

Men as Cultural Ideals: Cultural Values Moderate Gender Stereotype Content

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Four studies tested whether cultural values moderate the content of gender stereotypes, such that male stereotypes more closely align with core cultural values (specifically, individualism vs. collectivism) than do female stereotypes. In Studies 1 and 2, using different measures, Americans rated men as less collectivistic than women, whereas Koreans rated men as more collectivistic than women. In Study 3, bicultural Korean Americans who completed a survey in English about American targets rated men as less collectivistic than women, whereas those who completed the survey in Korean about Korean targets did not, demonstrating how cultural frames influence gender stereotype content. Study 4 established generalizability by reanalyzing Williams and Best's (1990) cross-national gender stereotype data across 26 nations. National individualism–collectivism scores predicted viewing collectivistic traits as more—and individualistic traits as less—stereotypically masculine. Taken together, these data offer support for the *cultural moderation of gender stereotypes hypothesis*, qualifying past conclusions about the universality of gender stereotype content.

Keywords: gender stereotypes, stereotype content, culture, individualism, collectivism

Men are stereotyped as self-oriented and women as other-oriented. The preceding statement represents a consensus based on decades of research (Kite, Deaux, & Haines, 2008; Wood & Eagly, 2010). However, theories of intergroup social stratification, which posit that people attribute the most culturally valued traits to dominant groups (Ridgeway, 2001; Ridgeway, Boyle, Kuipers, & Robinson, 1998), imply that gender stereotype content should vary depending on differences in nations' core cultural values. Specifically, because men dominate (both economically and politically) in virtually all nations (UN Development Programme, 2013), national stereotypes of men should reflect the culture's most valued traits. If so, in cross-national comparisons, men should be stereotyped as collectivistic (i.e., other-oriented) in collectivistic

cultures and individualistic (i.e., self-oriented) in individualistic cultures, qualifying past conclusions about cross-cultural consistency in gender stereotypes.

The logic for our hypothesis that cultural values moderate gender stereotypes is supported by several theories. Expectation states theory (Berger, Conner, & Fisek, 1981; Berger & Zelditch, 1998; see Correll & Ridgeway, 2003, for a review) proposes that widely shared cultural beliefs associate status characteristics and expectations (i.e., personal traits and abilities that are highly socially valued) with higher status groups, and that both advantaged and disadvantaged groups assign socially valued traits more to higher status group members than to lower status group members (e.g., Ridgeway, 2001; Ridgeway et al., 1998). Similarly, social dominance theory and system justification theory describe how people justify existing systems of social stratification by endorsing legitimating myths and stereotypes that attribute the most culturally valued traits to dominant social groups (Ho et al., 2012; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Even social identity theory, which emphasizes preference for one's in-group, suggests that social hierarchy shapes the form that in-group favoritism takes: because high status groups, who have greater social influence, claim the most socially valued traits as their own, lower status groups rely on "social creativity" to redefine less valued traits as favorably distinguishing them (Tajfel, 1981). In sum, all of these theories offer support for the notion that people should assign the most valued traits in each culture to dominant groups.

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Susan Crotty is now an independent market research and management consultant in Charlotte, NC. We thank Bonneil Koo for his help with Study 3 data collection; Tori Brescoll, Adam Galinsky, Kathleen McGinn, and Tyler Okimoto for their helpful comments on this research; and Nico Thornley for his help preparing the manuscript.

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Given that men possess higher status than women in virtually every society (e.g., UN Development Programme, 2013), male stereotypes theoretically should match each society's core cultural values. Although there has been extensive research on how status beliefs develop (e.g., Ridgeway et al., 1998), underlie racial prejudices (e.g., Ho, Sidanius, Cuddy, & Banaji, 2013; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and drive behavior (see Correll & Ridgeway, 2003), to our knowledge, no research has empirically tested whether core cultural values shape the specific content of gender stereotypes.

Culture Moderates the Content of Gender Stereotypes

We propose and test the *cultural moderation of gender stereotypes hypothesis* (which, for brevity, we subsequently refer to as the *cultural moderation hypothesis*): Stereotypes of men more closely align with core cultural values than do stereotypes of women. In other words, characteristics that are particularly valued in a culture should be ascribed more to men in that culture when compared with cultures that do not particularly value those characteristics. By “valued,” we do not merely mean positively valenced characteristics, but characteristics that garner respect because they match core cultural values. For example, as the women-are-wonderful effect shows, women are positively evaluated as a group because they are associated with likable traits (e.g., nurturance and warmth; Eagly & Mladinic, 1994). Perceivers evaluate such traits as highly positive; however, in Western, individualistic nations, these traits are not highly respected or valued in that they are associated with unpaid work, rather than with high status roles such as leadership and management (Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011) or with having power (Glick et al., 2004).

In the current paper, we examine the cultural moderation hypothesis in the context of the individualism–collectivism (I-C) dimension, which not only closely parallels the self-oriented–other-oriented distinction central to gender stereotypes but also represents one of the most fundamental and widely studied cultural value distinctions in psychology (e.g., Oyserman, Coon, & Kimmelmeier, 2002; Triandis, 1989). For these reasons, comparing gender stereotypes in individualistic versus collectivistic cultures offers an ideal context in which to test the cultural moderation hypothesis. Individualistic cultures emphasize individual rights and self-assertion, valuing self-oriented traits such as independence and autonomy; by contrast, collectivistic cultures emphasize social connectedness and fulfilling social roles and obligations, valuing other-oriented traits such as nurturance and deference (Hofstede, 1980; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Schwartz, 1994; Triandis, 1989; Wan et al., 2007).

Gender stereotype researchers have most frequently used the terms *agency* (i.e., self-oriented) versus *communion* (i.e., other-oriented) to capture gender stereotype content. Based on prior research, we view agency–communality and individualistic–collectivistic as different labels for the same dimension. A comprehensive factor analysis by Abele and Wojciszke (2007) in a Western sample supports the idea that agentic and communal traits are synonymous with, respectively, individualistic and collectivistic traits. Specifically, Abele and Wojciszke selected 300 traits characterized in prior research as indicating agency, masculinity, self-profitability, competence, or individualism versus communal, femininity, other-profitability, warmth, or collectivism, and asked Polish¹ participants to rate each of the traits on how well they matched one of the dimensions listed above. Based on their

analyses, Abele and Wojciszke (2007) concluded that agency and individualism on the one hand, and communion and collectivism on the other, are synonymous: agency and individualism both represent a focus on the self, whereas communion and collectivism both represent a focus on others. For consistency and because our hypotheses concern the cultural values of I-C, we use the labels “individualistic” and “collectivistic” to refer to the stereotype dimensions that are often labeled as agency–communion.

Putting the Cultural Moderation Hypothesis in Context: Relation to Past Theories

Past theories suggest that structural factors—most prominently, the relative degree of gender inequality and separation in gender roles—affect the content of gender stereotypes. We do not view the cultural moderation hypothesis as incompatible with these theories. Rather, it adds a previously unexamined reason for cross-cultural variation in gender stereotypes (cultural values) that prior theories do not address. Below we outline how the cultural moderation hypothesis is distinct from prior theories.

