrepreneur.

In order to validate our aggregate empirical patterns and understand micro-mechanisms that might be at play, we conduct a program of qualitative interviews with 11 entrepreneurs from our sample. Appendix Section [A.1](#) describes our qualitative interview process. We weave in qualitative findings from these interviews into our hypothesis development purely for context and clarity. These examples and anecdotes are not intended as empirical proof for the theory, but as transparent illustrations of the logic underlying the theoretical mechanisms.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup>We intend for the theory and hypotheses to arise from conventional deductive arguments, which we then ground in our specific context using examples and quotes from the qualitative interviews, rather than using the qualitative evidence as a basis for inductive theory development.

### 3.1 Increasing Unforeseen Interdependencies

Based on the above theorizing, we predict that as entrepreneurs gain experience across projects, they suffer from an increasing number of unforeseen interdependencies. Consistent with [Brunswik \(1952\)](#) and [Csaszar & Laureiro-Martínez \(2018\)](#), we define unforeseen interdependencies as the interdependencies that the entrepreneur does not consider in her mental model to generate a strategic prediction for a particular outcome, but that do play a role in determining the realized outcome. We theorize that as a boundedly rational entrepreneur gains experience and pursues projects with additional features, the gap increases between the total number of interdependencies in her actual project and the foreseeable interdependencies in her mental model.

Each time an entrepreneur executes a project, she gains experience designing, prototyping, manufacturing, and delivering a product. Consider an entrepreneur repeatedly executing the exact same project with the same set of tasks and interdependencies again and again. We would expect her to learn as she observes unforeseen interdependencies that arise, allowing her to update her prior beliefs about the set of interdependencies for the next related pursuit ([Raveendran et al., 2020](#)). Under this scenario, experience improves strategic foresight. Consider the case of MaskCo, founded by two friends, which creates sound-reactive LED masks. In 2015, MaskCo launched its first mask project on Kickstarter: a jaguar design outlined by basic LED strips. On its initial project, MaskCo experienced production delays due to unforeseen manufacturing challenges. However, if MaskCo continues to produce this exact same mask again and again, we would not expect it to continue to suffer delays from the same unexpected manufacturing challenges. Rather, we would expect the number of unforeseen interdependencies to decrease.

However, this is not the case. As discussed previously, the total number of interdependencies in a subsequent project increases relative to the previous project when an entrepreneur implements new features discovered while executing past projects, both through exposure to new information about customers and the market as well as through discovering new ways of combining pre-existing knowledge. In the example of MaskCo, the initial

Kickstarter experience exposed MaskCo to additional opportunities to innovate based on consumer feedback suggesting demand for additional design options, leading MaskCo to add a host of new design options—including an owl, wolf, fox, skull, robot, wildcat, and even a version with President Obama’s face—on its subsequent project. The MaskCo entrepreneur also discovered new ways of combining pre-existing knowledge: the initial mask would only light up in response to sound, but the entrepreneur deduced that it would be valuable to have pre-programmed light patterns so the mask could also light up without sound.

Each new feature added interacts with some or many of the tasks and components required to complete the prior project, thus introducing additional new interdependencies with each new feature added (Townsend et al., 2018). But when an entrepreneur makes predictions about this more complex product specification and the timeline on which she will deliver it, we theorize that the boundedly rational entrepreneur may do so with an incomplete view of the interdependencies that might arise. Thus, if new features added to a subsequent project increase the total number of project interdependencies in excess of the foreseen interdependencies gained through boundedly rational learning on prior projects, the number of unforeseen interdependencies will increase on each subsequent project.

**Hypothesis 1** *As entrepreneurs gain experience from past projects, they encounter an increasing number of unforeseen interdependencies on their next project.*

To illustrate this hypothesis in context, we continue with the example of MaskCo and highlight the seemingly small choice to introduce packaging to the company’s subsequent project. Adding packaging to a product that is even otherwise the same introduces significant complexity given all the ways the new packaging is interdependent with the existing production tasks. This addition required MaskCo to arrange for the packaging to occur at a separate plant, which necessitated coordinating shipping between the plants and hiring a contractor to facilitate communication in a different language between the manufacturer and the packaging plant. Then, when the quality of the first finished batch was poor, correcting the problem was more costly given the additional interdependency of the finished product with packaging. Going back through the whole process to correct the problem and



then repackage cost MaskCo an additional month. Then, the new packaging meant that the finished products could no longer be shipped by the shipping company used previously, so MaskCo ultimately had to move all the stock to a different warehouse for shipment.

Our interviewees repeatedly emphasized unexpected organizational issues that came up during execution. Given Kickstarter’s requirement to have a working prototype before fundraising, many if not most of the interdependencies intrinsic to the product itself were already known prior to launching the project. However, “the prototypes are all hand made—they’re more of a unique product that has more time put into it—but when you’re doing production, you’re not spending that much time on every single unit. You’re doing large volume. That’s where we end up having problems” (GPSCo CEO). Another entrepreneur shared, “our [second product] was more complicated because organizing all the different sourcing was a lot more difficult. For [the first product], it was basically, ‘go to one supplier and then just put in an order.’ But with [the second product], there was a lot of back and forth with a bunch of different suppliers” (CircuitsCo CEO). Indeed, the MaskCo entrepreneur noted that the ultimate set of steps required to add packaging involved “things [he] never thought about” in working with other organizations.

### **3.2 Strategic Foresight as Multiple Predictions**

We now turn to how entrepreneurs respond when they encounter unforeseen interdependencies that conflict with the strategic foresight of their initial predictions. As a starting premise, we characterize strategic foresight as a set of multiple predictions.<sup>7</sup> When we suggest in our theory that entrepreneurs make increasingly inaccurate or infeasible predictions on each subsequent project, we mean that with respect to the aggregate of all the entrepreneur’s predictions that comprise their strategic foresight as a whole. The individual predictions are fundamentally connected: entrepreneurs have the choice to absorb the inaccuracy in one prediction while satisfying another prediction.

It is important to discuss predictions in context because strategic foresight in different

---

<sup>7</sup>In our context, entrepreneurs make forward-looking predictions which serve a distinct purpose and arise differently from goals. Goals are more aspirational, and meeting them or not is indirectly associated with final performance. Goals seek to motivate individuals and organizations to increase productivity and performance, to stretch beyond what they would accomplish otherwise, or to create a common vision (Corngnet et al., 2015; Osterloh & Frey, 2000).

contexts comprises different dimensions on which entrepreneurs make predictions. Crowdfunding entrepreneurs make two important, and readily observable, predictions: product specification and delivery date.<sup>8</sup> Entrepreneurs make these predictions publicly to prospective customers who finance a project on the possibility that they will receive the specified product by the specified date. Based on our qualitative interviews, we find that entrepreneurs make these predictions first by detailing an anticipated product specification, and then defining a timeline by breaking the production process down into concrete interdependent tasks, predicting the timeline for each task, and aggregating those timelines. In most cases, entrepreneurs also try to be conservative by adding some buffer time to their overall timeline.<sup>9</sup>

Product specification and delivery date are connected in such a way that the prediction relative to one can be met at the expense of the other. For example, if an entrepreneur makes an inaccurate delivery date prediction, she could still choose to meet the delivery date prediction by delivering a product that fails to meet the product specification (and vice versa).<sup>10</sup> In principle, an entrepreneur could choose to prioritize a predicted timeline by allocating a fixed amount of time to a project, even if the predicted product specification is not fully achieved, so she can move on to other activities.

### 3.3 Prioritizing Product Specification Over Delivery Date

However, we argue that entrepreneurs in the crowdfunding context—and perhaps many in other settings—prioritize achieving the predicted project specification rather than adhere to

---

<sup>8</sup>In the product crowdfunding context, the amount of time to deliver a product is the key costly resource consumed by the entrepreneur. Because the entrepreneur in principle raises the financial capital needed to deliver a product as part of the campaign itself, the only remaining resource that is not already realized *ex ante* is time. In principle, an entrepreneur can under-predict the amount of money she needs to (profitably) deliver on the product in a campaign, which in this context would leave her underfunded. We cannot observe whether or not an entrepreneur does this, but absent other financing sources, we presume that underfunding a project could observably affect whether an entrepreneur delivers on the predicted product specification and delivery date. Thus, time can be predicted incorrectly. On the other hand, financial resources, in a reductive sense, mechanically cannot be incorrectly predicted in an observable way: the entrepreneur cannot raise additional funds from the backers *ex post*. Our empirical analyses control for external equity financing, and it is unlikely that most entrepreneurs in our sample would be able to raise substantial debt financing given the lack of reliable cash flows to serve as collateral.

<sup>9</sup>Appendix Section A.3 elaborates on this prediction process for hardware technology projects and provides qualitative context from entrepreneur interviews.

<sup>10</sup>Never delivering a product would be an asymptotic combination of these two ways of missing a prediction, i.e., delivering a product of zero value with an infinite delay. We exclude this situation from our empirical analysis because this situation is rare and some potentially substantial number of those situations involve fraud by the entrepreneur (Mollick, 2015).

the initially predicted delivery date. In other words, given inaccurate strategic foresight, most entrepreneurs tend to continue working towards achieving a predicted product specification, even if it requires going beyond the delivery date they originally predicted. This tendency to prioritize achieving product specification over deadline follows if an entrepreneur holds certain beliefs about customer preferences and the resulting consequences of achieving (or not) either predicted dimension. While there are meaningful consequences for delay,<sup>11</sup> these consequences are overshadowed by both the negative consequences of failing to deliver the specified product as well as the positive benefits of succeeding in doing so. If a customer receives a product below the promised specification, this can cause severe reputational damage to the entrepreneur. However, delivering a product as specified (even a delayed product) can still lead to brand-building testimonials and organic growth. Additionally, succeeding in delivering the specified product allows an entrepreneur to get feedback on her actual intended product specification which she can then use to develop future projects.

When inaccurate strategic foresight leads to unforeseen interdependencies that make it impractical to achieve both initial predictions, entrepreneurs can choose which prediction they will ultimately prioritize and achieve and which to relegate and fail to address. We argue that most entrepreneurs prioritize achieving the predicted product specification over the predicted delivery date. As a result, as entrepreneurs gain experience implementing projects and encounter an increasing number of unforeseen interdependencies on subsequent projects, we expect achieving their predicted product specification requires failing to achieve their predicted timeline by increasing margins. This will manifest in increasing delays.

**Hypothesis 2** *As entrepreneurs gain experience from past projects, they fail to achieve their predicted delivery date on their next project by a wider margin.*

Without exception, our interviews with crowdfunding entrepreneurs confirm this tendency to achieve their predicted product specification at the expense of their predicted delivery date. One explained, “At the end of the day, you have to make the decision: Do I want to ship a product that we don’t feel meets the needs of the customer just to be able

---

<sup>11</sup>Appendix Section [A.10](#) expounds and quantifies these consequences of delay.

to ship it and be done with it? Or do we want to delay and end up shipping a quality product? I always want to ship a quality product” (GPSCo CEO). Another entrepreneur believed that “consumers can delay gratification for something better” (TabletCo CEO). To put it another way, “We wanted to first be able to deliver the highest-quality parts we could, and then second to do as best we can to deliver them on time. If we had to suffer on the cost side, we would do that within reason” (3DPrintCo CEO).

We observe this tendency in both the LEGO brick and MaskCo entrepreneurs mentioned previously. The LEGO brick entrepreneur referenced in the introduction could have decided to deliver a product on the predicted delivery date that did not perform the predicted function of interfacing with LEGO sensors. Similarly, the MaskCo entrepreneur could have delivered a mask in whatever state it was in (perhaps without packaging) by the predicted delivery date. However, both entrepreneurs chose to delay in order to continue striving to meet the predicted product specification. The discussion highlights other prominent examples where entrepreneurs—like Elon Musk of Tesla—exhibit this tendency to spend more time working towards their predicted product specification rather than adjusting their product specification to meet the predicted allocation of time resources.

## 4 Empirical Methods

### 4.1 Context

In order to test these hypotheses, we need a sample of entrepreneurs who complete multiple projects over time with clearly defined markers for experience, complexity, predictions, and outcomes. The crowdfunding platform Kickstarter provides an ideal setting that meets these criteria. Kickstarter, founded in 2009, is a popular crowdfunding platform that connects entrepreneurs to customers. Customers pre-purchase specific products that the entrepreneurs promise to deliver by a future date. This fundraising process requires Kickstarter entrepreneurs to provide several predictions, including the features and qualities of the product they will produce and the timeline on which they will deliver the product. This setting allows us to identify metrics to capture each of the characteristics and outcomes of interest outlined in our hypotheses. Figure 2 provides specific examples of these metrics

using the series of projects implemented by one of the entrepreneurs in our sample.

— INSERT FIGURE 2 EXAMPLE PROJECT SERIES. —

Using Kickstarter projects favorably standardizes several characteristics. All hardware technology projects are required to have a working prototype before they can raise capital, helping to reduce some of the variation in the starting point of new projects (Kickstarter PBC, 2020). The crowdfunded capital then funds the manufacturing and distribution of the product at scale. In addition, the platform is all-or-nothing, meaning that if the project does not reach the target financing level, the pledges are refunded to the customers and the entrepreneur does not receive any capital. As a result, we can assume that the entrepreneurs have sufficient financial resources to deliver the product relative to their expectations.

While some associate Kickstarter with fun trinkets and board games, our study focuses on manufactured hardware technology, the most complex products on Kickstarter and among the most complex that an entrepreneur could generally pursue.<sup>12</sup> First, the value of these products hinges on the entrepreneur precisely and accurately addressing a large number of interdependencies. If a wire is cut a nanometer too short, it may not connect the necessary circuits for the product to function. In contrast, if the pair of dice in a board game is produced a nanometer smaller than planned, it has virtually no impact on the other pieces of the game. Second, modern manufacturing requires an international supply chain with multiple suppliers from different organizations, e.g., distinct suppliers for all the parts, assembly, packaging, and international shipping.<sup>13</sup>

## 4.2 Data and Sample

We construct a sample of Kickstarter entrepreneurs who complete multiple projects of the same project subtype. We collect basic project data and characteristics for all Kickstarter projects from Web Robots, which runs a monthly scrape of all past and present Kickstarter projects. We identify the 394 entrepreneurs with two or more projects that met the fundraising goal in one of the main project subtypes in the hardware technology space (i.e., gadgets,

---

<sup>12</sup>Appendix Section A.2 details the high and increasing degree of complexity in crowdfunded hardware technology products.

<sup>13</sup>Appendix Section A.3 further expounds the complexity inherent in this context as well as the implications of that complexity for the prediction process.

3D printing, hardware, camera equipment, sound, DIY electronics, wearables, robots, and fabrication tools) with predicted delivery dates prior to the date of our analysis. We look specifically at entrepreneurs with multiple projects that meet the fundraising target because they gain execution experience from actually having to produce and deliver these projects. In order to maximize the potential impact of learning, we further segment our sample to the entrepreneurs who specialize in one of the selected project subtypes, refining our sample to 326 entrepreneurs.<sup>14</sup> After reviewing each entrepreneur’s profile, we also exclude 12 entrepreneurs whose circumstances are disqualifying (e.g., a large, established company launches the campaign) or where it is apparent we have incomplete data (e.g., the entrepreneur is clearly doing many other projects outside of Kickstarter, in which case our data set does not contain data on much of their experience and learning process).

These criteria result in a final sample of 314 entrepreneurs who created 722 projects from September 2010 through June 2019. For each of these projects, we scrape comprehensive information from its Kickstarter pages, including the project story and potential risks and challenges posted by the entrepreneur, the most recent 100 comments, and all project updates posted by the entrepreneur. Each project has one or more rewards that backers can purchase. We scrape data for all the rewards of each project, including the reward price, description, predicted delivery date, and number of backers. A couple of variables of interest were manually collected: actual delivery time and number of features. The manual data collection process is described in the subsequent section. In addition, we link Kickstarter entrepreneurs with their Crunchbase profiles to collect information on external funding from all sources over time as a control for time-varying entrepreneur quality.<sup>15</sup>

## 4.3 Variables

### 4.3.1 Dependent Variables: Features and Unforeseen Interdependencies

As a starting point, we define a set of measures to test the basic assumption leading into Hypothesis 1: entrepreneurs pursue increasingly complex projects, i.e., projects with greater

---

<sup>14</sup>While an entrepreneur could intentionally shift to a product subtype “distant” from her prior experience (e.g., [Eggers & Song, 2015](#)), this possibility falls outside the scope of this study.

<sup>15</sup>Appendix Section [A.4](#) provides additional detail about the data collection and aggregation process across these data sources.

total interdependencies. An ideal measure would exactly measure the total interdependencies in a predicted project, but this is impossible to identify based on the public information available since we cannot see inside the product or organization. Instead, we identify a product’s level of features relative to the other product(s) by the same entrepreneur. We hired five independent reviewers to rank each entrepreneur’s set of products by number of features and then aggregated the rankings for each product across reviewers.<sup>16</sup> Specifically, we hired individuals with relevant educational and professional experience—backgrounds in computer programming, mechanical engineering, and robotics—from a broad set of backgrounds, e.g., gender and age. The following measures are intended to at least roughly correlate positively with the total interdependencies in a planned project.

**Features Most** *Features Most* is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the product has the most features compared to the other products by the same entrepreneur (and 0 otherwise).

**Features Rank** *Features Rank* is the relative rank of the product compared to other products by the same entrepreneur, e.g., if an entrepreneur completed two products, the product with the fewest features would have a *Features Rank* of 1 and the product with the most features would have a *Features Rank* of 2.

**Features Percentile** *Features Percentile* specifies the relative percentile of a project for an entrepreneur, e.g., if an entrepreneur had three projects with *Features Rank* equal to 1, 2, and 3, the corresponding *Features Percentile* would be 0%, 50%, and 100%, respectively.

