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Employees Overestimate the Interpersonal Costs of Extension Requests**

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ABSTRACT

Employees today experience high levels of time stress at work, undermining their health, happiness, and productivity. In this paper, we propose a novel cause and possible solution to the stressful feeling of not having enough time to complete one's tasks at work: employees' willingness to ask for deadline extensions. Results from one archival data and ten experiments ($N = 7,241$) suggest that employees avoid asking for more time and submit suboptimal work, even when supervisors often readily grant their employees more time. We document a mechanism for these results: Employees fail to ask for extensions due to the belief that asking for more time will cause them to look incompetent in the eyes of their supervisors. Yet, supervisors do not necessarily perceive extension requests as a sign of incompetence. These findings highlight a previously unexplored impression management strategy in the workplace – avoiding extension requests – as a contributor to unnecessary time stress at work.

Keywords: extension request; impression management; deadline; time-stress

Time pressure—the feeling of not having enough time to complete one’s tasks—is a prevalent issue in organizations. Time pressure is identified as one of the greatest sources of job stress (Lazarus, 1995; Sonnentag & Fritz, 2015). In a recent survey of over 1,000 working employees, frequent deadlines were identified as the most common cause of work stress (30%) followed by being responsible for the lives of others (17%), competitiveness (10.2%), and physical demands (8.4%) (CareerCast.com, 2017). In professions varying from teaching to nursing, time pressure correlates with high burn out and low job engagement (Demerouti, Bakker, Nachreiner, & Schaufeli, 2001; Teuchmann, Totterdell, & Parker, 1999). In fact, a recent survey of over 1,500 Swedish employees suggests that differences in felt time pressure is responsible for roughly 5% of employees’ emotional well-being (Gärling, Gamble, Fors, & Hjerm, 2016). Moreover, time pressure often has adverse effects on performance. Time-pressured employees invest less time in development and adopt more avoidant rather than promotion goals (Beck & Schmidt, 2013). Excessive time pressure is particularly harmful for creative performance – in a series of lab studies, MBAs working under excessive time pressure created significantly less creative proposals as compared to those working under no time pressure (Amabile, Hadley, & Kramer, 2002; Andrews & Farris, 1972).

One simple yet potentially powerful solution to feelings of time pressure at work is to ask for more time to complete one’s tasks. Prior organizational research on deadlines has treated deadlines as a fixed, non-adjustable condition and instead has focused on how individuals are affected by these deadlines (Amabile, DeJong, & Lepper, 1976; Gevers, Rutte, & Van Eerde, 2006; Karau & Kelly, 1992; Waller, Zellmer-Bruhn, & Giambatista, 2002). However, popular press articles and our own recent cross-occupational survey¹ suggest that many deadlines in the

¹ See supplementary materials for a detailed description of the survey.

workplace may be open to adjustment. Deadlines are often set as a commitment device rather than due to an absolute need to complete the work in a certain timeline (Saunders, 2016a; Zenger & Folkman, 2016). In such cases, supervisors or employees themselves will set an arbitrary deadline based on a subjective estimation of how long the task will take. According to our own survey of paid employees ($N = 191$) – ranging from software engineers to warehouse staff – deadlines were often readily adjusted: 95% of respondents who asked their supervisors for a deadline extension were granted one. Furthermore, 59.9% of respondents reported that the deadline for the task that they most recently asked an extension for was set based on the *preferences* of their supervisor, team members, or themselves as opposed client preferences or external deadlines that would be difficult to adjust for. Extension requests might therefore be a powerful means to gain time, reduce time pressure, and improve the quality of one's work.

In the current research, we provide evidence that despite the adjustability of deadlines, employees often refrain from communicating their need for more time, instead choosing to suffer under high time stress and submitting suboptimal quality work. We propose that a key reason why employees underutilize extension requests can be found in the interpersonal nature of deadline setting in the workplace. Specifically, we hypothesize that employees avoid asking for more time because they believe that asking for more time will harm how competent they seem to their supervisors. Furthermore, we predict that these beliefs are misguided: supervisors do not perceive employees who ask for more time as incompetent, and employees are failing to reap the various benefits of extension requests even when their costs are minimal.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

Impression Management at the Workplace

People constantly draw inferences about others' traits from their actions (Uleman, Adil Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008). Indeed, countless material and social outcomes depend on the impressions we make on other people. In the workplace, for example, supervisors tend to evaluate the same employee's performance as higher quality if they have a positive impression of the employee (Cooper, 1981; Crant & Bateman, 1993; Wayne & Kacmar, 1991). These evaluations in turn impact important workplace rewards such as promotions, bonuses, and subsequent task assignments. Supervisors are also more likely to recommend rewards for employees they perceive to be highly motivated (Yun, Takeuchi, & Liu, 2007).

Naturally, employee's personal beliefs regarding what traits their actions signal to others often drive or hinder their actions in the workplace (Ashford & Northcraft, 1992; Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley, & Gilstrap, 2008; Bozeman & Kacmar, 1997; Gardner & Martinko, 1988; Grant & Mayer, 2009; Hui, Lam, & Law, 2000; Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Morrison & Bies, 1991; Rosenfeld, Giacalone, & Riordan, 1995). For instance, employees are most likely to help other people at work when their helping behavior is conspicuous and when a promotional evaluation is near, because they believe helping behaviors can signal their value as a helpful member of the organization (Hui et al., 2000).

Decisions to engage in certain actions in the workplace is a balancing act, where employees must consider the direct outcome of the act and what the behavior signals to others. When deciding whether to seek feedback, for example, employees not only consider the value of the information that will help them improve their performance but also what their feedback seeking behavior will signal to others (Morrison & Bies, 1991), such as incompetence (Ashford & Northcraft, 1992) or the motivation to perform well (Ashford & Tsui, 1991).

Recent research in the impression management literature suggests that this added layer of impression management can impede employees from engaging in behaviors that would otherwise enhance their effectiveness at work. A cross-occupational survey found that employees who harbor negative beliefs about accepting help from their coworkers (e.g. “When I allow others to help me finish my work, my boss perceives me as less capable”) exhibited lower levels of in-role job performance and creativity, according to their supervisors (Thompson & Bolino, 2018). In a field experiment, individuals solving an experimental task avoided seeking hints from their designated advisors when the hint request could signal their low ability, even when the extra clues would have considerably enhanced their likelihood of success (Chandrasekhar, Golub, & Yang, 2018). In the lab, individuals with poor performance, who otherwise would have sought feedback, avoided seeking feedback when their feedback seeking was visible to others (Ashford & Northcraft, 1992). By not asking for feedback, these individuals were forgoing an invaluable possible resource for improving their performance (Ashford & Cummings, 1983).

Building on this research, the current research examines extension requests as an underexplored domain where impression management concerns may be especially likely to hinder one’s effectiveness and well-being at work. We argue that employees’ high motivation to appear competent to their supervisors, coupled with the interpersonal nature of deadline setting, may deter employee’s from proactively adjusting their deadlines even when it will clearly benefit their well-being and performance.

Extension Request as a Signal of Incompetence

We define extension requests as the act of asking for more time to complete a work-relevant task. Extension requests may be seen as a type of employee voice (i.e. speaking up with suggestions for improvement), in that extension requests involve the employee actively

expressing preferences (1) in ways that they are not expected to, based on their formally defined roles and (2) with the potential to promote their own and their organizations' effectiveness (Grant, 2013; Grant & Ashford, 2008; LePine & Van Dyne, 1998). A rich body of literature has explored the antecedents (Detert & Edmondson, 2011; Dyne, Ang, & Botero, 2003; Grant, 2013; LePine & Van Dyne, 1998) and consequences (Burris, 2012; Morrison, 2014) of employees' speaking up at work. This prior research has identified two major deterrents of employee voice. First, employees often choose to remain silent because they perceive "voice" to be interpersonally risky. Employees fear that by challenging a set practice within an organization they may be viewed as a complainer, lose respect or support from others, be assigned to undesirable projects, or even be fired (Detert & Edmondson, 2005; Grant, 2013; LePine & Van Dyne, 1998; Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003). Second, employees avoid speaking up because they believe their voice will be futile (Detert & Treviño, 2010; Milliken et al., 2003). However, cross-sectional surveys and laboratory studies suggest that managers often evaluate employees who speak up as better performers and readily endorse their ideas, particularly if the manager had positive prior impressions of the employee (Burris, 2012; Dyne et al., 2003; Whiting, Podsakoff, & Pierce, 2008).

In this paper, we focus on extension requests where these two well-identified concerns behind voice behaviors are minimal. Specifically, we focus on extension requests made for (1) deadlines that are adjustable and (2) tasks that are non-interdependent. We believe employees' avoidance of extension requests with high likelihoods of success and low cost for the requestee is both practically and theoretically most worthy of investigation. Practically, these are the extension requests that can effectively alleviate employees' time pressure with minimal personal and organizational costs. Thus, understanding the obstacles against employees' active utilization

of these extension requests may help organizations develop costless interventions to enhance employee effectiveness.

Theoretically, by investigating these costless extension requests we extend the literature on employee voice in two ways. First, we explore the motives and outcomes of an understudied instantiation of employee voice, extension requests. While existing literature on employee voice has explored a rich set of employee voice behaviors including offering (dissenting) opinions regarding on-going projects (Detert & Edmondson, 2011; Kassing, 2005; Tourish & Robson, 2006; Whiting et al., 2008), issue selling (Ashford, Rothbard, Piderit, & Dutton, 1998), or whistleblowing (Miceli, Near, Rehg, & Van Scotter, 2012), no prior research, to our knowledge, has explored extension requests as a form of employee voice behavior. Thus, our work expands the taxonomy of employee voice by investigating the antecedents and consequences of employees' speaking up against an assigned deadline. Second, these costless extension requests allow us to identify *perceived* impression costs, independent from other well-established obstacles against employee voice such as the fear of backlash or rejection, as a unique deterrent of extension requests. Therefore, our research offers greater nuance for the field's understanding of the motives behind employees' speaking up.

Extending the aforementioned literature on impression management in the workplace, we predict that when impression concerns are high (i.e. extension request is visible to observers who will evaluate and reward them), employees will avoid asking for more time even when the costs of the extension request is minimal and the potential benefits are high.

HYPOTHESIS 1: *When the extension request is visible to observers who will evaluate and reward them, employees will avoid asking for more time (even when the deadline is adjustable and they would likely perform better with an extension).*

Furthermore, we argue that employees do not make extension requests because they are primarily concerned with seeming incompetent. Given the widespread orientation toward productivity, particularly in the United States, employees likely believe that extension requests lead to perceptions of incompetence by their coworkers and supervisors. Indeed, working under an accelerated pace and Puritan work ethic, employees often view time as a valuable resource which they should guard, hoard, and protect (Gleick, 2000; Gross, 1987; Liu & Aaker, 2008; Zauberaman & Lynch, 2005). Individuals value the productive use of time so much that even when choosing leisure activities, they voluntarily choose to engage in novel, extreme activities that allow them to feel productive at the expense of pleasure (Keinan & Kivetz, 2011). More specifically in the work domain, “good time management” skills are identified by supervisors and peers alike as one of the most characteristic skills of top performers, according to a recent survey of over 2000 full-time employees (Maxfield, Grenny, Hale, & Hoffman, 2017). Based on such observations, we propose that when having to ask for more time to complete a given task, employees may fear that they are demonstrating their inability to use their time efficiently.

HYPOTHESIS 2: *Employees’ avoidance of extension requests will be driven by their concerns that asking for more time will signal incompetence to their supervisors.*

Overestimating Impression Cost of Extension Requests

Emotional perspective-taking, or predicting how another person will respond to a situation that one is not currently in, is extremely difficult (Bohns & Flynn, 2015; Epley & Caruso, 2008; Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004). Meta-perception, or predicting how one's behavior influences others' judgments (Laing, Phillipson, & Lee, 1966), is a type of perspective taking that we are particularly inept at. On top of the difficulty of predicting another person's state of mind, when predicting others' judgments of ourselves, our judgments are further clouded by self-enhancement motives (Swann, 1990) and egocentrism (Kenny &

DePaulo, 1993). Even if an individual cares deeply about accurately judging others' reactions, rather than seeing themselves in a flattering light, the opportunity to receive feedback and calibrate ones' predictions of social judgments are rare. This is because people seldom directly express social judgment toward each other, due to politeness norms (Blumberg, 1972).

Thus, our impression management strategies are frequently misguided based on inaccurate predictions of how others will react to our actions. For example, individuals may avoid sharing their failures or mistakes, because they believe that observers will judge them as more incompetent and unintelligent for their mistakes in task performance than is actually the case (Savitsky, Epley, & Gilovich, 2001). In the workplace, employees avoid seeking advice because they believe it will signal incompetence. However, in a series of lab studies, advice givers perceived those who sought their advice as more competent than those who did not (Brooks, Gino, & Schweitzer, 2015). Employees also refrain from asking for help at work, anxious that they will look incompetent to others (Lee, 1997). Yet, in a cross-occupational survey, supervisors' frequency of having helped an employee was positively correlated to how enthusiastic and competent the supervisor rated the employee to be (Thompson & Bolino, 2018).

Two key drivers behind inaccurate meta-perceptions about incompetence are particularly noteworthy for the current investigation. First, individuals tend to anchor on their own self-perceptions when predicting others' judgments (Epley et al., 2004; Kenny & DePaulo, 1993). For example, individuals who are forced to admit their own shortcomings due to their mistakes (Savitsky et al., 2001), advice requests (Brooks et al., 2015), or help requests (Lee, 1997; Thompson & Bolino, 2018) may project their own disappointment when predicting others' reactions. As a result, they overestimate how disappointed others would be. Second, individuals suffer from focalism, (Gilbert & Wilson, 2000; Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999; Savitsky et al.,

2001; Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000), narrowly focusing on the impact of the focal act (e.g., asking for an extension request) rather than the broader context (e.g., that the deadlines are flexible).

In the case of extension requests, employees who imagine failing to reach the goal of completing a task within a given deadline may be disappointed in themselves and expect that their supervisors will share this sentiment. Employees may also focus too much on their extension requests and neglect the broader relevant context which the supervisors also take into consideration in judging the employee's competence, such as the adjustability of the deadline, employee's work ethic during prior interactions, or the quality of their performance output. Building on the meta-perception literature, we predict that employees will overestimate how incompetent supervisors will perceive them to be when they ask to adjust the deadline, due to such anchoring on self-perception and neglecting the broader context.

HYPOTHESIS 3: *Employees will overestimate how incompetent supervisors will perceive them to be due to an extension request.*

Underestimating the Benefits of Extensions

Apart from overestimating the impression costs, employees may also avoid asking for more time because they underestimate its benefits. From honest, constructive communication (Levine & Cohen, 2018) to social interactions with weak ties—such as a Starbucks barista—(Sandstrom & Dunn, 2014), individuals avoid various social interactions not only because they mispredict others' negative responses but also because they fail to predict their own *positive* reactions to these future events (Dunn, Biesanz, Human, & Finn, 2007; Gilbert & Wilson, 2000; Hsee & Zhang, 2004; Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999; Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; Wilson et al., 2000). In the case of extension requests, even when an employee is certain they will likely receive an extension, they might believe that asking for more time is futile because they

underestimate how much the incremental extension could help them feel less stressed and could enhance their work quality. As a result, they may feel less motivated to ask for more time.

HYPOTHESIS 4: *Employees underestimate the benefits of extension requests on their well-being and work quality.*

Overview of the Current Research

Across nine experiments, we examine (1) whether employees do not ask for more time because they believe extension requests signal their incompetence, (2) whether employees overestimate the negative impact of extension requests on perceived competence, and (3) whether employees underestimate the benefits of asking for more time on their well-being and work quality.