Ambivalent Sexism Theory

Ambivalent sexism theory focuses on social structural differences between men and women, emphasizing how men's greater power and status, combined with intimate interdependence between the sexes, affects gender attitudes (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001). The theory posits that both hostility toward women who challenge men's power and patronizing benevolence toward women who conform to traditional expectations combine to reinforce gender inequality. Further, it proposes that men are also targets of ambivalence because status and power foster both admiration and resentment. Cross-cultural studies measuring ambivalent sexism toward both sexes support the theory's contention that structural gender inequality predicts greater ambivalence toward both sexes (i.e., higher scores on benevolent and hostile sexism toward both women and men; Glick et al., 2000, 2004).

Ambivalent sexism research has focused more on stereotype valence than content. However, in their development of the Ambivalence Toward Men Inventory, Glick and Fiske (1999) contended that men's structural power creates stereotypes of men as dominant. Glick et al. (2004) tested this idea in three national samples. Respondents rated their spontaneous stereotypes of men and women on (a) valence and (b) the degree to which the traits were associated with dominance. These ratings revealed that although male stereotypes were rated less positively overall than female stereotypes, male stereotypes were more strongly associated with dominance.

Dominance represents a trait dimension distinct from individualism and collectivism. For example, cross-cultural researchers have explicitly considered hierarchy/dominance to be separate from I-C, proposing an orthogonal “horizontal–vertical” dimension (e.g., Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Individualism does not imply desire to exert authority over others, but rather freedom from authority; likewise, collectivism does not necessarily imply a flat social structure but can include strict hierarchies that differentiate

¹ Poland is an individualistic culture; on Hofstede's (2001) national I-C scale Poland scores 60.

roles and obligations. Similarly, although gender research has sometimes conflated dominance traits with agency, factor analyses by Rudman and Mescher (2013) have shown that dominance represents a dimension distinct from agency in gender stereotypes. Thus, both relevant research literatures (on cultural values, on gender stereotypes) suggest that ambivalent sexism theory makes predictions about a trait dimension (dominance) this is distinct from the individualistic–collectivistic dimension relevant to the cultural moderation hypothesis.

In sum, the focus on different causes (structural gender inequality vs. core cultural values) and different dimensions in stereotypes about men (dominance vs. cultural values such as individualism and collectivism) distinguish ambivalent sexism theory from the cultural moderation hypothesis. However, we do not consider the two approaches to represent mutually exclusive alternatives, but rather as addressing different pieces of the gender stereotype content puzzle.

Stereotype Content Model

Although not specifically a theory about gender, the stereotype content model proposes two universal dimensions of stereotype content: warmth (traits such as sincere, good-natured, and friendly) and competence (traits such as intelligent, capable, and skillful). A group's structural cooperation versus competition (i.e., interdependence) with other groups in society determines stereotypes about its warmth, whereas a group's socioeconomic status determines stereotypes about its competence (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Previous research demonstrates that warmth and competence are universal dimensions of cognition and that, across cultures, a group's perceived interdependence predicts stereotypes about its warmth and its perceived status predicts stereotypes about its competence (Cuddy et al., 2009; for reviews, see Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007), which subsequently predict specific patterns of intergroup emotions and behaviors (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007).

Abele and Wojciszke's (2007) comprehensive factor analysis (reviewed above) suggested that competence traits are part of the general agentic or individualistic trait dimension and warm traits part of the general communal or collectivistic trait dimension, making it important to consider how the stereotype content model relates to our current hypothesis. Although we agree that warmth overlaps with collectivism, we suggest that competence is not universally associated with individualism, but that cultural values moderate whether individualistic or collectivistic traits are associated with competence. If collectivistic traits have greater value and garner more respect in collectivistic (compared with individualistic) cultures, then to be considered "competent" (a universally high status trait; Cuddy et al., 2009) in such cultures ought logically also to require demonstrating collectivistic traits (e.g., the ability to promote group harmony would be more associated with competence in a collectivistic vs. individualistic culture). By contrast, in individualistic cultures, competence should be linked to individualistic traits, as Abele and Wojciszke demonstrated in a Western, individualistic sample from Poland.

Stereotype content model theorists have not previously considered whether competence is more or less associated with individualistic versus collectivistic traits depending on cultural values. In a recent series of studies, however, Torelli, Leslie, Stoner, and

Puente (2014) provide suggestive evidence consistent with such a cultural shift. They found that people in collectivistic (compared with individualistic cultures) placed much greater importance on enacting collectivistic behaviors to attain status, success, respect, and admiration from supervisors at work. These findings suggest that collectivists (compared with individualists) view collectivistic traits as more aligned with status and competence.

A cultural shift in the traits associated with demonstrating competence would fit with our overall view that men are assigned culturally valued traits. In collectivistic cultures, we posit that men are viewed as more collectivistic and that competence (which is universally valued) is associated with collectivistic traits. By contrast, in individualistic cultures, we posit that men are viewed as more collectivistic and that competence is associated with individualistic traits. In other words, competence should be stereotyped as masculine in both individualistic and collectivistic cultures, but we suggest that the specific traits associated with demonstrating competence are moderated by cultural values.

Although viewing men as competent as well as having culturally valued (individualistic or collectivistic) traits requires a shift in "what is considered competent," there is no reason to expect cultural moderation in the association between the stereotype content model's warmth dimension and collectivistic traits. Rather, we posit a cultural shift in how much these traits are valued or respected, such that warmth (which remains part of the general collectivism dimension) garners more respect in collectivistic (vs. individualistic) cultures.

In sum, the cultural moderation hypothesis has important implications for the stereotype content model, introducing a previously unanticipated hypothesis. Specifically, we aim to show that cultural values moderate the degree to which people view individualistic or collectivistic (warm) traits as being related to competence in a manner that supports assigning both competence and culturally valued (individualistic or collectivistic) traits to men as the dominant group.

Social Role Theory

Social role theory (Eagly, 1987; for a recent review, see Wood & Eagly, 2010) posits that the gendered division of labor determines both gender stereotype content and gender differences in actual behavior. In general, women's traditional domestic and relational roles require collectivistic traits and behaviors (e.g., successful child-rearing requires nurturance and putting others' needs first). By contrast, success in the competitive job market typically requires men to enact individualistic traits (e.g., looking out for their own interests and cultivating self-assertion). Enacting gendered roles demands role-consistent behavior, shaping personality and inducing hormonal changes that reinforce gender differences in behavior. Role divisions also create social pressure to conform to gender stereotypes; counterstereotypical behavior is discouraged and punished in both children and adults. Stereotypical behavior then further reinforces gender stereotypes. The link between social roles and stereotypes is supported by research using experimental manipulations of social roles in hypothetical groups (e.g., Hoffman & Hurst, 1990) and examining historical and projected increases in American women's perceived individualism as they have increasingly moved into the paid workforce (Diekmann & Eagly, 2000).

Social role theory differs from the cultural moderation hypothesis because roles and cultural values represent distinct constructs. Social role theory makes predictions about stereotypes based on the specific behaviors required by role-defined tasks. For example, being an effective caregiver to young children requires behaviors such as closely monitoring the child's needs or providing food and comfort that, in turn, require certain kinds of traits (e.g., a nurturing disposition). Women's caregiving role, therefore, leads them to enact and develop nurturing traits, which become incorporated into stereotypes about women. By contrast, cultural values represent much broader, socially shared beliefs about which behaviors and traits are generally important, good, right, or desirable (Schwartz, 1994; Triandis, 1989). Cultural values transcend specific roles or tasks, representing a much broader social agreement about valued traits.