**Unforeseen Interdependencies** We then construct a measure of unforeseen interdependencies in a direct test of Hypothesis 1. *Unforeseen Interdependencies* is the total number of updates posted by the entrepreneur during project execution—after the fundraising campaign has ended and before the product is delivered—that cite unforeseen interdependencies. A member of our research team reviewed the most common words contained in updates relevant to unforeseen interdependencies. They identified two categories of relevant words. The first set relate to issues being unforeseen, which includes the words (or any variants): unforeseen, unexpected, and unanticipated. The second set relate to typical

---

<sup>16</sup>Appendix Section A.4 provides additional details on the background of each reviewer as well as the ranking and aggregation process.

interdependence-related issues that come up in our context, which includes the words (or any variants): manufacturing, production, assembly, and factory. When defining *Unforeseen Interdependencies*, we include all updates that contain words from either set.<sup>17</sup>

### 4.3.2 Dependent Variables: Delivery Time Metrics

**Delay Indicator** If the actual delivery date is after the predicted delivery date or if the project has not yet shipped and the predicted delivery date is prior to the date we collected our sample, *Delay Indicator* is set equal to 1 (and 0 otherwise). We identify *Delay Indicator* for 95% of projects in our sample.

**Delay Duration** *Delay Duration* is the time (in days) between the actual delivery date and the predicted delivery date. We identify the delay for 89% of our sample; for comparison, Mollick (2014) identifies outcomes for 81% of his sample.

**Predicted Time** To test whether *Delay Duration* is driven by more aggressive predictions versus missing static predictions by wider margins, we define *Predicted Time* as the time (in days) between the end of the fundraising campaign and the predicted delivery date.

**Actual Time** *Actual Time* is the time (in days) between the end of the fundraising campaign and the actual delivery date, i.e., sum of *Predicted Time* and *Delay Duration*.

### 4.3.3 Main Independent Variable: Project Experience

The main independent variable *Project Experience* measures an entrepreneur’s total execution experience as her number of projects prior to and of the same subtype as her current project. We only count projects that meet the funding threshold because they provide the entrepreneur with execution experience that exposes her to project interdependencies.

### 4.3.4 Control Variables

Entrepreneur fixed effects control for any time-invariant variation among entrepreneurs in our sample, so we add additional controls for other types of entrepreneur experience characteristics that may change over time, as well as project-specific characteristics.

We control for other types of entrepreneurial experience with executed *projects* (that meet the funding threshold) and attempts at funding *campaigns* (most of which become

---

<sup>17</sup>The main findings hold when running the analysis separately for either word set.



projects). Given the potential impact of fundraising failure on entrepreneur behavior,<sup>18</sup> *Failed Campaign Experience* is the cumulative count of Kickstarter crowdfunding campaigns of the same product subtype conducted by the entrepreneur where those campaigns did not reach their funding threshold.<sup>19</sup> In a similar vein, to account for the degree and direction of deviation from the funding threshold, *Prior Campaign Funding Deviation* is the percentage by which the entrepreneur’s prior campaign exceeded (or missed) the funding threshold. Another way past performance could impact an entrepreneur’s behavior on subsequent projects is the number of days by which the entrepreneur missed (or beat) their predicted timeline on the past project. *Prior Project Delay* is the entrepreneur’s prior project’s *Delay Duration* divided by *Predicted Time*.

We also include controls for changes in the entrepreneur’s circumstance over time. Simultaneous execution of multiple projects could impact performance as compared to projects that are the sole focus of an entrepreneur. *Execution Overlap* is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the execution start date of the current project comes before the execution completion date of the prior project (and 0 otherwise).<sup>20</sup> To control for changes in entrepreneur quality over time, we use Crunchbase data and define *External Funding* as a binary indicator of whether the entrepreneur had raised venture capital funding prior to launching the current project. To account for the impact of switching industries documented by [Eggers & Song \(2015\)](#), among others, we define *New Category* as a time-variant binary indicator of whether the project immediately prior to the current project was of a different subtype. We also control for general experience and learning that may accrue to the entrepreneur naturally over time and separate from project execution, with *Elapsed Time* defined as the number of

---

<sup>18</sup>Compared to the average 70.9% failure rate of technology Kickstarter projects, only 10.5% of the campaigns attempted by the entrepreneurs in our sample failed to reach their funding threshold. This is likely driven by key differences between the serial-project entrepreneurs in our sample who generally treat their projects as full-time jobs and the average person who casually launches a project more as a hobby.

<sup>19</sup>*Project Experience* plus *Failed Campaign Experience* is the total number of Kickstarter campaigns of the specific product subtype that the entrepreneur had launched; including both of these variables together also controls for the total number of campaigns in aggregate, which would be collinear.

<sup>20</sup>We look at overlap in execution rather than fundraising given that executing a project takes substantial time and other resources. This overlap only occurs in 4.7% of our sample (34 out of the 722 projects). This makes sense given that the entrepreneurs interviewed noted that executing even a single project is a full-time job for most people. In addition, many of the ideas for subsequent projects come through executing past projects, so it makes sense that the projects would generally be sequential rather than concurrent.

days since the entrepreneur launched her first successful project of the same subtype as the current project. *Baseline Updates* is the total number of updates posted prior to the end of the fundraising campaign, which allows us to control for the entrepreneur’s time-variant propensity to post updates across projects.

We also control for project characteristics determined ex ante to initiating the fundraising campaign. These variables control for whether heterogeneity in project characteristics account for heterogeneity in measured outcomes. *Funding Period* is the time (in days) that the project accepted contributions. This window is set before the fundraising campaign launches and cannot be changed after the fact. *Funding Reward Tiers* is the total number of rewards available for funding backers to purchase. *Funding Reward Size* is the median price of the rewards available for funding backers to purchase. *Funding Threshold* is the amount of money (in thousands of USD) the entrepreneur set out to raise. This amount is set at the start of the *campaign* and cannot be adjusted; all *projects* meet or exceed this threshold.

In addition, we control for project characteristics determined ex post after the fundraising period. We include these ex post controls in regressions where the dependent variable is realized after the fundraising period. *Funding Exceeded* is the amount of money (in thousands of USD) the project raised in excess of the *Funding Threshold*. This is an important control given that [Mollick \(2014\)](#) finds that the degree to which projects exceed the funding threshold is a predictor of delay. *Funding Backers* is the total number of people (in thousands) who contributed to the project.

#### 4.4 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 provides summary statistics.<sup>21</sup> To validate our measures, we compare our sample of 722 technology projects to the 843 technology projects in [Mollick \(2014\)](#): our sample has an average *Funding Threshold* of \$23,272 (versus \$21,177) and *Funding Period* of 33.34 day (versus 40.28 days). In addition, [Mollick \(2014\)](#) uses a similar manual process to collect actual delivery dates and identifies that “only 24.9% of projects delivered on time” (or 75.1% of projects are delayed). Our sample identifies a similar pattern, where 76.3% of projects delay.

---

<sup>21</sup>Appendix Section A.5 provides additional statistics and visualizations of variable distributions.

— INSERT TABLE 1 SUMMARY STATISTICS. —

Looking at the pairwise correlations between each of our independent variables in Table 2, we note the high correlation (0.748) between *Funding Exceeded* and *Funding Backers*. Given that, by construction, each new backer contributes additional funds to the project, this high correlation aligns with expectations. We re-run all regressions taking turns excluding each of these variables and do not see any meaningful changes to the results. In addition, there is a high correlation (0.697) between *Project Experience* and *Elapsed Time*. Again, this aligns with expectations given that each subsequent project occurs at a later time. All the results hold if we remove *Elapsed Time* and re-run all the regressions.

— INSERT TABLE 2 PAIRWISE CORRELATION MATRIX. —

Given their importance, Figure 3 visualizes the distributions of *Predicted Time* and *Actual Time*. The distribution of *Actual Time* is shifted and skewed to the right of the distribution of *Predicted Time*, of course because the vast majority of projects delay.

— INSERT FIGURE 3 DISTRIBUTION OF ACTUAL TIME AND PREDICTED TIME. —

#### 4.5 Statistical Model

We estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) models across all analyses. These models include many different fixed effects to control for several dimensions of otherwise unobserved heterogeneity that could correlate with the observed independent variables. Entrepreneur fixed effects control for time-invariant entrepreneur characteristics, such as natural talent, intelligence, work ethic, etc. Product subtype fixed effects absorb any heterogeneity between the various categories of projects, e.g., DIY electronics versus 3D printing. Month fixed effects control for seasonal cycles; for example, if projects that predict delivery dates in December are more likely to delay due to the holidays, month fixed effects would account for that seasonal heterogeneity. Year fixed effects control for any factors that change year to year but are common to all entrepreneurs who launch new projects in a given year. To account for potential correlation in the error term across projects by the same entrepreneur, we cluster robust standard errors at the entrepreneur level.

The models using the dependent variables *Features Most*, *Features Rank*, *Features Percentile*, and *Predicted Time*—determined ex ante to launching the fundraising campaign—

include only the controls for project characteristics that exist ex ante and exclude the control variables realized ex post, *Funding Exceeded* and *Funding Backers*.

## 5 Results

Hypothesis 1 predicts that, as entrepreneurs gain experience, they encounter an increasing number of unforeseen interdependencies. Before we look at this directly, we first validate a key assumption leading to this hypothesis: entrepreneurs make their project specification more complex as they gain experience. We examine this by looking at the relationship between *Project Experience* and three measures of how complicated the proposed project specification is in terms of its observable features. In the first three columns of Table 3, we find that *Features Most* ( $p = 0.047$ ), *Features Rank* ( $p = 0.000$ ), and *Features Percentile* ( $p = 0.016$ ) are all positively related to *Project Experience*.<sup>22</sup> Each subsequent project is 11.7% more likely to be the highest-ranked project in terms of number of features. The ranking of each subsequent project increases by an average of 0.37 in absolute terms or 13.8% on a percentile basis. If additional features increase the number of interdependencies, we posit that more experienced entrepreneurs take on projects with more total interdependencies.

— INSERT TABLE 3 COMPLEXITY AND UNFORESEEN INTERDEPENDENCIES. —

To explicitly test Hypothesis 1, we examine the effect of experience on the number of unforeseen interdependencies. In column 3 of Table 3, we find that *Unforeseen Interdependencies* ( $p \sim 0.000$ ) is positively related to *Project Experience*. On each subsequent project, entrepreneurs disclose encountering 1.3 additional unforeseen interdependencies. This increase in unforeseen interdependencies is consistent with our theory of decreasing prediction accuracy in increasingly complex systems when bounded rationality limits the learning that might attenuate unforeseen interdependencies.  $\ln$  *Unforeseen Interdependencies* ( $p = 0.002$ ) also positively associates with *Project Experience*. Each subsequent project increases unforeseen interdependencies by 21%.<sup>23</sup>

Hypothesis 2 suggests what entrepreneurs will do when they make inaccurate pre-

---

<sup>22</sup>For the binary indicator variable *Features Most*, the results hold when using a conditional fixed-effects logit model.

<sup>23</sup>Appendix Section A.6 shows there is a significant and positive relationship between increasing unforeseen interdependencies and increasing number of features.

dictions. Specifically, we hypothesize that as entrepreneurs gain experience and encounter increasing unforeseen interdependencies, they miss their predicted delivery date by wider margins. As outlined in Table 4, we find that *Project Experience* is positively related to *Delay Indicator* ( $p = 0.010$ ) and *Delay Duration* ( $p = 0.001$ ). As a baseline, with each additional project of experience, the entrepreneur is 11.9% more likely to be delayed. Regarding the magnitude of delay, with each additional project of experience, the average entrepreneur is delayed by an additional 39.6 days. Although *Delay Duration* measures the absolute difference between the entrepreneur’s actual and predicted timeline, it is also important to consider the difference on a percentage point basis to account for different predicted project lengths. We also find that *Project Experience* is positively related to *Delay Duration / Predicted Time* ( $p = 0.001$ ). With each additional project of experience the average entrepreneur is delayed by an additional 53.0% relative to her predicted time. Taken together, these findings suggest that, given increasing prediction inaccuracies, entrepreneurs choose to absorb these inaccuracies in the product timeline, leading to increasing delay.

— INSERT TABLE 4 DELIVERY AND DELAY. —

As important context for the above finding, column 4 of Table 4 shows that *Project Experience* positively associates with *Predicted Time* ( $p = 0.014$ ). On average, entrepreneurs increase their *Predicted Time* by 8.4 days on each subsequent project. This means that entrepreneurs are not becoming more delayed because they are setting shorter, more aggressive timelines. To the contrary, entrepreneurs give themselves more time on each subsequent project, seemingly anticipating some increase in complexity or adjusting for time they learned that they needed, yet they still miss the prediction by a wider margin. Finally, column 5 of Table 4 shows that *Project Experience* is positively related to *Actual Time* ( $p \sim 0.001$ ). On average, entrepreneurs increase their *Actual Time* by 46.4 days on each subsequent project.

To provide an intuitive illustration for interpreting the empirical findings, Figure 4 plots the relative trends of *Actual Time* and *Predicted Time* as the entrepreneur gains experience. Figure 4 plots coefficient estimates for an alternate non-parametric model of the relationship between experience and the dependent variables by including indicators

for project number instead of *Project Experience*.<sup>24</sup> This figure shows that the actual delivery time increases much more sharply relative to the predicted delivery time, with the gap between actual delivery time and predicted delivery time increasing as entrepreneurs gain experience. These empirical patterns are consistent with the theorized actual project complexity curve and learning curve, respectively, in Figure 1.

— INSERT FIGURE 4 ACTUAL TIME AND PREDICTED TIME WITH EXPERIENCE. —

## 5.1 Learning from Prior Project Delay

While *Prior Project Delay* primarily serves as a control variable in the main analyses, we find several statistically significant relationships of note. Recall that *Prior Project Delay* is the duration of the delay divided by predicted time on the prior project, so a value of 1 or 100% means a project was delayed by the same amount of time the entrepreneur predicted the project would take. First, *Prior Project Delay* is significant and negatively related to *Unforeseen Interdependencies* ( $p \sim 0.000$ ) and its logged value ( $p \sim 0.000$ ). Each increase in days delayed on the prior project equal to the predicted time on the prior project leads to 0.7 fewer unforeseen interdependencies on the current project.<sup>25</sup> *Prior Project Delay* is significant and positively related to *Predicted Time* ( $p \sim 0.024$ ). Each increase in days delayed on the prior project equal to the predicted time on the prior project leads to a 4.3 day increase in the predicted time on the current project, showing that entrepreneurs who experience delay give themselves more time on their current project. *Prior Project Delay* is significant and negatively related to *Delay Indicator* ( $p \sim 0.042$ ), *Delay Duration* ( $p \sim 0.020$ ), and *Actual Time* ( $p \sim 0.034$ ). Each increase in days delayed on the prior project equal to the predicted time on the prior project leads to a 4.2% decrease in the chance the entrepreneur is delayed on the current project, a 21.7 day decrease in delay on the current project, and a 19.7 day decrease in the actual delivery time of the current project.

Although we do not formally a priori theorize on the implications of *Prior Project Delay*, the observed patterns have important theoretical implications for this line of research. Based on these empirical findings, we propose two post hoc theoretical explanations. First,

<sup>24</sup>Appendix Section A.7 details how this figure was created, including the additional underlying regressions.

<sup>25</sup>For example, if the predicted time on the prior project is 45 days, then for every additional 45 days of delay on the prior project, the current project would have 0.7 fewer unforeseen interdependencies.

it may be the case that learning from a delay, which could be characterized as a failure in a past execution-related prediction, may be more salient to the entrepreneur. From our specific theoretical view, it could be the case that past delays—that come from not accounting for the full set of interdependencies in a prediction—make past unforeseen interdependencies more salient and memorable for the entrepreneur. The mental model of interdependencies she uses to make predictions on the next project would then better account for more of the total interdependencies she would face. Prior work identifies several patterns of entrepreneurs learning from failure of this form (Politis, 2005). Early work by Sitkin (1992) proposes that failure can be especially valuable for learning when the failure is: large enough to draw the attention of the entrepreneur; hard to predict; or able to stimulate the entrepreneur to try new ways of doing things. Indeed, a past delay is a notable experience that was hard to predict. On the entrepreneur’s next project, this experience can prompt the entrepreneur to account for a previously unforeseen interdependency or at least to give herself more time.

Second, an entrepreneur suffering from a past delay may gain a sense of the shape of the complexity curve that she faces. Based on the premise of our main theory, an entrepreneur in general cannot fully anticipate the full set of interdependencies she will face when she executes her next, more complex project. An underlying assumption here is that the entrepreneur cannot fully anticipate that she cannot fully anticipate the full set of interdependencies. However, through a past delay, perhaps she can learn to anticipate that she cannot fully anticipate the interdependencies. If she does not experience a delay on the prior project, she could still be left assuming that she can anticipate the interdependencies on subsequent projects. To operationalize this awareness that might come from past delay, the entrepreneur could faster-than-linearly build in more extra time into her timeline on subsequent projects. Based on our interviews, most entrepreneurs already try to build in this extra time, but clearly they do so insufficiently. Theoretically, the ideal padding process can be interpreted as an entrepreneur developing an intuitive sense for the shape of the project complexity curve that she faces: she could make predictions of interdependencies based on an extrapolation of the curve, rather than direct knowledge of the actual interdependencies she will face. This argument mirrors early work by Toffler (1985) and others that theorizes best

practices for strategic planning and that specifically warns against the pitfalls of straight-line thinking when extrapolating.

In many ways, this self-awareness of the faster-than-linear nature of complexity and her inability to directly anticipate the underlying interdependencies might be the ultimate lesson that can be learned through prior experience. To put this argument in more colloquial terms: we all face known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns. The interdependencies that an entrepreneur could face fall into these buckets. Learning from past delay could make an entrepreneur more aware that there are going to be unknown unknowns—making them into known unknowns—and to intuitively plan for those unknowns through extrapolation based on a higher level of intuition.

