For the past thirty years David J. Collis has been a professor at the Harvard Business School, where he is only the second full-time Adjunct Professor appointed at HBS. Previously, he was the MBA Class of 1958 Senior Lecturer and an Associate Professor in the Strategy group at the Harvard Business School, having also completed five years as the Frederick Frank Adjunct Professor of International Business Administration at the Yale School of Management and two years as a professor at Columbia Business School. The winner of the 50th Anniversary McKinsey Award for the best article in the Harvard Business Review in 2008, and a Harvard Business Review best-selling author, he is an expert on corporate strategy and global competition, and is the author of the recent books International Strategy: Context, Concepts and Choices; Corporate Strategy (with Cynthia Montgomery); and Corporate Headquarters (with Michael Goold and David Young). Professor Collis is on the faculty for several HBS Executive Education programs, including Strategy: Building and Sustaining Competitive Advantage, and chairs Corporate Level Strategy and Global Strategic Management. As the author of over thirty articles and book chapters, his work has been frequently published in the Harvard Business Review, Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, and in many books including Managing the Multibusiness Company, International Competitiveness, and Beyond Free Trade. The nearly one hundred cases he has authored have sold over 1 million copies worldwide and his articles over a quarter of a million copies, with over 11,000 citations.
David Collis received an M.A. (1976) with a Double First from Cambridge University where he was the Wrenbury Scholar of the University. He graduated as a Baker Scholar from Harvard Business School, MBA (1978), and received a Ph.D. (1986) in Business Economics at Harvard University where he was a Dean's Doctoral Fellow. From 1978 to 1982 he worked for the Boston Consulting Group in London. He is currently a consultant to several major U.S. corporations, and on the Board of Directors of Cambridge in America, the Board of Trustees of the Hult International Business School, and the Advisory Boards of Walter Scott, Vivaldi Partners, Muzzy Lane and formerly of PICIS, Ocean Spray, and WebCT. He is also the cofounder of the elearning company E-Edge, and the advisory firm Ludlow Partners.
This book is designed for every student who will be involved in managing and advising companies that compete internationally or face international competitors. Designed around the course at Harvard Business School, Collis' new text takes the firm that operates across borders as a unit of analysis and the senior manager in a multinational as the typical decision maker. Illustrated with examples from companies of all sizes from around the globe, this text provides students with the means to navigate their way through the decisions they will face and formulate an effective business strategy. This is a much-needed guide to the common strategic issues that arise when firms compete internationally.
Corporations across the globe have been focused on the question of innovation for decades and longer. The desire to become leaner, better, and more efficient has driven innovative leaders for years. In higher education, however, this innovative mindset is a relatively new phenomenon, and one many stakeholders are still coming to terms with. In this interview, I reflect on a few of the lessons and roadblocks that face innovation in the corporate world and share my thoughts on how these ideas can inspire leaders across the postsecondary space.
Strategy and entrepreneurship are often seen as polar opposites. Yet the two desperately need each other: strategy without entrepreneurship is central planning; entrepreneurship without strategy leads to chaos. The two approaches can be reconciled through the Lean Strategy process which ensures that startups innovate in a disciplined fashion and make the most of their limited resources by knowing "what not to do". Deliberate strategy sets the bounds within which entrepreneurial experimentation takes place, while the results of that innovation leads to learning that reshapes the strategy. Lean Strategy enables company builders to pursue viable opportunities, stay focused, and align the entire organisation while supporting front-line entrepreneurial activities.
The corporate headquarters (CHQ) is the central organizational unit in the contemporary corporation and is critical for value creation in the overall firm. Since the early 1960s, a significant body of research on the CHQ has evolved along two separate but related streams. The first stream focuses on the CHQ in the multibusiness firm, while the second stream concerns the CHQ in the multinational firm. In this article, we promote a consistent multimarket firm perspective that draws on research in both streams. First, we describe the origins and evolution of CHQ research in each stream and articulate the benefits of a multimarket firm perspective. Second, we integrate the conversations found in the two streams into a schematic framework, review the studies' findings, and establish a shared language. We also propose ways in which scholars in each stream might enrich their work by incorporating some of the theories, methods, and findings of the other stream. Third, we discuss four fundamental inquiries for future research that draw upon the cumulative CHQ research in both streams. Overall, this article informs the study of the CHQ and, thereby, contributes to our understanding of the contemporary corporation.