In other words, roles are task-specific and cultural values are not. Social role theory broadly predicts gender stereotypes of women as collectivistic and men as individualistic because of the pan-cultural tendency for women to be assigned child-rearing and domestic roles and men to have greater involvement in competitive markets. However, social role theory does suggest that cultural variations in gender stereotypes would occur on the basis of the traits required for specific gender-segregated roles within each culture (A. Eagly, personal communication, February 28, 2014). For example, a high proportion of women in the workforce would not alter stereotypes of women's collectivism if working women mainly held jobs that require nurturing traits (e.g., day care worker, elementary school teacher, nurse) instead of individualistic assertion. By contrast, our cultural moderation hypothesis suggests that variations in cultural values, a factor not accounted for in social role theory, influence the content of gender stereotypes.

It is possible that cultural values influence the behavior required by different social roles. For example, Torelli et al., (2014) found that within collectivistic cultures, communal behaviors (e.g., promoting social harmony) are viewed as correlated with success in male-dominated business roles. Therefore, men in collectivistic (compared with individualistic) cultures may engage in more collectivistic behaviors to gain success, which in turn may create more collectivistic cultural stereotypes about men. Although it is beyond the scope of the current paper to test whether cultural values influence the specific behaviors required by social roles in different cultures, the possibility represents one way to reconcile social role theory with our notion that cultural values moderate gender stereotypes.

In sum, as with the other theories reviewed above, social role theory makes predictions that are distinct from, but not incompatible with, the cultural moderation hypothesis. We suggest that cultural values represent one of many social factors that determine gender stereotype content.

Overview

Four studies test the *cultural moderation of gender stereotype content hypothesis*: stereotypes of men align more closely with the core cultural values of a given culture than do stereotypes of women. This hypothesis identifies a cause distinct from the structural factors identified by ambivalent sexism theory, the stereotype content model, and social role theory; as noted above, we do not propose that cultural moderation is a direct competitor to these

other theories, but rather suggest that it identifies an additional, previously overlooked factor that contributes to cross-cultural variation in gender stereotypes. In Study 1, we examine the extent to which people from an individualistic (the United States) versus a collectivistic (South Korea) culture stereotype men and women on individualism and collectivism. In Study 2, we develop and use a more sophisticated measure of I-C, asking Americans and Koreans to rate men and women on behaviors reflecting the two traits—such as the closeness of their friendship ties. Study 3 uses these same measures to explore whether bicultural individuals (Korean Americans) perceive men and women as more individualistic or collectivistic depending on the culture they consider (the United States or South Korea). Study 3 therefore tests how temporary (as opposed to chronic) cultural framing affects gender stereotypes. Finally, to determine whether these two-culture comparisons generalize, Study 4 reanalyzes the most extensive cross-cultural dataset on gender stereotype content: Williams and Best's (1990) study of more than two dozen diverse nations, in which respondents classified the stereotypic masculinity of 300 traits. These data are uniquely suited to testing whether national levels of I-C moderate gender stereotype content on relevant (individualistic vs. collectivistic) traits.

Study 1: Individualistic and Collectivistic Stereotypes

In Study 1 we asked Korean and American participants to rate the extent to which their societies viewed two traits—communal and individualistic²—as more typical of women or of men. We chose these two countries because they are high on collectivism (South Korea) and individualism (United States). Specifically, on Hofstede's (2001) commonly used Bipolar Individualism–Collectivism Scale, which ranges from 1 to 100 with higher numbers representing greater individualism and lower numbers indicating greater collectivism, United States scores 91 (individualistic) and South Korea scores 18 (collectivistic).

We anticipated cultural moderation such that (Hypothesis 1; H_1) Koreans would rate the term communal as more typical of men than do Americans, and (Hypothesis 2; H_2) Americans would rate the term individualistic as more typical of men than do Koreans.

Method

Participants. The Korean sample included 103 students (62% female, $M_{\text{age}} = 21.8$) at the Seoul National University in South Korea who completed the questionnaire in exchange for course credit. The American sample included 78 undergraduate and graduate students (59% female, $M_{\text{age}} = 26.5$) who completed the questionnaire online, along with several unrelated ones, for payment. Three non-U.S. residents were dropped from the sample, bringing the final N to 75.

Materials and procedure. All participants read the following instructions in their respective language:

² We chose *communal* as a synonym for *collectivistic* because we believe the former is less awkward than the latter when used to describe individuals (“He is communal” vs. “He is collectivistic”), whereas “individualistic” works to describe both individuals and groups. Jihye Chong, who conducted the studies in Korea, agreed that *communal* was more natural than *collectivistic*.

To what extent is each of the following traits viewed by society as more true of women or more true of men? Using the scale below, please rate the extent to which each trait generally applies to women or men. There are no right or wrong answers. We are simply asking for your impressions.

They were then asked to rate the two traits—communal and individualistic—on a 7-point scale: -3 (*much more true of women*), -2 (*somewhat more true of women*), -1 (*slightly more true of women*), 0 (*equally true of women and men*), $+1$ (*slightly more true of men*), $+2$ (*somewhat more true of men*), $+3$ (*much more true of men*). The Korean version of the questionnaire was translated and back-translated by two bilingual translators. No discrepancies were identified in the back-translation.

Results and Discussion

We first conducted a 2 (culture: Korea vs. United States) \times 2 (trait: communal vs. individualistic) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on the second factor. As predicted, the interaction between culture and trait was significant, $F(1, 175) = 120.41, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .41$.³ For more focused tests of our hypotheses we conducted two one-way ANOVAs testing the effect of culture on the two traits of interest. We found support for both of our hypotheses: (H_1) Koreans ($M = 0.79, SD = 1.30$) rated the term communal as more typical of men than Americans did ($M = -1.13, SD = 1.34, F(1, 176) = 92.00, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .34$, and (H_2) Americans ($M = 0.77, SD = 1.38$) rated the term individualistic as more typical of men than Koreans did ($M = -0.76, SD = 1.24, F(1, 176) = 59.40, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .25$). Not only were ratings of the masculinity or femininity of the terms *communal* and *individualistic* moderated by culture, but all means differed significantly from the midpoint of the scale (0: equally true of women and men). Koreans rated “communal” as characteristic of men (i.e., as significantly greater than zero), one-sample $t(102) = 6.12, p < .001, d = 1.21$, and “individualistic” as characteristic of women, one-sample $t(102) = 6.20, p < .001, d = 1.23$; whereas Americans rated “communal” as characteristic of women, one-sample $t(74) = 7.33, p < .001, d = 1.70$, and “individualistic” as characteristic of men, one-sample $t(74) = 4.80, p < .001, d = 1.12$ (see Figure 1).

These results provide initial support for the cultural moderation hypothesis, demonstrating not only moderation in the content of gender stereotypes by cultural value systems, but a reversal in gender stereotypes in a collectivistic compared with an individualistic society: men (compared with women) were viewed as possessing significantly more of the culturally valued trait—communality in Korea and individualism in the United States—and, conversely, women were perceived as possessing more of the opposing, and less culturally valued, trait than men.