## 5.2 Supplemental Analyses

We empirically test for and rule out a number of potential alternative explanations that could lead to patterns similar to the main empirical findings or otherwise confound the estimates. First, performance feedback from success or failure on prior funding campaigns could generate an outcome–aspiration gap for the entrepreneur and affect prediction behavior on subsequent projects. Second, an entrepreneur may base predictions on the relative predictions made by her peers, e.g., predict delivery times that match the average as opposed to predicting how long she actually thinks it will take to deliver. Third, as an entrepreneur gains experience, she may learn that there are limited to no consequences to delaying and, as a result, not care as much about whether she misses the deadline on subsequent projects. In other words, she may learn that it is “acceptable” to miss deadlines, especially for more complex projects, which would affect the accuracy of her prediction if it was somehow valuable to promise an aggressive deadline known ex ante to be unrealistic. Fourth, if customers are more likely to fund projects that predict earlier delivery dates, an entrepreneur may be incentivized to overpromise and predict a delivery date that is sooner than her true predicted value. Fifth, higher-quality entrepreneurs may exit the sample when they gain sufficient experience, leaving increasingly lower-quality entrepreneurs in the sample at high levels of project experience. For example, higher-quality entrepreneurs may be able to raise external venture capital financing in lieu of crowdfunding and go to customers through another



channel (e.g., direct-to-consumer or retail). Sixth, entrepreneurs who experience a project with significant delay may leave the sample after they “learn their lesson,” resulting in a sample of entrepreneurs who disproportionately do not learn. In this scenario, the failure of missing a delivery time by a large margin could lead better-learning entrepreneurs to pursue an opportunity outside of crowdfunding or to quit altogether. We empirically test each of these alternative explanations and do not find evidence that these mechanisms drive the main results. The Appendix provides detailed descriptions of these supplemental analyses with full regression tables.<sup>26</sup>

## 6 Discussion and Conclusion

This study addresses how an entrepreneur’s execution experience affects the accuracy of predictions for a subsequent project. We theorize that as entrepreneurs gain experience, they learn about previously unforeseen interdependencies (which would increase the accuracy of subsequent predictions), but they also learn about new opportunities to innovate by implementing new features on a subsequent project, which introduces new, previously unencountered interdependencies (which would decrease the accuracy of subsequent predictions). When project complexity increases rapidly for a boundedly rational entrepreneur, we argue that the latter effect dominates the former, leading increasingly experienced entrepreneurs to make increasingly infeasible predictions. In our crowdfunding context, we show that entrepreneurs take on projects with an increasing number of features and encounter an increasing number of unforeseen interdependencies. When entrepreneurs make infeasible predictions, they prioritize achieving the predicted product specification over the predicted delivery date. In line with our conceptual model, we show that, on average, entrepreneurs miss their predicted timeline by nearly six additional weeks (on a percentage basis, by an additional 53.0% relative to their predicted timeline) on each subsequent project.<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup>In the order outlined here, the documentation for these analyses appears in Appendix Sections [A.8](#), [A.9](#), [A.10](#), [A.11](#), [A.12](#), and [A.13](#), respectively.

<sup>27</sup>Our findings are reminiscent of the conventional managerial wisdom embodied by the Peter Principle ([Peter & Hull, 1969](#)), often phrased as “Employees rise to their ‘level of incompetence’ in a hierarchy,” i.e., managers who are promoted due to success in a prior job are then confronted with managing a new set of responsibilities unrelated to what made them successful previously. One could summarize the findings of this study as, “Entrepreneurs rise to their ‘level of incompetence’ in strategic foresight,” i.e., entrepreneurs who succeed in making a product and then continue to add features and increase the complexity of

## 6.1 Bounded Rationality as an Impediment to Learning Under Complexity

Despite the extensive conceptual work on behavioral perspectives of the firm, there has been a limited degree of attention paid to how issues of cognition and bounded rationality might affect entrepreneurial learning and the ability of entrepreneurs to predict and plan for the future. Recent work highlights the broad value of taking this perspective in the study of entrepreneurship. For example, bounded rationality limits how entrepreneurs evaluate inventors (Hallen & Pahnke, 2016) and interact with mentors, customers, and other ventures (Cohen et al., 2019). More specific to the focus of this study, Eggers & Song (2015) demonstrate the value of applying a behavioral-theory-of-the-firm perspective to entrepreneurial learning; they apply attribution theory to show that entrepreneurs may incorrectly attribute the sources of past failure and success and come away with the wrong takeaways.

We consider another dimension of bounded rationality overlooked by past work on entrepreneurial learning: cognitive limitations in a complex environment with many interdependencies. In a review, Townsend et al. (2018) note that there has been sparse work on understanding entrepreneurship in a complex environment where the construct of “uncertainty has been stretched to try to address aspects of unknowingness that are better conceptualized as complexity” (p. 674). We seek to address this gap by taking a view that, for boundedly rational entrepreneurs, complexity presents a barrier to what can and cannot be learned. We assert that it is the cognitive limitation in accounting for complexity, rather than just uncertainty from a lack of available knowledge, that limits how much an entrepreneur can improve her ability to make predictions.

The nuanced cognitive mechanism we propose stands in contrast to the view of the extant literature that entrepreneurs’ prediction inaccuracies stem from a general characterization of entrepreneurs as being “overconfident.” Prior literature documents compelling evidence that entrepreneurial entrants make infeasible predictions about their own future performance, leading them to enter markets they should not (e.g., Artinger & Powell, 2016; Camerer & Lovo, 1999; Cassar, 2010; Chen et al., 2019; Forbes, 2005; Hayward et al., 2006;

---

that product, are required to manage systems of interdependencies which they have never encountered previously and which they are ill-equipped to manage.

Wu & Knott, 2006). This literature generally frames this observed pattern as a consequence of entrepreneurial overconfidence. However, we assert that bounded rationality may be a key antecedent to this overconfidence. Our view aligns with Hogarth & Karelaia (2012), whose simulation model shows how bounded rationality can lead to over-entry among both overconfident and underconfident entrepreneurs. While an entrepreneur’s lack of a full understanding of the complexity she faces may appear as overconfidence to an observer, cognitive limits on information likely account for at least some of the error in her predictions.

Our study documents empirical evidence for this nuanced characterization of entrepreneurs as facing a cognitive limitation around complexity rather than being generically overconfident. The entrepreneurs in our setting accumulate information through experience that should help address an overconfidence bias that stems from a lack of information. However, inconsistent with a basic overconfidence explanation, we show that entrepreneurs become less accurate as they accumulate knowledge from experience. We argue that experience drives expansion of the project pursued by the entrepreneur, which drives an increase in complexity that cannot be fully anticipated by a boundedly rational entrepreneur. While we show that bounded rationality plays a role in prediction inaccuracies, our arguments do not rule out the possibility that overconfidence still exists. Future research might establish boundary conditions by identifying and tracking a set of entrepreneurs who complete very high numbers of projects.

## **6.2 Serial-Product Entrepreneurship**

Within the last decade, product crowdfunding rose to prominence as one of the few channels by which nascent entrepreneurs, particularly those developing hardware products, can raise capital and access customers. Accordingly, a recent but extensive body of management scholarship recognizes both the importance of understanding this entrepreneurial phenomenon itself as well as the opportunity to leverage the unique properties of the empirical context to test organizational and strategy theory. With respect to this phenomenon, comparatively early studies document many of the unique aspects of this setting: geographic and social network effects (Agrawal et al., 2011), the comprehensive representation of both successes and failures (Mollick, 2014), and entrepreneur privacy (Burtch et al., 2015). More recent

studies demonstrate the opportunity to use the setting to study a variety of organizational and strategy theory: resource mobilization (Bapna & Ganco, 2020), legitimacy spillovers (Soublière & Gehman, 2020), slack time and innovation (Agrawal et al., 2018), and strategic choices and platform performance (Dushnitsky et al., 2020). Extending this body of work, this study puts forth the concept of serial-product entrepreneurship as a novel and distinct phenomenon, requiring distinct theory not addressed by prior studies of, or in the setting of, product crowdfunding. This setting provides a longitudinal way to study entrepreneurs as they advance from product to product.

We highlight the distinct role and implications of experience in the context of within-firm serial-product entrepreneurship. In contrast to the classical view of within-firm organizational experience and learning curves that apply to a specific product or process (e.g., Rapping, 1965; Thompson, 2001), serial-product entrepreneurship directly takes on the idea that products evolve and shift. In doing so, the firm can pursue a new value proposition that is somewhat or entirely different from the prior product. As a close relative of recent work characterizing serial entrepreneurship as across-firm learning for an individual entrepreneur (e.g., Eesley & Roberts, 2012; Eggers & Song, 2015; Paik, 2014), serial-product entrepreneurship allows knowledge, resources, and routines to be carried forward only within the same organization. For example, intellectual property and contractual relationships belong to the organization, rather than to the individual entrepreneur. Our study shows that firms carry over past organizational learning to pursue later products with additional features. The persistent and increasing delay we document may not be intentional or the result of inexperience but, rather, delay may be an inherent property of serial-product entrepreneurship.

We propose that serial-product entrepreneurship represents an important and distinct learning channel that warrants independent study. Thus, future studies should consider the implications of serial-product learning for other performance dimensions and in the context of different organizational forms, e.g., large vs. small firm, hierarchical vs. flat organization.

### **6.3 Strategic Foresight as Multiple Predictions**

Finally, this research represents one of the few empirical studies of the theoretical construct of strategic foresight. Recent work brings attention back to this essential component of

competitive advantage, but largely from a theoretical and qualitatively inductive perspective on its consequences (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017; Gavetti & Menon, 2016; Ott et al., 2017), with limited quantitative work unpacking its antecedents (cf. Csaszar, 2018; Csaszar & Laureiro-Martínez, 2018; Kapoor & Wilde, 2020). In our opinion, the antecedents are what matter most: strategic foresight is clearly a good thing in theory, but can one build strategic foresight? By examining strategic foresight over time, we respond to a call in the extant literature to go beyond a static view of strategic foresight and take a dynamic view (Csaszar, 2018; Ott et al., 2017).

To empirically study strategic foresight, we make a key advance with our explicit interpretation of strategic foresight as not just one prediction but the combination of a set of predictions. In contrast, the broader set of work on strategic decisions—and specific studies on foresight—focus on whether a manager or other actor can make a sole prediction or decision, e.g., enter into a market (Camerer & Lovo, 1999) or invest in a specific firm (Csaszar & Laureiro-Martínez, 2018). We argue that strategic planning must inherently invoke several predictions simultaneously, whether articulated or not, because the predictions depend on one other. Predicting a value proposition also entails predicting a cost structure for delivering that value proposition such that the aggregate strategy is viable.

At a general level, our findings suggest that as entrepreneurs gain experience across projects, their strategic predictions on a successive project will be less accurate, but that characterization would be far from a complete story. By studying value proposition (product specification), cost (time to deliver), and interdependencies (complexity) simultaneously, we gain several advantages that prior studies overlook. We show a trade-off among the aggregate predictions that comprise strategic foresight broadly. In our study, entrepreneurs pursue success in achieving the predicted product specification but at the cost of delivering their product on time. But that is a choice they made. In principle, the entrepreneur could deliver the product on time but at a lower value proposition than they originally predicted.

There are many high-profile examples of entrepreneurs prioritizing the delivery of an initially specified product over staying within the initially predicted timeline. In July 2017, Elon Musk promised Tesla would deliver 20,000 Model 3 cars in December of that

same year. However, Tesla only produced 2,425 cars the entire fourth quarter of 2017, falling short of Musk's prediction by 93%. Tesla eventually reached their predicted product specification, and even exceeded it reaching over 10,000 vehicles per week in 2018, but far behind the initially predicted timeline. Speaking of Tesla's tradeoff between delivering on predicted product specification versus timeline, Musk himself said, "It pretty much always happens, but not exactly on the time frame." As another example, the tendency to persist and achieve predicted product specification is also manifest in the large number of bridge financings that occur between formal venture capital financing rounds. As the name implies, these financings bridge the gap between the capital raised in the prior financing round and the capital it actually takes to achieve what the company predicted it would accomplish with the capital raised in the prior financing round. In other words, bridge financings occur when additional time and financial resources, in excess of what was initially predicted, are required to achieve the predicted product specification.

By considering several predictions simultaneously in a holistic view of strategic foresight, future research can provide more nuance in the ways in which entrepreneurs previously categorized one-dimensionally as failures (or successes) might actually have succeeded (or failed) along other overlooked dimensions. In doing so, we might show that some failures are driven by an intentional choice to succeed on other dimensions. By recognizing the multiple predictions inherent in strategic foresight and their relative prioritization, entrepreneurs and investors may be able to improve performance. For example, given that additional costs may be required to achieve a fixed product specification, especially as entrepreneurs gain experience from past projects and take on increasingly complex projects, future research could explore how entrepreneurs and investors can identify situations where adjusting the product specification may be preferable to accruing high costs or missing deadlines.

## References


- Agrawal, A. K., Catalini, C., & Goldfarb, A. (2011). The geography of crowdfunding. *NBER Working Paper*.
- Agrawal, A. K., Catalini, C., Goldfarb, A., & Luo, H. (2018). Slack time and innovation. *Organization Science*, 29(6), 1056–1073.
- Ahuja, G., Coff, R. W., & Lee, P. M. (2005). Managerial foresight and attempted rent appropriation: Insider trading on knowledge of imminent breakthroughs. *Strategic Management Journal*, 26(9), 791–808.
- Aldrich, H. & Ruef, M. (2006). *Organizations evolving*. London: SAGE Publications, 2nd edition.
- Alvarez, S. A. & Barney, J. B. (2007). Discovery and creation: Alternative theories of entrepreneurial action. *Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal*, 1(1), 11–26.
- Alvarez, S. A. & Barney, J. B. (2010). Entrepreneurship and epistemology: The philosophical underpinnings of the study of entrepreneurial opportunities. *Academy of Management Annals*, 4(1), 557–583.
- Anderson, P. (1999). Perspective: Complexity theory and organization science. *Organization Science*, 10(3), 216–232.
- Artinger, S. & Powell, T. C. (2016). Entrepreneurial failure: Statistical and psychological explanations. *Strategic Management Journal*, 37(6), 1047–1064.
- Baldwin, C. & Clark, K. (2000). *Design rules: The power of modularity*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Bapna, S. & Ganco, M. (2020). Does equity crowdfunding facilitate access to capital for user innovators: Evidence from a randomized field experiment. *SSRN Working Paper*.
- Barney, J. B. (1986). Strategic factor markets: Expectations, luck, and business strategy. *Management Science*, 32(10), 1231–1241.
- Barney, J. B. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. *Journal of Management*, 17(1), 99–120.
- Baron, R. A. & Ensley, M. D. (2006). Opportunity recognition as the detection of meaningful patterns: Evidence from comparisons of novice and experienced entrepreneurs. *Management Science*, 52(9), 1331–1344.
- Brunswik, E. (1952). *The conceptual framework of psychology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Burtch, G., Ghose, A., & Wattal, S. (2015). The hidden cost of accommodating crowdfunder privacy preferences: A randomized field experiment. *Management Science*, 61(5), 949–962.
- Camerer, C. & Lovallo, D. (1999). Overconfidence and excess entry: An experimental approach. *American Economic Review*, 89(1), 306–318.
- Cassar, G. (2010). Are individuals entering self-employment overly optimistic? An empirical test of plans and projections on nascent entrepreneur expectations. *Strategic Management Journal*, 31(8), 822–840.
- Cassar, G. (2014). Industry and startup experience on entrepreneur forecast performance in new firms. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 29(1), 137–151.
- Casti, J. (1994). *Complexification: Explaining a paradoxical world through the science of surprise*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Chen, J. S., Croson, D. C., Elfenbein, D. W., & Posen, H. E. (2019). The impact of learning and overconfidence on entrepreneurial entry and exit. *Organization Science*, 29(6), 989–1009.
- Cho, H. & Clough, D. (2015). ‘If at first you don’t succeed’: Learning and aspiration level adjustment in venture fundraising on Kickstarter. In *Academy of Management Annual Meeting Vancouver, Canada*.
- Cohen, S. L., Bingham, C. B., & Hallen, B. L. (2019). The role of accelerator designs in mitigating bounded rationality in new ventures. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 64(4), 810–854.
- Corgnet, B., Gómez-Miñambres, J., & Hernán-González, R. (2015). Goal setting and monetary

- incentives: When large stakes are not enough. *Management Science*, 61(12), 2926–2944.
- Csaszar, F. A. (2012). Organizational structure as a determinant of performance: Evidence from mutual funds. *Strategic Management Journal*, 33(6), 611–632.
- Csaszar, F. A. (2018). What makes a decision strategic? Strategic representations. *Strategy Science*, 3(4), 606–619.
- Csaszar, F. A. & Laureiro-Martínez, D. (2018). Individual and organizational antecedents of strategic foresight: A representational approach. *Strategy Science*, 3(3), 513–532.
- Daft, R. L. & Lewin, A. Y. (1990). Can organization studies begin to break out of the normal science straitjacket? An editorial essay. *Organization Science*, 1(1), 1–9.
- Delmar, F. & Shane, S. (2006). Does experience matter? The effect of founding team experience on the survival and sales of newly founded ventures. *Strategic Organization*, 4(3), 215–247.
- Dencker, J. C. & Gruber, M. (2015). The effects of opportunities and founder experience on new firm performance. *Strategic Management Journal*, 36(7), 1035–1052.
- Dencker, J. C., Gruber, M., & Shah, S. K. (2009). Pre-entry knowledge, learning, and the survival of new firms. *Organization Science*, 20(3), 516–537.
- Denrell, J., Fang, C., & Levinthal, D. A. (2004). From T-mazes to labyrinths: Learning from model-based feedback. *Management Science*, 50(10), 1366–1378.
- Dushnitsky, G., Piva, E., & Rossi-Lamastra, C. (2020). Investigating the mix of strategic choices and performance of transaction platforms: Evidence from the crowdfunding setting. *Strategic Management Journal*.
- Edmondson, A. C., Dillon, J. R., & Roloff, K. S. (2007). Three perspectives on team learning. *Academy of Management Annals*, 1(1), 269–314.
- Eesley, C. E. & Roberts, E. B. (2012). Are you experienced or are you talented?: When does innate talent versus experience explain entrepreneurial performance? *Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal*, 6(3), 207–219.
- Eggers, J. P. & Song, L. (2015). Dealing with failure: Serial entrepreneurs and the costs of changing industries between ventures. *Academy of Management Journal*, 58(6), 1785–1803.
- Eisenhardt, K. M. & Bingham, C. B. (2017). Superior strategy in entrepreneurial settings: Thinking, doing, and the logic of opportunity. *Strategy Science*, 2(4), 246–257.
- Ethiraj, S. K. (2007). Allocation of inventive effort in complex product systems. *Strategic Management Journal*, 28(6), 563–584.
- Ethiraj, S. K., Kale, P., Krishnan, M. S., & Singh, J. V. (2005). Where do capabilities come from and how do they matter? A study in the software services industry. *Strategic Management Journal*, 26(1), 25–45.
- Ethiraj, S. K. & Levinthal, D. (2009). Hoping for A to Z while rewarding only A: Complex organizations and multiple goals. *Organization Science*, 20(1), 4–21.
- Ethiraj, S. K. & Posen, H. E. (2014). Do product architectures affect innovation productivity in complex product ecosystems? In *Collaboration and competition in business ecosystems*, volume 30 of *Advances in Strategic Management* (pp. 127–166). Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing.
- Ethiraj, S. K., Ramasubbu, N., & Krishnan, M. S. (2012). Does complexity deter customer-focus? *Strategic Management Journal*, 33(2), 137–161.
- Forbes, D. P. (2005). Are some entrepreneurs more overconfident than others? *Journal of Business Venturing*, 20(5), 623–640.
- Gary, M. S. & Wood, R. E. (2011). Mental models, decision rules, and performance heterogeneity. *Strategic Management Journal*, 32(6), 569–594.
- Gavetti, G. (2012). Toward a behavioral theory of strategy. *Organization Science*, 23(1), 267–285.
- Gavetti, G. & Menon, A. (2016). Evolution cum agency: Toward a model of strategic foresight. *Strategy Science*, 1(3), 207–233.
- Gompers, P., Kovner, A., Lerner, J., & Scharfstein, D. (2010). Performance persistence in en-