In studies 1A and 1B, we test whether employees are less likely to ask for more time when their request is visible to targets whose evaluation determines their reward via workplace simulations using lab tasks (H1). In Study 2, we test whether employees do not ask for more time because they are concerned that this action would undermine their perceived competence through a workplace interaction simulation using a vignette (H2). We then compare how incompetent supervisors perceive employees to be in response to an extension request to the employees' prediction of supervisor response (Study 3). This study revealed that employees overestimate how costly asking for more time is on their perceived competence (H3). Extending this finding, we assess whether this overestimation holds even when the task is explicitly urgent (Study 4). In studies 5A and 5B we explore how the history of interaction among employees and supervisors moderates this perspective gap by comparing employee prediction and supervisors' reactions of extension requests made among employees and supervisors who actually interact in the workplace. In Study 6, we examine whether the extra time gained through extension requests provides employees the opportunity to improve their performance, in turn enhancing supervisors'

appraisal (H3). Finally, in studies 7A and 7B, we test whether asking for more time improves the employee's task experience and performance, and whether employee's fail to appreciate the benefits of asking for a deadline extension (H4).

Collectively, our studies—which utilize a combination of surveys with managers and employees, online and lab experiments—contribute to the literature on deadline and impression management in at least three critical ways. First, prior research on how employees respond to deadlines has treated deadlines as fixed. Here, we initiate a shift in this line of work by examining how employees respond to *adjustable* deadlines. Given the malleable nature of deadlines in organizations we highlighted above, our investigation provides valuable insights into this overlooked phenomenon. Second, we explore a form of employee voice which has not garnered much attention among organizational scholars – extension requests. Finally, we identify a novel domain in which impression management motives may undermine organizational effectiveness. We examine whether the belief that extension requests signal their incompetence may lead employees to avoid asking for more time even when the deadline is clearly adjustable and their performance will no doubt benefit from the extra time. As a result, employees may not only experience greater time stress, but also perform less well and be viewed less favorably by their supervisors. Overall, this research not only expands the literature on employees' reactions to deadlines and impression management at work, but also provides empirical evidence that exaggerated negative beliefs about asking for more time at work have important implications.

In this manuscript, we follow the reporting standards proposed by (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011): we report all exclusions, every central measure, and the stopping rule for each study. The data, stimuli, data analysis code, and preregistration documents for our studies are available through the Open Science Framework (<https://osf.io/rsp8g/>).

Preliminary Study

A core assumption of our paper is that employees do not utilize extension requests in the workplace. Therefore, to motivate our experiments, we explored how frequently employees discuss project timelines and communicate their need for more time. To this end, we used a large corpus of emails exchanged between employees of a large multinational corporation between 1997 and 2002 (Enron). Although most well-known for its scandalous downfall, Enron was one of the liveliest corporate workplaces in the U.S. prior to its crisis in 2001, employing approximately 17,900 staff and claiming revenues over \$40B during 2000 (Fortune, 2000). We believe Enron is an apt case for our preliminary study due to the intense time and performance pressure its employees experienced, which resonates with the high emphasis on productivity within the American corporate culture highlighted above. Due to the firm's fast pace of innovation and infamous 360-degree review, employees at Enron were constantly under immense time stress and the pressure to manage one's impression to their colleagues (Fishman, 2002; Swartz & Watkins, 2003). Some have compared Enron's intense work environment to that of a top law firm (Tourish & Vatcha, 2005).

In our analysis, we utilized the publicly available data, which contains over half a million emails exchanged with Enron executives. For this study, we used a cleaned corpus prepared by the CALO project (<http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~enron/>). We limited our analysis to emails that were internally exchanged, from a firm domain email to another firm domain email, and removed all forwarding and duplicate emails. We bound our analysis to emails that were exchanged prior to 2001, as the company's crisis following year 2001 may have created a sense of urgency that would have prevented employees from asking for more time. These decisions left us with a total sample of 31,405 messages. We then selected 977 email threads that included at least one

extension related phrase such as “deadline” or “delay” to identify emails that discussed deadlines or involved extension requests.²

A team of coders categorized these 977 email threads by answering the following questions: (1) Is this email thread about a specific work project that the sender and recipient are involved in? (2) If yes, does the email thread talk about a deadline or project timeline? (3) Is the most recent sender asking for more time to complete the sender’s task? (4) Is the most recent sender replying to a deadline extension request previously made? Each email was coded by at least two coders. All disagreements were resolved through consensus discussions with a third rater. Based on this coding, we could identify email that was work project related, timeline related, and extension request related. The data provide preliminary evidence that the need for more time is rarely discussed among work teams.

Out of 977 emails selected for their potential relevance for extension requests, 534 were related to internal team projects. Of these, 213 discussed the project timeline or schedule coordination, in which managers often mentioned that they understand that the team is under an “extremely tight time frame” or “very tight deadlines”. Out of these 213 timeline related emails, only eight messages (3.76%) either implicitly or explicitly expressed the need for more time to work on tasks or projects. Thus, we find that extension requests were made in less than 0.03% of the 31,405 emails employees exchanged in our sample. A detailed breakdown of the categorized emails can be found in Figure 1.

Study 1A/B

² These phrases included time, deadline, end of the day (EOD), delay, late, tight, more, timeline, apologies, excuse, by, hours, and days. We identified the extension-related phrases based on a sample of emails asking for extensions at work (N=15), collected from full-time employees via Amazon Mechanical Turk.

In the preliminary study, we found initial evidence that employees rarely asked for more time in a corporate workplace in the U.S. using a large-scale publicly available data set. It is possible that the Enron email corpus may not be representative of employee behavior in all workplaces. Furthermore, it is unclear how much of the deadlines set for the Enron employees were adjustable or how beneficial each extension could have been for the employees. Thus, in studies 1A and 1B we build on our initial findings and examine whether workers avoid making extension requests in two different tasks with adjustable deadlines, where having extra time should dramatically improve task performance when their requests are visible to their evaluators. By doing so, we aimed to provide initial evidence that employees believe asking for more time could incur negative evaluations from managers (H1).

Study 1A

In this study, we asked participants to complete a laboratory task for a short amount of time, with the opportunity to make an extension request. All participants were told that they would be compensated based on how another participant rates their performance, and half of the participants were additionally told that their extension request would be visible to the rater. We predicted that participants would be less likely to ask for more time when their extension request was visible to their rater. We further predicted that participants in both conditions would feel highly time-pressed. Additionally, we hypothesized that when the extension request is visible, felt time pressure will be a worse predictor of whether the participants ask for more time compared to when it is not visible. Finally, we expected that the tendency to not ask for more time will be greater among participants who are highly concerned about how they will be evaluated by others.

Participants and Procedure

398 adults were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk³. All participants wrote a short essay that another participant would ostensibly evaluate. To increase motivation, and to mirror real-world workplace demands, participants were told that they would receive a bonus based on how competent their evaluators rated them to be (however, all participants received the maximum available bonus and their work was not evaluated by another participant).

All participants had two minutes to work on the essay writing task. This decision was based on pilot research suggesting that a two minute deadline created significant time stress. Once the initial two minutes were up, participants had the option to ask for more time by answering “Would you like to ask for more time (1 more minute) to work on your essay?” Depending on their experimental condition, participants were told that their evaluator will (*visible*) or will not (*invisible*) be notified if they asked for more time. Participants who did not ask for more time were immediately directed to the post-task survey. Those who asked for more time worked on their essays for one more minute before being directed to the post-task survey (described in detail below).

Measures

Time Pressure. Immediately after their initial two minutes of writing the essay, all participants answered “While writing the essay, how pressed for time did you feel?” on a 1 (*Not at all*) to 7 (*Extremely*) scale (adapted from Whillans & Dunn (2015)).

Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE). We measured participants’ anxiety toward social evaluation using the 12-item Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation scale (Leary, 1983).

Results

³ For all studies, see Table 1 for details on sample characteristics; see Table 2 for details on sample size targets, stopping rules, and power analysis.

Time Ask. Our main dependent variable was whether the participant asked for more time to work on their essay. As predicted, a logistic regression revealed that participants were significantly less likely to ask for more time when the request was visible to their evaluator (36.2%) as compared to when the request was invisible (65.7%), $b = -1.22$, $SE = 0.21$, 95% CI [-1.64, -0.81], $p < .001$. (Figure 2)

Time Pressure. Also as expected, participants felt highly time-pressured both when the extension request was visible ($M = 6.23$, $SD = 1.30$) and not ($M = 6.12$, $SD = 1.34$), confirming that the two-minute deadline was stressful for participants. Furthermore, felt time pressure was a better predictor of extension requests when the request was not visible to the rater, $b = 0.47$, $SE = 0.12$, 95% CI [0.24, 0.71], $p < .001$, than when it was visible, $b = 0.15$, $SE = 0.13$, 95% CI [-0.089, 0.42], $p = .243$. The interaction term of condition and time pressure predicting extension request was negative and marginally significant, $b_{Visible \times TimePressure} = -0.32$, $SE = 0.18$, 95% CI [-0.66, 0.033], $p = .070$, suggesting that participants who felt highly time-pressured and did not ask for more time when they knew that this request would be visible to their raters.

Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE). To test whether participants with higher fear of negative evaluation were more likely to be impacted by the visibility of their extension request, we ran a logistic regression using condition, FNE scores, and their interaction as independent variables and extension request as the dependent variable. The interaction effect was insignificant, $b = -0.22$, $SE = 0.22$, 95% CI [-0.65, 0.21], $p = .324$, here (and across our subsequent studies); thus, we do not discuss fear of negative evaluation further.

Study 1B

In Study 1A, we found initial evidence for our key hypothesis: employees did not ask for more time when completing a task under a tight deadline when the extension request was visible

to their raters. These results suggest that employees believe asking for more time could send a negative signal to observers. In Study 1B, we sought to replicate this finding using a task where the benefits of extra time for task performance would be even more obvious to participants. We also explored how the request visibility impacted asking for more time both before *and* after the deadline had passed. We preregistered the methods and predicted results for this study on aspredicted.org (<http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=dc5he4>).

Participants and Procedure

We recruited 901 participants and ended up with a final sample size of $N = 825$.⁴ Study 1B followed a largely similar design to Study 1A with four notable differences. First, participants in Study 1B were explicitly instructed to simulate working in a firm and they were told that they would be evaluated by other participants who would take on the role of their supervisors.

Second, instead of writing an essay, participants in both conditions were asked to describe events that were captured in an image of a city center for two minutes. Specifically, they were asked to describe many events as possible in as much detail as possible (see Figure 3 for the task). Unlike the essay writing task, where it was unclear whether asking for more time would necessarily translate into better performance, the image description task allowed us to clarify to the participants that their goal was to describe as many events as they could. Given the quantitative nature of the task, the extra time they would gain would be unambiguously useful.

Finally, unlike Study 1A, where all participants were provided with the opportunity to ask for an extension only *after* the deadline has passed, participants in Study 1B had two opportunities to ask for more time. During the two-minute task, participants could ask for more time by clicking on a button labelled “I need more time”. Those who asked for more time were

⁴ See Table 2 for details on sample size target and exclusion criteria for all studies.

instantly granted one more minute to work on the task. Once their three minutes were up, these participants were directed to the end-line survey. Those who did not ask for more time during the task were given another extension request opportunity at the end of their initial two minutes as in Study 1A. With this new design, we aimed to better simulate workers' experiences of making extension requests in the workplace, where extensions can be made either preemptively *or* after the deadline has passed. We were also interested in exploring whether employees' tendencies to avoid visible extension requests were stronger for requests made before or after the deadline.

Fourth, we evaluated the quality of the participants' submitted work, using the wordcount and the number of events that participants described in each submission. We predicted that participants who asked for more time would have created image descriptions of higher quality.

As in Study 1A, our key experimental manipulation was whether the extension request would be visible to their rater or not. Participants were reminded that their raters would or would not be notified about their request each time they had the chance to make an extension request.

Measures

Apart from assessing whether the participant asked for more time, we assessed felt time pressure during the task and trait fear of negative evaluation as in Study 1A. In Study 1B, we also evaluated performance by measuring the wordcount and the number of events that participants described in each submission, counted by two coders blind to the conditions ($ICC=0.94$).

Results

Time Ask. As predicted, participants were significantly less likely to ask for more time when the request was visible to their rater (52.1%) than when it was not (68.8%), $b = -0.71$, $SE = 0.15$, 95% CI [-0.99, -0.42], $p < .001$.

In addition to a binary measure of whether the employee asked for more time, we were able to compare the rate at which the employee asked for more time before and after the two-minute deadline. The decrease in extension requests when the request was visible was driven by the decrease in the rate of asking for more time during the task, $b = -0.52$, $SE = 0.16$, 95% CI [-0.83, -0.21], $p = .001$, rather than after the deadline had passed, $b = -0.18$, $SE = 0.15$, 95% CI [-0.47, 0.11], $p = .215$. (Figure 2)

Time Pressure. As expected, participants felt as highly time-pressed when the extension request was visible ($M = 5.87$, $SD = 1.47$) as they did when the request was not visible ($M = 5.91$, $SD = 1.40$). As in Study 1A, felt time pressure was a better predictor of extension requests when the request was not visible to the rater, $b = 0.78$, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI [0.59, 0.98], $p < .001$, than when the request was visible, $b = 0.54$, $SE = 0.08$, 95% CI [0.38, 0.71], $p < .001$. The interaction term of condition and time pressure predicting extension request was negative and marginally significant, $b_{Visible \times TimePressure} = -0.24$, $SE = 0.13$, 95% CI [-0.50, 0.012], $p = .063$, suggesting that the visibility of an extension request prevented some time-pressured participants from making a request.

Performance. In line with our predictions, employees in the visible condition produced shorter descriptions ($M = 73.88$, $SD = 34.88$) than those in the not visible condition ($M = 80.46$, $SD = 34.37$), $t(824) = -2.73$, $p = .007$, $d = -0.19$. Using the “lavaan” package in R, we performed a bootstrap mediation analysis of a model that included the direct effect of condition on description length and the indirect effects of condition on description length via asking for more time. The results revealed that participants in the visible condition produced shorter descriptions because they did not ask for more time (95% CI, -5.40 to -2.07; Figure 4). Employees in the visible condition also described marginally fewer number of events ($M = 7.10$, $SD = 0.15$) than

those in the not visible condition ($M = 7.47$, $SD = 0.15$), $t(818) = -2.73$, $p = .079$, $d = -0.12$, as a result of not asking for more time (95% CI, -0.39 to -0.14).

Discussion

In studies 1A and 1B, we demonstrated that workers who felt highly time-pressed and would have asked for more time decided not to ask for more time when their extension requests were visible to their raters. As a result, these workers performed less well.

What drove employees to not ask for more time when the request was visible? We argue that it is the perceived image costs of asking for more time. In Study 2, we explored whether employees fail to ask for more time because of impression management concerns. We also aimed to pinpoint which specific impression motivation was driving employees' avoidance of extension requests. Based on prior literature (Gardner & Martinko, 1988; Jones & Pittman, 1982) and our own survey of 408 employees⁵, we identified four primary impression concerns employees have: the desire to appear competent, motivated, authentic, and moral. In Study 2, we compared the impact of each of these four impression concerns on their extension requests. Clarifying which impression that employees hoped to maintain by asking for more time will provide a more granular understanding of employees' extension request experience. Furthermore, it will provide the possibility to examine whether the employees' concerns are valid directly assessing the supervisor's impression of the employee in that dimension.