Study 2: Perceptions of Individualistic and Collectivistic Behaviors

Study 1 provided support for our hypothesis at the level of trait judgments; in Study 2, we move beyond traits to measure perceptions of men and women on *behaviors* reflecting the traits of interest—individualism and collectivism. Collectivistic cultures, significantly more than individualistic cultures, stress cohesion and closeness within their respective communities; members of a rel-




Figure 1. Study 1: Ratings of the extent to which “communal” and “individualistic” are more typical of women (<0) or men (>0) as a function of participants’ culture (Korea or United States).

atively small community, a culturally important social network, are often expected to be “connected” to others in their community (e.g., Triandis, 1989). In Study 2, American and Korean participants were presented with segments of social networks within a small community, and then asked to predict the social closeness among members of the network. For instance, they were told that “Katie and Linda are friends” and that “Linda and Mary are friends”; our measure of perceived collectivism was participants’ perceptions of (a) whether Katie and Mary—one node removed in the network—were also friends, and (b) how close their friendship was. Our goal in constructing these particular dependent variables was to begin to establish convergent validity by measuring participants’ perceptions of behaviors that reflect individualism and collectivism—the extent of closeness within a meaningful social network (i.e., the targets’ own community)—rather than simply asking participants to rate the targets on the specific traits (i.e., individualism and collectivism) themselves. Participants rated either members of all-male networks or members of all-female networks.

Based on the results of Study 1, we predicted that (Hypothesis 3; H_3) Americans would perceive men to be more individualistic (i.e., as having weaker ties within their community’s social network) than women, but that Koreans would perceive men to be more collectivistic (i.e., as having stronger ties within their community’s social network) than women.

Method

Participants. The Korean sample included 100 undergraduate students (52% female, $M_{age} = 22.0$) at the Korea University in

³ Sex of participant had no main or interaction effects in Studies 1–3, for which sex of participant was known. Sex of participant data were not available for Study 4 analyses.

Seoul, South Korea who completed the questionnaire in exchange for course credit. The American sample included 100 undergraduate students (56% female, $M_{\text{age}} = 20.1$) at Rutgers University in New Jersey who completed the questionnaire, followed by several unrelated ones, in exchange for course credit. One incomplete questionnaire was dropped from the analyses.

Materials and procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to complete a questionnaire that measured perceived collectivistic orientations of male or female targets. They read a vignette about a fictitious American (in the American sample) or South Korean (in the Korean sample) small town whose residents had purportedly completed a questionnaire that assessed their social networks by measuring their reports of who their friends were. American participants read the following description (whereas South Korean participants read an identical description in Korean, but describing Korean individuals in a Korean town):

All of the following people reside in Winterport, Massachusetts. Recently, five hundred Winterport residents completed the CiTY (Communities, Towns, and Youth) Survey, an in-depth questionnaire on the health of communities and local economies. The following people were participants in the CiTY Survey, which also assessed people's social networks—people's reports of who their friends are.

All participants were presented with five segments of a social network made up of town residents, each of which listed two pairs of friends. To make the task more engaging, three of the networks included three people with a shared friend (e.g., “Matt and George are friends. George and John are friends”) and two included four people without a shared friend (e.g., “Adam and Sam are friends. Joe and Tom are friends.”).⁴ Because social networks in small collectivistic communities are expected to be quite close-knit, participants in collectivistic cultures should not see it as particularly unusual for people in the same community, even without an explicitly identified shared friend, to also be friends.

For each of the segments, participants were asked to estimate the collectivism between the first and last person listed (Matt and John, or Adam and Tom, respectively). On a 10-point scale ranging from “0%–10%” to “91%–100%,” they answered the question, “What’s the probability that [the first person] and [the last person] also are friends?” Next, they were asked to “circle the picture below that best describes the relationship between [the first person] and [the last person]” followed by a 5-point scale depicting the relationship between two circles, ranging from two distant, nonoverlapping circles to two almost entirely overlapping circles (adapted from Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). To create a composite measure of perceived collectivism, we combined the responses from the circles measure with the responses from the probability measure. Because the two scales differed in number of points (5 points for the circles; 10 points for the percentages), we followed Aiken’s (1987) recommendation to equate ratings on different scales before merging them, by first converting responses on the circles measure from a 5-point to a 10-point scale, and then averaging them to create a composite measure of perceived collectivism (South Korea $\alpha = .85$, U.S. $\alpha = .78$).

The questionnaire was originally written in English. The Korean version was translated to Korean by a bilingual translator, and then back-translated by a second bilingual translator. No discrepancies were identified in the back-translation.

Results and Discussion

To test our hypothesis (H_3) that Americans would perceive men to be more individualistic than women, but that Koreans would perceive men to be more collectivistic than women, we entered the perceived collectivism ratings into a 2 (culture: South Korea, United States) \times 2 (sex of target: male, female) between-subjects ANOVA. The culture by sex of target interaction was significant, $F(1, 195) = 9.27, p = .003, \eta_p^2 = .05$ (see Figure 2). Simple effects tests using the overall error term revealed that, as we predicted, American participants rated the male targets as marginally less collectivistic (i.e., more individualistic, $M = 4.14, SD = 1.16$) than the female targets ($M = 4.65, SD = 1.28$), $F(1, 195) = 3.11, p = .08, \eta_p^2 = .02$. Most importantly, Korean participants showed the predicted opposite pattern, rating the male targets ($M = 4.95, SD = 1.75$) as significantly more collectivistic than the female targets ($M = 4.22, SD = 1.51$), $F(1, 195) = 6.48, p = .01, \eta_p^2 = .03$. Similarly, Americans rated the male targets as significantly more individualistic than Koreans, $F(1, 195) = 7.80, p = .006, \eta_p^2 = .04$, and Americans rated the female targets as nonsignificantly more collectivistic than Koreans, $F(1, 195) = 2.26, p = .13, \eta_p^2 = .01$. There were no main effects, $F_s < 1, p_s > .35$.

Consistent with Study 1, these results support our hypothesis that men are perceived as possessing more of the characteristic that reflects a fundamental value in their culture: collectivism in South Korea and individualism in the United States. As in Study 1, the contents of the gender stereotypes reversed, with men being viewed as more collectivistic than women among South Koreans. These data offer further evidence that gender stereotypes of individualism and collectivism are not universal, but are moderated by cultural values: In cultures where collectivism is valued, men—and not women—were seen as having more collectivistic social networks.

Study 3: Manipulating Cultural Frames

Studies 1 and 2 revealed that Americans and Koreans differed in their ratings of the I-C of men and women, thus suggesting the presence of cultural differences in how men and women are perceived. However, given that we could not randomly assign participants to cultures, Studies 1 and 2 do not allow us to make any claims about the causality of the relationship between cultural values and the contents of gender stereotypes. Taking a step closer toward establishing a causal link, we manipulated the cultural frame of Korean American participants, randomly assigning half of them to complete a survey in English and rate American social networks, and the other half to complete the same survey in Korean and rate Korean networks. For bicultural people (e.g., Chinese Americans), language (e.g., Mandarin vs. English, respectively) cues the associated culture (e.g., Chinese vs. American, respectively), thus priming that culture’s norms and values (e.g., collectivism vs. individualism, respectively; Ross, Xun, & Wilson, 2002).

⁴ All names used in the U.S. version of the questionnaire were among the 50 most popular names in the United States for at least one decade of the 20th century, according to U.S. Census Bureau data. Although we were not able to identify a similar resource in South Korea, popular names were also selected for the Korean version of the questionnaire.