- entrepreneurship. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 96(1), 18–32.
- Greve, H. R. (1998). Performance, aspirations, and risky organizational change. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 43(1), 58–86.
- Greve, H. R. (2003). A behavioral theory of R&D expenditures and innovations: Evidence from shipbuilding. *Academy of Management Journal*, 46(6), 685–702.
- Gruber, M., MacMillan, I. C., & Thompson, J. D. (2008). Look before you leap: Market opportunity identification in emerging technology firms. *Management Science*, 54(9), 1652–1665.
- Hallen, B. L. & Pahnke, E. C. (2016). When do entrepreneurs accurately evaluate venture capital firms' track records? A bounded rationality perspective. *Academy of Management Journal*, 59(5), 1535–1560.
- Hannan, M. T., Pólos, L., & Carroll, G. R. (2003). The fog of change: Opacity and asperity in organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 48(3), 399–432.
- Hayward, M. L., Shepherd, D. A., & Griffin, D. (2006). A hubris theory of entrepreneurship. *Management Science*, 52(2), 160–172.
- Heath, C. & Staudenmayer, N. (2000). Coordination neglect: How lay theories of organizing complicate coordination in organizations. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 22, 153–191.
- Hogarth, R. M. & Karelaia, N. (2012). Entrepreneurial success and failure: Confidence and fallible judgment. *Organization Science*, 23(6), 1733–1747.
- Hsu, D. H. (2007). Experienced entrepreneurial founders, organizational capital, and venture capital funding. *Research Policy*, 36(5), 722–741.
- Hsu, D. H. & Ziedonis, R. H. (2013). Resources as dual sources of advantage: Implications for valuing entrepreneurial-firm patents. *Strategic Management Journal*, 34(7), 761–781.
- Joseph, J. & Gaba, V. (2015). The fog of feedback: Ambiguity and firm responses to multiple aspiration levels. *Strategic Management Journal*, 36(13), 1960–1978.
- Kapoor, R. & Wilde, D. (2020). Peering into a crystal ball: Foresight during periods of industry change. *Wharton School Working Paper*.
- Kauffman, S. A. (1995). *At home in the universe*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kickstarter PBC (2020). *Our rules*. <https://www.kickstarter.com/rules>.
- Leiblein, M. J., Reuer, J. J., & Zenger, T. (2018). What makes a decision strategic? *Strategy Science*, 3(4), 558–573.
- Levinthal, D. A. (1997). Adaptation on rugged landscapes. *Management Science*, 43(7), 934–950.
- Levinthal, D. A. & March, J. G. (1993). The myopia of learning. *Strategic Management Journal*, 14(S2), 95–112.
- Lewis, K., Lange, D., & Gillis, L. (2005). Transactive memory systems, learning, and learning transfer. *Organization Science*, 16(6), 581–598.
- Minniti, M. & Bygrave, W. (2001). A dynamic model of entrepreneurial learning. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 25(3), 5–16.
- Mollick, E. (2014). The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 29(1), 1–16.
- Mollick, E. (2015). Delivery rates on Kickstarter. *SSRN Working Paper*.
- Nelson, R. R. & Winter, S. G. (2002). Evolutionary theorizing in economics. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 16(2), 23–46.
- Nickerson, J. & Argyres, N. (2018). Strategizing before strategic decision making. *Strategy Science*, 3(4), 592–605.
- Osterloh, M. & Frey, B. S. (2000). Motivation, knowledge transfer, and organizational forms. *Organization Science*, 11(5), 538–550.
- Ott, T. E., Eisenhardt, K. M., & Bingham, C. B. (2017). Strategy formation in entrepreneurial settings: Past insights and future directions. *Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal*, 11(3), 306–325.
- Paik, Y. (2014). Serial entrepreneurs and venture survival: Evidence from U.S. venture-capital-


- financed semiconductor firms. *Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal*, 8(3), 254–268.
- Peter, L. J. & Hull, R. (1969). *The Peter principle*. London: Souvenir Press.
- Pich, M. T., Loch, C. H., & Meyer, A. D. (2002). On uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity in project management. *Management Science*, 48(8), 1008–1023.
- Politis, D. (2005). The process of entrepreneurial learning: A conceptual framework. *Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice*, 29(4), 399–424.
- Porter, M. E. (1980). *Competitive strategy: Techniques for analyzing industries and competitors*. New York: Free Press.
- Rapping, L. (1965). Learning and World War II production functions. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 47(1), 81–86.
- Raveendran, M., Silvestri, L., & Gulati, R. (2020). The role of interdependence in the micro-foundations of organization design: Task, goal, and knowledge interdependence. *Academy of Management Annals*, 14(2), 828–868.
- Rivkin, J. W. (2000). Imitation of complex strategies. *Management Science*, 46(6), 824–844.
- Rivkin, J. W. & Siggelkow, N. (2003). Balancing search and stability: Interdependencies among elements of organizational design. *Management Science*, 49(3), 290–311.
- Shane, S. (2000). Prior knowledge and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. *Organization Science*, 11(4), 448–469.
- Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 69(1), 99–118.
- Simon, H. A. (1962). The architecture of complexity. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 106(6), 467–482.
- Simon, H. A. (1969). *The sciences of the artificial*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Simon, H. A. (1990). Invariants of human behavior. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 41(1), 1–20.
- Sitkin, S. B. (1992). Learning through failure: The strategy of small losses. In L. Cumming & B. Staw (Eds.), *Research in organizational behavior* (pp. 231–266). New York: JAI Press.
- Sommer, S. C. & Loch, C. H. (2004). Selectionism and learning in projects with complexity and unforeseeable uncertainty. *Management Science*, 50(10), 1334–1347.
- Soublière, J.-F. & Gehman, J. (2020). The legitimacy threshold revisited: How prior successes and failures spill over to other endeavors on Kickstarter. *Academy of Management Journal*, 63(2), 472–502.
- Stuart, R. W. & Abetti, P. A. (1990). Impact of entrepreneurial and management experience on early performance. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 5(3), 151–162.
- Talbot, F. B. (1982). Resource-constrained project scheduling with time-resource tradeoffs: The nonpreemptive case. *Management Science*, 28(10), 1197–1210.
- Thompson, P. (2001). How much did the Liberty shipbuilders learn? New evidence for an old case study. *Journal of Political Economy*, 109(1), 103–137.
- Toffler, A. (1985). *The adaptive corporation*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Toft-Kehler, R., Wennberg, K., & Kim, P. H. (2014). Practice makes perfect: Entrepreneurial-experience curves and venture performance. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 29(4), 453–470.
- Townsend, D. M., Hunt, R. A., McMullen, J. S., & Sarasvathy, S. D. (2018). Uncertainty, knowledge problems, and entrepreneurial action. *Academy of Management Annals*, 12(2), 659–687.
- Ulrich, K., Eppinger, S., & Yang, M. (2020). *Product design and development*. New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 7th edition.
- Van den Steen, E. (2016). A formal theory of strategy. *Management Science*, 63(8), 2616–2636.
- Venkataraman, S. (2003). Foreword. In S. Shane (Ed.), *A General Theory Of Entrepreneurship: The Individual-Opportunity Nexus* (pp. xi–xii). Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
- Wu, B. & Knott, A. M. (2006). Entrepreneurial risk and market entry. *Management Science*, 52(9), 1315–1330.




**Figure 1: Conceptual Model of Experience and Interdependencies.** The vertical axis *Interdependencies* represents the number of interdependencies. The horizontal axis *Experience* represents an entrepreneur’s level of project execution experience. The *Project Complexity* curve illustrates the total number of interdependencies in projects pursued by an entrepreneur at different levels of *Experience*. The shaded grey area reflects the range of possible *Project Complexity* curves: linear as a lower bound and geometric as an upper bound; the black dotted line illustrates one possible scenario. The *Learning* curve illustrates the total number of interdependencies foreseen (*Foreseen Interdependencies*) by an entrepreneur at different levels of *Experience*. As *Experience* increases, the gap between the *Learning* curve and the *Project Complexity* curve increases and, as a result, the ratio of *Unforeseen Interdependencies* to *Foreseen Interdependencies* also increases.

Name & Date	Image	Features Rank	Delay Duration	Delay Duration/ Predicted Time	Unforeseen Interdependencies
<b>Ringo</b> Feb 25, 2015		1 (Fewest)	66 Days	92%	“Our machine refused to pick up the programming ports... this programming port was just a bit [too] heavy.”
<b>Wink</b> Oct 28, 2015		2 (Middling)	73 Days	115%	“The testing procedure is taking longer than expected... finding a few units with bad motors.” “We ran out of motors and our replenishment shipment was held up.”
<b>Spirit Rover</b> Sept 28, 2016		3 (Most)	340 Days	254%	“Found two mistakes on the boards... fixed with an extra step on our end, but I should have known better on both of these.” “We finally found sources for all the screws, fasteners, washers, nuts, and spacers. I was surprised and unprepared at how difficult this part was going to be.”

**Figure 2: Example Products by Entrepreneur Over Time.** All projects by Plum Geek Robotics, founded by Kevin King, in the robotics subtype of the technology category. The Unforeseen Interdependencies column provides quotations from updates by the entrepreneur. All other variables mirror those defined in the paper.



**Figure 3: Density Plot of *Actual Time* and *Predicted Time*.** The distribution of *Actual Time* is shifted and skewed to the right compared to the distribution of *Predicted Time*. We adjust the bandwidth to smooth the distributions.



**Figure 4: *Actual Time* and *Predicted Time* with Experience.** Visual representation of the relative coefficients of the average actual time entrepreneurs take to deliver a product versus the average time the entrepreneurs predict it will take to deliver, with this relative relationship shown over time as entrepreneurs gain experience. Figure based on coefficient estimates from a non-parametric model detailed in Appendix Section A.7 that includes indicators for project number instead of *Project Experience*.

**Table 1: Summary Statistics.** 722 project-level observations. *Actual Time*, *Delay Duration*, and *Delay / Predicted Time* are based on 644 observations and *Delay Indicator* is based on 686 observations. *Funding Threshold (USD)*, *Funding Exceeded (USD)*, and *Funding Backers (count)* are all in thousands.

<b>Dependent Variables</b>	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Features Most	0.45	0.50	0	1
Features Rank	1.68	0.74	1	6
Features Percentile	0.50	0.48	0	1
Unforeseen Interdependencies	3.39	4.11	0	31
Delay Indicator	0.76	0.43	0	1
Delay Duration	70.72	114.84	-77	946.60
Predicted Time	90.48	52.97	5	414
Actual Time	159.25	142.81	10	1, 231.60
<b>Independent Variables</b>	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Project Experience	0.70	0.74	0	5
Failed Campaign Experience	0.10	0.36	0	4
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation	3.24	8.86	-1	86
Prior Project Delay	0.42	1.02	-1	11
Execution Overlap	0.05	0.21	0	1
External Financing	0.09	0.29	0	1
New Category	0.03	0.17	0	1
Elapsed Time	322.72	426.76	0	2, 458
Baseline Updates	6.73	5.12	0	40
Funding Period	33.34	10.02	2	60
Funding Reward Tiers	9.72	5.07	1	34
Funding Reward Size	234.83	493.38	4	5, 995
Funding Threshold	23.27	31.40	0.02	261.96
Funding Exceeded	102.54	273.62	0	3, 351.36
Funding Backers	0.95	2.19	0.001	28.14

**Table 2: Pairwise Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables.**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
(1) Project Experience	1														
(2) Failed Campaign Experience	0.173	1													
(3) Prior Campaign Funding Deviation	0.251	-0.059	1												
(4) Prior Project Delay	0.306	0.009	0.162	1											
(5) Execution Overlap	0.161	0.027	0.008	0.129	1										
(6) External Financing	-0.004	-0.091	0.124	0.036	-0.026	1									
(7) New Category	-0.036	-0.006	0.063	0.001	-0.001	-0.001	1								
(8) Elapsed Time	0.697	0.064	0.241	0.334	-0.049	0.124	0.001	1							
(9) Baseline Updates	-0.172	-0.156	-0.081	-0.038	-0.113	0.081	-0.027	-0.086	1						
(10) Funding Period	-0.010	-0.121	0.093	0.012	-0.121	0.061	-0.039	0.033	0.193	1					
(11) Funding Reward Tiers	-0.056	-0.163	0.026	-0.004	-0.122	0.062	-0.046	0.024	0.277	0.218	1				
(12) Funding Reward Size	0.005	-0.068	0.008	0.035	-0.019	-0.007	-0.054	0.057	0.148	0.010	0.017	1			
(13) Funding Threshold	-0.084	-0.160	0.002	0.050	-0.081	0.190	-0.052	0.065	0.215	0.156	0.187	0.254	1		
(14) Funding Exceeded	-0.076	-0.092	0.175	-0.003	-0.070	0.247	-0.054	-0.005	0.181	0.138	0.140	0.091	0.307	1	
(15) Funding Backers	-0.093	-0.091	0.110	0.004	-0.070	0.276	-0.053	-0.051	0.149	0.152	0.161	-0.085	0.227	0.748	1

**Table 3: Features and Unforeseen Interdependencies.** Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Robust standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level.  $p$ -values are shown in parentheses.

	Features Most	Features Rank	Features Percentile	Unforeseen Interdependencies	Ln Unforeseen Interdependencies
Project Experience	0.117 (0.047)	0.370 (0.000)	0.138 (0.016)	1.298 (0.000)	0.205 (0.002)
Failed Campaign Experience	0.075 (0.506)	0.169 (0.245)	0.081 (0.401)	0.672 (0.066)	0.185 (0.057)
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation	0.001 (0.779)	0.000 (0.932)	0.001 (0.858)	0.005 (0.772)	-0.000 (0.908)
Prior Project Delay	0.011 (0.758)	-0.034 (0.535)	0.003 (0.941)	-0.698 (0.000)	-0.128 (0.000)
Execution Overlap	-0.365 (0.025)	-0.447 (0.031)	-0.338 (0.028)	-0.216 (0.736)	0.096 (0.410)
External Financing	0.371 (0.006)	0.286 (0.055)	0.367 (0.006)	1.122 (0.317)	0.148 (0.515)
New Category	-0.063 (0.685)	0.156 (0.464)	0.020 (0.895)	1.596 (0.078)	0.246 (0.231)
Elapsed Time	-0.000 (0.665)	0.000 (0.879)	0.000 (0.961)	0.004 (0.009)	0.001 (0.000)
Funding Period	0.007 (0.101)	0.008 (0.119)	0.007 (0.053)	0.028 (0.172)	0.006 (0.144)
Funding Reward Tiers	0.006 (0.395)	0.007 (0.539)	0.008 (0.296)	-0.023 (0.521)	-0.003 (0.646)
Funding Reward Size	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.779)	0.000 (0.848)
Ln Funding Threshold	0.027 (0.527)	0.048 (0.356)	0.016 (0.693)	0.754 (0.004)	0.157 (0.000)
Ln Funding Exceeded				0.671 (0.008)	0.076 (0.109)
Ln Funding Backers				-0.018 (0.960)	0.074 (0.268)
Baseline Updates				0.172 (0.001)	
Ln Baseline Updates					0.271 (0.000)
Entrepreneur FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Product Subtype FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.284	0.437	0.279	0.744	0.774
Entrepreneurs	314	314	314	314	314
Observations	722	722	722	722	722

**Table 4: Delivery and Delay.** Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Robust standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level.  $p$ -values are shown in parentheses.

	Delay Indicator	Delay Duration	Delay Duration/ Predicted Time	Predicted Time	Actual Time
Project Experience	0.119 (0.010)	39.616 (0.001)	0.530 (0.001)	8.364 (0.014)	46.386 (0.001)
Failed Campaign Experience	0.139 (0.123)	-2.720 (0.870)	-0.071 (0.749)	15.751 (0.031)	11.345 (0.620)
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation	-0.003 (0.062)	0.094 (0.828)	-0.001 (0.864)	0.095 (0.578)	0.390 (0.411)
Prior Project Delay	-0.042 (0.042)	-21.689 (0.020)	-0.111 (0.690)	4.288 (0.024)	-19.655 (0.034)
Execution Overlap	-0.052 (0.457)	11.587 (0.774)	1.183 (0.233)	-3.993 (0.636)	9.501 (0.831)
External Financing	0.138 (0.196)	95.312 (0.234)	0.371 (0.481)	21.388 (0.376)	124.811 (0.205)
New Category	0.082 (0.611)	39.284 (0.135)	0.425 (0.156)	6.012 (0.546)	46.345 (0.168)
Elapsed Time	-0.000 (0.422)	-0.092 (0.130)	-0.001 (0.353)	-0.023 (0.265)	-0.111 (0.094)
Funding Period	0.009 (0.000)	1.302 (0.059)	0.004 (0.848)	0.147 (0.555)	1.730 (0.022)
Funding Reward Tiers	0.003 (0.454)	0.785 (0.474)	0.001 (0.977)	-0.150 (0.721)	0.996 (0.441)
Funding Reward Size	0.000 (0.807)	-0.011 (0.721)	0.000 (0.707)	0.005 (0.533)	-0.008 (0.830)
Ln Funding Threshold	0.008 (0.786)	22.716 (0.103)	-0.090 (0.533)	19.806 (0.000)	40.817 (0.011)
Ln Funding Exceeded	0.034 (0.195)	28.728 (0.004)	0.201 (0.085)		27.973 (0.014)
Ln Funding Backers	0.008 (0.837)	-34.159 (0.009)	-0.176 (0.281)		-31.278 (0.040)
Entrepreneur FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Product Subtype FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.662	0.717	0.656	0.752	0.744
Entrepreneurs	306	303	303	314	303
Observations	686	644	644	722	644

## A Appendix

### A.1 Qualitative Interviews

We conducted a program of qualitative interviews after deductively theorizing hypotheses and testing those hypotheses empirically to determine the mean effect. These interviews were not used to draw inductive conclusions. Instead, the purpose of these interviews was to better understand and confirm the mean effect observed in the quantitative data. Given that intent, we identified and reached out to entrepreneurs in our sample who match the observed empirical trends to gain additional color on what drove those outcomes. These interviews confirmed the mechanisms outlined in our theory, which we established prior to conducting the interviews.