Study 2

⁵ A panel of employees ($N=408$) who worked paid 21+ hours a week indicated how much they are concerned that their supervisor sees them along seven different traits using a 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A great deal). These seven traits – competent, motivated, pitiful, authentic, likeable, powerful, moral – have been theorized by organizational scholars as primary dimensions of impression management in the workplace (Gardner & Martinko, 1988; Jones & Pittman, 1982). We found that employees were most concerned with being perceived as competent ($M = 5.80$, $SD = 1.63$) and motivated ($M = 5.66$, $SD = 1.57$) to their supervisors, followed by seeming moral ($M = 5.53$, $SD = 1.72$), authentic ($M = 5.33$, $SD = 1.70$), likeable ($M = 5.33$, $SD = 1.67$), powerful ($M = 4.42$, $SD = 1.74$), and pitiful ($M = 2.13$, $SD = 1.72$).

In Study 2, we assessed employee responses in a scenario-based simulated experience. According to Greenberg & Eskew (1993) and Aguinis & Bradley (2014), using scenarios is preferred for ensuring tight internal control and for demonstrating causality. Furthermore, research suggests that people can easily imagine and experience hypothetical workplace interactions and that responses to such hypothetical situations are similar to responses in actual workplace interactions (Gurmankin, Baron, & Armstrong, 2004; Sedikides & Green, 2004).

Participants were asked to immerse themselves in a real-world situation (via a scenario) that employees frequently encounter: asking for more time for a task that was assigned within a short deadline. Instead of manipulating the visibility of the extension request, we manipulated how much influence the supervisor had on the employee's future compensation. We made this decision based on prior research showing that manipulating how much influence the supervisor has over the employees' future compensation, also shapes the extent to which employees care about the impression they make on their supervisor (Hur, Lee-Yoon, & Whillans, 2018).

We predicted that participants with high impression concerns will be less likely to ask for more time than those with low impression concerns. Based on Hypothesis 2, we also predicted that this avoidance of extension requests will be driven by employees' fear that extension requests would hurt how competent they appear rather than other impression concerns.

We preregistered the methods and predicted results for this study on aspredicted.org (<http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=2fh9ew>).

Participants and Procedure

We recruited 602 adults to answer a survey based on an imagined workplace interaction. Participants were randomly assigned to imagine a scenario in which they interacted with their supervisor, under one of two experimental conditions: *high impression concern* or *low*

impression concern. In the high impression concern condition, participants read the following scenario (word changes in the low impression concern condition are shown in brackets):

“Imagine you work at a firm where you work closely with a single direct supervisor [your supervisor changes every few weeks]. You have been working with your current supervisor for the past two weeks, and will continue to work with him/her for the next few years [will be assigned a new supervisor soon]. The supervisor’s evaluation of you determines the pay raise you will receive at the end of the year [does not affect your pay in any way].”

Then, all participants imagined that they were assigned a task from this supervisor that is due tomorrow:

“Today, your supervisor assigned you to review your department's past fundraiser events and draft an event proposal for next year. Hosting the event is one of the most important projects of your department, so you want to do a good job. This is your second time planning the event. He/She wants you to submit the proposal by the end of tomorrow, just as he/she did last year.”

Then participants answered a survey about how they would think and react to this situation.

Measures

Likelihood of Time Ask. Participants indicated their likelihood of asking for more time to work on the task on a scale of 1 (*Extremely Unlikely*) to 7 (*Extremely Likely*).

Predicted Impression Cost of Time Ask. Next, we assessed how concerned employees were that their extension request would hurt various images they strive to maintain in the workplace. We asked participants four questions measuring their perceived impression costs of asking for more time by indicating their agreement on the statements “*I am worried that if I ask for more time to work on the task, my supervisor will see me as less competent / motivated / authentic / moral*” on a scale ranging from 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly Agree*).

Perception of Supervisor. In the case that the experimental conditions could shape supervisor perceptions, we included items to control for employees perceived supervisor fairness and likeability. Specifically, we measured employees' agreement to the statements "My supervisor is fair" and "My supervisor is likeable" on a scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).

Results

Likelihood of Time Ask. Consistent with studies 1A and 1B, participants in the high impression concern condition were less likely to ask for more ($M = 3.21$, $SD = 1.72$) than employees who were randomly assigned to the low impression concern condition ($M = 3.76$, $SD = 1.71$), $t(600) = -3.91$, $p < .001$, $d = -0.32$ (A graphical description of the results can be found in Figure 5).

Predicted Impression Cost of Time Ask. Participants in the high impression concern condition were more strongly concerned that their request for more time would make them seem less competent ($M = 5.26$, $SD = 1.55$) than those in the low impression concern condition ($M = 4.92$, $SD = 1.62$), $t(600) = -2.63$, $p = .009$, $d = -0.21$. They were also more strongly concerned that their request for more time would make them seem less motivated ($M = 4.94$, $SD = 1.77$ vs. $M = 4.67$, $SD = 1.77$, $t(600) = -2.02$, $p = .044$, $d = -0.16$) and less authentic ($M = 3.57$, $SD = 1.70$ vs. $M = 3.24$, $SD = 1.77$, $t(600) = -2.34$, $p = .020$, $d = -0.19$) to their supervisors, though to a lesser degree. Participants' concern that their extension request would make their supervisor see them as less moral was not significantly different across conditions ($M = 2.64$, $SD = 1.71$ vs. $M = 2.72$, $SD = 1.77$, $t(600) = 0.53$, $p = .596$, $d = 0.04$).

Mediation. We examined whether the decrease in the likelihood of asking for more time in the high vs. low impression concern condition was explained by participants' concerns that the

extension request would make them look less competent, motivated, authentic, or moral. Using the “lavaan” package in R, we performed a bootstrap mediation analysis of a model that included the direct effect of condition on the likelihood of time ask and the indirect effects of condition on the likelihood of time ask via competence concern, motivation concern, authenticity concern, and morality concern (Rosseel, 2012). The results reveal that competence concern partially mediated the negative relationship between high (vs. low) impression concern and the likelihood of asking for more time (95% CI, -.20 to -.02). However, motivation concern (95% CI, -.10 to .01), authenticity concern (95% CI, -.01 to .08), and moral concern (95% CI, -.08 to .05) were not significant mediators, as demonstrated by the confidence intervals crossing zero. (Figure 6)

Perception of Supervisor. Participants in the high impression concern condition perceived their supervisor as more likeable ($M = 5.01$, $SD = 1.11$) than participants in the low impression concern condition ($M = 4.74$, $SD = 1.18$), $t(599) = -2.88$, $p = .004$, $d = -0.24$. They also perceived their supervisors as fairer ($M = 5.04$, $SD = 1.19$) than participants in the low impression concern condition ($M = 4.75$, $SD = 1.19$), $t(599) = -2.93$, $p = .004$, $d = -0.24$. All of the results above were robust controlling for these differences.

Discussion

In Study 2, we conceptually replicated studies 1A and 1B by demonstrating that employees were less willing to ask for more time to supervisors when they were motivated to make a positive impression to the supervisor. Furthermore, this tendency was driven by employees' concern that asking for more time would signal incompetence to their supervisors. Employees who were motivated to make a positive impression also had greater concern that asking for more time would cause the supervisor to perceive them as less motivated and less

authentic, but these concerns could not explain the negative relationship between employees' impression management motivation and their likelihood of asking for more time.

Taken together, studies 1A, 1B, and 2 suggest that when impression concerns are high, employees are less likely to ask for more time, even when extension request is possible and when their performance would benefit from making an extension request. Furthermore, we demonstrate that employees' tendencies to not ask for more time was driven by their beliefs that asking for more time would make them look less competent in the eyes of their supervisors.

Are the employees' belief that asking for more time signals incompetence accurate? In studies 3-5 we explore how supervisors' actual perceptions of the employee following an extension request compares with employees' predictions.

Study 3

In Study 3, we compared employees' predicted evaluation and supervisors' actual evaluation of employees in response to their extension requests. We predicted that supervisors will not perceive employees who ask for more time as less competent or motivated.

Participants and Procedure

We recruited 783 working adults to answer a survey based on an imagined workplace interaction. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two roles: employee or supervisor. Employee participants imagined a workplace interaction based on the following scenario (word changes in the supervisor condition are shown in brackets):

“Imagine you work at a firm where you work closely with a direct supervisor [work closely with an employee who you directly supervise]. You have been working with this supervisor [this employee] for the past two weeks, and will continue to work with him/her for the next few years.

This supervisor's evaluation of you [Your evaluation of the employee] will determine the pay raise you [he/she] will receive at the end of the year.

Today, your supervisor assigned you [you assigned the employee] to draft a proposal for a fundraising event that your department will host this year. Hosting the event is one of

the most important projects of your department. This is your [the employee's] second time planning the event.

Your supervisor wants you [You asked the employee] to submit the proposal by the end of tomorrow."

Then, employee participants imagined that they asked their supervisor for more time to work on the task and predicted how this would impact their supervisor's perceptions. Supervisor participants imagined that the employee asked for more time to work on the task and indicated how this would impact their perceptions of the employee.⁶

Measures

Predicted Impact of Time Ask on Employee Image. To predict how their extension requests would impact how competent their supervisors perceived them to be, employee participants completed the statement "My asking for more time to work on the task, compared to not asking for more time, would make my supervisor see me as..." using a 7-point scale ranging from -3 (*Much less competent*), 0 (*About the same*), to +3 (*Much more competent*). They also completed a similar scale to predict how more or less motivated they would appear to their supervisor due to their extension request.

Actual Impact of Time Ask on Employee Image. To indicate how the employee's asking for more time impacted how competent they perceive the employee to be, supervisor participants completed the statement "The employee's asking for more time to work on the task, compared to not asking for more time, makes me see the employee as..." using a 7-point scale ranging from -3 (*Much less competent*), 0 (*About the same*), to +3 (*Much more competent*). They also filled out

⁶ We also measured participants' personality traits and experience in supervising others throughout their career as potential moderators. In this paper, we do not discuss supervision experience as it did not moderate any of our effects here (and across our subsequent studies). Discussions of the personality trait measures can be found in the Supplementary Materials.

a similar scale to predict how more or less motivated they would perceive the employee to be because of the extension request⁷.

Results

A graphical description of the results can be found in Figure 7. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of measures can be found in Table 3.

Predicted Impact of Time Ask on Employee Image.

Competent. To test whether employees predicted that supervisors would perceive them as less competent if they asked for more time, we conducted a one-sample t-test examining whether the employee's predicted impact of extension request on their competence was significantly lower than 0 (About the same (as not asking)) on a -3 (Much less competent) to +3 (Much more competent) scale. As expected, employees predicted that their asking for more time to work on the task, compared to not asking for more time, would make their supervisor perceive them as less competent ($M = -0.33$, $SD = 1.58$), $t(388) = -4.11$, $p < .001$, $d = -0.21$.

Motivated. Contrary to our hypothesis, employees did not predict that they would be perceived as less motivated to their supervisors due to their extension request ($M = -0.12$, $SD = 1.58$), $t(388) = -1.48$, $p = .070$, $d = 0.08$.

Actual Impact of Time Ask on Employee Image.

Competent. To test whether the supervisors perceived the employee as less competent due to the employee's extension request, we conducted a one-sample t-test examining whether the supervisor's rated impact of the extension request on how competent they perceive the employee to be was significantly lower than 0 (About the same (as not asking)) on a -3 (Much

⁷ We also explored how authentic supervisors perceive the employee to be in response to their extension requests. We predicted and found that supervisors perceived an employee who asked for more time as more authentic than they would have had the employee not asked for more time ($M = 0.51$, $SD = 1.37$), $t(393) = 8.04$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.41$, here and in our subsequent studies.

less competent) to +3 (Much more competent) scale. As predicted, supervisors did not perceive an employee as less competent because they asked for more time ($M = -0.10$, $SD = 1.27$), $t(393) = -1.51$, $p = .066$, $d = 0.08$.

Motivated. Supervisors also did not perceive an employee as less motivated due to their extension request ($M = -0.01$, $SD = 1.32$), $t(393) = -0.15$, $p = .439$, $d = 0.008$.

Perspective Gap.

Competent. Using an independent-samples t-test, we examined whether the employees predicted that their extension request would lead their supervisors to perceive them as much less competent compared to how the supervisors actually reacted. Employees overestimated how costly the extension request would be for their perceived competence ($M = -0.33$, $SD = 1.58$) relative to the supervisor's actual ratings ($M = -0.10$, $SD = 1.27$), $t(781) = -2.27$, $p = .023$, $d = 0.16$.

Motivated. An independent-samples t-test revealed that employees' predicted impact of their extension requests on how motivated they look ($M = -0.12$, $SD = 1.58$) was not significantly different from the actual impact of the extension request on how motivated the supervisor perceived the employee to be ($M = -0.01$, $SD = 1.32$), $t(781) = -1.04$, $p = .208$, $d = 0.07$.

Discussion

In Study 3, employees believed that asking for more time would hurt how competent their supervisors perceive them to be, while supervisors did not view employees as less competent when the employee asked for more time. These results suggest that employees overestimate how incompetent they are perceived by their supervisors when they ask for more time.

Our data also suggest that employees accurately predict how their extension requests impact how motivated the supervisor perceives them to be. Employees neither overestimated nor underestimated the costs or benefits of asking for more time on their perceived motivation. This result lends further support to our findings in Study 2 that employees are avoiding extension requests because they are concerned about appearing incompetent rather than lacking in other impressions. Furthermore, the lack of difference in the motivation ratings among employees and supervisors confirms that the difference in the competence ratings is not merely a byproduct of the employees and supervisors understanding and using the scales differently.

It is important to note that in Study 3, we only gave participants minimal information about how time-sensitive the task was. Yet, in the absence of any information about the urgency of the task, employees may assume that the task is more urgent than supervisors perceive it to be and in turn expect supervisors to react more negatively to extension requests. To explore this possibility, in Study 4 we explored whether clarifying the time-sensitive nature of the task reduces the perspective gap between employees and supervisors regarding how supervisors would react to employees' extension requests.

Study 4

Participants and Procedure

603 working adults were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 2 (Role: employee vs. supervisor) x 3 (Task Urgency: high, low, ambiguous) between subject factorial design. Study 4 followed the same design as Study 3 with one notable difference. Depending on their conditions, participants were given additional information about the urgency of the task. Specifically, participants in the task urgency high (low) conditions read the following additional

information about the task (word changes in the task urgency low conditions are shown in brackets):

“The event will be happening soon [not be happening for a while], so planning the event is a time-sensitive task [is NOT a time-sensitive task].”

Participants in the task urgency ambiguous conditions were not given any further information about the urgency of the task.

Measures

In addition to the perceived and actual impact of asking for more time on the employee's image, participants also indicated how urgent they thought the task described in the scenario was on a 1 (Not at all) to 5 (A great deal) scale.

Results

A graphical description of our findings can be found in Figure 8.

Manipulation Check: Task Urgency

Comparing the task urgency ratings across conditions revealed that our manipulation was successful. Participants in the high task urgency conditions perceived the task as more urgent ($M = 4.32$, $SD = 0.70$) than participants in the ambiguous task urgency conditions ($M = 4.00$, $SD = 0.83$), $t(399) = 4.12$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.68$. Participants in the low task urgency conditions ($M = 2.38$, $SD = 1.15$) perceived the task to be less urgent than those in the ambiguous task urgency conditions, $t(402) = 16.23$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.61$.