Figure 2. Study 2: Collectivism ratings for male and female targets as a function of participants' culture (Korea or United States).

We expected that completing the questionnaire in Korean about Korean targets would prime a Korean cultural frame, whereas completing the questionnaire in English about American targets would prime an American cultural frame. We therefore predicted that (Hypothesis 4; H_4) results from Korean American participants who completed the survey in English would resemble those of our American participants from Study 2—rating women as more collectivistic than men—whereas results from those who completed the survey in Korean would resemble those of our Korean participants from Study 2—rating men as more collectivistic than women.

Method

Participants. Sixty Korean American Rutgers University undergraduate and graduate students (47% female, $M_{\text{age}} = 20.0$) volunteered to complete the questionnaire. Four incomplete questionnaires were excluded from the analyses. Participants were recruited at meetings of extracurricular organizations and via acquaintances. Seventy-three percent of the participants were born in the United States, whereas 27% were born in South Korea. For 95% of participants, both parents were born in South Korea. Eighty-one percent of participants reported that Korean was the primary language spoken in their childhood households; only these participants ($n = 47$), who we expected to have equal access to both cultural frames, were included in the analyses.

Materials and procedure. We used the same materials as in Study 2. Half of the participants completed the survey in English—about Americans in a town in the United States—and half completed the survey in Korean—about Koreans in a South Korean town.

As in Study 2, we collapsed across all 10 items to create a composite closeness measure (Korean $\alpha = .67$, American $\alpha = .88$).

Results and Discussion

To test whether (H_4) participants who completed the survey in English rated women as more collectivistic than men and those who completed the survey in Korean rated men as more collec-

tivistic than women, we conducted a 2 (cultural frame: American, Korean) \times 2 (sex of target: male, female) between-subjects ANOVA. We found no main effect of cultural frame ($F < 1, p > .30$), but there was a main effect of sex of target, with male targets receiving overall lower closeness ratings than female targets, $F(1, 43) = 7.74, p = .008, \eta_p^2 = .15$. Most importantly, however, this main effect was qualified by the predicted interaction, $F(1, 43) = 23.31, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .35$ (see Figure 3). Simple effects tests using the overall error term revealed that, as predicted, participants completing the American version of the questionnaire rated male targets as significantly less collectivistic (i.e., more individualistic, $M = 3.31, SD = 1.10$) than female targets ($M = 5.88, SD = 1.78$), $F(1, 43) = 27.30, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .39$. Participants completing the Korean version of the questionnaire, on the other hand, rated male targets as more collectivistic ($M = 5.26, SD = 0.83$) than female targets ($M = 4.58, SD = 0.75$), $F(1, 43) = 2.23, p = .14, \eta_p^2 = .05$, although this effect did not reach statistical significance. Similarly, participants completing the survey in English, as opposed to Korean, rated the female targets as significantly more collectivistic, $F(1, 43) = 6.78, p = .01, \eta_p^2 = .14$, and participants completing the survey in English, as opposed to Korean, rated the male targets as significantly more individualistic, $F(1, 43) = 18.70, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .30$.

These results extend our results from Study 2 by demonstrating that a shift in cultural frame can change people's perceptions of the extent to which men versus women are collectivistic-individualistic. Bicultural Korean Americans primed with a Korean frame perceived men as more collectivistic than women, whereas bicultural Korean Americans primed with an American cultural frame perceived women as more collectivistic than men. As with Studies 1 and 2, these results support the cultural moderation hypothesis, with a reversal in the usual stereotypic expectations when collectivistic cultural values were made salient.

Study 4: Reanalyzing Williams and Best

The studies presented thus far are limited to comparing two nations. Study 4 tests the generalizability of Studies 1–3's results




Figure 3. Study 3: Collectivism ratings for male and female targets as a function of cultural frame condition (Korean or English/American).

in two ways, by (a) comparing across many nations and (b) constructing broader measures of collectivistic and individualistic traits. We accomplished these aims by reanalyzing the extensive data collected by Williams and Best (1990). These data are uniquely well suited for our purposes because Williams and Best examined gender stereotypes using over 300 trait adjectives (from Gough and Heilbrun's [1965, 1980] Adjective Check List) in 27 nations.⁵ Further, the nations in Williams and Best's samples split fairly evenly into collectivistic versus individualistic cultural value categories, based on Hofstede's (1980, 2001) widely used classification system. By contrast, other cross-cultural studies that have examined gender stereotypes either did not record specific stereotype contents, failed to use an extensive trait list, or did not survey such a diverse set of nations.⁶

Williams and Best (1990) asked respondents to classify whether, in their nation, each of 300 traits is "more frequently associated with men than with women" or "more frequently associated with women than with men" (p. 51). Respondents were told to skip items that they could not classify as more characteristic of either men or women. Instructions indicated that respondents should report the "characteristics generally said to be associated with women and men in our culture" (Williams & Best, 1990, p. 51) independent of their personal beliefs. Thus, responses should have reflected general cultural stereotypes.

For each nation, Williams and Best (1990) reported a stereotypical *masculinity score* for each trait, which represents the percentage of respondents who classified that trait as associated with men rather than women (adjusting for the number of individuals who did not respond). Scores could range from 0 (*never associated more with men than with women*) to 100 (*always associated more with men than with women*). Scores lower than 50 indicate that a trait is stereotypically feminine; scores greater than 50 indicate that a trait is stereotypically masculine. Williams and Best considered scores greater than 67 to indicate "focused-male stereotypes" and scores below 33 to indicate "focused female-stereotypes."

We used the national scores Williams and Best (1990) reported for each trait to construct masculine stereotype scales for individualistic (e.g., individualistic, assertive) and collectivistic (e.g., helpful, tactful) traits. This allowed us to test whether I-C cultural values, as assessed by Hofstede national I-C scores, moderate gender stereotype content, as assessed by masculinity scores for individualistic and collectivistic traits from Williams and Best's data.

Specifically, we hypothesized that (Hypothesis 5; H_5) the more individualistic the national culture, the more members of that culture would stereotype individualistic traits as masculine and (Hypothesis 6; H_6) the more collectivistic the national culture, the more members of that culture would stereotype collectivistic traits as masculine. Because both Hofstede (2001) and Williams and Best (1990) reported national averages rather than individual respondent data, we tested our hypotheses using nation as the unit of analysis.

As noted in the general introduction, there are theoretical and empirical reasons for suspecting that competence is defined differently in individualistic versus collectivistic cultures (i.e., competence is aligned with culturally valued traits). If competence is associated with individualistic traits in individualistic cultures, but collectivistic traits in collectivistic cultures, then cultural values should moderate whether stereotypes about men's competence are

related to stereotypes about their individualism and collectivism. Therefore, we constructed a separate masculine stereotype scale for competence (distinct from individualistic traits) from Williams and Best's (1990) data. This allowed us to test two further hypotheses: (Hypothesis 7; H_7) in individualistic cultures, masculinity scores for competence will positively correlate with individualistic (but not collectivistic) traits, whereas (Hypothesis 8; H_8) in collectivistic cultures, masculinity scores for competence will positively correlate with collectivistic (but not individualistic) traits.