Based on a six-country survey of nearly 250 multinationals (MNCs), this paper is the first empirical analysis to describe the size and composition of MNC headquarters and to account for differences among them. Findings are as follows: MNC corporate headquarters are more involved in "obligatory" and value creating and control functions than in operational activities; there are no systematic differences in the determinants of the size and composition of corporate headquarters between MNCs and purely domestic companies; and as the geographic scope of an MNC increases, two offsetting phenomena occur—headquarters decrease their influence over operational units that, ceteris paribus, reduces the size of headquarters, but the relative size of obligatory functions at headquarters increases with increased country heterogeneity. The net effect is that the size of corporate headquarters expands as MNC geographic scope increases. The notion of "administrative heritage" is validated as MNCs from different countries have substantially different corporate headquarters—U.S. headquarters are large (255 median staff for a 20,000 FTE MNC) and European headquarters smaller (124). Implications are drawn that countries will lose activities if domestic firms are acquired by foreign MNCs, and that MNCs need to allow more subsidiary autonomy as their geographic scope increases.
Collis, David J., and Michael G. Rukstad. "Can You Say What Your Strategy Is?"Harvard Business Review 86, no. 4 (April 2008). (50th Anniversary McKinsey Award Winner for Best Article in Harvard Business Review, 2009.)
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BOOK ABSTRACT: In spite of surging interest in the business group organization among business scholars, economists, and historians in recent years, academic research on business groups has, to date, remained within the boundary of emerging markets. The major aim of this volume is to explore the long-term evolution of different varieties of large enterprises in today's developed economies in the West. More specifically, the volume focuses on the economic institution of the business group and aims at understanding the factors behind its rise, growth, resilience, and/or fall; its behavioral and organizational characteristics; and its contributions to national economic development. While business groups, especially those with widely diversified product portfolios, are a dominant and critical enterprise model in emerging and developing economies and have lately attracted much attention in academic circles and business presses, interestingly, their counterparts in developed economies have not been systematically examined. This contempt for business groups in mature market settings stands in sharp contrast to the intensive research that has been conducted on other major models of large modern enterprises in those economies, such as functionally organized firms with a clear product focus and multidivisional enterprises that have diversified into related product lines. The present book aims to fill in this gap in the literature by adopting a coherent approach to this elusive subject.
Honoring Pankaj Ghemawat's receipt of an Academy of Management award, this chapter examines his contribution to the global strategy field. It notes the continuing importance of country differences to international strategy and how geographic scope contributes to competitive advantage.
Collis, David J. "The Paradox of Scope: A Challenge to the Governance of Higher Education." In Competing Conceptions of Academic Governance: Negotiating the Perfect Storm, edited by William G. Tierney. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.
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Collis, David J. "New Business Models for Higher Education." In The Future of the City of Intellect: The Changing American University, edited by Steven Brint, 181–202. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002.
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Collis, David J. "When Industries Change Revisited: New Scenarios for Higher Education." In Forum Futures, edited by David J. Collis, 103–126. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2001.
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Ghemawat, Pankaj, and David J. Collis. "Mapping the Business Landscape." In The Portable MBA in Strategy, edited by Liam Fahey and Robert M. Randall, pp.171–188. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994.
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Collis, David J. "When Industries Change: Scenarios for Higher Education." In Exploring the Future of Higher Education, edited by David J. Collis, 47–70. New York, NY: Forum for the Future of Higher Eucation, 1999.
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Collis, David J., Stephen P. Bradley, and P. William Bane Jr. "The Converging Worlds of Telecommunications, Computing and Entertainment." In Sense and Respond: Capturing Value in the Network Era, edited by Stephen P. Bradley and Richard L. Nolan, 31–62. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1998.
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Collis, D. J., P. W. Bane, and S. P. Bradley. "Winners and Losers--Industry Structure in the Converging World of Telecommunications, Computing, and Entertainment." In Competing in the Age of Digital Convergence, edited by D. B. Yoffie. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997.
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Collis, David J. "Organisational Capability as a Source of Profit." In Ogranisational Learning and Competitive Advantage, edited by David J. Collis, 139–163. London: Sage Publications, 1996.
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Collis, David J. "Related Corporate Portfolios." In Managing the Multibusiness Company, edited by David J. Collis, 122–142. London: Routledge, 1996.
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Collis, D. J., and P. Ghemawat. "Industry Analysis." In The Portable MBA in Strategy, edited by Liam Fahey and Robert M. Randall. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994.