We also found that, in line with our predictions, participants playing the role of employee on average perceived the task as marginally more urgent ($M = 3.67$, $SD = 1.26$) than those playing the role of supervisor ($M = 3.46$, $SD = 1.23$), $t(601) = 2.06$, $p = .040$, $d = 0.17$. A two-way ANOVA revealed that this difference in perceived task urgency between supervisors and employees was not moderated by the task urgency conditions, $F(2, 597) = 0.21$, $p = .808$. In

other words, employees perceived the task as more urgent than supervisors did, even when there was a clear signal regarding how (non) time-sensitive the task is. The analyses presented below hold when controlling for perceived task urgency.

(Predicted) Impact of Time Ask on Perceived Employee Competence.

Employee Prediction. Employees predicted that their supervisors would perceive them as less competent if they ask for more time regardless of whether the task urgency was explicitly high ($M = -0.76$, $SD = 1.54$), $t(101) = -5.01$, $p < .001$, $d = -0.50$, low ($M = -0.59$, $SD = 1.39$), $t(100) = -4.30$, $p < .001$, $d = -0.43$, or ambiguous ($M = -0.57$, $SD = 1.40$), $t(101) = -4.09$, $p < .001$, $d = -0.41$.

Supervisor Reaction. Supervisors perceived employees who ask for more time as less competent when the task urgency was explicitly high ($M = -0.35$, $SD = 1.34$), $t(96) = -2.58$, $p = .006$, $d = 0.26$, but not when the task urgency was ambiguous ($M = 0.04$, $SD = 1.33$), $t(99) = 0.30$, $p = .618$, $d = 0.03$, or low ($M = 0.08$, $SD = 1.25$), $t(100) = 0.64$, $p = .738$, $d = 0.06$.

Perspective Gap. Employees significantly overestimated how incompetent supervisors would perceive them to be if they ask for more, regardless of whether the task urgency was explicitly high, $t(197) = 2.02$, $p = .045$, $d = 0.29$, low, $t(200) = 3.63$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.51$, or ambiguous, $t(200) = 3.17$, $p = .002$, $d = 0.45$.

(Predicted) Impact of Time Ask on Perceived Employee Motivation.

Employee Prediction. Employees predicted that supervisors would perceive them to be much less motivated if they asked for more time, regardless of whether the task urgency was explicitly high ($M = -0.34$, $SD = 1.58$), $t(101) = -2.20$, $p = .015$, $d = -0.21$, low ($M = -0.49$, $SD = 1.47$), $t(100) = -3.32$, $p < .001$, $d = -0.33$, or ambiguous ($M = -0.32$, $SD = 1.50$), $t(101) = -2.18$, $p = .016$, $d = -0.22$.

Supervisor Reaction. Supervisors perceived employees who ask for more time as less motivated when the task urgency was explicitly high ($M = -0.29$, $SD = 1.40$), $t(96) = -2.03$, $p = .022$, $d = 0.21$, but not when the task urgency was ambiguous ($M = 0.11$, $SD = 1.41$), $t(99) = 0.78$, $p = .782$, $d = 0.08$, or low ($M = -0.03$, $SD = 1.36$), $t(100) = -0.22$, $p = .413$, $d = 0.02$.

Perspective Gap. Employees significantly overestimated how unmotivated supervisors would perceive them to be both when the task urgency was low, $t(200) = 2.29$, $p = .023$, $d = 0.32$, or ambiguous, $t(200) = 2.12$, $p = .035$, $d = 0.30$. However, employees' predictions and supervisors' reactions were not significantly different when task urgency was explicitly urgent, $t(197) = 0.26$, $p = .797$, $d = -0.04$. The interaction effect of role and task urgency was not significant, $F(2, 597) = 1.20$, $p = .301$.

Discussion

In Study 4, we tested (1) whether employees perceive tasks to be more urgent than supervisors do when the time sensitivity of the task is ambiguous and (2) whether providing task urgency information to employees and supervisors would mitigate their perspective gap regarding how supervisors would react to the employees' extension request. We found that employees perceive the same task to be more urgent than supervisors do, even when they are told that the task is not time-sensitive. Furthermore, regardless of how time-sensitive the employees and supervisors were told that the task was, the perspective gap regarding supervisor reaction persisted. When the task was described as time-sensitive, supervisors perceived employees who ask for more time as less competent and less motivated, but less so than what employees predicted. When the task was described as not time-sensitive, employees still expected supervisors to react more negatively to their extension requests than the supervisors actually did.

Study 5A/B

One potential limitation of studies 3 and 4 are that the participants were imagining an interaction with a hypothetical individual, whom they did not have a history of meaningful interactions with. As a result, our experiments may not have been an accurate assessment of employees' and supervisors' perspectives during extension requests in a real workplace. Employees may be more accurate when predicting the reactions of their actual supervisors, to whom they may be closer or have asked for extensions in the past. Similarly, due to their lack of relational investment, supervisors in our studies may have reacted more negatively than they would have for actual employees in the workplace. Alternatively, experiencing less visceral reactions to a hypothetical target's extension requests, the supervisors may have been relatively forgiving about the employee's extension requests in our studies. In Study 5A and 5B, we aimed to address this shortcoming by measuring employee predictions and supervisor reactions in an imagined interaction among actual colleagues at their workplace.

Study 5A

In Study 5A, we measured employees' prediction of how their actual supervisors would react to their extension requests.

Participants and Procedure

203 full-time employees answered a survey based on an imagined workplace interaction. Participants first wrote down the initials of their current direct supervisor. To help them vividly imagine their interaction targets, participants answered several questions about this supervisor, such as their age, gender, and relational closeness with the participant. Then participants imagined an interaction with this supervisor based on the employee scenario from Study 3 and predicted their supervisors' reactions to their extension request.

Measures

In addition to predicting the impact of their extension requests on their supervisors' perception of how competent and motivated they seem, employees predicted how likely their supervisor would give them more time in the scenario on a -3 (Extremely Unlikely) to +3 (Extremely Likely) scale. Participants also indicated how many times they have asked their supervisor for more time to work on a task he or she assigned on a slider scale ranging from 0 (Never) to 20 (20 or more times).

Study 5B

In Study 5B, we measured supervisor reaction to extension requests made by actual colleagues at their workplace.

Participants and Procedure

401 full-time employees answered a survey based on an imagined workplace interaction. We limited the target employee to colleagues that the participants would know interpersonally but would have minimal prior impression about them professionally. We expected that this would allow the extension request to have a maximum impact on the participants' impression of the employee since they would have little other information by which to form an impression of the employee outside this interaction. Thus, participants first listed three people at their current workplace who were lower in rank than them that they had never worked together on a project with.

As in Study 5A, to help the participants vividly imagine their interaction targets, participants answered several questions about each of the three junior colleagues, such as their age, gender, and relational closeness with the participant. Then participants imagined an interaction with one of the three junior colleagues based on the supervisor scenario from Study 3 and indicated their reactions to the employee's extension request.

Measures⁸

As in Study 5A, in addition to indicating the impact of the employee's extension requests on their perception of the employee, supervisors answered how likely they would give more time to the employee in the scenario on a -3 (Extremely Unlikely) to +3 (Extremely Likely) scale.

Results

A graphical description of the results can be found in Figure 9:

(Predicted) Impact of Time Ask on Perceived Employee Competence.

Employee Prediction. As in studies 3 and 4, a one-sample t-test revealed that employees predicted supervisors would perceive them as less competent if they asked for more time ($M = -0.17$, $SD = 1.25$), $t(202) = -1.91$, $p = .029$, $d = -0.13$. Relationship closeness as measured by the Inclusion of Other in Self scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) had a positive effect on employee's prediction of how competent supervisors would perceive them to be due to their extension requests, $b = 0.27$, $SE = 0.06$, 95% CI [0.16, 0.39], $p < .001$. Stated differently, employees who were close to their supervisors predicted their supervisors would rate them as less incompetent in response to their extension requests.⁹

Supervisor Reaction. In line with our findings in studies 3 and 4, supervisors did not perceive their employees as less competent due to their extension requests ($M = 0.07$, $SD = 1.21$), $t(400) = 1.15$, $p = .876$, $d = 0.06$. Relationship closeness had a positive effect on perceived

⁸ To explore what attributions supervisors may be making about the employee's extension request as well as to document the downstream behavioral consequences (e.g. recommending employee to upcoming team project), we also asked the participants why they thought the employee was asking for more time using direct and indirect measures. As these data are not relevant to our hypotheses, we do not discuss them further in this paper. The measures and data can be found in our OSF repository.

⁹ Employees who have frequently asked for more time in the past also tended to believe their supervisors would perceive them as less incompetent in response to their extension requests, $b = 0.06$, $SE = 0.02$, 95% CI [0.02, 0.10], $p = .002$. This result should be interpreted with caution. On the one hand, employees who had asked for more time learned from experience that their supervisors are forgiving. However, it is equally likely that employees who have lenient supervisors had asked for more time more frequently.

competence due to extension requests, $b = 0.17$, $SE = 0.04$, 95% CI [0.092, 0.24], $p < .001$.

Stated differently, the closer the supervisor felt to the employee, the supervisor rated the employee to be more competent in response to their extension request.

Perspective Gap. A Welch two-sample t-test¹⁰ revealed that employees significantly overestimated how incompetent supervisors would perceive them to be if they ask for more time, $t(395.13) = -2.23$, $p = .026$, $d = -0.19$.

(Predicted) Impact of Time Ask on Perceived Employee Motivation.

Employee Prediction. Employees predicted that supervisors would perceive them as neither more or less motivated if they asked for more time ($M = -0.09$, $SD = 1.34$), $t(202) = 0.94$, $p = .347$, $d = 0.07$. Employees who were close to their supervisors had a greater tendency to predict that their supervisors would rate them as more motivated in response to their extension request, $b = 0.29$, $SE = 0.06$, 95% CI [0.16, 0.42], $p < .001$.

Supervisor Reaction. Supervisors perceived an employee as more motivated in response to their extension request ($M = 0.27$, $SD = 1.19$), $t(400) = 4.60$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.23$. The more relationally close the employee was to the supervisor, the supervisor perceived the employee's extension request as a stronger signal of motivation, $b = 0.16$, $SE = 0.04$, 95% CI [0.082, 0.23], $p < .001$.

Perspective Gap. Employees prediction and supervisor's rating of employee motivation in response to extension requests were not significantly different, $t(367.08) = -1.67$, $p = .097$, $d = -0.15$.

(Predicted) Likelihood of Supervisor Granting Extra Time.

¹⁰ As the variances across the two conditions are not equal, when comparing employee predictions from Study 5a and supervisor reactions from Study 5b we use a Welch Two-Sample t-test.

Employee Prediction. Employees predicted their supervisor to be on average “Somewhat Likely” to give them more time ($M = 1.04$, $SD = 1.40$), and the average rating was significantly different from “Neither Unlikely nor Likely”, $t(202) = 10.55$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.74$. Employees who felt relationally close to their supervisors thought their supervisors were more likely to grant them more time, $b = 0.45$, $SE = 0.06$, 95% CI [0.32, 0.57], $p < .001$.

Supervisor Reaction. Lending support to our claim that not all deadlines in the workplace are rigid and supervisors are willing to grant more time at work, supervisors were on average “Somewhat Likely” to give their employees more time ($M = 0.97$, $SD = 1.35$), and the average rating was significantly different from “Neither Unlikely nor Likely”, $t(400) = 14.33$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.72$. Supervisors who felt relationally close to the employee were more likely to grant the employee with more time, $b = 0.14$, $SE = 0.04$, 95% CI [0.057, 0.23], $p < .001$.

Perspective Gap. Employees accurately predicted how likely supervisors would grant them with more time, $t(391.84) = 0.62$, $p = .534$, $d = 0.05$.

Discussion

In Study 5A and 5B, we replicated our findings in studies 3 and 4 that contrary to the employees' assumption, supervisors do not perceive employees who ask for more time as less competent. Furthermore, we found evidence that when making decisions about non-hypothetical targets, supervisors perceived the employee's asking for more time as a signal of greater motivation, particularly when they already have a close relationship with the employee. These findings suggest that studies 3 and 4, in which supervisors and employees lacked the rich history of relationship that is typical in the workplace, may have underestimated how positively supervisors may react to extension requests. Finally, the findings corroborate our claim that supervisors are, on average, open to giving more time to employees. We further find that

employees accurately predict supervisors' willingness to grant them more time, supporting our claim that employees are avoiding extension requests even as they acknowledge that the deadline is adjustable.

Study 6

Thus far we have explored how extension requests are perceived in the immediate moment, without considering the possible downstream consequences of extension requests. One major benefit of asking for more time under adjustable deadlines is that the employee could invest more time and effort in their task with less stress which in turn, could positively impact performance. This improved task output, in turn, could benefit the employee's image – the very characteristic that they strive to protect by not asking for more time. In Study 6, we explored this possibility by asking whether extension requests would enhance employees' perceived competence as rated by their supervisor via performance improvements.

We predicted that on average, supervisors will evaluate employees who asked for more time more favorably, because the employee would have performed better. We further predicted that the cost of the supervisors knowing that the employee asked for more time will be smaller than the benefits of the extra time. Thus, we predicted that asking for more time when the request is visible will in net be beneficial for the employee's image.

Participants and Procedure

In Study 6, we assessed the supervisors' perspective for Study 1B. 1,414 adults were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk to simulate working as a supervisor for a stratified subset of the online workers who produced image descriptions in Study 1B. The study followed a 2 (asked vs. did not ask for more time in Study 1B) x 2 (Supervisors told vs. not told that the employee asked for more time in Study 6) between subjects design. Participants in Study 6 were

randomly matched with one of the 825 participants in Study 1B¹¹. As a result of the random matching, the performance of 494 “employees”, 232 of whom actually asked for more time and 262 of whom did not, were reviewed by at least two “supervisors”. These supervisors were either told that the employee asked for more time or given no information about the employee’s extension request. Based this information on the employee’s extension request, the submitted description, and 4-point scale detailedness score rated by a blind coder, the supervisors evaluated how competent and motivated the employee seems to be. (See Figure 10 for a sample employee performance description).

This design allowed us to parse out the distinct effects of the two consequences of asking for more time on the employee’s image: the gaining of extra time – which allows the employees to improve their performance quality – and the supervisor’s knowledge of the employee’s extension request. Furthermore, by comparing the supervisor’s rating of the employee in the two conditions where the employee’s behavior and the supervisor’s beliefs match – *employee did not ask for more time / supervisor not told that the employee asked for more time* and *employee asked for more time / supervisor told that the employee asked for more time* – we could simulate the net impact of asking and getting more time on the employee’s image when the request is visible to the supervisor.

Measures

Supervisors rated how competent they perceived their employee to be by answering “Compared to the average employee, how competent do you think the employee who created the image description above is?” on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*much less than the average*

¹¹ The employees were sampled with replacement.

employee) to 7 (*much more than the average employee*). They answered a similar question on employee motivation.

Results

See Figure 11 for a graphical description of the results.

Competence. A two-way ANOVA revealed that, as predicted, supervisors rated employees who asked for more time as significantly more competent ($M = 4.39$, $SD = 1.43$) compared to employees who did not ask for more ($M = 4.03$, $SD = 1.52$), $F(1, 1410) = 19.88$, $p < .001$, $d = .014$. However, supervisors who were told their employees asked for more time ($M = 4.21$, $SD = 1.50$) did not rate their employee as less competent than those who were not told that their employees asked for more time ($M = 4.21$, $SD = 1.48$), $F(1, 1410) = 0.007$, $p = .934$, $d = .000005$. This was true even when controlling for various measures of performance quality (e.g. the number of topics in the image description) using an ANCOVA analysis, $F(1, 1410) = 0.24$, $p = .621$. The interaction effect of supervisor knowledge and employee extension request was also insignificant, $F(1, 1410) = 0.38$, $p = .536$, $d = .0003$, suggesting that employees who asked for more time were equally favorably evaluated as those who did not, regardless of whether their supervisors knew about their extension requests.