Method

Hofstede's individualism–collectivism dimension. National scores on Hofstede's scale range from 1 to 100 on a single, bipolar I-C dimension: scores greater than 50 indicate individualism, whereas scores under 50 indicate collectivism. Hofstede (1980) originally surveyed IBM employees in 39 countries to assess national differences in cultural values, including I-C, or people's tendency to prefer loose- versus tight-knit social frameworks and to frame their self-images around "I" versus "we." Hofstede (2001) later expanded his research, eventually assigning I-C scores to 76 nations. Hofstede's ratings have been widely used in cross-cultural research, producing reliable correlations with core outcome (such as extraversion, national wealth, exclusionism vs. universalism, life satisfaction) theoretically associated with individualism versus collectivism (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede & McCrae, 2004; Oyserman et al., 2002). National I-C ratings were available for 26 of the 27 nations surveyed by Williams and Best (1990).

Masculinity scales for individualistic and collectivistic traits. We used Oyserman et al.'s (2002) comprehensive review of theory and research on individualism and collectivism to create perceived masculinity scales on these dimensions from the adjectives used by Williams and Best (1990). Oyserman et al. suggest that, although negatively correlated, individualism and collectivism are not necessarily "opposites" along a single dimension. Consistent with this idea, we used the richness of Williams and Best's adjective list to create separate masculinity scales for individualistic and collectivistic traits. We consider this two-scale (rather than a single bipolar scale) approach more rigorous because it yields two (rather than one) tests for our moderator hypothesis, putting the hypothesis at greater risk.

To select potential scale items, we relied on Oyserman et al.'s (2002) definition of individualism and collectivism (see their Ta-

⁵ Williams and Best (1990) collected data in 30 nations, but only used the full adjective list in 27 nations. The curtailed adjective list used in three nations was not sufficient for constructing reliable individualism and collectivism scales. South Korea was not included in their study.

⁶ By contrast, Glick et al.'s (2000, 2004) cross-cultural studies primarily examined ambivalent sexism more than stereotypes. Their gender stereotype measures allowed each participant to generate up to 10 traits for men and for women, but most provided far fewer; further, each participant could generate a unique set of traits. Glick et al.'s (2000, 2004) main purpose was to correlate participants' subsequent valence ratings of the traits they had generated to hostile and benevolent sexism; they did not systematically record stereotype content (but rather valence ratings). Thus, Glick et al.'s research does not provide a fixed or extensive trait list as Williams and Best did. Cuddy et al.'s (2009) cross-cultural stereotype content model work did not focus on gender (although in some nations, men and women were target groups) and examined warmth and competence, which we have argued are not the same as individualistic and collectivistic personality traits.

ble 1). Two of the authors independently sorted the 300 traits into “individualistic,” “collectivistic,” or “neither” categories. This first pass quickly and consensually eliminated most traits (about 85%) as not fitting the core constructs. After completing the initial sort, we compared lists and attempted to resolve discrepancies through discussion, erring on the side of maintaining traits in the pool pending statistical analysis to construct reliable scales. This initial sort yielded 21 individualistic traits and 27 collectivistic traits.

Traits were then eliminated on the basis of statistical analysis. Because Williams and Best (1990) reported sample averages (rather than individual respondent data) for each nation, the relatively small sample size ($n = 26$ nations) prevented use of advanced techniques such as factor analysis (e.g., Comrey & Lee, 1992). Therefore, consistent with Everitt and Skrondal’s (2010, p. 225) suggested guidelines, we eliminated traits with item-total correlations below .2. The final masculinity scale for individualistic traits included 10 items ($\alpha = .74$); the final masculinity scale for collectivistic traits included 17 items ($\alpha = .89$). All included scale items, as well as items initially considered but later eliminated, are reported in the Appendix.

Both scales included a number of reverse coded items, which generally represent traits that are valued only when reversed. For example, group harmony represents a core value Oyserman et al. (2002) ascribe to collectivistic cultures. We therefore classified items such as “quarrelsome” and “tactless” as reverse-coded collectivism items because they (negatively) relate to maintaining group harmony. These reversal items also illustrate why we decided, consistent with Oyserman et al., to construct separate masculinity scales for individualistic and collectivistic traits, rather than a single bipolar scale. Although individualists value self-expression and directness in asserting needs and opinions, this does not necessarily imply being quarrelsome or tactless. As expected, however, the masculinity scales for individualistic and collectivistic traits were negatively correlated, $r(24) = -.65, p < .001$. Observed values for each nation on both scales are included in Figure 4.

Masculinity scale for competence traits. In contrast to individualism and collectivism (which are more typically assessed at

the cultural rather than individual level), a well-established competence scale has been validated in past research (Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 2002). Williams and Best’s (1990) adjective list included several traits on this scale: capable, efficient, intelligent, and unintelligent (reverse scored), which we averaged to form a masculinity scale for competence ($\alpha = .66$).

Results and Discussion

To test our hypotheses, we ran a repeated measures general linear model, using Hofstede’s (2001) national I-C ratings as our independent variable and the masculinity scales for individualistic and for collectivistic traits as dependent variables. As expected, there was no main effect of Hofstede (2001) I-C rating on the collectivistic and individualistic stereotype scales averaged together ($p = .13$). However, there was a main effect of scale: across cultures individualistic traits ($M = 71.22, SD = 7.65$) were seen as more masculine (i.e., less feminine) than collectivistic traits ($M = 34.65, SD = 9.49$), $F(1, 24) = 8.59, p = .007, \eta_p^2 = .26$. Regression estimates suggest that even for a national I-C score of zero (i.e., extremely collectivistic) the regression model would predict that individualistic traits ($b = 62.94, SE = 3.22$) would be stereotyped as more masculine than collectivistic traits ($b = 47.46, SE = 2.95$). However, given that Williams and Best (1990) defined values between 66 and 34 as gender-neutral, these regression estimates suggest that in highly collectivistic cultures, neither collectivistic traits nor individualistic traits are strongly associated with either gender.

In the most important test of the cultural moderation hypothesis, we found the predicted significant interaction between scale and national I-C ratings, $F(1, 24) = 19.73, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .45$. National cultural values moderated scores on the masculinity scales. Supporting H_5 , that the more individualistic the nation, the more people would view individualistic traits as masculine, Hofstede (2001) I-C scores *positively* and significantly predicted masculinity scores for individualistic traits, $\beta = .54, b = .15, t(24) = 3.12, p = .005$, see Figure 5. Supporting H_6 , that the more collectivistic the nation, the more people would view collectivistic traits as masculine, Hofstede (2001) I-C scores *negatively* and significantly predicted masculinity scores for collectivistic traits, $\beta = -.67, b = -.23, t(24) = 4.43, p < .001$; see Figure 6. In sum, regression analyses confirmed that the more individualistic the culture, the more individualistic traits are stereotyped as masculine, whereas the more collectivistic the culture, the more collectivistic traits are stereotyped as masculine. Both effects were strong, with national I-C scores explaining 29% of the variance in the perceived masculinity of individualistic traits and 45% of the variance in the perceived masculinity of collectivistic traits.

In conclusion, we found strong support for our central hypothesis that cultural I-C moderates gender stereotype content: the more individualistic the culture, the more masculine individualistic traits are rated; the more collectivistic the culture, the more masculine collectivistic traits are rated. However, in an absolute sense, individualistic traits are generally viewed as more masculine than collectivistic traits across cultures.