We reached out to entrepreneurs via LinkedIn messages, company contact forms, Kickstarter messages, or email, depending on what was available in each case. We received 18 responses to our outreach. Two of these entrepreneurs were not willing to participate and five dropped out in the scheduling process. In the end, we conducted interviews with 11 entrepreneurs from our sample. Table A.1 and Table A.2 provide summary information and statistics for each of these entrepreneurs. We conducted all interviews via Zoom videoconferencing except for one interview conducted via Google Hangouts per the entrepreneur's request. All interviews conducted via Zoom were recorded after obtaining the entrepreneur's verbal consent and transcribed for review. Interviews were conducted between January 29, 2020 and June 24, 2020. The interviews were scheduled for 30 minutes, with most interviews lasting between 30 and 45 minutes.

— INSERT TABLE A.1 QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW SAMPLE. —

— INSERT TABLE A.2 QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW SAMPLE SUMMARY STATISTICS. —

Each interview followed a semi-structured format. Interview questions covered a broad range of topics roughly mirroring the topics outlined in our theory, hypothesis development, and supplemental analysis, as well as general background. We asked entrepreneurs: why they decided to launch crowdfunding projects on Kickstarter (and why they stopped); what they learned implementing an earlier project and how that impacted future projects;



what their process was for determining the predicted product specification and predicted timeline; what unforeseen challenges they encountered; what they did when they encountered unforeseen challenges, etc.

## **A.2 Complexity in Crowdfunded Hardware Technology Projects**

We provide contextual evidence that: (1) entrepreneurs tend to add multiple features to subsequent projects, and (2) even relatively “low” complexity projects in our sample were still highly complex and required addressing a large number of interdependencies.

### **A.2.1 Within Entrepreneur: Tendency to Add Multiple Features**

Close examination of specific products in our sample make it clear that entrepreneurs generally add multiple features as they advance from project to project, leading to increased complexity across an entrepreneur’s hardware technology crowdfunding projects. Continuing from Figure 2, we use the example of Plum Geek Robotics to illustrate this progression across various quantitative and qualitative measures. Figure A.1 presents a detailed breakdown of the product features in Plum Geek Robotics’s first and third projects.

— INSERT FIGURE A.1 PLUM GEEK ROBOTICS PRODUCT FEATURES. —

The first project, Ringo Robot, has six colored lights, multi-frequency sound abilities, a light sensor, 360-degree visibility edge sensors, an accelerometer, a gyroscope, etc. By the time the company reached their third project, the Spirit Rover, the product had significantly more features, with a total of 27 colored lights, new computer vision capabilities, retractable gripper arms, wireless network capabilities, etc.

If we consider this example in the language of the NK model (Kauffman, 1995),  $N$  increased rapidly from the first to the third project. Based on our oversimplification of the product, we might imagine that  $N$  went from 5 to 15 to 35 across three projects. This increase in  $N$  is one way that the total number of interdependencies can increase rapidly from project to project.

### **A.2.2 Across Entrepreneur: “High” Complexity on Different Project Types**

The hardware technology projects in our sample generally have high complexity, with both a large number of features and high level of interdependencies. That said, there is certainly variation in both the number of features and the level of interdependencies among those

features—particularly when the features are modularized and separate from one another.

Before we highlight our context, we want to start with an extreme example of a type of product that is outside of our sample: board games. Board games are a popular crowdfunded project type, and it would certainly be the case that the printing of a game board is quite modular and separate from the die casting of game tokens. In this example, the entrepreneur would face limited interdependence when executing on the game board and the game tokens, except perhaps when packaging them together in a box, e.g., if the game tokens might scratch the game board in shipping. This example illustrates a product where both components and the level of interdependencies are comparatively low in the scheme of possible projects. However, this board game example is vastly different from the hardware technology projects that we study, where the numbers of components and interdependencies remain high across the different project types.

Figure A.2 shows how complexity can vary across projects in our sample. We highlight two examples from our sample: one project selected to exemplify what a low-complexity project looks like, and another strongly contrasting example of what high complexity looks like.

— INSERT FIGURE A.2 EXAMPLE PRODUCTS BY ENTREPRENEUR OVER TIME. —

**Process for Identifying Projects and Complexity** To identify these two examples, we systematically reviewed product images and descriptions on the campaign webpages. We isolate that sample to smaller and smaller subsamples based on the following criteria. First, the projects needed to provide enough images of the product to allow for a visual examination of the product. Second, the projects needed to have most of their features observable from the images. Projects which sophisticated internal components were only considered if they provided images of the internal workings of the product. We also excluded projects where most of their capabilities were enabled by embedded software or firmware, which would not be observable to us. The ideal projects were the ones where most of their capabilities were exposed on the exterior of the product. Third, we focused on products where most of their value or innovation came from improvements in the fabrication of a custom circuit board to avoid examples that were not transparent to laypersons. For the projects that

meet these criteria, we take discretionary liberties to focus on products that readers of the manuscript could appreciate the value and novelty of. We selected the two projects among that set that had among the least and most complexity based on the process described next. The low-complexity project is the Griffin Pocket Tool XL, a metal multi-purpose tool. The high-complexity project is the Obsidian 3D Printer.

We take a deep dive to document the complexity of these projects in as much detail as possible, describing the exact process that was used and subsequently independently verified by an expert hardware technology entrepreneur. First, as detailed as we can possibly observe from public records, we list out all the possible components or modules that make up the product. One can think of the set of components that generally reflect the feature set of the product. Each of these components is associated with several organizational tasks, which can happen within the focal entrepreneurial firm or by third-party suppliers to the entrepreneur.

We then list out the interdependencies that we know must exist relative to these product components and modules. These are just the ones that we can infer from a best-case scenario of how the product would be manufactured. To be clear, our effort in listing out these interdependencies is subject to the same bounded rationality limitations as the entrepreneur. To be even clearer, we are likely underestimating the total number of interdependencies by a substantial degree relative to the actual entrepreneur who obviously knows more about the product than we do. But the point we want to make is simple: the total number of interdependencies starts getting out of hand very rapidly. We are certain that our examination is incomplete and that we have left many “unforeseen interdependencies” off our list.

**Implications of Illustrative Projects** From Figure [A.2](#), there are two takeaways. First, the number of components or tasks, even on one of the simplest projects, is legitimately quite high already. Second, and more importantly, this results in an enormous number of interdependencies that need to be addressed, even for the simplest project. This suggests that we should infer that the general level of interdependencies, and even the lowest levels of interdependencies, is indeed quite high, and high enough to allow for interdependencies to increase rapidly as features are added.

### **A.3 Entrepreneurial Prediction Process**

We provide contextual background and supporting evidence for (1) the challenges inherent in making predictions and (2) the practical steps the entrepreneurs take to make these predictions.

#### **A.3.1 What Predictions Entail**

Through our qualitative interviews, we sought to understand the details of the prediction process undertaken by entrepreneurs, including the specific steps taken and items considered when predicting the project timeline.

Making predictions in any system with many interdependencies is very difficult. The entrepreneurs in our sample consistently recognize the complexity of the entrepreneurial endeavors they undertake. One noted, “The hardware game is hard. Even if you’ve been through... so many form factors and production issues, you think you would have perfected it. There is no perfecting manufacturing” (TabletCo CEO). Another highlighted the specific difficulties with launching hardware projects: “Software is very different if something goes wrong. You just push an update on the back end and it’s there in the morning. When you’re doing hardware and you miss a washer, that’s a huge freakin’ problem, and you’re for sure going to miss a washer sometime” (WidgetsCo CEO).

Our interviews suggest that the main source of prediction difficulty revolves around uncertainty relative to the interdependencies rather than the distinct components. The WidgetsCo CEO knew that the washer was a component of the project, but it was interdependencies with other parts of the project that could lead to the washer’s omission that was the source of uncertainty. Entrepreneurs generally know all or most of the components required to complete the project, whereas a large number of the interactions between all the different components are unknown. In the language of the NK model ([Kauffman, 1995](#)), we interpret entrepreneurs making predictions in our context as having some reasonable sense for the value of N, but they also recognize that the bulk of the work in execution revolves around K, for which they have a much less accurate sense prior to actually executing the projects.

This is evident in our review of the entrepreneurs’ own assessments of uncertainty, as they publicly report as “Risks and Challenges” required for every Kickstarter funding campaign. We review this content for a large set of projects and observe that the top risks that concern entrepreneurs relate to the interdependencies they might face in execution. They know the various components of the project (N) but don’t yet know how these components fit together (K). One entrepreneur writes, “Every single component of this product is well known,” but we “only have a 3D-printed prototype right now, and...don’t have any experience with injection moulding at this point.” Others note interdependencies inherent in “Coordination with multiple manufacturers, with various lead times”; “testing the pre-mass production sample device”; and obtaining “CE, FCC, IC compliance...certificates.”

Part of this knowledge around components and uncertainty around interdependencies is true by construction in our setting. Kickstarter requires all entrepreneurs to have a working prototype. As a result, the entrepreneurs are already aware of the various components needed to produce the product. The complexity lies in the interdependencies that may not have surfaced when making the prototype: “The prototypes are all handmade. They’re more of a unique product that has more time put into it. But when you’re doing production, you’re not spending that much time on every single unit. You’re doing large volume. That’s where we end up having problems” (GPSCo CEO).

### **A.3.2 How Predictions Are Made**

Based on our qualitative interviews, we find that entrepreneurs generally make predictions by breaking down the project into specific tasks, making predictions relative to each specific task, and then aggregating the task-level predictions to the project level. CircuitsCo CEO described how, “I just took basically all the things I knew would take time—like waiting for Kickstarter to wire the money, manufacturing, shipping—and I added all of them together.” 3DPrintCo CEO detailed a similar process for making the timeline prediction: “We’ve got a lot of experience in manufacturing. So it was a matter of understanding what our supply chain would look like and understanding how our product design could deviate from the design that we launched with so that whatever unforeseen challenges we may have faced we could have accomplished or overcome those challenges with deviations in our plan. So we

tried to create basically a risk mitigation program for the possible design variations that we would have expected.”

Our interviews also support the notion that entrepreneurs are making these predictions for execution that follows a local search (Sommer & Loch, 2004). AccessoryCo CEO emphasized how his execution involved sequentially changing “one component after another” and “one iteration” at a time. For example, he first changed “the quality of the plastic, then the color of the plastic, . . . then the adhesive tape.” This local search execution process is complementary to the process of aggregating the individual, step-by-step task-level predictions to the project level.

Once entrepreneurs determine their best project-level prediction, they seem to systematically “pad” their timelines with extra time as a precaution. CircuitsCo CEO said he usually “added like a month of buffer or something” and TabletCo CEO said he urges other entrepreneurs, “Don’t be too aggressive...definitely build in like two or three months extra.” This sentiment is echoed by WidgetsCo CEO who said, “Obviously, things go wrong. So another thing I do is I take my timeline and I add 30% to it. I don’t care what it is because you’re going to fuck it up so yeah. So that’s my rule for financial modeling and project modeling. Always add 30% because something’s gonna go wrong.”

As detailed in Appendix Section A.9, we find no evidence that the prediction process for delivery timelines involves social comparison or competitive benchmarking with or against other entrepreneurs.

## A.4 Data Collection

### A.4.1 Features Rank

To collect the *Features Rank* variable, we hired five independent reviewers to rank each entrepreneur’s projects by the number of features.<sup>a</sup> We made two separate efforts to make sure this data generation process would be fruitful. First, to ensure a potential reviewer could handle what was asked of them, we carefully selected among reviewers to make sure they met a general qualification level. We sought out individuals with educational and

---

<sup>a</sup>The reviewers also ranked the projects according to technical sophistication, which is closely correlated to number of features.

professional experience in fields relevant to understanding and evaluating hardware products. Second, given that the projects span a relatively diverse set of product subtypes—although limited to only hardware products—it was important that we bring in a diverse set of reviewers such that, for any given project, the majority of reviewers would be qualified to make an assessment. We sought out reviewers of different genders and generations to obtain a balanced perspective. Table A.3 summarizes the backgrounds of the reviewers.

— INSERT TABLE A.3 PROJECT REVIEWER BACKGROUNDS. —

Each reviewer reviewed the photographs and product descriptions of each project by the same entrepreneur. We provided the reviewers with an Excel document containing sets of projects grouped by entrepreneur. The order of the projects within each entrepreneur group was randomized. The reviewers opened the links for the Kickstarter project page for each of the projects in the entrepreneur group. They then assigned a rank to each of the projects by the same entrepreneur. Even when projects seemed almost identical or very similar, we required the reviewers to force a ranking between all projects. Each reviewer repeated this process for all the groups of projects by the same entrepreneur.

We aggregate the rankings across the reviewers. In the case of disagreement between reviewers, we take the average rank between the two reviewers and then re-rank the projects based on the averaged scores. We allow for ties (which only occur in the case of conflicting rankings). Given that we force a ranking even when projects are nearly identical or very similar, this means that rank assignment is close to random in those circumstances. As a result, we expect some disagreement between reviewer rankings. This design gives more weight to the rankings that are more clear-cut and less weight to the rankings that are more ambiguous. If two projects tie for the most features, the binary indicator turns on for both projects, which washes out with the inclusion of entrepreneur fixed effects.<sup>b</sup>

---

<sup>b</sup>For example, if an entrepreneur has two total projects and the two reviewers disagree on which of the two projects has more features, then both projects would have an average rank of 1.5 (being rated as 1 by one reviewer and 2 by the other). After re-ranking based on these average scores, both of the entrepreneur's projects would have a 1 for *Features Most*. Because we include entrepreneur fixed effects in the regression, this entrepreneur would show no change across projects. As a result, in our model the variation in number of features across an entrepreneur's subsequent projects is driven by the projects where the ranking between projects is clearer and more objective and is not driven by the projects where the ranking is ambiguous.

#### A.4.2 Delay Duration and Actual Time

To collect the actual shipment date for all the projects in our sample, we hired two contractors on UpWork.<sup>c</sup> We provided them with an Excel file containing a link to each project and a row for each of the rewards associated with that project. The contractor followed the link to the project page and read through the updates and comments to record (at the individual reward level) the date on which the reward first began to ship, the date on which all the rewards were shipped, whether it was apparent that the reward had still not shipped, or whether there was no mention of shipping. Across the 722 projects in our sample, there are 7,019 different rewards with an average of 9.7 rewards per project. We exclude the \$1 cash donation reward option included on most projects as well as rewards that were not backed. We were able to identify the date the reward started shipping for 71% of rewards and the date the reward finished shipping for 49% of rewards.

At the reward level, we take the later of the date the reward first shipped and the date the reward finished shipping. We take the later date because the entrepreneur's prediction is for the date all rewards will be delivered, not when the entrepreneur would deliver the first reward. This allows us to measure the actual shipment date for 80% of all rewards in our sample (which includes all rewards that list either the date the reward first shipped or the date the reward finished shipping). The actual delivery date has a day, month, and year whereas the predicted delivery date is just a month and a year. To be conservative, the delay for each reward is computed as the difference between the actual shipment date and the first day of the month after the month of the predicted delivery date. We then aggregate this reward-level data to the project level to compute the *Delay Duration* by taking the mean delay of all the rewards in each project. This same method of aggregating from the reward level to the project level is used for *Predicted Time*. The results are almost identical if we use the median. Using this approach we are able to measure the *Delay Indicator* for 89% of projects in the sample. This includes all projects with shipment information for at least one

---

<sup>c</sup>We use the date shipped as opposed to the date the product arrived on the customer's doorstep. Shipment date is more standardized and consistent across all projects regardless of customer location. There are also generally only one or two shipment dates per project as opposed to many more unique dates when the backers receive the reward. And, as a practical matter, the data on when customers receive rewards is much sparser and more inconsistent than the data on when the rewards ship.



reward in the project.

### **A.4.3 External Funding**

To define our *External Funding* control variable, we collect data on venture financing from Crunchbase. We hired an RA to search both the entrepreneur name and the company name (if available) for each project to look for any matches on Crunchbase. For those entrepreneurs with a Crunchbase page, we collected data on each fundraising round (excluding those classified as crowdfunding, which would reflect the Kickstarter projects). This binary indicator turns on if the date the project launched comes after the date the entrepreneur of that project raised external capital from another source. The results do not change in any substantive way if we use the cumulative number of external funding rounds instead of this binary indicator.

## **A.5 Variable Distributions**

### **A.5.1 Quantile Summary Statistics**

For transparency and clarity, we supplement the summary statistics provided in Table 1. Table A.4 includes the 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% quantiles for each independent variable used in analysis.

— INSERT TABLE A.4 VARIABLE QUANTILES. —

### **A.5.2 Distribution Visualization**

In addition, we include a visualization of the distribution of the variables. Figure A.3 contains plots of the distribution of each independent variables used in analysis. Density plots are used for continuous measures, and histograms are used for measures that fall into a small number of finite values or categories.