A planned pairwise t-test simulating asking for more time when the request is visible revealed that even with full information, supervisors rated employees who asked for more time as more competent ($M = 4.41$, $SD = 1.43$) compared to those who did not ($M = 4.06$, $SD = 1.50$), $t(711) = 3.15$, $p = .008$, $d = 0.24$.

Motivation. A two-way ANOVA revealed that supervisors rated employees who asked for more time as significantly more motivated ($M = 4.76$, $SD = 1.66$) compared to those who did not ask for more ($M = 4.05$, $SD = 1.71$), $F(1, 1410) = 33.20$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .023$.

Furthermore, in line with our findings in Study 5, supervisors who *believed* their employee asked for more time rated their employee as more motivated ($M = 4.43$, $SD = 1.71$) compared to supervisors who had no information about the employee's extension request ($M = 4.17$, $SD = 1.68$), $F(1, 1410) = 7.80$, $p = .005$, $\eta^2 = .005$. There was no interaction effect of employee's asking for more time and the supervisor's knowledge of the time request on perceived employee motivation, $F(1, 1410) = 0.12$, $p = .733$, $\eta^2 = .00008$, suggesting that employees who asked for more time were equally favorably evaluated as those who did not, regardless of the supervisor's knowledge about their extension requests.

A planned pairwise t-test simulating asking for more time when the request is visible revealed that even with full information, supervisors rated employees who asked for more time as more motivated ($M = 4.69$, $SD = 1.65$) compared to employees who did not ask for more time ($M = 3.94$, $SD = 1.69$), $t(711) = 6.08$, $p < .001$.

Mediation of Performance. As we have seen in Study 1B, employees who asked for more time created longer image descriptions ($M = 80.90$, $SD = 33.31$) than those who did not ask for more time ($M = 65.52$, $SD = 29.78$), $t(1412) = 9.16$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.49$.

Focusing on the two conditions where the supervisors had accurate knowledge about their employees' extension requests (i.e. *employee did not ask for more time / supervisor not told that the employee asked for more time* and *employee asked for more time / supervisor told that the employee asked for more time*), we examined whether supervisor's positive evaluation of employees who asked for more time was driven by their improved performance. We performed a bootstrap mediation analysis of a model that includes the direct effect of employee's asking for more time on their competence rating and the indirect effects of asking for more time on competence rating via performance quality. Performance improvement – as measured by

description length – partially mediated the positive relationship between asking for more time and perceived competence (95% CI, .31 to .53) and motivation (95% CI, .37 to .63). (Figure 12) These results suggest that supervisors in our study perceived employees who asked for more time as more competent because they produced better output, even when the supervisors knew that the employee asked for more time.

Discussion

In Study 6, we demonstrated that asking for more time when their request is visible provides employees with an opportunity to impress their supervisors by improving their performance. Furthermore, providing converging evidence with our findings from Study 5, supervisors in Study 6 rated employees whom they thought to have asked for more time as *more motivated*, even when they did not perform better than employees who did not ask for more time. Taken together, studies 5 and 6 suggest that contrary to the employee's prediction, extension requests may signal to the supervisor that the employee is more motivated without hurting how competent they seem. Combined with studies 2-4, which suggest that employees avoid extension requests because they fear that they would seem less competent to their supervisors, Study 6 highlights that when avoiding extension requests employees are acting against their goals to appear more competent to their supervisors.

Study 7A/B

Thus far, we found evidence that employees do not ask for more time to supervisors because they worry that asking for more time will hurt their perceived competence, but supervisors do not perceive employees who ask for more time as incompetent as the employees fear. Rather, asking for more time provides employees an opportunity to signal their commitment to the task and improve their performance. Together, these studies highlight that employees

overestimate the interpersonal costs of asking for more time and forgo the opportunity to improve their performance and image in the eyes of their supervisors.

In studies 7A and 7B, we focused our attention to an additional potential contributor to employees' avoidance of extension requests: their underestimation of its benefits. In Study 7A, we explored whether asking for more time benefits employee well-being, in addition to improved performance and enhanced image, which the employees may be missing out on due to their inaccurate assessment of what their extension requests signal to their supervisors. In Study 7B, we examined whether employees underestimate these happiness benefits of asking for more time.

Study 7A

In Study 7A, we compared the work experience of participants who were assigned to ask for more time with the experience of participants who were either (1) given a tight deadline but did not ask for more time or (2) given sufficient time to work on the task. We predicted that asking for more time will reduce participant's negative experience of the task caused by the tight deadline, as well as reduce the time stress they experience during the task, to levels that are comparable to participants who are given sufficient time to work on the task. We also predicted that participants who ask for more time will perform better in the creative proposal task, as in the image description task in Study 1B.

Participants and Procedure

442 college students were recruited to simulate working in an R&D team of a firm. In this study, we explored the effects of extension requests on creative tasks. We adapted a creativity task proposed by Torrance (1974) and used by Madjar & Oldham (2006). All participants were asked to propose creative new designs for a refrigerator based on a list of

examples as an employee. The goal of the task was to come up with as many original, creative refrigerator design ideas as they could. As in studies 1A and 1B, participants were told that another participant playing the supervisor role would evaluate them on how competent and motivated they seemed based on their performance, which would determine whether they would receive a \$100 gift card.

Participants were assigned to one of three conditions: *not ask*, *ask*, and *abundant*.

Participants who were assigned to either *ask* or *not ask* for more time were given a tight deadline (2 minutes) to work on the product design task (consistent with studies 1A and 1B). Then, these participants were told that they may be assigned to ask their supervisors for more time (two additional minutes) to work on the task. For participants who were assigned to *not ask* for more time, the task portion of the study was complete once their initial two minutes were up.

Participants who were assigned to *ask* for more time all clicked on a button that said “I need more time”. When the *ask* participants made the request, another participant in the room playing the role of a supervisor ostensibly granted the participant with more time. Participants in the *ask* condition could use as little or much of the extra two minutes as they would like towards the task. Participants in the *abundant* condition were given the same amount of time to work on the task as those in the *ask* condition – two minutes to use toward the task and two minutes they can choose to continue working or to move on – but without having to go through the process of asking for more time. This control condition was included to explore whether there were benefits of asking for more time that were independent of the windfall of time that employees received.

Once participants completed the task portion of the study, they answered a survey about their task experience. Our main variables of interests were participants' negative experience during the task, time stress, and task performance.¹²

Measures

Manipulation Check. To ensure that our participants were highly motivated to perform well as an employee in our experiment, we asked "How motivated were you to do well in the task?", "How much did you care whether your supervisor perceived you as competent/motivated?", and "How much were you interested in receiving the \$100 gift card?" on a 1 (*Not at all*) to 7 (*A great deal*) scale.

Furthermore, to make sure that 2 minutes was a tight timeline and 4 minutes was a sufficient timeline to work on the proposal task, we assessed participant's agreement to the statement "I felt that I did not have enough time to do well in the task" on a 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly Agree*) scale.

Negative Task Experience. To assess participant's negative experience during the task, we asked participants how frustrating, stressful, and difficult the task was using a 1 (*Not at all*) to 7 (*A great deal*) scale ($\alpha = 0.86$).

Time Stress During Task. Participants rated how stressed about time they felt during the task by rating their agreement with seven statements about feelings of time stress using a 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly Agree*) scale (Whillans & Dunn, 2015).

Task Performance. To assess the creativity of the participant's proposal, two independent coders counted the number of original ideas in the proposal ($ICC=0.77$).

¹² In addition to these three key measures, we also assessed a number of other exploratory variables. See Supplementary Materials for descriptions and analyses of these variables. We also measured participants' trait personality and general sense of time scarcity as potential moderators. The descriptions and data for these measures can be found in our OSF repository.

Results

A summary of all findings, including those from our exploratory measures, can be found in Table 4.

Manipulation Check. Our manipulation check measures revealed that participants in our study were highly motivated to do well in the task ($M = 4.70$, $SD = 1.76$), to make a positive impression on their supervisors ($M = 4.64$, $SD = 1.93$), and to receive the \$100 gift card ($M = 5.00$, $SD = 2.13$). None of the three motivation ratings were significantly different across conditions (All $ps > .800$).

Participants who did not ask for more time agreed more strongly that they did not have sufficient time to do well in the task ($M = 5.73$, $SD = 1.61$) than participants who had abundant time ($M = 4.34$, $SD = 1.90$), $t(301) = 6.49$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.80$, or had asked for more time ($M = 4.50$, $SD = 1.69$), $t(299) = 5.94$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.69$.

Negative Task Experience. We created a composite measure of negative task experience by averaging the three items ($\alpha = 0.86$). In line with our hypothesis, participants who asked for more time found the task to be less frustrating, stressful, and difficult ($M = 3.34$, $SD = 1.60$) compared to participants who did not ask for more time ($M = 3.79$, $SD = 1.67$), $b = 0.45$, $SE = 0.19$, 95% CI [0.083, 0.81], $p = .016$. Participants who asked for more time and had abundant time ($M = 3.10$, $SD = 1.50$) indicated similar degrees of negative task experience, $b = -0.25$, $SE = 0.18$, 95% CI [-0.61, 0.11], $p = .180$.

Time Stress During Task. We created a composite measure of felt time pressure during the task using the average of the seven time-stress items ($\alpha = 0.94$). As predicted, participants who asked for more time experienced less time pressure ($M = 5.11$, $SD = 1.38$) when compared to those who had limited time ($M = 5.75$, $SD = 1.21$), $b = 0.64$, $SE = 0.17$, 95% CI [0.30, 0.98], p

< .001. But even with asking for more time, participants felt more time-pressed when compared to those who were given abundant time to work on the task ($M = 4.62$, $SD = 1.80$), $b = -0.49$, $SE = 0.17$, 95% CI [-0.83, -0.15], $p = .005$.

Task Performance. Participants who asked for more time created more creative proposals ($M = 2.34$, $SD = 1.82$), as measured by the number of creative ideas in the proposal, than those who had limited time ($M = 1.31$, $SD = 1.08$), $b = -1.03$, $SE = 0.18$, 95% CI [-1.39, -0.67], $p < .001$. They also created proposals that are comparable in creativity to those had abundant time ($M = 2.32$, $SD = 1.63$), $b = -0.02$, $SE = 0.18$, 95% CI [-0.38, 0.33], $p = .896$.¹³

Study 7B

Participants and Procedure

279 college students predicted the experience of participants in Study 7A. First, they were introduced to the experimental set up of Study 7A. Then they predicted how they would have felt in each of the three conditions (see Table 5 for the condition descriptions provided to participants in Study 7B).

Results

As in Study 7A, our main comparison of interest in Study 7B was between the predicted experience of participants who asked for more time with that of (1) participants who did not ask for more time and (2) those who had abundant time. Our three main variables of interest were predicted negative task experience, time stress, and task performance. We predicted that participants will underestimate how much asking for more time would alleviate negative task

¹³ Interestingly, when looking at the amount of extra time participants in the *ask* and *abundant* conditions freely spent on the task, we found that participants who asked for more time on average used more of the extra time they were given, $b = -9.13$, $SE = 3.24$, 95% CI [-15.51, -2.76], $p = .006$. This finding suggests that being assigned to actively ask for more time may have led these participants to be more motivated to do the task well.

experience and time stress. We also predicted that participants will underestimate how much asking for more time would benefit their performance.

Negative Task Experience. In line with our prediction, participants underestimated how much asking for more time would reduce their negative task experience. Participants predicted that they would find the task to be significantly less stressful if they asked for more time ($M = 4.36$, $SE = 0.08$, 95% CI [4.19, 4.53]) compared to not asking for more time ($M = 5.46$, $SE = 0.08$, 95% CI [5.29, 5.63]), $b = 1.10$, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI [0.91, 1.29], $p < .001$, but still significantly more stressful when compared to having abundant time ($M = 3.38$, $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI [3.21, 3.55]), $b = -0.98$, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI [-1.17, -0.79], $p < .001$.¹⁴

Time Stress. As expected, participants underestimated how much asking for more time would alleviate their time stress. Participants predicted that they would feel less time-pressed if they asked for more time ($M = 4.24$, $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI [4.07, 4.40]) compared to not asking for more time ($M = 5.66$, $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI [5.50, 5.84]), $b = 1.43$, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI [1.23, 1.63], $p < .001$, but still significantly more pressed for time when compared to having abundant time ($M = 3.03$, $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI [2.86, 3.20]), $b = -1.21$, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI [-1.41, -1.01], $p < .001$.

Task Performance. Participants predicted that they would perform better on the proposal task if they asked for more time ($M = 4.60$, $SE = 0.08$, 95% CI [4.45, 4.75]) compared to not asking for more time ($M = 3.76$, $SE = 0.08$, 95% CI [3.61, 3.92]), $b = -0.84$, $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI [-1.01, -0.66], $p < .001$, but not as well as when compared to having abundant time ($M = 5.03$, $SE = 0.80$, 95% CI [4.87, 5.18]), $b = 0.43$, $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI [0.25, 0.60], $p < .001$.

¹⁴ In all our analyses for Study 7B, we fitted a linear mixed effects model to calculate the fixed effect of condition while controlling for the random effect of each participant's rating tendency utilizing R's lme4 package (Bates et al., 2018). We used the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2018) to derive p-values and degrees of freedom. The reported means below are predicted marginal means.

A summary of all findings, including those from our exploratory measures, can be found in Table 6.

Discussion

In Study 7A, we found evidence that asking for more time, relative to not asking for more time, led to reduced negative experience (e.g. frustration) and time stress as well as enhanced creative performance, to levels that were comparable to having abundant time to work on the task. Yet, in Study 7B, we found that participants failed to appreciate that the benefits of asking for more time on reducing negative task experience, alleviating time stress, and improving their performance are comparable to having abundant time to work on the task. Taken together, studies 7A and 7B suggest that asking for more time for adjustable deadlines has various benefits for worker's well-being and performance, and workers underestimate the magnitude of these benefits. Such underestimation of the benefits of extension requests, along with the overestimation of its interpersonal costs, may partially explain why employees avoid asking for more time on adjustable deadlines.

General Discussion

Although a substantial literature has explored workers' experience (e.g. Amabile, DeJong, & Lepper, 1976; Demerouti et al., 2001; Teuchmann et al., 1999) and performance (Amabile et al., 2002; Andrews & Farris, 1972; Karau & Kelly, 1992) under externally imposed tight deadlines, little research has explored how workers directly interact with the deadline in question. Across ten experiments with over seven-thousand participants including working employees and managers, we find consistent evidence that employees rarely ask for more time to work on tasks because they overestimate how costly asking for more time will be for their image.

As hypothesized, employees were less likely to ask for more time when their extension request was visible to targets that they were highly motivated to make a positive impression on, such as supervisors whose evaluation determines rewards (Studies 1A-2). This tendency to not ask for more time was driven by the employee's belief that their extension request would signal their incompetence to their supervisors (Study 2). However, employees were overestimating the interpersonal cost of extension requests – supervisors did not perceive employees who ask for more time as less competent as employees' predicted (Study 3). This perspective gap was robust to information about task urgency (Study 4). We also found evidence that extension requests may benefit rather than undermine employees' image – supervisors perceived employees who asked for more time as equally competent and more motivated compared to those who did not (Studies 3, 5B). Finally, we demonstrated that employees may underestimate the benefits of asking for more time (Study 7B), which may further contribute to employees' forgoing the opportunity to ask for more time and reduce task stress, enhance task focus, and improve task performance (Studies 6, 7A). Together, these studies help to shed light on how the interpersonal nature of deadline setting may deter employees under high time pressure from asking for more time even when a deadline is clearly adjustable.