Competence in individualistic and collectivistic nations. Next, we tested whether competence (H_7) is associated with individualistic traits in individualistic cultures and (H_8) is associated with collectivistic traits in collectivistic cultures. To do so, we used




Figure 4. Study 4: Masculinity attributed to individualistic and collectivistic traits in 26 countries, ordered from least to most individualistic. Masculinity scores less than 50 indicate that the trait is ascribed more to women than to men; masculinity scores greater than 50 indicate that the trait is ascribed more to men than to women.




Figure 5. Study 4: Masculinity attributed to individualistic traits as a function of national scores on Hofstede's (2001) Individualism/Collectivism dimension for 26 countries. Masculinity scores less than 50 indicate that the trait is ascribed more to women than to men; masculinity scores greater than 50 indicate that the trait is ascribed more to men than to women. National individualism scores less than 50 indicate that the culture values collectivism; national individualism scores greater than 50 indicate that the culture values individualism.

Hofstede's (2001) national I-C ratings to dichotomize the nations into two groups: collectivistic (below 50 on the I-C scale; $n = 11$) or individualistic (above 50 on the I-C scale; $n = 15$). We then correlated the masculinity scale for competence with those for individualistic and collectivistic traits. Our hypotheses suggest that in individualistic nations, masculinity ratings for competence should correlate positively with masculinity scores for individualistic (but not collectivistic) traits, whereas the opposite should be true for collectivistic nations.

Consistent with H_7 , in individualistic cultures, the masculinity scores for competence and individualistic traits were significantly positively correlated, $r(13) = .53, p = .04$, whereas the competence and collectivistic traits scales were not correlated, $r(13) = .006, p = .98$. Consistent with H_8 , we found that masculinity scores for competence and collectivistic traits were significantly positively correlated, $r(9) = .65, p = .03$, whereas the competence and individualistic trait scales were not correlated, $r(9) = .14, p = .69$.

These results suggest that the definition of competence varies by culture, with people in individualistic cultures associating competence with individualism and people in collectivistic cultures associating competence with collectivism.

General Discussion

We began by exploring a paradox created by two rich research streams in psychology: one suggests that men are universally stereotyped as more individualistic and less collectivistic than women, and another suggests that individualism is valued more in some cultures whereas collectivism is more highly valued in others. Would men—the dominant, higher status group compared with women in nearly every culture—still be perceived as individualistic in cultures that value the opposite, collectivism?

Our studies demonstrate that the commonly endorsed “individualistic-man” and “collectivistic-woman” stereotypes are not universal, but rather are moderated by cultural values. Studies 1 and 2 showed that in the United States, a nation with strong individualistic values, people perceived men as more individualistic and as having less close social networks than women; by contrast, in South Korea, a highly collectivistic nation, people perceived men as more communal and as having closer networks than women. This pattern was replicated in Study 3 when cultural frame was randomly assigned: Bicultural Korean Americans viewed men as more individualistic than women when taking a survey in English about American social networks, but viewed men as more collectivistic than women when taking the same survey in Korean about Korean social networks. In sum, the first three studies showed that members of a collectivistic culture, South Korea, perceived men as more collectivistic than women, deviating from the “universal” stereotype of male individualism.

To our knowledge, this represents the first time “collectivistic-man” and “individualistic-woman” stereotypes have been documented. This counterexample punctures the claim that gender stereotypes universally characterize men as individualistic and women as collectivistic. Study 4 moved beyond a two-culture comparison by reanalyzing Williams and Best's (1990) foundational study of gender stereotypes, using data from 26 nations. Using a broader index of stereotypes about individualistic and collectivistic traits, our reanalysis also supported cultural moderation: the more collectivistic the nation, the more masculine it rated collectivistic traits; the more individualistic the nation, the more masculine it rated individualistic traits. Although most of the collectivistic nations surveyed by Williams and Best still stereotyped men as more individualistic and less collectivistic than women—compared with the crossover in the content of gender




Figure 6. Study 4: Masculinity attributed to collectivistic traits as a function of national scores on Hofstede's (2001) Individualism/Collectivism dimension for 26 countries. Masculinity scores less than 50 indicate that the trait is ascribed more to women than to men; masculinity scores greater than 50 indicate that the trait is ascribed more to men than to women. National individualism scores less than 50 indicate that the culture values collectivism; national individualism scores greater than 50 indicate that the culture values individualism.

stereotypes between the United States and South Korea in Studies 1–3—Study 4 documented significant cultural moderation across a relatively large and diverse sample of nations, such that gender stereotypes converged in collectivistic nations: whereas in individualistic cultures individualistic traits were strongly associated with men and collectivistic traits were strongly associated with women, in collectivistic cultures, both individualistic and collectivistic traits were relatively gender neutral.

Why did we find “collectivistic-man” and “individualistic-woman” stereotypes in a collectivistic nation in Studies 1–3 but not in Study 4’s collectivistic nations? It is possible that South Korea represents one of a limited number of highly collectivistic nations (South Korea scores 18 on Hofstede’s (2001) national I-C scale, which places it among the most collectivistic nations) where men are stereotyped as collectivistic and women are stereotyped as individualistic. It is unfortunate that South Korea was not included in Williams and Best’s (1990) study, making direct comparison impossible. Speculatively, we suggest that stereotypes about men may skew more toward individualistic (rather than collectivistic) traits even in somewhat collectivistic cultures because other forces such as social roles and male dominance represent counterforces to collectivistic cultural values. As noted in the introduction, social roles (Eagly, 1987) and power differences (Glick et al., 2004) influence the content of gender stereotypes. Because collectivistic nations tend toward greater gender traditionalism (Archer, 2006; Williams & Best, 1990), role differentiation and power differences may push male stereotypes in an individualistic direction. For example, if leadership roles are predominately occupied by men and objectively require individualistic traits (e.g., ambitiousness), whereas domestic roles such as childcare are predominantly occupied by women and objectively require collectivistic traits (e.g., unselfishness) then, consistent with social role theory, men may still be viewed as relatively more individualistic and less collectivistic than women.

The possibility that social roles and cultural values influence stereotypes in opposing directions represents one reason why the significant cultural moderation uncovered in our reanalysis of Williams and Best’s (1990) data was previously undetected: for collectivistic nations, cultural value moderation may be swimming upstream against other forces that skew male stereotypes more toward individualistic than collectivistic traits. The current studies show that some collectivistic nations buck this general trend, sometimes to the point of a crossover in the “typical” gender stereotypes (of men as individualistic rather than collectivistic) and that, across cultures, collectivistic nations stereotype men as relatively less individualistic and more collectivistic than individualistic nations do.

In the collectivistic nations, stereotypes of men and women significantly converged: men and women are viewed as more similar on individualistic and collectivistic traits in these nations compared with individualistic nations, where gender stereotypes were more pronounced. Costa, Terracciano, and McCrae (2001) documented a similar convergence in men’s and women’s self-reported personality traits. Given that stereotypes can cause discrimination, one might conclude that women would face less discrimination in collectivistic nations (where gender stereotypes converge and sometimes even reverse) than in individualistic nations (where gender stereotypes diverge). Ironically, structural and ideological indicators of gender discrimination indicate the

opposite: women generally face greater discrimination in collectivistic than individualistic societies as indicated by a strong correlation between national indicators of I-C and structural measures of gender inequality (Archer, 2006). Of course, the I-C dimension is confounded with other national differences—such as overall economic development, role-based gender segregation, educational opportunities for women, and religious and political ideologies—that serve to reinforce or to attenuate gender discrimination (UN Development Programme, 2013). Our results serve as a reminder that discrimination does not stem solely from stereotyping.