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Collis, David J. "The Machine Tool Industry and Industrial Policy 1955-82." In International Competitiveness, edited by A. Michael Spence and Heather A Hazard, 75–114. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988.
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The concept of dynamic capabilities draws its theoretical basis from two classic traditions within the strategy field—the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) (Wernerfelt, 1984) and market positioning (Porter, 1996). A dynamic capability qualifies as a source of sustained heterogeneous firm performance within the RBV framework because it arises from embedded organizational routines that accumulate in a path dependent process—the “stock” explanation of durable advantage (Barney, 1991). Because such a dynamic capability allows a firm to continually reposition itself in product market space, it satisfies the “flow” explanation of current competitive advantage by ensuring that the firm always maintains a wider gap between willingness to pay and cost than competitors (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996). Indeed, dynamic capabilities seem to give rise to the enviable ability to “always have a competitive advantage in an attractive industry” and so continually deliver superior financial performance regardless of external circumstances.
One attempt to regain the ground that strategy has recently lost, which was described in the first article, has been the introduction of “business models” as the precursor to competitive positioning within an industry. Understanding a business model provides a shorthand description of how value is created—although the business model, by itself, does not determine how profitable it will be for any firm: for that we need to examine the complete strategy landscape.
Developing the firm’s strategy was once seen as the most important task facing a CEO. Yet in the last 20 years, the practice of strategy has been relegated to a routinized function—part of the annual planning process, like performance management and succession planning reviews—necessary and useful, but neither vitally important nor the focus of CEO attention. Why has strategy lost its primacy and relevance? And can it recover its exalted position in C-suite discussions?
“Tell me David, is it better to have a great strategy poorly executed or a so-so strategy really well executed?” The age-old question suggests there is a fundamental tradeoff between strategy and execution. The tone in which it is asked typically flags that the questioner already knows the answer—the superiority of execution over strategy. But is this really true? Does, to borrow a phrase, execution eat strategy for lunch?
During the past five decades, scholars have studied the corporate headquarters (CHQ)—the multidivisional firm's central organizational unit. The purpose of this article is to review the diverse and fragmented literature on the CHQ and to identify the variables of interest, the dominant relationships, and the contributions. We integrate, for the first time, the existing knowledge of the CHQ into an organizing framework. Based on a synthesis of the literature, we identify major shortcomings and gaps and present an agenda for future research that contributes to our understanding of the CHQ and the multidivisional firm.
This paper examines differences in the size and roles of corporate headquarters around the world. Based on a survey of over 600 multibusiness corporations in seven countries (France, Germany, Holland, UK, Japan, US, and Chile) the paper describes the differences among countries, and then applies a model of the factors determining the size of corporate headquarters (Young, Collis, and Goold, 2003) to systematically examine those differences. The data shows that there are significant differences among countries in the size and role of corporate headquarters, and strongly suggests the existence of a developing country model, a European model, a US model, and a Japanese model of corporate headquarters. Contrary to popular expectations, corporate headquarters in the US are about twice the size of European counterparts. Headquarters there exert a higher level of functional influence and have larger staffs in certain key areas, such as IT and R&D. US managers are generally more satisfied than their European counterparts with their larger more powerful headquarters which suggests that, at least in the US context, large corporate headquarters can create value. Japanese headquarters, as might have been expected, are substantially larger than elsewhere - a factor of four times larger than in Europe. However, those headquarters are becoming smaller because of dissatisfaction with their performance. It is clear that having headquarters the size of the Japanese firms in the survey is not conducive to value creation. More specifically, the evidence cannot refute a hypothesis that the slope of the relationship between firm size and the size of corporate headquarters is the same across all countries, but that there are significant differences in the intercept for Chile, the US, Japan, and the European countries. What the data indicates is that at a firm employing 20,000, a European corporate headquarters would on average employ 124 individuals, a US headquarters would have 255 employees, and Japan 467 employees. The paper also examines differences between countries in the extent to which they perform the two key corporate tasks of control and coordination. The US and Chile chose to be somewhat more interventionist in the traditional tools and processes used to monitor and control business units - setting strategy, budgets, and administering capital budgets. However, there was a significant difference in the degree of influence in operational affairs between countries. The US and Japan exerted far more influence than the other countries over every activity from IT and purchasing, to marketing, R&D and HR issues. The US was also found to have significantly larger legal, tax, and treasury functions than the common European model, perhaps reflecting a more legalistic institutional structure. Japan also has significantly larger tax, treasury, and corporate management functions, but overall was not that much larger than the common European model. While the causes of these observed differences cannot be directly determined from the research, suggestions are made that the institutional infrastructure, the size and homogeneity of the domestic market, and cultural factors within countries are important underlying drivers.