Theoretical Contributions. Our findings make several theoretical contributions to the literature on time scarcity and employee voice. First, we break new ground in the time scarcity literature by investigating an alternative accessible yet powerful means to alleviate time scarcity at work – asking for more time. Prior work has focused on how deadlines impact the worker's affective experience (e.g. Amabile et al., 1976) or performance (Amabile et al., 2002), but this literature has largely neglected how time-stressed individuals may attempt to alleviate their time scarcity, with the exception of planning (Claessens, Van Eerde, Rutte, & Roe, 2004; Parke,

Weinhardt, Brodsky, Tangirala, & DeVoe, 2018; Rapp, Bachrach, & Rapp, 2013). Using a multimethod approach employing archival data analysis, a survey of working employees, and online and in-person experiments, we find that a surprisingly large number of deadlines in organizations are adjustable, yet workers avoid asking for more time due to impression management concerns, even when the deadlines are experimentally induced and unambiguously malleable. By examining how employees initiate deadline adjustment, we also extend the literature on deadlines, which has treated deadlines as fixed.

Second, our work challenges conventional wisdom and previous work (e.g. Sheldon, Thomas-Hunt, & Proell, 2006), which presumes that task delays in collaborations are interpersonally costly. Prior literature on time in organizations suggests that time delays in organizations (e.g. delays in flight schedules or in meetings) often evokes anger (Blount & Janicik, 2001; Weiner, 1985, p. 19), impatience (Blount & Janicik, 2001), and frustration (Amsel, 1992; Spector, 1978). In the domain of collaboration, studies suggest that task delays can cost the worker's perceived competence, particularly for low-status collaborators (Sheldon et al., 2006). However, in our experiments, supervisors did not react negatively to lower status employees expressing their need for more time (Studies 3-5). One key attribute of our experiments that may drive this difference in collaborator reaction is that employees in our studies preemptively announced their need for more time before the deadline had passed. In contrast, workers in prior experiments violated their collaborator's expectations without warning (e.g. submitted task 10 minutes after the expected time without notice). Thus, our results provide preliminary evidence that *preemptive* extension requests, relative to silently missing deadlines, may be an effective means to minimize interpersonal costs when a task delay is unavoidable. Considering our findings in Study 1B, where preemptive extension requests were more strongly

deterred by impression management concerns, alleviating employees' impression management concerns in extension requests may be a particularly powerful and costless means to reduce time stress at work.

Third, we add to the rich literature on proactive behavior at work by exploring an underexamined type of proactive employee voice at work – making requests to adjust task deadlines. Taking the initiative to adjust one's deadlines is often not a behavior that is expected as part of an employee's role. As many extensively studied employee voice such as making constructive suggestions about organizational practices (Grant & Mayer, 2009), extension requests have the potential to advance personal effectiveness. Prior literature highlights that employees often avoid voicing their input, either because they believe it will be futile or interpersonally risky. We add to this literature by demonstrating that employees underutilize extension requests despite the potential positive impact on their well-being and productivity due to impression management concerns – an understudied deterrent of employee voice.

Finally, the current research contributes to our understanding of how impression management concerns impact workplace behavior. Adding to the literature that describes employees' avoiding advice seeking (e.g. Brooks et al., 2015), feedback seeking (e.g. Ashford & Northcraft, 1992), and help seeking (e.g. Bohns & Flynn, 2015; Thompson & Bolino, 2018) in order to maintain how competent they seem, we find a novel domain where impression management concerns hinder optimal employee performance: asking for more time. Although extension requests may be conceptually similar to requesting advice, feedback, or help, it is unique from other domains in that it does not require others to expend their resources (e.g. mental effort, time, money) to benefit the seeker (Lee, 2002), particularly when (1) the original deadline is adjustable and (2) the other party's task is not contingent upon the requester's task

completion. In our studies, we find that even in these situations where the potential burden for the requestee is low, employees avoid asking for more time to protect their own image.

Practical Implications. Our findings also hold important practical implications. In our experiments, we found that employees are hesitant to ask for more time when their extension request is visible to evaluative parties, even when the deadline is highly adjustable and the extra time would benefit their performance. Employees' failing to ask for more time when they need it may undermine their task experience and performance. Indeed, our findings indicate that asking and receiving more time may lead to reduced task stress and improved task performance. Thus, our studies suggest that managers should strategically think about ways to encourage employees to ask for more time when they need it, without the fear of being negatively judged. To do so, managers may need to directly address some of the negative beliefs that employees harbor about asking for more time, by clarifying that (1) an extension request does not signal incompetence and (2) the benefits of extra time could be more substantial than employees may believe. Clear communication from managers may help to create an environment whereby employees actively optimize their time and resources for optimal task performance without the fear of judgment.

Future Directions. Our findings are qualified by several limitations that suggest new directions for future research. In our studies, we only examine one-time interactions and cannot address how observers would react to frequent extension requests. Would repeated extension request cost the worker's perceived competence more so than one-time requests? In a pilot study ($N = 177$), we asked working employees how frequently their supervisor failed to get back to their work on time during the past four weeks. In this study, supervisors who failed to meet their deadlines four or more times during the past four weeks were perceived as less competent relative to those who failed to meet their deadlines one to three times, $t(176) = 2.41$ $p = .017$, $d =$

0.36. These results suggest that frequently adjusting deadlines may signal greater incompetence relative to less frequently asking for more time. As this evidence is correlational, additional research that experimentally assigns extension request frequency would help shed light on how observer reaction is moderated by request frequency.

Our studies also focused on extension requests for relatively short deadlines and extensions (e.g. 2 minutes, 3 days). This limited our ability to address how supervisors react to extension requests for projects with long deadlines or how employees react when their extension request results in substantial windfall of time. If the deadline is longer, supervisors may be more likely to perceive the assigned timeline as sufficient and react more negatively to the employees' extension requests. If the extension period is longer, prior research on deadline and financial windfalls suggest that long deadline extensions may have adverse effects on task completion. Tight deadlines are often effective means to overcome procrastination (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002) due to people's tendency to prioritize tasks based on their urgency rather than importance (Zhu, Yang, & Hsee, 2018). When deadlines are extended, workers no longer reap the motivational benefits of tight deadlines. In fact, research on time slack (Zauberman & Lynch, 2005) – people's optimism towards the amount of surplus time we will have in the future relative to the present – suggests that even moderate deadline adjustments may lead to a perception of time abundance, attenuating a sense of urgency and leading to greater procrastination. Furthermore, in the financial domain, unanticipated surplus money is more carelessly spent (Arkes et al., 1994) and often readily spent for pleasure (O'curry & Strahilevitz, 2001). Taken together, these research suggest that substantial unanticipated surplus time gained from extensions may be wasted on task-irrelevant things. Finally, longer deadlines may lead workers to infer that the task requires more effort, leading to procrastination or quitting the task (Zhu,

Bagchi, Hock, & Diehl, 2018). Thus, if employees are given substantial amount of additional time, they may be demotivated to work on the task until they experience time scarcity again. Future research tracking how employee's work engagement is impacted by longer extension requests would help uncover more granular insights about the optimal amount and timing of deadline adjustments.

Another interesting remaining question is how the extension request impacts supervisors' expectations regarding the quality of the employee's performance. One may expect that supervisors expect the output to be higher quality if an employee asks for more time, and are more likely to be disappointed when an employee submits a mediocre quality output after making an extension request. Indeed, employees may be anxious about making extension request precisely because they fear that they may be setting themselves up to disappoint their supervisors by asking for more time, as it would heighten their supervisor's expectations. Our results from Study 6, where supervisors rated an employee as equally competent and motivated regardless of whether the supervisor thought the employee asked for more time, suggests that supervisors' evaluation criteria do not change in response to the employees' extension requests. However, it is possible that supervisor expectations may change if the timing of the extension request and the evaluation is separated, such that the longer time investment to the task is more salient to the supervisor. At the same time, prior literature on input bias, or the systematic misuse of input information in the judgment of outcome quality, suggests that extension requests may actually benefit perceived performance quality (Chinander & Schweitzer, 2003). Just as observers perceive an identical presentation to be higher quality when they knew it took a longer time to prepare for it, supervisors may perceive an objectively identical task output to be higher quality if it was submitted after an extension request. Future studies directly assessing supervisor's

evaluation of task performance following a deadline extension as opposed to employee competence would help shed light on how extension requests shape supervisor's evaluation of task output.

The question of how supervisors' prior expectations about the employee impacts supervisor's reactions to extension requests also demands further investigation. In our experiments, we chose to limit individuating information about the employees, as we were primarily interested in the predicted and actual main effect of what extension requests signal about the employee. While this set up allows for a clean investigation of the impact of extension requests, it fails to capture the nuances of how deadline extension requests may interact with prior expectations the supervisor holds about the employee. Countless papers on person attribution highlight that prior knowledge (e.g. stereotype) of individuals impacts the attributions we make about the person's behavior (Monteith, Woodcock, & Lybarger, 2013; Reeder, 2013). Thus, an employee's extension request may signal a variety of things – from lack of competence to motivation to perfect one's work – depending on whether the supervisor perceived the employee as lacking in skill or highly motivated prior to the extension request. In our exploratory analysis of Study 5B, for instance, where supervisors took the perspective of the employee and described why the employee may need an extension request, supervisors describing female employees were more likely to discuss an employees' personal situation compared to those who were describing male employees, $b = 0.75$, $SE = 0.34$, 95% CI [0.10, 1.46], $p = .029$. We hope to further investigate these nuanced dynamics in our future research to understand how the benefits and costs of deadline extension requests for employees vary across a range of demographic, performance, and status hierarchy dimensions.

Finally, and most importantly, avoidance of extension requests, like any behavior in the workplace, is not determined by a single psychological cause. Countless intriguing factors other than impression management concerns that contribute to employees' reluctance to adjust malleable deadlines demand further exploration. One such psychological factor may be the perceived rigidity of the deadline. Although we have provided preliminary evidence that many deadlines in the workplace are adjustable and employees recognize this fact, it is possible that employees in general tend to perceive deadlines as less malleable than supervisors do, adding to employee's hesitations towards asking for more time. Our findings in Study 4, where employees perceived tasks to be more urgent than supervisors, support this hypothesis. Perceived rigidity of deadline may not only vary by worker status, but also by personality traits and cultural norms (Pant, 2016). For example, in Study 4, employees with high (vs. low) neuroticism perceived tasks as more urgent, $b = -0.26$, $SE = 0.11$, 95% CI [-0.48, -0.048], $p = .017$). Further research identifying the antecedents and interactions of varying subjective deadline rigidity will help to shed light on challenges of interpersonal coordination in team settings.

Conclusion

Time scarcity is a prevalent issue in the workplace, harming employee well-being and performance. One potential solution to time scarcity, which employees underutilize, are extension requests. In this paper, we report multiple experiments exploring why employees are reluctant to ask for more time and what they may be forgoing as a result. Our findings indicate that employees may avoid asking for more time because they believe asking for more time may signal their incompetence to parties whose evaluation is meaningful to them. Further, we find that employee's fear that extension requests would cost their image is exaggerated, and that supervisors do not perceive employees who ask for more time as less competent. Rather,

supervisors may perceive extension requests as a signal of employee's motivation. Gaining more time may also provide employees with the opportunity to improve their performance and how competent they seem to their supervisors. Taken together, our findings suggest that workers should actively ask for more time to their supervisors whenever necessary in order to increase their effectiveness at work.

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APPENDIX

Figure 1:

Email Categorization (Preliminary Study)




Figure 2:

Rate of Extension Request (Studies 1A & 1B)




Figure 3:
Screenshot of Task (Study 1B)

Describe the events captured in the image below, as many as you can and as detailed as you can.

Remember, your performance will be evaluated by a rater on how "competent" and "motivated" you seem to be. If you receive a rating of 6 or 7 on both "competent" and "motivated" ratings, you will receive a \$0.30 bonus.

You will have 2 minutes to work on your task.

At any point during the task, if you would like to ask for more time, please click on the button below.

Your rater WILL know whether you asked for more time.

I need more time.

01 37



Figure 4:
Impact of Extension Visibility on Performance (Study 1B)





Figure 5:
Impression Cost Concern and Extension Request (Study 2)







Figure 6:

Mediation Path Model (Study 2)



Note: $N = 602$; For clarity of presentation, control variables and non-significant indirect effects (i.e. motivation, authenticity, moral) are omitted from the figure.

Figure 7:
Supervisor-Employee Perspective Gap (Study 3)




Figure 8:
Task Urgency and Employee-Supervisor Perspective Gap (Study 4)




Figure 9:

(Predicted) Supervisor Reaction to Employee's Extension Request (Study 5A & 5B)




Figure 10:
Performance Information Given to Supervisors (Study 6)




Figure 11:
Manager Evaluation of S1B Employee Performance (Study 6)





Figure 12:
Effect of Employee's Extension Request (Study 6)



Note: $N = 713$ (Subsample of evaluation where supervisor knowledge of extension request and employee's actual extension request behavior were matched)

Table 1: Sample Characteristics Across Studies

Study	% Female	M_{age} (SD_{age})	Population
S1A	54.52	37.34 (13.10)	Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers located in the U.S.
S1B	54.42	36.51 (12.36)	Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers located in the U.S.
S2	54.49	36.40 (11.17)	Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers located in the U.S.
S3	46.36	35.52 (10.11)	Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers located in the U.S.; Working paid 21+hr/week
S4	51.74	35.51 (10.44)	Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers located in the U.S.; Working paid 21+hr/week
S5A	48.77	33.35 (9.33)	Adults recruited on Prolific; Working paid 21+hr/week; Not self-employed; Working with a direct supervisor
S5B	46.63	34.94 (9.20)	Adults recruited on Prolific; Working paid 21+hr/week; Not self-employed; Had supervising experience
S6	54.42	37.62 (11.70)	Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers located in the U.S.

7A	46.08	20.79 (1.30)	College Students recruited from a midwestern university in U.S.
7B	44.09	20.91 (4.86)	College Students recruited from a midwestern university in U.S.