— INSERT FIGURE A.3 VARIABLE DISTRIBUTIONS. —

## **A.6 Increasing Features and Unforeseen Interdependencies**

We test and present empirical evidence for the assumption that, as more features are added to a project, the unforeseen interdependencies will increase, showing a positive relationship between an increase in the number of features and an increase in unforeseen interdependencies.

We define *Features Increase* as a binary indicator of whether the entrepreneurs add

more features for their next projects, which is equal to 1 if the current project has more features than the prior project and 0 otherwise. We use *Features Increase* as the main independent variable for this analysis and look at the relationship between it and three different measures of whether the unforeseen interdependencies will increase as dependent variables. *Unforeseen Interdependencies Increase Binary* is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the current project has more updates related to unforeseen interdependencies than the prior project. *Unforeseen Interdependencies Increase Count* is equal to the number of additional updates related to unforeseen interdependencies than the prior project. *Unforeseen Interdependencies Increase IHS* takes the inverse hyperbolic spline of *Unforeseen Interdependencies Increase Count* in order to account for any potential non-linearities in the relationship and to reduce the impact of any outliers. The results of these analyses are shown in Table A.5. We find a significant and positive relationship between *Features Increase* and each of our three measures of increasing unforeseen interdependencies.

— INSERT TABLE A.5 FEATURES INCREASE AND  
UNFORESEEN INTERDEPENDENCIES. —

## A.7 Non-Linear Effect of Experience

We find empirical evidence for a faster-than-linear increase in unforeseen interdependencies and delay duration. This empirical evidence suggests that we more than meet the minimum set of assumptions required by our theory, e.g., the project complexity curve increases faster than a concave learning curve. Figure 4 of the main manuscript is the visual representation of the estimates from the regression models we describe next.

We considered several econometric models—including those that specify a specific functional form of the relationship—but we decided that it would be best to remain agnostic to functional form. Instead, we construct a series of indicator variables representing different levels of *Project Experience* that allow us to flexibly and non-parametrically identify the relationship. This type of specification allows the functional form to “reveal” itself to us without us having to pre-specify its exact shape.

In place of *Project Experience*, we include a set of indicator variables. *Project Experience: Second* takes a value of 1 if the focal project is the entrepreneur’s second project,

and 0 otherwise. *Project Experience: Third* and *Project Experience: Fourth or More* follow similarly. We group together experience for entrepreneurs on their fourth or later project because the number of observations on these higher levels of experience is quite sparse and thus noisy; the observed pattern of statistically significant results is robust to the exclusion of projects that are the entrepreneur's fifth or later project. Since we omit the indicator for an entrepreneur's first project (zero experience), all coefficients on these three indicators should be interpreted as relative to the scenario of the entrepreneur's first project. Table 3 and Table 4 are replicated in Table A.6 and Table A.7, respectively, swapping out *Project Experience* for this set of indicator variables.

— INSERT TABLE A.6 NON-LINEAR ANALYSIS OF COMPLEXITY AND UNFORESEEN INTERDEPENDENCIES. —

— INSERT TABLE A.7 NON-LINEAR ANALYSIS OF DELIVERY AND DELAY. —

We outline the effects for a subset of the key variables here, with the full results shown in the regression tables.

### **A.7.1 Features**

All relative to the entrepreneur's first project, the average entrepreneur's second project has 0.417 higher feature rank, the third project has an average of 0.541 higher feature rank, and the fourth or later project has 1.468 higher feature rank. To give an idea of the comparison across projects, we can look at the difference between these coefficient values, with the second project having a feature rank 0.417 higher than the first project, the third project having a feature rank 0.124 higher than the second project, and the fourth or later project having a feature rank 0.927 higher than the third project. We also look at the same interpretation for unforeseen interdependencies.

### **A.7.2 Unforeseen Interdependencies**

All relative to the entrepreneur's first project, the average entrepreneur's second project encounters 1.457 more unforeseen interdependencies, the third project encounters an average of 2.721 more unforeseen interdependencies, and the fourth or later project encounters 4.116 more unforeseen interdependencies. To give an idea of the comparison across projects, we can look at the difference between these coefficient values, with the second project encountering

1.457 more unforeseen interdependencies than the first project, the third project encountering 1.264 more unforeseen interdependencies than the second project, and the fourth or later project encountering 1.395 more unforeseen interdependencies than the third project.

### **A.7.3 Delay Duration**

All relative to the entrepreneur's first project, the average entrepreneur's second project is delayed by an additional 44.858 days, the third project is delayed by an additional 75.369 days, and the fourth or later project is delayed by an additional 145.106 days. To give an idea of the comparison across projects, we can look at the difference between these coefficient values, with the second project delayed by 44.858 more days than the first project, the third project delayed by 30.511 more days than the second project, and the fourth or later project delayed by 69.737 more days than the third project.

Furthermore, to provide readers with more intuition on the holistic pattern implied by the above regression estimates, we generate a visualization of the estimates for the effect of various levels of project experience on *Actual Time* and *Predicted Time*. In some sense, these variables intuitively map to actual project complexity and predicted project complexity curves, respectively. Figure 4 of the main manuscript plots the coefficients, with the project number on the horizontal axis and the *Actual Time* and *Predicted Time* (both in days) on the vertical axes.<sup>d</sup> This figure shows that the actual delivery time increases much more sharply relative to the predicted delivery time, with the gap between actual delivery time and predicted delivery time increasing as entrepreneurs gain experience.

## **A.8 Prior Campaign Funding and Behavior**

### **A.8.1 Theoretical Background**

We explore in depth whether prior campaign funding outcomes impact an entrepreneur's behavior on subsequent projects. We do not intend to make any groundbreaking theoretical claims on this point: our primary goal is to make sure we properly account for and apply classic behavioral theory on performance feedback and outcome–aspiration gaps (Cyert &

---

<sup>d</sup>To set the level of the omitted coefficient of the entrepreneur's first project—and thus the level of all the estimates as they are relative to that baseline—we calculate the mean value of each variable used in the regression and multiply that average value by the corresponding coefficient. We sum those values and then add the mean entrepreneur fixed effect.

March, 1963; Greve, 1998). We apply this theory to product introductions (Joseph & Gaba, 2015). In short, we consider the theoretical argument that when an entrepreneur suffers from an outcome–aspiration gap in their prior experience—specifically, they suffer from a failed funding campaign on the previous project—the entrepreneur would have higher risk tolerance and engage in problemistic search on the next project (Greve, 2003). Assuming that this feedback is sufficiently unambiguous to trigger the entrepreneur to respond (Joseph & Gaba, 2015), the entrepreneur would take on a project that has a greater likelihood of unforeseen complexity that could delay the project. As shown in Figure A.4, this relationship can be visualized as a “V”, where the outcome–aspiration gap is on the x-axis and the accuracy of strategic foresight is on the y-axis. This “V” shape would manifest if these were a linear relationship; however, if the relationship is non-linear, we would see more of a “U” shape, which is also included in the visualization.

— INSERT FIGURE A.4 OUTCOME–ASPIRATION GAP AND ACCURACY OF STRATEGIC FORESIGHT. —

Recent research adds additional nuance to the theory that would strengthen the argument. Keum & Eggers (2018) argue that managers would set more aggressive aspirations, like on project complexity and timeline, when facing increased pressure to acquire resources, like if they feared missing funding targets on the next project because they missed them on the prior project. Eggers & Kaul (2018) argue that firms over-invest in radical invention when performance is moderately below aspiration, whereas in our setting a radical invention would be a radical departure from their previous project (which would add a lot of new complexity).

### A.8.2 Empirical Context

Turning to our specific empirical context, it is quite rare for these serial-project entrepreneurs to fail in their fundraising efforts. Of the 314 entrepreneurs who completed successful projects in our sample, only 33 entrepreneurs had previously run a failed funding campaign (10.5% of entrepreneurs), with 42 failed funding campaigns total out of 782 total funding campaigns (5.4% of funding campaigns). At a project level, our level of analysis, only 36 (5.0%) out of 722 projects in our sample (i.e., the successful projects) had a failed funding campaign of the

same product subtype immediately prior to the focal project. In comparison, Kickstarter reports that 61.6% of all projects fail in their funding campaigns, and specifically 79.0% of technology projects (where our sample originates) fail in their funding campaigns.<sup>e</sup>

Clearly, there is a compositional difference between our sample of projects and entrepreneurs and the universe present on Kickstarter. First, we study serial-project entrepreneurs, a more professional set of entrepreneurs who tend to treat their projects as full-time jobs; in many cases, there are entrepreneurial firms behind the effort. Second, we focus on technical hardware product categories, of which there might be more consumer interest and that may have a higher barrier to entry, i.e., it takes a significant amount of effort to even create the prototype that gets presented on the fundraising page.

Thus, our sample of entrepreneurs may not be the best sample on which to study the implications of prior funding failure as a general phenomenon. Nevertheless, we proceed with an empirical exploration that accounts for this past project funding failure (and success).

### **A.8.3 Variables**

As the main independent variable capturing the outcome–aspiration gap, we use *Prior Campaign Funding Deviation*, which is equal to the percentage by which the prior funding campaign exceeded (or missed) its funding goal. Values of *Prior Campaign Funding Deviation* less than 0 occur when the entrepreneur failed to meet her prior campaign’s funding threshold, and greater than or equal to 0 occur when the entrepreneur succeeded. We interact *Prior Campaign Funding Deviation* with an indicator variable *Prior Campaign Funding Success* that takes a value of 1 if *Prior Campaign Funding Deviation* is greater than or equal to 0, and 0 otherwise. This interaction term allows us to estimate separate slopes for the two halves of the “V” shape outlined in the theoretical background.

### **A.8.4 Statistical Model**

We need to also consider that the effect of performance feedback may be heterogeneous and non-linear, e.g., greater degrees of success or failure have a greater effect size per unit of deviation than success or failure that is close to the aspiration level. In other words, a U-shaped relationship rather than a V-shaped relationship. Thus, we also test a model that

---

<sup>e</sup><https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats>, accessed December 2020.

enters in a quadratic term for *Prior Campaign Funding Deviation*, and we interact both the base term and the quadratic term with *Prior Campaign Funding Success* to allow estimates of different “curves” above and below the aspiration level. In theory, this would allow us to estimate the two halves of a theoretical “U.”

### A.8.5 Descriptive Visualization

Before we turn to the regression analysis, we generate descriptive plots of the relationship between *Prior Campaign Funding Deviation* and our two main measures of performance: (i) *Delay Percent* (defined as *Delay Duration* divided by *Predicted Time*) and (ii) *Unforeseen Interdependencies*. When generating the plots, we exclude outliers for clarity in visualization, but all trends and interpretations hold when including outliers. Examining these plots in Figure A.5 and Figure A.6, we see similar trends in both plots, with a positive slope where *Prior Campaign Funding Deviation* is less than zero (though with a very wide confidence interval given the very limited number of observations) and a flat or very slightly increasing trend where *Prior Campaign Funding Deviation* is greater than zero (though again with an increasingly wide confidence interval moving away from the bulk of the data).

— INSERT FIGURE A.5 DEVIATION AND DELAY. —

— INSERT FIGURE A.6 DEVIATION AND UNFORESEEN INTERDEPENDENCIES. —

### A.8.6 Results

Table A.8 shows this relationship when including controls and fixed effects. Given the focus on the lagged funding deviation, we exclude first projects where there is no defined lagged funding deviation. As a result, we also exclude entrepreneur fixed effects which are not appropriate for entrepreneurs with only a single project after their first project, leaving no variation within the entrepreneur’s set of projects. As suggested by the visual evidence, we do not observe any significant relationship between *Prior Campaign Funding Deviation* and *Delay Percent* or *Unforeseen Interdependencies*. The directionality of the point estimates matches the visual evidence, with a positive coefficient on *Prior Campaign Funding Deviation*, suggesting a positive slope when *Prior Campaign Funding Success* is equal to zero (the area to the left of zero on the plots) and then a flat slope when *Prior Campaign Funding Success* is equal to one and the coefficients are summed to give a slope

around zero. We also find no significant relationships when including a quadratic term.

— INSERT TABLE A.8 DEVIATION AND UNFORESEEN INTERDEPENDENCIES. —

Given the small sample size of projects that missed their funding goal, we are limited in our ability to interpret the trend where *Prior Campaign Funding Success* is equal to zero. We do have ample data where *Prior Campaign Funding Success* is greater than zero, but again we find no significant relationship. One possible explanation is that the impact of deviation from the funding target on the prior project is overshadowed by the impact of deviation from the funding target on the current project (which is included as a control). Another possible explanation is that *Delay Percent* and *Unforeseen Interdependencies* are both measures of execution and are therefore one step removed from the impacts of fundraising outcomes.

## A.9 Social Comparison

We seek to address potential ambiguity around what could be driving prediction failure in this setting. If the entrepreneur believes that setting a delivery timeline comparable to her peers is important to fundraising, the prediction failures could be interpreted as a matter of entrepreneurs socially informed about their competitive context. To test, and ultimately rule out, this alternative explanation, we define the entrepreneur's peer group and then empirically test the impact of the peer group on the entrepreneur's predicted time as well as the impact of deviation from the peer group on ability to fundraise.

### A.9.1 Defining Entrepreneur Peer Group

We consider two dimensions when defining an entrepreneur's peer group that may impact their behavior through social comparison. First, we define a set of comparable projects the entrepreneur could reasonably view as competition. At a reductive level, all Kickstarter projects that are soliciting the same dollars are in competition. The most competitive set of projects seem to be those within same product subtype, e.g., 3D printing, camera equipment, wearables. The key assumption we make here is that the entrepreneur perceives that she is competing with those projects, based on our assumption of the entrepreneur's assumption that her customers navigate and search through Kickstarter by product subtype. That said, based on our interviews, entrepreneurs do not seem to view competition for crowdfunding



as a zero-sum game, given that the vast majority of customer spending is not on Kickstarter projects and that many backers find their way directly to a project without navigating through the Kickstarter platform, e.g., by a direct link from an organic social media campaign or direct-response online advertising.

Second, we define a time window during which the entrepreneur could reasonably have taken into account comparable projects prior to specifying her prediction for her own product specification and delivery date. As first order, we should only include projects prior to the launch of the focal campaign. We decided to include only peer projects that successfully completed their funding prior to the focal campaign; it seems unlikely the entrepreneur would benchmark herself against failed funding campaigns. In addition, intuitively it seems unlikely the entrepreneur would search deeply into the distant past to benchmark herself: more recent projects likely matter more since they reflect the current state of the market the entrepreneur would face. We set a threshold of one year, meaning that we only include peer funding campaigns launched within one year of the focal campaign. In summary, we specify the entrepreneur's peer group as the projects within the last year by other entrepreneurs in the sample that successfully met their funding threshold.

### A.9.2 Setting Delivery Time

We consider whether the peer group timeline has an effect on the predicted timeline set by the entrepreneur. The dependent variable *Predicted Time* is the time in days between the end of the fundraising campaign and the predicted delivery date. Using the definition of the peer group previously explained, the main independent variable *Peer Group Predicted Time* is the average *Predicted Time* across all projects in the focal project's peer group.<sup>f</sup>

**Results** As shown in Table A.9, we find no statistically significant relationship between *Peer Group Predicted Time* and *Predicted Time*. The coefficient and statistical significance of *Project Experience* remains consistent. These findings align with our understanding of how entrepreneurs in our study actually set their project timelines, based on our qualitative

---

<sup>f</sup>For example, one entrepreneur in the sample launched a hardware project on October 11, 2018. His peer group contains all hardware projects launched prior to October 11, 2018 but after October 11, 2017 (one year prior). This defines a set of 11 projects with predicted times ranging from 10 days to 149 days. Taking the average predicted time across all 11 projects gives a *Peer Group Predicted Time* of 89 days.

interviews. To summarize our understanding of this process, which is outlined in more detail in Appendix Section A.3, entrepreneurs seem to be giving their best estimate of how long they believe the project will actually take—summing the estimated time for each project component—and then adding some buffer time on top of their best guess at the predicted time. No entrepreneur in any of our interviews mentioned benchmarking their predicted time against the predicted time of other projects, or trying to game the predicted time in any other way.

— INSERT TABLE A.9 PREDICTED TIME AND PEER GROUP COMPARISON. —

### A.9.3 Incentive Alignment

We also explore whether the difference between an entrepreneur’s predicted time from the average predicted timeline of other comparable projects impacts the amount of money the entrepreneur is able to raise. If estimating a shorter predicted time has pecuniary benefits in the fundraising process, entrepreneurs would be incentivized to benchmark against their peer projects. If this is not the case, that would imply that exceeding the funding threshold would not rely on benchmarking against a social comparison.

In this analysis, and as alluded to above, the main independent variable *Peer Group Deviation* is the difference between the *Predicted Time* of the focal project and the *Peer Group Predicted Time* of the focal project. We examine the relationship between *Peer Group Deviation* and two measures of exceeding the funding threshold. *Funding Exceeded* is equal to dollars raised in the focal project in excess of the *Funding Threshold*. *Funding Positive Deviation* is the percentage by which the funding threshold was exceeded, equal to *Funding Exceeded* divided by *Funding Threshold*. Because *Funding Threshold* is used in the derivation of both *Funding Exceeded* and *Funding Positive Deviation*, we include regressions including and excluding it as a control.

**Results** As shown in Table A.10, we see a mixture of significant and insignificant relationships between *Peer Group Deviation* and our measures of exceeding the funding threshold. However, in the cases where the result is significant, the value is small and positive. This would suggest that entrepreneurs would be incentivized to give themselves slightly more time than the average among their peers, which is the exact opposite of the narrative that increas-

ing delays are due to pressure to predict shorter delivery times relative to the peer group. Together, these regressions provide insignificant or contradictory evidence of the alternative explanation.

— INSERT TABLE [A.10](#) FUNDING AND PEER GROUP COMPARISON. —

While entrepreneurs are incentivized to maximize funds raised, they also recognize and experience real pecuniary consequences for failing to meet their predicted time, as outlined in Appendix Section [A.10](#). As a result, even if there were some benefits to predicting shorter delivery times, entrepreneurs that we interviewed seemed unwilling to make the tradeoff of estimating a shorter delivery time now with the expectation to need to delay later. For example, one notes that, “Whatever goodwill you built up beforehand, it’s like so discounted by the time you have to announce delays” (TabletCo CEO).