Two esports entrepreneurs must choose on which business model to focus their time and money. After successfully launching an online esports coaching platform, a number of new opportunities emerge in the rapidly growing esports space which now has close to 1 billion gamers and an online audience that is greater than the Superbowl. Should they focus on a B2C business, a B2B business? Develop an analytics capability to support "sabremetrics" for esports or a content creation capability? How can they best exploit ownership of the world's top team in the "Hearthstone" league. The choice will depend on the future industry structure and how the two can most effectively "follow the money".
In 2017 Edward Jones, the largest brokerage firm in the U.S., is deciding whether and how to implement a new "solutions" business model to replace its traditional "product" or "transactional" approach. Many of the required changes appeared to violate some of the tradeoffs that had made the previous approach successful. Was this the right way forward for Edward Jones? Where did this leave the classic strategy with its reliance on the one financial advisor office as the sole channel of distribution?
Raffaella Sadun, David J. Collis, Amram Migdal and Kerry Herman
The case focuses on Irene Rosenfeld’s tenure as CEO of the global snack food company Mondelēz International. Beginning in 2006, she had led the company through many acquisitions, including France’s LU Biscuit and British confectionery company Cadbury, before, in 2012, boldly splitting the company into two: Kraft, a North American grocery business, and Mondelēz International, a global snack food company.
The case discusses the digitalization strategy of Siemens AG, a German-based company operating in manufacturing and electronics. The increasing impact of digital technologies on all of its business units had prompted CEO Joe Kaeser and his team to put digitalization at the core of the new corporate strategy, alongside electrification and automation. The challenge was to balance this corporate initiative with the many business units within Siemens, which were used to being independent and had very specific offerings for their clients. For its new analytics platform, Siemens had opted for a push and pull approach to involve business units in its creation, rather than conceptualizing the platform centrally and imposing it on the business units afterwards. The jury was still out on whether this approach would drive digitalization within Siemens fast enough, given the exponential developments in data generation and analytics.
David Collis, Eric Van den Steen and Ashley Hartman
On the Upper East Side, fifty fit women and men cycled in unison to blaring music in an indoor cycling studio shrouded in darkness except for the grapefruit-scented candles lining the podium. A few who had proven their skills were selected to lead the pack in the coveted front row, next to Jake Gyllenhaal and Selena Gomez. The cyclists, clad in spandex and tank-tops featuring the SoulCycle logos, dripped sweat as they climbed hills and sprinted down flat roads while the instructor shouted inspirational slogans. SoulCycle was a leading indoor cycling studio with a massive following. It had grown from a single, 31-bike studio in 2006 to a network of 38 studios in seven metropolitan areas in 2015 (Exhibit 1). Compared to the many other health clubs that existed, SoulCycle saw itself as a lifestyle brand that aimed to “empower riders in an immersive fitness experience."
CEO Melanie Whelan led SoulCycle’s growth since 2012 and was committed to expanding its footprint, opening 10-15 new studios per year. In July 2015, the company announced an IPO – which valued the company at $900 million – but it was ultimately postponed due to macroeconomic uncertainty. Although Whelan was confident about the company, she knew that the ride was getting more challenging and struggled with how to keep cyclists loyal to the high-priced brand.
When Joe Jimenez became CEO of Swiss-based Novartis in 2010, replacing longtime CEO Dan Vasella, he assumed control of one of the top pharmaceutical companies in the world. Vasella, an avowed advocate of diversification, had expanded the scope of the company and structured it into 16 distinct business units ranging from animal health to oncology while “actively fostering competition between those divisions for resources.” Shortly after assuming his position, Jimenez initiated a strategic review that sought to concentrate the portfolio on businesses where Novartis could be at global scale in attractive markets. Rather than following competitors, like Pfizer, in a single mega-acquisition, Jimenez and his M&A team decided to achieve this goal through targeted transactions or “precision M&A.” By 2014, after examining 20 or so possible deals, the company was in the process of negotiating a multibillion dollar asset swap with Glaxo-Smith Kline (GSK) that was unprecedented in the pharma industry. Although Novartis would improve its position in oncology by acquiring GSK’s promising drug portfolio, it had to sell its vaccines and animal health businesses, while giving up control of the over-the-counter (OTC) business. Jimenez and his team knew the offer was “all-or-nothing” and struggled over whether to accept it or reject it and move in another direction.