Table 2:
Sample Size and Stopping Rules

Study	N	Stopping Rule
S1A	398	We targeted for $N=200$ per cell. No samples were dropped for the reported analysis.
S1B	825	To detect a small effect in a logistic regression (Odds ratio = 0.65) with a power of 0.80, we recruited 901 participants. After excluding 18 participants who did not complete their task as instructed (e.g. copy and pasted random texts instead of describing the image), 6 participants who were suspicious that their performance will not be evaluated and 57 participants who failed to accurately recall their experimental conditions, we were left with a total sample of $N = 825$. Including this data did not change our main results (See Supplementary Materials).
S2	602	The sample size was determined based on a pilot study to detect a significant standardized indirect effect of 0.06. 49 of these participants failed to recall the manipulated portion of the scenario accurately. In the paper, we present the analyses including these participants who failed the manipulation check, in order to retain our target sample size.
S3	783	After collecting an initial sample of $N=199$, we conducted an interim analysis and found a marginal effect that suggested that asking for more time had a positive effect on the supervisor's perceived motivation of the employee. To gain sufficient power to be confident in this effect, we decided to collect more sample up to $N = 780$ to detect a small significant effect ($d = 0.23$) in a one-sample t-test with a power of 0.80 in each condition. As we conducted an interim analysis, we adjusted the alpha level to reflect the fact that we conducted multiple statistical tests following suggestions from Bender & Lange (2001). Using the O'Brien Fleming-type alpha spending function, we applied α/Z boundaries of 0.0412/1.68 and a nominal p-value of 0.0467 for the one-sample t-tests of our final analysis and α/Z boundaries of 0.0224/1.98 and a nominal p-value of .024 for the independent-samples t-tests of our final analysis.
S4	603	We targeted for $N=200$ per cell. No samples were dropped for the reported analysis.
S5A	203	To detect a small effect ($d = 0.20$) in a one-sample t-test with a power of 0.80, we targeted $N=200$. No samples were dropped for the reported analysis.
S5B	401	To explore the effects of employee gender on supervisor reaction, we targeted for $N=400$ ($N=200$ per employee gender). No samples were dropped for the reported analysis.
S6	1,414	After collecting a sample of $N = 793$, we conducted an interim analysis, and found that supervisors who were told that their employee asked for more time perceived the employee as marginally less competent compared to supervisors who were not. We decided to collect additional samples, up to $N = 1400$, that would allow us to detect a small difference ($d = 0.22$) in the competence rating across the two supervisor knowledge conditions with a power of at least 0.80. As in Study 3, we applied α/Z boundaries of 0.0224/1.98 and a nominal p-value of .024 for our final analysis.
7A	442	After collecting an initial sample of $N = 217$, we conducted an interim analysis, we found a marginal effect that suggested that asking for more time impacted, compared to having abundant time, had a positive effect on the employee's task focus. To gain sufficient power to be confident in this effect, we decided to collect as many more samples as we can until the end of the semester, which resulted in a final sample size of $N = 442$.

Our main goal of the study is to examine how the experience of participants who asked for more time compares with both that of participants who did not ask for more time and those who had abundant time. To avoid alpha inflation issues due to multiple comparisons, in all our analyses we run a linear regression examining the effect of the other two conditions relative to asking for more time instead of multiple paired t-tests. As in studies 4 and 6 applied α/Z boundaries of 0.0224/1.98 and a nominal p-value of .024 for our final analysis.

7B 279

We recruited as many participants as we can, given our available lab sections. 3 participants were dropped from the reported analysis, as they have participated in Study 7A.

Table 3:

Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations (Study 3)

Variable	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. IsEmployee	(49.7%)	-										
2. Competent	-0.21	1.43	-0.08									
3. Motivated	-0.06	1.45	-0.04	0.76								
4. Openness	0.62	0.99	-0.03	-0.04	0.00							
5. Conscientiousness	1.09	0.85	-0.01	-0.07	-0.02	0.18						
6. Extraversion	-0.13	1.09	-0.08	0.14	0.13	0.18	0.16					
7. Agreeableness	0.59	0.97	-0.03	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.29	0.21				
8. Neuroticism	-0.40	1.14	0.01	-0.15	-0.14	-0.05	-0.40	-0.33	-0.36			
9. # Supervisee	8.53	6.71	-0.01	0.06	0.03	0.10	0.15	0.20	0.10	-0.18		
10. IsFemale	(46.4%)	-	0.01	-0.09	-0.06	0.05	0.05	-0.04	0.03	0.21	-0.05	
11. Age	35.52	10.11	-0.03	0.02	0.04	0.09	0.21	0.00	0.13	-0.16	0.17	0.10

Table 4:

Condition Differences on Task Experience Measures (Study 7A)

Variable	Ask	Not Ask	Statistics (Comparison with Ask)	Abundant	Statistics (Comparison with Ask)
Study 7A	<i>N</i> =147	<i>N</i> =146		<i>N</i> =149	
Negative Task Experience	3.34 (1.67)	3.79 (1.67)	$b = 0.45, SE = 0.19, 95\% CI [0.083, 0.81], p = .016^*$	3.10 (1.50)	$b = -0.25, SE = 0.18, 95\% CI [-0.61, 0.11], p = .180$
Time Stress	5.11 (1.38)	5.75 (1.21)	$b = 0.64, SE = 0.17, 95\% CI [0.30, 0.98], p < .001^{***}$	4.62 (1.80)	$b = -0.49, SE = 0.17, 95\% CI [-0.83, -0.15], p = .005^{**}$
Number of Original Ideas	2.34 (1.82)	1.31 (1.08)	$b = -1.03, SE = 0.18, 95\% CI [-1.39, -0.67], p < .001^{***}$	2.32 (1.63)	$b = -0.02, SE = 0.18, 95\% CI [-0.38, 0.33], p = .896$
Proposal Length	113.03 (40.56)	63.36 (23.20)	$b = -49.66, SE = 4.34, 95\% CI [-58.19, -41.14], p < .001^{***}$	102.10 (40.04)	$b = -10.93, SE = 4.32, 95\% CI [-19.41, -2.44], p = .012^*$

Positive Task Experience	3.70 (1.60)	3.57 (1.49)	$b = -0.12, SE = 0.18, 95\% CI [-0.48, 0.23], p = .503$	3.61 (1.55)	$b = -0.09, SE = 0.18, 95\% CI [-0.44, 0.27], p = .624$
Positive Affect	28.09 (6.74)	28.42 (5.98)	$b = 0.34, SE = 0.77, 95\% CI [-1.17, 1.85], p = .662$	28.66 (6.95)	$b = 0.57, SE = 0.76, 95\% CI [-0.93, 2.07], p = .457$
Negative Affect	21.12 (8.35)	23.07 (7.74)	$b = 1.95, SE = 0.92, 95\% CI [0.14, 3.77], p = .035$	20.42 (7.60)	$b = -0.69, SE = 0.75, 95\% CI [-2.50, 1.11], p = .451$
Distraction	2.80 (0.47)	3.15 (0.47)	$b = 0.35, SE = 0.13, 95\% CI [0.09, 0.61], p = .009^{**}$	2.91 (0.47)	$b = 0.11, SE = 0.13, 95\% CI [0.02, 0.51], p = .418$
Control Over Time	3.60 (1.32)	3.08 (1.40)	$b = -0.52, SE = 0.16, 95\% CI [-0.83, -0.20], p = .001^{**}$	3.70 (1.38)	$b = 0.11, SE = 0.16, 95\% CI [-0.20, 0.42], p = .497$
Positive Task Experience Satisfaction with Performance	3.70 (1.60)	3.57 (1.49)	$b = -0.12, SE = 0.18, 95\% CI [-0.48, 0.23], p = .503$	3.61 (1.55)	$b = -0.09, SE = 0.18, 95\% CI [-0.44, 0.27], p = .624$
Satisfaction with Performance	4.39 (1.31)	3.94 (1.22)	$b = -0.45, SE = 0.15, 95\% CI [-0.74, -0.15], p = .003^{**}$	4.18 (1.34)	$b = -0.21, SE = 0.15, 95\% CI [-0.50, 0.086], p = .165$
Positive Social Emotion	2.63 (0.94)	1.89 (0.86)	$b = -0.74, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [-0.94, -0.54], p < .001^{***}$	2.50 (0.86)	$b = -0.13, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [-0.33, 0.072], p = .206$
Negative Social Emotion	1.75 (0.91)	2.02 (0.95)	$b = 0.28, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [0.089, 0.47], p = .004^{**}$	1.44 (0.58)	$b = -0.30, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [-0.49, -0.11], p = .002^{**}$

Note: As we conducted an interim analysis, we applied a nominal p-value of .024 for independent samples t-tests based on the O'Brien Fleming-type alpha spending function.

Table 5:
Prediction Question (Study 7B)

In today's study, you will imagine that you were in each of the following situations and predict how you would have felt:

- Given **2 minutes** to work on the task and **did not ask for more time**. That is, you had *limited time*.
- Given **2 minutes** to work on the task, **asked for more time**, and **received 2 additional minutes** to work on the task. That is, you requested for *extra time*.
- Given **4 minutes** to work on the task. That is, you had *abundant time*.

Specifically, you will **imagine that you were in each situation** and answer the following questions:

Negative Task Experience.	“To what extent would you find the proposal-writing task to be stressful?” on a 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A great deal) scale.
Time Pressure.	“To what extent would you feel pressed for time?” on a 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A great deal) scale.
Task Performance.	“How well would you perform on the proposal-writing task?” and “How satisfied would you be with your performance?” on a 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A great deal) scale.

Table 6:**Condition Differences on Predicted Task Experience Measures (Study 7B)**

Variable	Ask	Not Ask	Statistics (Comparison with Ask)	Abundant	Statistics (Comparison with Ask)
Study 7B	<i>N</i> =279	<i>N</i> =279		<i>N</i> =279	
Negative Task Experience	4.36 (0.08)	5.46 (0.08)	$b = 1.10, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [0.91, 1.29], p < .001^{***}$	3.38 (0.09)	$b = -0.98, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [-1.17, -0.79], p < .001^{***}$
Time Stress	4.24 (0.09)	5.66 (0.09)	$b = 1.43, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [1.23, 1.63], p < .001^{***}$	3.03 (0.09)	$b = -1.21, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [-1.41, -1.01], p < .001^{***}$
Performance	4.60 (0.08)	3.76 (0.08)	$b = -0.84, SE = 0.09, 95\% CI [-1.01, -0.66], p < .001^{***}$	5.03 (0.08)	$b = 0.43, SE = 0.09, 95\% CI [0.25, 0.60], p < .001^{***}$
Positive Task Experience	3.84 (0.09)	3.00 (0.09)	$b = -0.84, SE = 0.09, 95\% CI [-1.02, -0.66], p < .001^{***}$	4.31 (0.09)	$b = 0.47, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [0.29, 0.65], p < .001^{***}$
Positive Affect	4.72 (0.09)	2.87 (0.08)	$b = -1.85, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [-2.05, -1.66], p < .001^{***}$	5.21 (0.08)	$b = 0.49, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [0.29, 0.68], p < .001^{***}$
Negative Affect	4.06 (0.09)	5.05 (0.09)	$b = 0.99, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [0.80, 1.18], p < .001^{***}$	3.19 (0.80)	$b = -0.87, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [-1.06, -0.68], p < .001^{***}$
Task Focus	4.62 (0.09)	5.02 (0.09)	$b = 0.40, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [0.21, 0.60], p < .001^{***}$	4.44 (0.09)	$b = -0.18, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [-0.37, 0.016], p = .072$
Satisfaction with Performance	4.55 (0.08)	3.40 (0.08)	$b = -1.15, SE = 0.09, 95\% CI [-1.34, -0.97], p < .001^{***}$	5.06 (0.08)	$b = 0.51, SE = 0.09, 95\% CI [0.32, 0.69], p < .001^{***}$

Note: The reported means are predicted marginal means.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

I. Robustness Checks

Main Analyses Including Excluded Participants (Study 1B)

Variable	Invisible <i>N</i> =445	Visible <i>N</i> =456	<i>Statistics</i>
Condition (Visible)	67.4%	51.8%	$b = -0.66, SE = 0.14, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.93, -0.30], p < .001^{***}$
Visible \times Time Pressure	-	-	$b = -0.28, SE = 0.12, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.52, -0.04], p = .021^*$

II. Preliminary Study: How Adjustable are Deadlines in the Workplace?

To gain a descriptive understanding of how deadlines are set and adjusted in the workplace, we conducted an exploratory survey that documents to whom, when, why, and how employees communicate for more time, their communication partners' predicted and actual affective reactions, and the speaker's affective state before and after the communication. The results suggest that (1) majority of the supervisors willingly grant the additional time requested by the employee, (2) employees overestimate how negatively their supervisors will react to their time requests, and (3) employees psychologically benefit from gaining more time and asking for yet being denied more time does not hurt employee morale.

Method

Respondents. We recruited 270 adults who work for pay at least 21 hours a week through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Respondents were first asked if they have ever “felt that [they] did not have enough time to finish a task that was assigned to [them] at work.” and whether they have ever “communicated with someone at work that you need more time for a task?”. Only respondents who had experience asking for more time at work proceeded to the survey, which left us with a final sample of 191 respondents (40.3% female; $M_{age} = 34.59$ years, $SD_{age} = 8.95$).

Procedure. Eligible respondents answered questions about the most recent time they communicated to someone at their workplace for more time. Using various free response and multiple-choice questionnaires, we asked respondents to elaborate on whom they communicated their time need to, how the deadline was initially determined, why they needed to ask for an extension, the length of the original time limit and the extension, the medium they used for the interaction, the predicted and actual affective reactions of the listener, and their own affective state before and after making the extension request. In this paper, we describe and report the results of the key questions that are relevant to our central thesis: (1) How do employees expect supervisors to react to their extension requests? (2) How do supervisors actually react? (3) how does asking for more time affect the employee's psychological well-being? (4) Do employees recognize that the deadline is adjustable?

The materials and data of exploratory questions not central to our research question (e.g. Why did you ask for more time? How was the deadline set?) can be found in our OSF repository.

Measures

The four relevant questions we asked in this survey are described below.

Manager Reaction. To assess employee's forecast of supervisor reaction and its accuracy, we asked respondents to first describe the reaction in a free response comment by answering "When you told your supervisor that you need more time, how did your supervisor react?".

Respondents also predicted the supervisor's affect in a 5-point likert scale (varying from 1= "Not at all" to "A great deal") on four positive affect categories (Happy, Grateful, Relieved, Pleased), six negative affect categories (Disappointed, Displeased, Angry, Upset, Unhappy, Frustrated) and one neutral affect ("Surprised"). This scale was adapted from the Success and Failure Affects Scale (SFAS; Russell & McAuley, 1986). Then, using the same scale, the respondents indicated how the recipient actually reacted when they asked for more time.

Employee affect. To assess employee's change in affective state before and after communicating their need for more time, we asked "Before you told [the recipient] that you need more time, how much did you feel the following emotions?" on a 5-point likert scale. The scale included three positive affect categories (Relieved, Grateful, Satisfied), four negative affect categories (Ashamed, Guilty, Embarrassed, Distressed), and one neutral affect (Determined). This scale was adapted from PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and Success Failure Affect Scale (Russell & McAuley, 1986).

Determinants of deadline. To examine employee's perceptions around how deadlines are determined, we asked respondents to indicate which factors they thought determined their original deadline by answering "Out of 100%, how much did each of the following factors contribute to the determination of your original deadline?". To answer this question, respondents allocated a total of 100% across six categories: "My preferences", "My supervisor's preferences", "Team members' preferences", "The client preference", "Company rules or convention", and "Other (Other)". For "Other", respondents were given a textbox to elaborate on what the other factors are. 9 respondents provided elaborations. Most of these elaborations were external demands such as "federal court set deadline", "office move date", "need for an audit".

Results

Determinants of Deadline. We coded the factor with the highest percentage assigned as each perceived primary determinant of the deadline. If equal percentages were assigned to multiple factors, all of these factors were considered as primary determinants. 59.9% of the perceived primary determinants of the original deadline were internal preferences that are arguably adjustable, such as the preference of the supervisor (40.5), oneself (12.0%) and team members (7.4%). 27.7% indicated external constraints that may be less adjustable such as client preferences (24.8%) or external (e.g. legal) deadlines (2.9%) as the primary determinant of the deadline. 12.4% indicated company rules and conventions. Analyzing the data by calculating the average percentage respondents assigned to each factor yielded similar results.