### **A.10 Learning That Delay Is “Acceptable”**

To test whether entrepreneurs could learn that a delay is acceptable, we need to test whether entrepreneurs face consequences for delay. [Li & Martin \(2019\)](#) study this exact question in the Kickstarter context. Specifically, they look at the impact of failing to meet predictions on the entrepreneur’s reputation and subsequent ability to raise money. Importantly, they find that, all else equal, if an entrepreneur defaults on what they promised, the probability that they reach their funding goal on their subsequent project drops by 50%. The key mechanism for reputation formation is the project comments left by investors. As a result, they conclude that “entrepreneurs likely have incentives to deliver the product or service they promised as long as the backers have the ability to provide product/service feedback to the public.”

Given that public comments are a demonstrated mechanism for reputation formation and, as a result, present real, pecuniary consequences to the entrepreneur, we empirically measure the relationship between delay and public comments in our sample. Specifically, we find a positive relationship between *Delay Duration* and both *Total Comments* ( $p \sim 0.002$ ) and *Negative Comments* ( $p = 0.000$ ). To calculate comment sentiment, we use a standard R package ([Rinker, 2019](#)) to calculate the sentiment of each of the most recent 100 project comments (excluding comments by the entrepreneur). We then sum the number of negative comments for each project. As summarized in [Table A.11](#), for each additional day

of delay, there are 1.7 additional comments and the number of negative comments increases by 0.016. This suggests that entrepreneurs do experience consequences when they delay and are, therefore, incentivized to deliver on time. In addition, to allow for the possible moderating effect of *Project Experience* on the effect of *Delay Duration* on the *Negative Comments* generated by customers, we also include a model with an interaction term for *Delay Duration* and *Project Experience*. We find that the interaction term has a significant and positive coefficient. Overall, we find no evidence, in terms of their public feedback, that customers are less concerned with a project delay because the entrepreneur is more experienced. In fact, the customers seem to penalize the entrepreneur with more negative comments on the entrepreneur’s subsequent projects.

— INSERT TABLE [A.11](#) CONSEQUENCES OF DELAY. —

However, it could be the case that customers are more lenient towards delay for projects with more features. If this is the case, and the entrepreneur becomes aware of this fact as they gain experience, they may learn that delay is acceptable particularly for projects with more features. To test whether this is the case, we analyze the relationship between number of negative comments (*Negative Comments*) and the complexity of the product in terms of features: *Features Most*, *Features Rank*, *Features Percentile*. We include models both with standalone terms for these measures of features as well as a model for each features measure interacted with *Delay Duration*, with the dependent variable of *Negative Comments*. Note that *Negative Comments* are roughly proportional to *Delay Duration*, given that there is more time for customers to enter negative feedback the longer the delay (in a hazard model sense) and that longer delays would of course agitate customers more. We interact the measures of features with *Delay Duration* to explore whether there is any heterogeneity in the possible customer leniency mechanism, e.g., the interaction term would be significant and negative if, at higher levels of product complexity, the customers made fewer *Negative Comments*, particularly under longer *Delay Duration* situations. As reported in [Table A.12](#), we find that the interaction term between *Delay Duration* and all three measures of features is insignificant, as well as negligibly small.

— INSERT TABLE [A.12](#) FEATURES AND NEGATIVE COMMENTS. —

Our interviews with entrepreneurs confirm these findings. One entrepreneur notes, “There is definitely some pressure to deliver things on time...There definitely is pressure making sure things are right, making sure you don’t have to take additional steps” (CircuitsCo CEO). And entrepreneurs do believe that there are consequences to delay: “[When a project gets delayed,] people really bash the product on review channels and pages and the comments section” (TabletCo CEO). Or, in the words of another, “[When a project gets delayed,] you get angry people. For us, image and branding is the most important thing, and you want to strive to deliver a really good product....and it does hurt your image when people are saying you’re delayed” (GPSCo CEO).

As an additional test for whether entrepreneurs continue to care about their image and the impact of negative comments (which are driven by delays), we look at whether entrepreneurs reduce the effort and care they put into customers over time. Specifically, we define a new variable, *Creator Engagement*, which is the total word count of the updates and comments posted by the entrepreneur on a given project. As shown in Table A.13, we find that there is a significant and positive relationship between *Creator Engagement* and *Project Experience*, indicating that entrepreneurs are posting and engaging with their backers more on each subsequent project. This suggests that there is no evidence in terms of their public engagement that entrepreneurs are less concerned with pleasing their customer base and defending their public reputation. In fact, the empirical evidence in our setting suggests the opposite. Again, the qualitative evidence aligns. TabletCo CEO described how even on his most recent project, he would “have people monitor the customer comments around the clock...to feed into consumer confidence.”

— INSERT TABLE A.13 CREATOR ENGAGEMENT. —

### A.11 Incentive to Overpromise

Despite facing consequences for delay, it could be the case that the ex post consequences are offset by ex ante benefits. While making unrealistic predictions likely leads to negative consequences down the road when entrepreneurs fail to meet those predictions, if making aggressive predictions is helpful in the fundraising process entrepreneurs may still be incentivized to overpromise. We construct dependent variables for the amount of money raised

in total and the amount of money raised in excess of the fundraising goal. We regress these dependent variables on an independent variable of the predicted delivery time. If there was a benefit to overpromising, we would expect to see a negative relationship here, with an increase in promised delivery time decreasing the amount of funds raised. As shown in Table [A.14](#), we do not find a statistically significant relationship, suggesting that there is no general incentive to make unrealistic predictions for the sake of upfront financing.<sup>8</sup> This is of course peculiar given the assumed desire of customers to get their products faster, but customers may mentally discount aggressive delivery times because they know they are unrealistic and thus not place any value on them. Overall, we contend that overpromising aggressive delivery times is not the major driver of the main findings.

— INSERT TABLE [A.14](#) INCENTIVE TO OVERPROMISE. —

## A.12 Exiting After VC Financing

We then turn to whether certain types of entrepreneurs are exiting our sample, looking first at whether entrepreneurs are more likely to exit the sample after raising external capital from another source (generally an indicator of higher quality or ability). We test whether high-quality entrepreneurs might exit the sample. In particular, we test the assumption that these higher-quality entrepreneurs may desire and be able to raise venture capital financing and leave crowdfunding. We define a binary indicator of whether the entrepreneur goes on to do a subsequent project as the dependent variable. For projects completed towards the end of our sample timeline, it is unclear whether the entrepreneur has truly exited the sample or is in the process of preparing another campaign. As such, we drop the projects from the last year of our sample when performing this analysis. We then regress the binary indicator of going on to do a subsequent project on a binary indicator of whether the entrepreneur has raised external capital at that time. As shown in Table [A.15](#), we find that raising venture funding does not impact whether entrepreneurs exit the sample or continue on and do another Kickstarter project.

---

<sup>8</sup>We recognize that the product specification is likely correlated with both the predicted time and the funds raised (e.g., really fancy product specifications have longer predicted times, but also raise more money). We include *Features Most* in the regression to try to serve as a proxy for the product specification; however, given that this is an imprecise measure of product specification there is likely still some omitted variable bias. The results are similar if we include *Features Ranks* or *Features Percentile* as controls.

— INSERT TABLE [A.15](#) EXITING AFTER VC FINANCING. —

### **A.13 Exiting After Delay**

We now evaluate whether entrepreneurs disproportionately exit the sample after they delay, which might suggest that entrepreneurs who learn leave while those who do not learn stay. Using the same dependent variable of whether the entrepreneur goes on to do another project and the same sample as the prior section, we regress this indicator of going on to do another project on the delay duration of the current project and do not find a significant effect. This result is shown in Table [A.16](#). As an additional check, we also looked at the distribution of the difference in delay between the second project of entrepreneurs who went on to do a third project matched with the most similar second project by an entrepreneur who did not go on to do a third project. If entrepreneurs left the sample after they delayed, we would expect to see a distribution skewed toward negative values (implying that the second project delay of those who went on to do a third project is smaller than the second project delay of those who exited the sample after two projects). However, we see a roughly normal distribution centered around zero.


— INSERT TABLE [A.16](#) EXITING AFTER DELAY. —

## Appendix References

- Cyert, R. M. & March, J. G. (1963). *A behavioral theory of the firm*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Eggers, J. P. & Kaul, A. (2018). Motivation and ability? A behavioral perspective on the pursuit of radical invention in multi-technology incumbents. *Academy of Management Journal*, 61(1), 67–93.
- Greve, H. R. (1998). Performance, aspirations, and risky organizational change. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 43(1), 58–86.
- Greve, H. R. (2003). A behavioral theory of R&D expenditures and innovations: Evidence from shipbuilding. *Academy of Management Journal*, 46(6), 685–702.
- Joseph, J. & Gaba, V. (2015). The fog of feedback: Ambiguity and firm responses to multiple aspiration levels. *Strategic Management Journal*, 36(13), 1960–1978.
- Kauffman, S. A. (1995). *At home in the universe*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Keum, D. D. & Eggers, J. P. (2018). Setting the bar: The evaluative and allocative roles of organizational aspirations. *Organization Science*, 29(6), 1170–1186.
- Li, E. & Martin, J. S. (2019). Capital formation and financial intermediation: The role of entrepreneur reputation formation. *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 59, 185–201.
- Rinker, T. W. (2019). {sentimentr}: Calculate text polarity sentiment. *GitHub Repository*.
- Sommer, S. C. & Loch, C. H. (2004). Selectionism and learning in projects with complexity and unforeseeable uncertainty. *Management Science*, 50(10), 1334–1347.




# Ringo Robot



## Smart Parts

- 1 Accelerometer
- 2 Motor Driver
- 3 Battery Charger
- 4 Gyroscope
- 5 Arduino UNO MCU








## Ins and Outs

- 6 Ambient Light Sensor
- 7 RGB NeoPixel LED
- 8 IR LED Transmitter
- 9 38kHz TV Remote Receiver
- 10 Piezo Sound Element
- 11 Power Switch
- 12 Reset Button
- 13 User Button
- 14 USB Port for Charging
- 15 Charging Status LED
- 16 Programming Port
- 17 Edge/Line Sensor
- 18 IR LED Surface Illuminator



# Spirit Rover



**Figure A.1: Plum Geek Robotics Product Features.** Reproduction of breakdowns of product features provided by Plum Geek Robotics on its company website. Ringo Robot was its first Kickstarter project, launched on February 25, 2015. The Spirit Rover was its third project, launched on September 28, 2016.

---

---

## Low Complexity



---

### Components


Metal casing  
Left bevel  
Wrench cutout  
Written measurements

---

### Interdependencies to be Addressed

Metal casing dimensions match specified measurements.  
Metal casing will fit in the machine that adds the measurements.  
Writing color will show up and adhere to the metal surface.  
Separate machine can accommodate metal casing to add left bevel.  
Separate machine can accommodate metal casing to add wrench hole.  
Intended functions of the metal casing are not impaired by cutout wrench hole.  
Upper ruler cutout does not fall off or weaken the tool's structural integrity.

## High Complexity



---

### Components

Nozzle  
Printing bed  
Heating apparatus  
Camera  
LED lights  
Color touchscreen  
Bearing spool holder  
Casing  
Power cords  
Circuit board  
Software operating system

---


### Interdependencies to be Addressed

*Only subset included for heating apparatus, bearing spool holder, and casing.*  
Power supply is sufficient for heating apparatus, camera, LEDs, touch screen, etc.  
Bearing spool holder can hold weight of spool and remains balanced with added weight.  
Heating mechanism does not impair function of screen or other electronics.  
Heating apparatus creates correct temperature for input material.  
Casing accommodates LED lights, printing bed, nozzle, touch screen, etc.  
Casing provides appropriate spacing between camera and printing bed for optimal focus.  
Casing allows nozzle sufficient range of motion when printing.  
Bearing spool holder fits the input material.  
Bearing spool holder attaches to casing.


---

---


**Figure A.2: Project Complexity Examples.** Selected projects from sample to illustrate a typical “low” complexity and “high” complexity project. *Components* (or modules) and *Interdependencies to be Addressed* represent only those confirmed by the researchers and likely constitute only a subset of those actually faced by the entrepreneurs. In the context of the NK model, the separate *components* represent N, and *Interdependencies to be Addressed* represent (an observable subset of) K.




**Figure A.3: Variable Distributions.** Visualizations of the distributions of independent variables, with density plots for continuous measures and histograms for those with finite discrete values.



**Figure A.4: Outcome–Aspiration Gap and Accuracy of Strategic Foresight.** In our context, we operationalize the accuracy of strategic foresight as *Unforeseen Interdependencies* and *Delay Duration*.



**Figure A.5: Deviation and Delay.** The binned scatter and linear fit to the left of 0% *Prior Campaign Funding Deviation* show the relationship with *Delay Percent* on the current project and the extent to which the entrepreneur failed to meet her funding threshold on the prior project. To the right, they show the same relationship but for the extent to which the entrepreneur met or exceeded her funding threshold on the prior project.



**Figure A.6: Deviation and Unforeseen Interdependencies.** The binned scatter and linear fit to the left of 0% *Prior Campaign Funding Deviation* show the relationship with *Unforeseen Interdependencies* on the current project and the extent to which the entrepreneur failed to meet her funding threshold on the prior project. To the right, they show the same relationship but for the extent to which the entrepreneur met or exceeded her funding threshold on the prior project.

**Table A.1: Qualitative Interview Sample.** Indexed set of interviewed entrepreneurs. All interviews lasted 30 to 45 minutes and were conducted between January 29, 2020 and June 24, 2020.

	Entrepreneur	Product Subtype	Location	Location Type
1	3DPrintCo CEO	3D Printing	Spicer, MN	Town
2	AccessoryCo CEO	Hardware	Izhevsk, Russia	Town
3	CircuitsCo CEO	DIY Electronics	North Sydney, AU	Suburb
4	ElectronicsCo CEO	DIY Electronics	Preston, UK	Suburb
5	GPSCo CEO	Gadgets	Seattle, WA	Town
6	LEGOCo CEO	Hardware	London, UK	Town
7	MaskCo CEO	Wearables	Montreal, Canada	Town
8	MusicCo CEO	Sound	Austin, TX	Town
9	SecureCo CEO	Hardware	Dublin, Ireland	Town
10	TabletCo CEO	Hardware	Beijing, China	Town
11	WidgetsCo CEO	DIY Electronics	Boulder, CO	Town

**Table A.2: Qualitative Interview Sample Summary Statistics.** Indexed set of interviewed entrepreneurs. All values are averaged across all the projects in the sample by the individual entrepreneur. *Funding Threshold*, *Funding Exceeded*, and *Funding Backers* are all in thousands.

	Funding Threshold	Funding Exceeded	Funding Backers	Unforeseen Interdependencies	Delay Duration	Predicted Time	Actual Time
1	12.5	22	0.1	5.0	33.6	96.8	130.4
2	230.0	504	3.9	14	381.9	148.3	530.2
3	1.1	12	0.5	3.5	27.8	89.5	117.3
4	3.1	14	0.5	1.0	3.7	51.8	55.5
5	10.0	145	2.3	3.0	37.0	59.0	96.0
6	76.4	128	1.1	4.5	154.5	79.6	234.1
7	8.6	165	3.3	1.0	53.5	91.7	145.2
8	42.5	108	0.9	3.5	128.7	107.4	236.1
9	86.7	121	0.5	4.0	359.5	165.6	525.1
10	75.0	929	11.6	2.0	14.0	51.9	65.9
11	8.2	25	0.3	0.5	4.9	112.3	117.2

**Table A.3: Project Reviewer Backgrounds.** Education and experience backgrounds of each of the five individuals hired to rank each entrepreneur’s set of projects according to number of features.

Reviewer	Education	Experience
Reviewer 1	MBA graduate with additional technical masters	12 years experience in computer programming
Reviewer 2	College degree in engineering	Career working at robotics company
Reviewer 3	College degree in business or engineering	2+ years work experience in consulting, banking, or engineering
Reviewer 4	Mechanical engineering and computer science	Freelance web design
Reviewer 5	Senior in high school	Experience in VC diligence and health technology

**Table A.4: Variable Quantiles.** 722 project-level observations. *Funding Threshold*, *Funding Exceeded*, and *Funding Backers* are all in thousands.

Variables	Quantiles				
	0%	25%	50%	75%	100%
Project Experience	0	0	1	1	5
Failed Campaign Experience	0	0	0	0	4
Prior Project Funding Deviation	-1	0	0.05	2.94	85.65
Prior Project Delay	-0.53	0	0	0.42	10.78
Execution Overlap	0	0	0	0	1
External Financing	0	0	0	0	1
New Category	0	0	0	0	1
Elapsed Time	0	0	112.50	538.75	2,458
Prior Updates	0	3	6	9	40
Funding Period	2	30	30	37	60
Funding Reward Tiers	1	6	9	12	34
Funding Reward Size	4	50	99	201.63	5,995
Funding Threshold	0.02	3.85	10.15	30	261.96
Funding Exceeded	0	3.51	17.59	74.92	3,351.36
Funding Backers	0.001	0.12	0.30	0.92	28.14

**Table A.5: Features Increase and Unforeseen Interdependencies.** Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. *p*-values are shown in parentheses.

	Unforeseen Interdependencies		
	Increase		
	Binary	Count	IHS
Features Increase	0.270 (0.000)	1.721 (0.000)	0.735 (0.000)
Prior Updates Binary	0.448 (0.000)		
Prior Updates Count		0.247 (0.000)	
Prior Updates IHS			0.504 (0.000)
Intercept	-0.120 (0.251)	-1.723 (0.000)	-1.199 (0.000)
Observations	722	722	722
R <sup>2</sup>	0.073	0.083	0.107

**Table A.6: Non-Linear Analysis of Complexity and Unforeseen Interdependencies.** Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Robust standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level. *p*-values are shown in parentheses.