Mickey Mouse, Snow White, and Buzz Lightyear strolled down Main Street at the grand opening of Hong Kong Disney in the fall of 2005, pausing to snap selfies with enthusiastic children in Mickey Mouse ears. Bob Iger, newly appointed CEO of The Walt Disney Company, proudly watched the parade go by, but concerned for the future of the global corporation, he turned to colleagues and asked, “How many characters in this parade were created by Disney in the last 10 years?” There was one. But the languishing Disney animation department was not the company’s only problem. Disney was under pressure: the company had recently delivered poor financial results; ratings at the ABC network had fallen below competitors; Walt’s nephew, Roy E. Disney, had stepped down from the Board after expressing his displeasure with the direction of the company under Iger’s predecessor, Michael Eisner; and Comcast had made a $54 billion hostile bid to take over Disney only one year before. The situation for Disney looked bleak.
Yet by December 2015 the tide had turned. The much-anticipated Star Wars: The Force Awakens was set to become the highest grossing film ever in the U.S. and earn over $2 billion worldwide. Frozen had just surpassed $1 billion in box office to become Disney animation’s biggest success ever. In live action movies, Disney franchises, like Pirates of the Caribbean and Marvel’s Iron Man, had produced multiple blockbuster hits. ESPN, ABC, and other cable and broadcast properties were producing record profits. Attendance was up at Disney parks and cruise ships, while the Shanghai Disney Resort, the company’s third and largest theme park in Asia, was scheduled to open in June 2016. Iger thought back to the Hong Kong Disney parade, reflecting on how far the company had come and the lessons he had learned about reawakening the Disney magic.
When Jamie Dimon took over as CEO of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan Chase) in 2005, he reaffirmed the commitment to pursue a "universal bank" strategy—providing a full range of products and services to both retail and wholesale clients. Yet the merits of the universal bank had long been disputed. After 2008, the financial crisis and subsequent Great Recession damaged many global and domestic financial services firms. While the government bailed out universal banks and monoline financial institutions alike, both governments and the public clamored for action against banks they deemed "too big to fail." Regulators around the world stepped in to increase capital requirements while the U.S. government passed the Dodd-Frank bill, which improved transparency and accountability, and, with the Volcker Rule, limited banks' ability to pursue proprietary trading. In response, many financial institutions reduced their scope and reshaped their portfolios.
In this context, JPMorgan Chase, the largest bank in the U.S. by assets since 2011, which had successfully weathered the financial crisis in part due to the benefits of diversification, emerged with a "fortress balance sheet" and an improved position in the banking league tables. Nevertheless, the bank faced pressure from many directions, including large civil fines to settle, analysts' arguments about its "conglomerate discount," and regulation that penalized size, interconnectedness, and complexity. Despite the pressure, Jamie Dimon remained vocal in advocating for the value of a broad scope, large scale financial services firm. However, questions remained about the optimal scope of the bank and how JPMorgan Chase could best allocate resources across its diverse lines of business in the face of new regulations designed to limit size and complexity.
By 2015, there had been an upsurge in activist shareholders arguing for radical changes in companies' corporate strategies. Personalities like Carl Icahn, Bill Ackman, and Daniel Loeb were feared and loathed in some quarters, celebrated in others. With nearly $120 billion in assets under management in 2014, and big players like Icahn Enterprises managing $22.3 billion, Pershing Square managing $13.4 billion, and Third Point managing $8.3 billion, activist hedge funds had become a prominent feature of the corporate landscape, escaping some of their earlier approbation as corporate raiders or, even worse, "greenmailers."
Activism covered a range of approaches—from proxy votes and demands for Board seats, to full blown takeover attempts—and sought to pressure changes on a wide range of issues—from corporate governance and executive pay, to strategic direction and excessive corporate overhead. Yet one of the most common concerned the scope of the corporation. In many cases, activists demanded the splitting up of the corporate entity, or the spinning off or sale of part of the company to another owner.
During his tenure as CEO since 2005, Bill Nuti had moved NCR Corporation (originally National Cash Register) from its historical competence in hardware to become a provider of hardware and software for managing transactions across a range of industries and payments methods. Nuti envisioned a world in which consumers would use NCR hardware or applications whether transacting at a bank or ATM, purchasing clothes at a retailer, or checking into a flight at an airport—and in which NCR software would register the transactions, securely store and process the data, and use the transaction information to help NCR customers efficiently manage their operations.