Communication Partner. 132 out of the 191 eligible respondents recalled an incident in which they asked for more time to their supervisor as opposed to other related agents such as team members or clients. We focus our analyses below on these responses based on the employees' interactions with their supervisors.

Supervisor Reaction. We coded employee's description of the supervisor's response in to three categories: "Extension granted without question", "Extension granted after initial rejection or questioning", and "Denied extension". We find that 79.7% of the extension requests made to supervisors were accepted without question. 14.8% of the supervisors granted time after an initial protest or questioning the rationale for the extension, and only 5.5% of the requests were denied.

Discussion

Pilot 1 provides preliminary evidence that when employees ask for more time, supervisors often willingly grant the additional time. In around 80% of the recalled instances, the supervisors granted the employee with more time without any additional question. The data also suggests that the employees overestimate how negatively their supervisors will react to their time requests, and that deadline extension requests may psychologically benefit the employees. Employees reported having experienced less negative affect and greater positive affect after asking for an extension request. This change in affect was driven by the experience of employees whose extension requests were accepted, and we find no evidence that supervisor's rejection to time asks negatively impacts employee's affect. Finally, deadlines were not set on inflexible grounds. Around two-thirds of the perceived primary determinants of the original deadline were preferences of the supervisor, team members, or employees themselves as opposed client preferences or external deadlines that are rather difficult to adjust for.

III. Study 3: Moderation of Personality Traits

Measures

Big Five Personality Traits. We measured participants' trait openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism using a 10-item big five inventory (Rammstedt & John, 2007). We predicted that the higher an employee scores on the neuroticism scale, the employee would perceive the extension request as more costly. We also predicted that the higher a supervisor scores on the neuroticism scale, they would be less open employee's asking for more time. We did not have strong predictions about how other personality factors would moderate the impact of asking for more time, and thus do not discuss these results below

Results

Predicted Impact of Time Ask on Employee Image.

Competent Employees who scored higher neuroticism believed that asking for more time would have a greater negative impact ($M = -1.20$, $SD = 1.45$) on their perceived competence than did those who scored lower on neuroticism ($M = -0.11$, $SD = 1.59$), $b = -0.32$, $SE = 0.07$, 95% CI [-0.46, -0.19], $p < .001$.

Motivated. In line with our hypothesis, employees who scored high on neuroticism believed that asking for more time would have a greater negative impact on how motivated they seem ($M = -0.83$, $SD = 1.55$) than those who scored low on neuroticism did ($M = 0.06$, $SD = 1.73$), $b = -0.26$, $SE = 0.07$, 95% CI [-0.40, -0.12], $p < .001$.

Authentic. Employees who scored higher on neuroticism believed that asking for more time would have a less positive impact on how authentic they seem to their supervisors ($M =$

0.10, $SD = 1.57$) compared to those who scored low on neuroticism ($M = 0.76$, $SD = 1.38$), $b = -0.19$, $SE = 0.06$, 95% CI [-0.31, -0.065], $p < .001$.


Actual Impact of Time Ask on Employee Image.

Competent. Supervisor neuroticism did not moderate how competent a supervisor perceived an employee to be in response to their extension request, $b = -0.05$, $SE = 0.06$, 95% CI [-0.16, 0.060], $p = .379$.

Motivated. Supervisor neuroticism did not moderate how motivated a supervisor perceived an employee to be in response to their extension request, $b = -0.10$, $SE = 0.06$, 95% CI [-0.22, 0.0096], $p = .073$.

Authentic. Supervisor neuroticism did not moderate how authentic a supervisor perceived an employee to be in response to their extension request, $b = -0.03$, $SE = 0.05$, 95% CI [-0.0059, 0.030], $p = .601$.

VI. (Predicted) Impact of Extension Requests on Perceived Employee Authenticity



V. Study 7A & 7B: Exploratory Findings

Study 7A			
Variable	Hypothesis	Measures	Findings
Positive Task Experience	Participants who asked for more time will experience greater positive task experience than those who did not ask for more time, comparable to participants who had sufficient time to work on the task.	Participants rated how satisfying, motivating, enjoyable, pleasurable, engaging, fun, positive, exciting, and interesting they found the task to be on a 1 (<i>Not at all</i>) to 7 (<i>A great deal</i>) scale.	We created a composite measure of positive task experience by averaging the nine items ($\alpha = 0.97$). Contrary to our hypothesis, positive experience of the task was not significantly different across conditions, $F(2, 439) = 0.24, p = .786$.
PANAS	Participants who asked for more time will experience more positive and less negative affect compared to those who did not ask for more time, comparable to participants who had sufficient time to work on the task.	We asked employees to indicate the extent to which they felt twenty different emotions during the product description task using PANAS (Watson et al., 1988)	In line with our hypothesis, participants who asked for more time experienced less negative affect ($M = 21.12, SD = 8.35$) than those who had limited time ($M = 23.07, SD = 7.74$), but this difference did not reach significance, $b = 1.95, SE = 0.92, 95\% CI$

Distraction	Time pressure imposes a cognitive load, making it difficult for individuals to focus their attention during decision making tasks (Wright, 1974). We hypothesized that the same cognitive load may make it difficult for individuals to focus on their task, and that asking for more time would reduce distraction caused by time pressure.	We measured distraction during the task in two ways. First, we assessed participant's agreement to "I found it difficult to focus during the task" and "I felt pulled in too many directions by the task" on a 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree) scale along with the extent to which the participant's attention was either on-task or on task-unrelated concerns on a 1 (Complete on task) to 5 (Completely on unrelated concerns) scale. We also measured the percent of time assigned to work on the task that the participant indicated to have actually spent on the task on a 0 to 100 scale.	<p>[0.14, 3.77], $p = .035$¹⁵. Participants who asked for more time experienced negative affect comparable to participants who had abundant time ($M = 20.32$, $SD = 7.60$), $b = -0.69$, $SE = 0.75$, 95% CI [-2.50, 1.11], $p = .451$.</p> <p>Participants who asked for more time also experienced positive affect ($M = 28.09$, $SD = 6.74$) that was similar in degree to those who had sufficient time ($M = 28.66$, $SD = 6.95$), $b = 0.57$, $SE = 0.76$, 95% CI [-0.93, 2.07], $p = .457$, but no greater than participants who had limited time ($M = 29.42$, $SD = 5.98$), $b = 0.34$, $SE = 0.77$, 95% CI [-1.17, 1.85], $p = .662$.</p> <p>Participants who asked for more time were on average less distracted ($M = 3.15$, $SE = 0.47$, 95% CI [1.24, 5.06]) compared to those who did not ask for more time ($M = 2.80$, $SE = 0.47$, 95% CI [0.88, 4.71]), $b = 0.35$, $SE = 0.13$, 95% CI [0.09, 0.61], $p = .009$¹⁶. Participants who had abundant time were similarly distracted ($M = 2.91$, $SE = 0.47$, 95% CI [0.99, 4.82]) as those who asked for more time, $b = 0.11$, $SE = 0.13$, 95% CI [0.02, 0.51], $p = .418$.</p> <p>The proportion of time participants indicated to have spent focusing on their task revealed similar pattern, such that participants who asked for more time were most focused on the task ($M = 85.31$, $SD = 19.06$) followed by</p>
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¹⁵ Based on an alpha level adjustment using the O'Brien Fleming-type alpha spending function, we applied a nominal p-value of 0.024.

¹⁶ As the consistency of our three item measures of distraction was poor ($\alpha = 0.59$; Kline, 2013), we utilized an analytic approach of ratings adapted from Biesanz and Human (2010). We treated each rating as a measurement of the same construct with biases from each respondent and measurement item and fit a linear mixed effects model. This approach allows us to estimate the effect of our experimental conditions while controlling for the variance due to scale item. We utilized R's lme4 package (Bates et al., 2018) and fitted a linear mixed effects model to calculate the fixed effect of condition while controlling for the mean rating tendency for each participant and measures. We used the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova et al., 2018) to derive p-values and degrees of freedom. The means reported for this analysis are predicted marginal means.

			those who had abundant time ($M = 82.34$, $SD = 19.52$) and limited time ($M = 80.75$, $SD = 23.34$).
Control over Time	Participants who asked for more time will experience more control over their time compared to those who did not ask for more time, comparable to participants who had sufficient time to work on the task.	We assessed how much control over their time participants experienced during the task using a 3-item measure of perceived time control adapted from Stanton and Barnes-Farrell (1996). Participants rated their agreement to statements such as "I felt in control of my time" on a 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree) scale.	We created a composite measure of felt time control during the task using the average of the three control over time items ($\alpha = 0.82$). As predicted, participants who asked for more time felt greater control over their time ($M = 3.60$, $SD = 1.32$) when compared to having limited time ($M = 3.08$, $SD = 1.40$), $b = -0.52$, $SE = 0.16$, 95% CI [-0.83, -0.20], $p = .001$, to a level that was comparable to those participants who were given abundant time for the task ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 1.38$), $b = 0.11$, $SE = 0.16$, 95% CI [-0.20, 0.42], $p = .497$.
Satisfaction with Performance	We explored whether participants who asked for more time feel greater satisfaction to their performance compared to those who had abundant time, because they actively participated in adjusting the timeline of the task.	We measured participant's satisfaction with their own performance using three items. We assessed their agreement on "I felt that I was doing well on the task assigned to me today" and "I worked hard on the task." on a 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree) scale. We also directly assessed their performance satisfaction by asking "How satisfied are you with your performance in today's task" on a 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A great deal) scale.	We created a composite measure using the average of these three ratings ($\alpha = 0.74$). Participants who asked for more time were more satisfied with their task ($M = 4.39$, $SD = 1.31$) than those who did not ask for more time ($M = 3.94$, $SD = 1.22$), $b = -0.45$, $SE = 0.15$, 95% CI [-0.74, -0.15], $p = .003$. These participants were also on average slightly more satisfied with their performance compared to those who were given abundant time ($M = 4.18$, $SD = 1.34$), but this difference did not reach significance $b = -0.21$, $SE = 0.15$, 95% CI [-0.50, 0.086], $p = .165$.

Affective Experience while Asking for More Time	Another alternative reason employees may avoid asking for more time, apart from concerns about impression costs and underestimating the benefits of extension request, is that they predict asking for more time would involve negative feelings such as embarrassment. We explored whether people experience negative emotions such as shame and embarrassment when they ask for more time.	We asked how much participants experienced a range of emotions either after asking for more time or not on a 1 (Not at all) to 5 (A great deal) scale. Along with the three positive emotion categories (Relieved, Grateful, Satisfied), four negative emotion categories (Ashamed, Guilty, Embarrassed, Distressed), and one neutral emotion (Determined) adapted from the Success and Failure Affects Scale (SFAS; Russell & McAuley, 1986), we included "In control" to measure how much sense of control participants felt during the task.	Based on an exploratory factor analysis (PCA), we created a composite score for negative emotions ($\alpha = 0.84$) by averaging the following four items: Ashamed, Guilty, Embarrassed, Distressed, along with a composite score for positive emotions ($\alpha = 0.83$) by averaging the following five items: Relieved, Grateful, Satisfied, Determined, In Control. Participants who asked for more time experienced more negative emotions after asking for more time ($M = 1.75, SD = 0.91$) relative to those who were given abundant time ($M = 1.44, SD = 0.58$), $b = -0.30, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [-0.49, -0.11], p = .002$, but less than what participants in the limited time condition experienced after not asking for more time ($M = 2.02, SD = 0.95$), $b = 0.28, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [0.089, 0.47], p = .004$. Participants' experienced positive emotions after asking for more time ($M = 2.63, SD = 0.94$) was significantly higher than what was experienced after not asking for more time ($M = 1.89, SD = 0.86$), $b = -0.74, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [-0.94, -0.54], p < .001$, and even slightly higher than what was experienced by participants who had abundant time ($M = 2.50, SD = 0.86$), though this difference was not significant, $b = -0.13, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [-0.33, 0.072], p = .206$.
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Study 7B

Variable	Measures	Findings
Positive Task Experience	"To what extent would you find the proposal-writing task to be enjoyable?" on a 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A great deal) scale.	Participants predicted that they would find the task to be significantly more enjoyable if they asked for more time ($M = 3.84, SE = 0.09, 95\% CI [3.67, 4.01]$) compared to not asking for more time ($M = 3.00, SE = 0.09, 95\% CI [2.83, 3.17]$), $b = -0.84, SE = 0.09, 95\% CI [-1.02, -0.66]$, but significantly less so when compared to having abundant time ($M =$

		4.31, $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI [4.14, 4.48]), $b = 0.47$, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI [0.29, 0.65], $p < .001$.
Positive Affect	“How happy would you be in this scenario?” on a 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A great deal) scale.	Participants predicted that they would be significantly happier if they asked for more time ($M = 4.72$, $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI [4.56, 4.89]) compared to not asking for more time ($M = 2.87$, $SE = 0.08$, 95% CI [2.70, 3.04]), $b = -1.85$, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI [-2.05, -1.66], $p < .001$, but significantly less so compared to having abundant time ($M = 5.21$, $SE = 0.08$, 95% CI [5.05, 5.38]), $b = 0.49$, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI [0.29, 0.68], $p < .001$.
Negative Affect	“How nervous would you be in this scenario?” on a 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A great deal) scale.	Participants predicted that they would be significantly less nervous if they asked for more time ($M = 4.06$, $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI [3.89, 4.23]) compared to not asking for more time ($M = 5.05$, $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI [4.88, 5.22]), $b = 0.99$, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI [0.80, 1.18], $p < .001$, but significantly more nervous when compared to having abundant time ($M = 3.19$, $SE = 0.80$, 95% CI [3.02, 3.36]), $b = -0.87$, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI [-1.06, -0.68], $p < .001$.
Task Focus	“To what extent would your attention be on-task as opposed to on task-unrelated concerns?” on a 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A great deal) scale. “Of the time you had, what % of the time would you actually spend on working on the task?” using a scale from 0 to 100%.	Participants predicted that they would be less able to focus on the task if they asked for more time ($M = 4.62$, $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI [4.45, 4.78]) compared to not asking for more time ($M = 5.02$, $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI [4.85, 5.19]), $b = 0.40$, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI [0.21, 0.60], $p < .001$. Participants predicted they would be marginally better focused if they asked for more time compared to having abundant time ($M = 4.44$, $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI [4.26, 4.61]), $b = -0.18$, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI [-0.37, 0.016], $p = .072$. Interestingly, participants predicted that they would spend equivalent % of their given time focusing on their task if they asked for more time ($M = 76.28$, $SE = 1.28$, 95% CI [73.75, 78.80]) when compared to not asking for more time ($M = 77.91$, $SE = 1.28$, 95% CI [75.38, 80.43]), $b = 1.63$, $SE = 1.05$, 95% CI [-0.42, 3.69], but that they would spend less time focusing on the task if they had abundant time ($M = 73.49$, $SE = 1.28$, 95% CI [70.97, 76.02]), $b = -2.78$, $SE = 1.05$, 95% CI [-4.84, -0.73], $p = .008$.
Satisfaction with Performance	“How satisfied would you be with your performance?” on a 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A great deal) scale.	Participants predicted that they would be more satisfied with their work if they asked ($M = 4.55$, $SE = 0.08$, 95% CI [4.40, 4.71]) compared to not asking for more time ($M = 3.40$, $SE = 0.08$, 95% CI [3.24, 3.55]), $b = -1.15$, $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI [-1.34, -0.97], $p < .001$, but

not as much as they would have been had they had abundant time ($M = 5.06$, $SE = 0.08$, 95% CI [4.90, 5.21]), $b = 0.51$, $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI [0.32, 0.69], $p < .001$.