	Features Most	Features Rank	Features Percentile	Unforeseen Interdependencies	Ln Unforeseen Interdependencies
Project Experience: Second	0.266 (0.001)	0.417 (0.000)	0.302 (0.000)	1.457 (0.000)	0.270 (0.001)
Project Experience: Third	0.188 (0.133)	0.541 (0.011)	0.234 (0.048)	2.721 (0.000)	0.420 (0.002)
Project Experience: Fourth or More	0.508 (0.024)	1.468 (0.000)	0.457 (0.026)	4.116 (0.000)	0.738 (0.003)
Failed Campaign Experience	0.091 (0.432)	0.184 (0.214)	0.103 (0.291)	0.632 (0.086)	0.184 (0.056)
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation	-0.001 (0.831)	0.000 (0.984)	-0.002 (0.653)	0.003 (0.888)	-0.001 (0.740)
Prior Project Delay	-0.004 (0.917)	-0.038 (0.475)	-0.015 (0.665)	-0.710 (0.000)	-0.133 (0.000)
Execution Overlap	-0.440 (0.005)	-0.488 (0.012)	-0.412 (0.006)	-0.295 (0.651)	0.063 (0.591)
External Financing	0.332 (0.010)	0.244 (0.113)	0.321 (0.011)	1.087 (0.336)	0.135 (0.559)
New Category	-0.013 (0.937)	0.179 (0.450)	0.075 (0.663)	1.686 (0.074)	0.272 (0.211)
Elapsed Time	-0.000 (0.435)	0.000 (0.900)	-0.000 (0.776)	0.004 (0.009)	0.001 (0.000)
Funding Period	0.005 (0.228)	0.008 (0.141)	0.005 (0.158)	0.028 (0.189)	0.006 (0.196)
Funding Reward Tiers	0.007 (0.345)	0.008 (0.505)	0.008 (0.254)	-0.024 (0.502)	-0.004 (0.634)
Funding Reward Size	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.796)	0.000 (0.814)
Ln Funding Threshold	0.035 (0.429)	0.043 (0.424)	0.028 (0.503)	0.745 (0.004)	0.156 (0.000)
Ln Funding Exceeded				0.679 (0.008)	0.080 (0.093)
Ln Funding Backers				-0.032 (0.929)	0.069 (0.299)
Baseline Updates				0.175 (0.001)	
Ln Baseline Updates					0.283 (0.000)
Entrepreneur FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Product Subtype FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.301	0.442	0.299	0.745	0.775
Entrepreneurs	314	314	314	314	314
Observations	722	722	722	722	722

**Table A.7: Non-Linear Analysis of Delivery and Delay.** Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Robust standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level. *p*-values are shown in parentheses.

	Delay Indicator	Delay Duration	Delay Percent	Predicted Time	Actual Time
Project Experience: Second	0.115 (0.038)	44.858 (0.003)	0.717 (0.000)	6.082 (0.151)	49.112 (0.004)
Project Experience: Third	0.262 (0.013)	75.369 (0.006)	1.109 (0.001)	18.816 (0.010)	89.149 (0.004)
Project Experience: Fourth or More	0.362 (0.010)	145.106 (0.002)	1.581 (0.001)	30.063 (0.028)	169.153 (0.001)
Failed Campaign Experience	0.134 (0.132)	-5.134 (0.766)	-0.053 (0.810)	14.622 (0.047)	7.842 (0.739)
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation	-0.003 (0.074)	0.034 (0.939)	-0.004 (0.620)	0.127 (0.450)	0.361 (0.464)
Prior Project Delay	-0.041 (0.050)	-21.968 (0.023)	-0.129 (0.640)	4.629 (0.021)	-19.659 (0.037)
Execution Overlap	-0.050 (0.474)	8.015 (0.839)	1.124 (0.248)	-3.411 (0.687)	6.427 (0.883)
External Financing	0.140 (0.198)	91.972 (0.254)	0.317 (0.548)	22.198 (0.358)	121.857 (0.217)
New Category	0.086 (0.596)	41.691 (0.109)	0.477 (0.091)	5.572 (0.576)	48.525 (0.149)
Elapsed Time	-0.000 (0.448)	-0.096 (0.100)	-0.001 (0.285)	-0.022 (0.271)	-0.112 (0.078)
Funding Period	0.009 (0.000)	1.272 (0.072)	0.003 (0.899)	0.190 (0.448)	1.739 (0.023)
Funding Reward Tiers	0.003 (0.479)	0.765 (0.489)	0.000 (0.989)	-0.165 (0.692)	0.968 (0.459)
Funding Reward Size	0.000 (0.792)	-0.011 (0.707)	0.000 (0.680)	0.005 (0.525)	-0.009 (0.814)
Ln Funding Threshold	0.006 (0.842)	22.322 (0.107)	-0.081 (0.582)	19.326 (0.000)	40.085 (0.011)
Ln Funding Exceeded	0.035 (0.194)	29.877 (0.003)	0.205 (0.081)		29.323 (0.010)
Ln Funding Backers	0.007 (0.852)	-35.697 (0.006)	-0.183 (0.265)		-33.133 (0.031)
Entrepreneur FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Product Subtype FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.663	0.719	0.657	0.753	0.738
Entrepreneurs	306	303	303	314	303
Observations	686	644	644	722	644



**Table A.8: Funding Deviation and Performance.** Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Robust standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level.  $p$ -values are shown in parentheses.

	Delay Percent		Unforeseen Interdependencies	
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation	0.519 (0.569)	-7.227 (0.356)	1.249 (0.468)	5.071 (0.498)
Prior Project Funding Success	-0.110 (0.898)	1.665 (0.247)	0.991 (0.420)	0.108 (0.954)
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation $\times$ Prior Project Funding Success	-0.524 (0.565)	7.238 (0.356)	-1.260 (0.465)	-5.010 (0.503)
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation <sup>2</sup>		-6.814 (0.351)		3.835 (0.572)
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation <sup>2</sup> $\times$ Prior Project Funding Success		6.814 (0.351)		-3.836 (0.572)
Project Experience	-0.045 (0.806)	-0.037 (0.841)	-0.106 (0.769)	-0.136 (0.713)
Failed Campaign Experience	0.081 (0.736)	0.135 (0.580)	0.647 (0.230)	0.651 (0.228)
Prior Project Delay	0.662 (0.023)	0.663 (0.022)	0.193 (0.238)	0.203 (0.222)
Execution Overlap	1.431 (0.210)	1.427 (0.213)	0.734 (0.168)	0.765 (0.155)
External Financing	-0.238 (0.550)	-0.264 (0.500)	0.917 (0.167)	0.799 (0.228)
New Category	-0.765 (0.196)	-0.640 (0.263)	2.876 (0.100)	3.213 (0.072)
Elapsed Time	-0.000 (0.277)	-0.000 (0.285)	0.000 (0.987)	0.000 (0.955)
Funding Period	0.012 (0.343)	0.012 (0.328)	0.003 (0.875)	0.005 (0.790)
Funding Reward Tiers	0.008 (0.565)	0.009 (0.515)	0.077 (0.053)	0.083 (0.042)
Funding Reward Size	0.000 (0.303)	0.000 (0.309)	0.000 (0.618)	0.000 (0.630)
Ln Funding Threshold	-0.069 (0.440)	-0.065 (0.473)	0.762 (0.000)	0.761 (0.000)
Product Subtype FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.205	0.206	0.262	0.271
Sample	2+ Proj	2+ Proj	2+ Proj	2+ Proj
Observations	342	342	402	402

**Table A.9: Predicted Time and Peer Group Comparison.** Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Robust standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level.  $p$ -values are shown in parentheses.

	Predicted Time
Project Experience	7.671 (0.031)
Peer Group Predicted Time	0.042 (0.736)
Failed Campaign Experience	18.161 (0.030)
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation	0.169 (0.304)
Prior Project Delay	4.035 (0.028)
Execution Overlap	-4.249 (0.608)
External Financing	14.281 (0.589)
New Category	9.998 (0.310)
Elapsed Time	-0.017 (0.435)
Funding Period	0.229 (0.356)
Funding Reward Tiers	-0.089 (0.834)
Funding Reward Size	0.004 (0.583)
Ln Funding Threshold	19.965 (0.000)
Entrepreneur FE	Yes
Product Subtype FE	Yes
Year FE	Yes
Month FE	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.757
Entrepreneurs	314
Observations	712

**Table A.10: Funding and Peer Group Comparison.** Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Robust standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level.  $p$ -values are shown in parentheses.

	Ln Funding Exceeded		Funding Positive Deviation	
Peer Group Deviation	0.002 (0.131)	0.002 (0.085)	0.019 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.822)
Project Experience	0.045 (0.668)	0.049 (0.644)	1.792 (0.009)	1.394 (0.053)
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation	-0.155 (0.306)	-0.167 (0.262)	-2.693 (0.002)	-1.204 (0.100)
Failed Campaign Experience	-0.024 (0.000)	-0.024 (0.000)	-0.422 (0.000)	-0.449 (0.000)
Prior Project Delay	0.039 (0.498)	0.037 (0.525)	0.132 (0.622)	0.367 (0.189)
Execution Overlap	-0.363 (0.113)	-0.376 (0.094)	0.645 (0.638)	2.313 (0.190)
External Financing	0.835 (0.286)	0.838 (0.282)	2.277 (0.264)	1.914 (0.327)
New Category	-0.098 (0.739)	-0.110 (0.709)	0.783 (0.606)	2.279 (0.258)
Elapsed Time	0.001 (0.417)	0.001 (0.417)	0.001 (0.834)	0.003 (0.677)
Funding Period	0.016 (0.002)	0.016 (0.002)	0.094 (0.004)	0.067 (0.047)
Funding Reward Tiers	0.030 (0.036)	0.031 (0.030)	0.126 (0.103)	0.019 (0.818)
Funding Reward Size	0.000 (0.219)	0.000 (0.195)	0.002 (0.040)	0.000 (0.897)
Ln Funding Threshold	0.032 (0.671)		-4.043 (0.000)	
Entrepreneur FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Product Subtype FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.850	0.850	0.813	0.783
Entrepreneurs	314	314	314	314
Observations	712	712	712	712

**Table A.11: Consequences of Delay.** Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Robust standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level and are shown in parentheses.  $p$ -values are shown in parentheses.

	Total	Negative	
	Comments	Comments	
Delay Duration	1.710 (0.002)	0.016 (0.000)	0.007 (0.197)
Project Experience			0.145 (0.846)
Delay Duration $\times$ Project Experience			0.011 (0.022)
Failed Campaign Experience	55.540 (0.572)	1.479 (0.144)	1.896 (0.065)
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation	-4.176 (0.491)	-0.005 (0.933)	-0.004 (0.955)
Prior Project Delay	23.430 (0.319)	0.951 (0.008)	0.621 (0.067)
Execution Overlap	-377.799 (0.143)	-1.741 (0.201)	-3.133 (0.024)
External Financing	-518.389 (0.041)	4.748 (0.202)	4.202 (0.251)
New Category	-150.405 (0.191)	-1.322 (0.510)	-1.031 (0.614)
Elapsed Time	-0.632 (0.086)	0.006 (0.052)	0.003 (0.356)
Funding Period	-1.006 (0.834)	0.047 (0.382)	0.058 (0.279)
Funding Reward Tiers	-6.520 (0.365)	-0.190 (0.042)	-0.205 (0.022)
Funding Reward Size	-0.174 (0.048)	-0.004 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.026)
Ln Funding Threshold	-43.482 (0.415)	0.735 (0.184)	0.713 (0.191)
Ln Funding Exceeded	151.209 (0.046)	-0.039 (0.952)	-0.023 (0.971)
Ln Funding Backers	283.235 (0.015)	5.226 (0.000)	5.258 (0.000)
Baseline Updates	-12.661 (0.153)	0.087 (0.402)	0.080 (0.448)
Entrepreneur FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Product Subtype FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.779	0.857	0.860
Entrepreneurs	303	303	303
Observations	644	644	644

**Table A.12: Features and Negative Comments.** Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Robust standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level. *p*-values are shown in parentheses.

	Negative Comments					
Features Most	0.537 (0.441)			1.436 (0.071)		
Features Rank		0.597 (0.181)			1.236 (0.028)	
Features Percentile			0.722 (0.309)			1.729 (0.029)
Delay Duration				0.016 (0.019)	0.018 (0.062)	0.017 (0.015)
Features Most × Delay Duration				-0.002 (0.849)		
Features Rank × Delay Duration					-0.001 (0.743)	
Features Percentile × Delay Duration						-0.003 (0.706)
Project Experience	2.221 (0.059)	2.063 (0.078)	2.184 (0.063)	0.501 (0.585)	0.213 (0.812)	0.428 (0.640)
Failed Campaign Experience	1.522 (0.532)	1.461 (0.549)	1.504 (0.539)	-0.042 (0.970)	-0.285 (0.803)	-0.182 (0.873)
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation	-0.126 (0.115)	-0.126 (0.115)	-0.126 (0.116)	-0.106 (0.170)	-0.107 (0.164)	-0.106 (0.172)
Prior Project Delay	0.994 (0.103)	1.020 (0.095)	0.998 (0.103)	1.019 (0.036)	1.071 (0.027)	1.034 (0.033)
Execution Overlap	-5.064 (0.006)	-4.993 (0.006)	-5.016 (0.006)	-2.685 (0.101)	-2.623 (0.123)	-2.622 (0.104)
External Financing	7.285 (0.039)	7.313 (0.037)	7.219 (0.040)	5.528 (0.198)	5.645 (0.177)	5.596 (0.190)
New Category	-0.745 (0.730)	-0.873 (0.684)	-0.793 (0.712)	-1.232 (0.586)	-1.551 (0.485)	-1.346 (0.546)
Elapsed Time	0.005 (0.392)	0.005 (0.375)	0.005 (0.400)	0.008 (0.231)	0.008 (0.189)	0.008 (0.246)
Funding Period	0.098 (0.083)	0.096 (0.087)	0.096 (0.089)	0.089 (0.139)	0.086 (0.154)	0.087 (0.148)
Funding Reward Tiers	0.011 (0.913)	0.010 (0.919)	0.009 (0.931)	-0.052 (0.664)	-0.051 (0.671)	-0.054 (0.654)
Funding Reward Size	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.008 (0.001)	-0.008 (0.001)	-0.008 (0.001)
Ln Funding Threshold	2.067 (0.001)	2.052 (0.001)	2.069 (0.001)	1.878 (0.003)	1.875 (0.003)	1.892 (0.002)
Entrepreneur FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Product Subtype FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.776	0.776	0.776	0.814	0.815	0.815
Entrepreneurs	314	314	314	303	303	303
Observations	722	722	722	644	644	644

**Table A.13: Creator Engagement.** Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Robust standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level. *p*-values are shown in parentheses.

	Creator Engagement
Project Experience	1660.434 (0.021)
Failed Campaign Experience	1510.288 (0.019)
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation	9.544 (0.653)
Prior Project Delay	-462.340 (0.023)
Execution Overlap	-1931.397 (0.237)
External Financing	687.536 (0.508)
New Category	719.917 (0.219)
Elapsed Time	-2.272 (0.241)
Funding Period	4.890 (0.820)
Funding Reward Tiers	-79.848 (0.072)
Funding Reward Size	-1.240 (0.067)
Ln Funding Threshold	1247.513 (0.071)
Ln Funding Exceeded	1187.129 (0.011)
Ln Funding Backers	-836.528 (0.284)
Baseline Updates	215.579 (0.034)
Entrepreneur FE	Yes
Product Subtype FE	Yes
Year FE	Yes
Month FE	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.720
Entrepreneurs	306
Observations	626

**Table A.14: Incentive to Overpromise.** Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Robust standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level.  $p$ -values are shown in parentheses.

	Ln Funds Raised	Ln Funding Exceeded
Predicted Time	0.001 (0.102)	0.002 (0.247)
Features Rank	0.111 (0.026)	0.169 (0.053)
Failed Campaign Experience	-0.097 (0.319)	-0.196 (0.149)
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation	-0.022 (0.001)	-0.026 (0.000)
Prior Project Delay	0.024 (0.454)	0.044 (0.435)
Execution Overlap	-0.163 (0.212)	-0.349 (0.125)
External Financing	0.137 (0.680)	0.302 (0.660)
New Category	0.023 (0.906)	-0.172 (0.559)
Project Experience	0.082 (0.182)	0.044 (0.665)
Elapsed Time	0.001 (0.509)	0.001 (0.477)
Funding Period	0.012 (0.002)	0.014 (0.005)
Funding Reward Tiers	0.023 (0.004)	0.031 (0.025)
Funding Reward Size	0.000 (0.198)	0.000 (0.328)
Ln Funding Threshold	0.405 (0.000)	0.015 (0.843)
Entrepreneur FE	Yes	Yes
Product Subtype FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.923	0.840
Entrepreneurs	314	314
Observations	722	722

**Table A.15: Exiting After VC Financing.** Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Robust standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level.  $p$ -values are shown in parentheses.

	Does Another Project
External Financing	0.033 (0.819)
Failed Campaign Experience	0.052 (0.617)
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation	-0.004 (0.124)
Prior Project Delay	-0.028 (0.132)
Execution Overlap	-0.081 (0.408)
New Category	-0.199 (0.042)
Project Experience	-0.394 (0.000)
Elapsed Time	-0.001 (0.001)
Funding Period	-0.003 (0.237)
Funding Reward Tiers	0.008 (0.195)
Funding Reward Size	0.000 (0.217)
Ln Funding Threshold	-0.035 (0.254)
Ln Funding Exceeded	0.030 (0.354)
Ln Funding Backers	-0.005 (0.921)
Entrepreneur FE	Yes
Product Subtype FE	Yes
Year FE	Yes
Month FE	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.770
Entrepreneurs	304
Observations	641



**Table A.16: Exiting After Delay.** Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Robust standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level.  $p$ -values are shown in parentheses.

	Does Another Project
Delay Duration	-0.0003 (0.194)
Failed Campaign Experience	0.235 (0.116)
Prior Campaign Funding Deviation	-0.004 (0.159)
Prior Project Delay	-0.024 (0.337)
Execution Overlap	-0.034 (0.785)
New Category	-0.266 (0.049)
Project Experience	-0.344 (0.000)
Elapsed Time	-0.001 (0.016)
Funding Period	-0.003 (0.352)
Funding Reward Tiers	0.008 (0.238)
Funding Reward Size	0.000 (0.527)
Ln Funding Threshold	-0.042 (0.259)
Ln Funding Exceeded	0.045 (0.280)
Ln Funding Backers	-0.014 (0.821)
Entrepreneur FE	Yes
Product Subtype FE	Yes
Year FE	Yes
Month FE	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.780
Entrepreneurs	294
Observations	581