In 2011 and early 2013, NCR had made two major acquisitions of companies that were important providers of transaction software in the retail and hospitality industries. Now, in late November 2013, Nuti and his team were considering a third potential major acquisition: Digital Insight, a market leader in online and mobile banking solutions. Nuti saw Digital Insight as key to complementing NCR's offerings in the financial services industry, transforming it from a maker of standalone, electromechanical cash registers and ATMs into an "omni-channel, omni-commerce, software-driven company." Would this acquisition be the next right strategic move for NCR's transformation?
Collis, David, Raffaella Sadun, and Matthew Shaffer. "The Transformation of NCR." Harvard Business School Case 715-438, April 2015. (Revised June 2016.)
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Beth Wozniak, President of Honeywell Environmental and Combustion Controls (ECC) at Honeywell International Inc., spun around in her office chair, reflecting about how the classic, mature thermostat industry was rapidly evolving. In February 2014, Google paid $3.2 billion to acquire Nest Labs, a new startup whose goal was to reinvent unloved home devices, such as thermostats and smoke alarms. Their smart thermostats posed a threat to the traditional thermostat business, and it was essential that Honeywell determine the best way to respond. In addition to selling thermostats, Nest had ambitious plans to facilitate connections between Nest and other companies, making it easier for consumers to save money and energy. Many companies were developing smart, connected products that could be controlled remotely. But who really wanted to check ten different apps to make sure the heat was down, the doors were locked, and the lights were turned off? The Internet of Things (IoT) redefined the potential of industries, allowing a company that created a smart, connected product to develop an entire system of products that worked together. How would Honeywell, the mature, industrial company in a basic, mechanical business, compete with the new startup bought by Google and developing its own ecosystem—notably giving away thermostats to Airbnb in return for selling data to utilities?
Josh Golomb, president and general manager of DaVita Rx (Rx), was about to meet with Kent Thiry, CEO of Rx's corporate parent, DaVita Healthcare Partners Inc. (DaVita), in August 2013. The two would discuss whether Golomb should lead a new DaVita venture, Paladina Health (Paladina), which operated a network of primary care clinics.
DaVita had launched Paladina in early 2011, and the startup was struggling to gain traction: Paladina had already used a significant amount of the $40 million in funding committed by DaVita; the company's primary care clinics had not yet reached the number of patients necessary to sustain a profitable business; and it was in the midst of trying to integrate with another primary care clinic operator that it had acquired years earlier but was just now merging into Paladina.
Although the startup was young and still finding its way in an emerging industry, Thiry believed that Paladina would benefit from Golomb's experiences at Rx, which had also struggled in its early years. The situation at Rx became so precarious at one point that many of DaVita's senior leaders wanted to shut it down entirely. Rx made it through those challenging early years though, and was expected to exceed $600 million in revenues for 2013.
However, Golomb wondered how relevant his Rx experience was to Paladina. Rx was closely tied to its parent company—DaVita provided dialysis services to patients with end-stage renal disease (ESRD) and Rx supplied medications to ESRD patients—while Paladina's connection to DaVita was less obvious. If Golomb took the job, what could he do to make Paladina's clinics as efficient as possible in terms of service and its economics, without compromising on its value proposition? Was Paladina just too different of a business to be part of the DaVita family?
This case offers an example of "intrapreneurship"—i.e. entrepreneurial ventures launched within large companies—at a Fortune 500 company. DaVita has already had a successful experience launching Rx (after some difficult early years), and the company is now even serving patients from some of DaVita's leading competitors. However, Paladina is the company's first intrapreneurial venture outside of its core focus of serving end-stage renal disease (ESRD) patients—DaVita's main function is to provide dialysis services to ESRD patients and Rx provides medication to ESRD patients. Can Paladina succeed simply by following Rx's example, or will it face different challenges?
In February 2014, Facebook announced the acquisition of WhatsApp for $19 billion. WhatsApp, founded in 2009, was a relatively young company that employed only 50 people and earned merely $10 million in revenue in 2013. It was one of many mobile messaging services that allowed users to contact each other without paying costly text message fees. However, its popularity and growth potential enticed Facebook, a company facing many challenges and looking for opportunities to expand its user base. Facebook, the social networking website that allowed users to share information with friends, believed WhatsApp was a logical next step that would help it achieve its mission of "making the world more open and connected."