The current research contributes to the burgeoning literature on intersectionality, which focuses on “the meaning and consequences of multiple categories of social group membership” (Cole, 2009, p. 170). Specifically, we provide new insight into how stereotypes vary on the basis of the intersection between gender and nationality, illuminating another domain in which considering multiple categories is critical to fully understanding gender. Our findings suggest that adopting an intersectional approach might help clarify some puzzling past findings regarding gender and culture. For example, Western research paradigms have assumed that certain qualities are masculine (e.g., assertiveness) and others are feminine (e.g., compassion), but we show that other cultures do not assign those qualities the same gendered ascriptions. The cultural moderation demonstrated here may help to explain why individual difference inventories that define “masculine” and “feminine” traits do not always replicate in non-Western, and typically more collectivistic, cultures. For example, previous research has shown that the factor structure of the Bem Sex-Role Inventory does not replicate in Malaysia (Ward & Sethi, 1986), Taiwan (Peng, 2006), and China (Zhang, Norvilitis, & Jin, 2001). Speculatively, this may occur because of collectivistic nations’ tendency not to associate masculinity with individualistic traits and femininity with collectivistic traits. The current results suggest important cultural exceptions to prior theory equating masculinity and individualistic agency, and femininity and collectivistic communality (Bem, 1981; Spence & Helmreich, 1978; see Wood & Eagly, 2010 for a review).

Although the current studies’ core strength is that they represent novel evidence that cultural values moderate the content of gender stereotypes, they have important limitations. One limitation concerns whether stereotypes about men’s relatively higher collectivism (in collectivistic cultures) apply mainly or even exclusively to male-male relationships. Note that Studies 2 and 3—in which perceived closeness in social networks represented the measure of men’s perceived collectivism—focused exclusively on same-sex relationships. Would men be perceived as having similarly close relationships with women in collectivistic nations? Given that gender segregation tends to be higher in collectivistic nations, results for other-sex relations might paint a different picture. It is possible that in collectivistic nations, men’s collectivistic traits reflect their closeness within “old boys’ networks” in which men cooperate with each other but segregate from and discriminate against women. This possibility may reconcile why men can be viewed as both collectivistic yet dominant within collectivistic cultures. Nevertheless, the trait measures we used in Studies 1 and 4 demonstrated significant cultural moderation effects, suggesting that even if men are perceived as exhibiting collectivistic traits

mainly within male-male relations, this collectivism generalizes to overall stereotypes about men.

A second limitation is that Study 3 conflated the ethnicities of the targets described in the scenarios and the language in which the survey was taken. To be consistent with and reinforce the cultural salience manipulation, participants read about social networks among people with Korean versus American names in the different versions of the survey. Thus, we cannot disentangle whether our results reflect cultural salience effects related to activating cultural values, beliefs that Korean and American men and women engage in systematically different behaviors, or both. Both mechanisms, however, are consistent with the main hypothesis that cultural values moderate gender stereotypes. It remains a task for future research to determine whether these stereotypical beliefs relate to value-influenced perceptions, to actual differences in men's and women's behavior, or both.

In addition, although Study 4 makes an important contribution by documenting cultural value moderation of gender stereotypes across a wide range of nations, there are several limitations due to the fact that we reanalyzed existing data. First, we had to construct individualistic and collectivistic trait scales from the measures used by Williams and Best (1990). Because we could not select the traits that were used in their study, we were unable to include the items "communal" and "interdependent." Second, because Williams and Best (1990) reported national averages—such that we did not have individual participants' responses within nations, but only an average for each nation—we could not factor analyze the trait ratings. In short, the study was not originally designed to test our specific hypothesis. It is fortunate that Williams and Best assessed 300 traits, making it possible to retrospectively construct scales with good face validity. Empirically, the individualistic and collectivistic trait scales showed acceptable reliability and their strong correlations with national I-C indices further supports the scales' validity.

Additionally, the Williams and Best (1990) data were published in 1990. We do not believe, however, that this invalidates the results obtained here. Although globalization and Westernization may have increased individualism globally, the relative ranking of nations on I-C has remained stable over time (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). Similarly, relative national rankings on gender inequality have remained stable year to year in the United Nations' annual Gender Inequality Index rankings (UN Development Programme, 2013). Arguably, changes in relative ranking of nations on these dimensions would only serve to attenuate the relationships between *current* I-C rankings and trait ratings in the Williams and Best data, making it more (not less) difficult to observe the relationships we found. Nevertheless, future research could test the cultural moderation hypothesis in contemporary cross-cultural samples using trait scales specifically constructed to assess gender stereotypes about individualistic and collectivistic traits.

Finally, none of the studies reported here were experimental, although Study 3 used a quasi-experimental design that manipulated bicultural individuals' cultural frame via language and nationality of targets. In part, this reflects the difficulty of experimentally manipulating deep-seated cultural values. We are skeptical about whether priming different values (e.g., trying to convince Americans that most Americans hold collectivistic values) could alter well-established gender stereotypes. Nevertheless, the non-experimental methods used here necessitate caution in

inferring causality, and reinforce the specific limitations mentioned above concerning the many other factors (e.g., economic development) that are naturally confounded with cultural values on the I-C dimension.

Conclusion

Are gender stereotypes universal? We have demonstrated significant cultural moderation of gender stereotypes: the first three studies present strong evidence that in one culture, South Korea, men are seen as more collectivistic than women and women are seen as more individualistic than men. The fourth study suggests that across 26 nations, cultural values moderate the content of gender stereotypes, such that collectivistic (compared with individualistic) nations characterize individualistic traits as relatively less, and collectivistic traits as relatively more, masculine. At the same time, nations that stereotype men as less selfish, more considerate, and more helpful (all collectivistic traits) should not be misconstrued as a nirvana for women: collectivistic nations have greater gender inequality relative to individualistic nations. More generally, our results suggest that the convergence of two well-established literatures—one on the masculine-feminine content of gender stereotypes, one on cross-cultural variation in I-C—offers novel insight into both literatures: men are not merely individualistic, but rather stereotypes of males reflect whichever construct is valued most highly in a given culture. As a result, some cultures may view men as more collectivistic than women—if and only if that collectivism is culturally valued.

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Appendix

Traits on the Individualism and Collectivism Trait Scales, Study 4

Traits Included versus Excluded Based on Item-Total Correlations	Trait scale	
	Individualism	Collectivism
Included	Ambitious Assertive Independent Individualistic Self-Centered Self-Confident Commonplace ^a Dependent ^a Unambitious ^a Unassuming ^a	Considerate Friendly Helpful Kind Sincere Tactful Unselfish Warm Arrogant ^a Boastful ^a Conceited ^a Egotistical ^a Greedy ^a Rude ^a Show Off ^a Tactless ^a Thankless ^a
Traits originally identified but excluded	Frank Headstrong Opinionated Original Outspoken Pleasure Seeking Self-Seeking Selfish Conventional ^a Inhibited ^a Self-Denying ^a	Generous Loyal Modest Obliging Aloof ^a Argumentative ^a Cold ^a Rebellious ^a Unkind ^a

^a Indicates the item was reverse coded.