When Facebook announced the acquisition, it vowed to keep WhatsApp operating independently, letting the founders control the direction of the company and allowing WhatsApp to stay true to its mission. Yet, many debated the logic behind paying so much for such a small company with limited revenue streams. Was Facebook correct to purchase WhatsApp? Even at $22 billion? How could it create value if it did not integrate WhatsApp with Facebook?
In 2014, seven years after he was appointed CEO of the Danish shipping and oil conglomerate A.P. Møller Maersk (the Maersk Group), Nils Andersen was reexamining the size and role of corporate headquarters in the company he had reshaped as a "premium conglomerate." During his tenure, Andersen had divided what had previously been operated as almost a single entity into separate lines of business, each accountable for its own performance and expected to deal at arms-length with its "sister" businesses, while substantially reducing the size and functions of the corporate headquarters. But as the business units (BUs) and corporate headquarters adjusted to their new roles, new issues surfaced.
David Collis, Diane Chang, Matthew Shaffer and Ashley Hartman
In 2006, Sophia Amoruso started Nasty Gal, an eBay boutique selling vintage clothes. With a strong sense of style and personality, Amoruso poured herself into building the brand and developing relationships with her customers—typically the slightly edgy 18–24 year old. The company had grown since that time into a multi-category retailer, expanding into third-party clothing, accessories, and its own private label. Its explosive growth was one of the biggest stories in e-commerce, especially when the retailer attracted $50 million in investment from Index Ventures, a top VC firm that funded other successful retailers such as Net-a-Porter and Etsy, in 2013. Yet, with a cash infusion, plans for a brick and mortar store, an ever-growing e-commerce site, and fierce competition, Amoruso wondered what opportunity to tackle next. Should she concentrate on product line expansion into lingerie, swimwear, cosmetics, and fragrances? How would a brick and mortar store impact the focus of the company or its ability to develop customized web sites for overseas markets? How would she maintain the detail and attention she had put into so many aspects of the company as Nasty Gal grew? As Amoruso's time was limited and management resources were already spread thin to sustain the existing site's growth, what was the best way forward?
Collis, David, Diane Chang, Matthew Shaffer, and Ashley Hartman. "Nasty Gals Do It Better." Harvard Business School Case 715-412, January 2015. (Revised October 2018.)
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In May 2012, Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) founded edX, a new non-profit joint venture that would provide a platform for massive open online courses (MOOCs). edX did not produce original courses or instructional content—it made a web platform through which Harvard and MIT, and subsequently dozens more "partner" universities, could offer their lecture courses as MOOCs. While the future role of MOOCs in higher education remained a topic of public debate, edX needed to answer concrete managerial and strategic questions. For example, what should edX's scope be? Should edX try to develop a consumer brand of its own or rely on the brands of its partners? And how could edX monetize its services to recoup Harvard and MIT's investments and reward participating universities? This case presented the history of edX and the online education market as background for a discussion about edX's strategic choices.
In July 2012, Michael Dell, CEO and founder of Dell, Inc., met with a representative of Silver Lake Partners to explore taking his company private. The company, which he had founded in his dorm room as a college freshman and which had made him the youngest Fortune 500 CEO in history, had been the market leader in PC sales in the early 2000s. In recent years, however, the company had been surpassed by competitors and, worse, the PC market was becoming less lucrative, due to overseas competition, longer turnover rates on PCs, and the rise of tablets and smartphones. Michael Dell hoped to respond by shifting the company from its core to a "new Dell" based around "Enterprise Solutions and Software" (such as servers, consulting, and software-as-a-service) and now claimed he needed to take the company private to do so. By the summer of 2013, the Dell board and its shareholders would have to decide whether to accept his offer to take the company private for $13.65 a share. Meanwhile, Carl Icahn bought a large stake in Dell Inc., accused Dell of trying to steal the company, and urged shareholders to rebel and demand a "leveraged recapitalization" instead. This case presents the information the Dell board worked with as it debated its decision.
Collis, David J., David B. Yoffie, and Matthew Shaffer. "Taking Dell Private." Harvard Business School Case 714-421, August 2013. (Revised December 2014.)
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Collis, David J. "Strategy in the Twenty-First Century Pharmaceutical Industry: Merck & Co. and Pfizer Inc. (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 713-450, March 2013.
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Collis, David J. "Cadbury Schweppes: Capturing Confectionery (TN) (A), (B), (C), and (D)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 713-413, January 2013.
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Collis, David J. "DeRemate.com: Building a Latin American Internet Auction Site (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 713-414, December 2012.
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Collis, David J. "The Guardian: Transition to the Online World and The Newspaper Industry in Crisis (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 713-416, October 2012.
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When Jim Weddle took over as Managing Partner of Edward Jones in January 2006, the brokerage firm was at a critical juncture. The firm's distinctive strategy had enabled it to grow from its roots in small-town America to become the 4th largest broker in the U.S. Weddle was concerned, however, that the firm's success, and the changing landscape of the financial services industry, were challenging the core aspects of the strategy that had brought the firm so far. He knew that the impending strategic decisions would determine whether Edward Jones could sustain its extraordinary performance and achieve its goal of growing to 20,000 financial advisors by 2017.
In late 2002, global confectionery and beverage maker Cadbury Schweppes needed to decide whether or not to make an acquisition bid for Adams, an underperforming gum company which had been put up for sale by pharmaceutical giant Pfizer. Examining the decision from a strategic perspective, the (A) case provides brief histories of the two companies; traces the global confectionery industry, focusing especially on chocolate and gum; and details the analysis of the merger decision. The (B) case explores the specific identified synergies in-depth and provides an opportunity to judge their viability. The (C) and (D) cases conclude the story and update the case with issues facing the global confectionery leader in 2008.
In late 2002, global confectionery and beverage maker Cadbury Schweppes needed to decide whether or not to make an acquisition bid for Adams, an underperforming gum company which had been put up for sale by pharmaceutical giant Pfizer. Examining the decision from a strategic perspective, the (A) case provides brief histories of the two companies; traces the global confectionery industry, focusing especially on chocolate and gum; and details the analysis of the merger decision. The (B) case explores the specific identified synergies in-depth and provides an opportunity to judge their viability. The (C) and (D) cases conclude the story and update the case with issues facing the global confectionery leader in 2008.
This note first documents the facts around the sustainability of competitive advantage. It then observes that the demise of a previously successful strategy, in the first instance, often comes from some change in the external environment. It, therefore, characterizes the types of change that can lead to strategic decline. But external change alone should not mean the end of superior performance since the skilled strategist ought to be able to adapt to such changes. The final part of the note looks inside the firm to examine why managers often fail to respond adequately to external threats and explains why it is valuable to study the causes of strategic decline.
Collis, David J., and Jan W. Rivkin. "Strategic Decline." Harvard Business School Background Note 708-497, April 2008. (Revised July 2011.)
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While it is relatively easy to identify why strategies fail, it is much harder to explain how to fix a failing strategy or build an organization that can continuously renew its strategy. This note identifies some patterns that distinguish companies whose renewal efforts made headway from firms whose efforts fell flat.
The Guardian had been an early innovator in online newspapers and had not only become the leading U.K. newspaper web site, but was making strides with audiences outside of the U.K. However, The Guardian had been losing money since 2000, and, in spite of the relative success of the website, online revenue remained less than 20% of the newspaper's total revenue. What changes would The Guardian have to make to sustain its mission of being "the world's leading liberal voice in perpetuity?"
Between 1985 and 2007, Danaher has been one of the best-performing industrial conglomerates in the U.S. This case examines the corporate strategy of this diversified, global corporation. It describes the firm's portfolio strategy and the Danaher Business System—a systematic and wide-ranging set of organizational processes the firm has developed to drive growth and create value. In 2008, the firm confronts various challenges in sustaining its impressive historical performance. First, can it continue to balance organic and acquisition-led growth? Second, what will be the impact of increased competition from private equity players? Third, for how long can its strategy of "continuous improvement" continue?
Anand, Bharat, David J. Collis, and Sophie Hood. "Danaher Corporation." Harvard Business School Case 708-445, February 2008. (Revised November 2015.)
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This note is designed to provide strategists with tools to perform two critical customer-related analyses: determining willingness to pay — the estimation of how much a given customer would be willing to pay for a particular product or service; and demand estimation — predicting the overall size of the market or segment which a company chooses to serve.
After its founding in the late 1980s, Cree Inc. quickly grew into a major player in the emerging LED market. By 2007, technological improvements in LEDs had made them suitable for TV, computer, and mobile "backlighting"; and concerns over global warning led to calls to shift to more energy-efficient sources of general lighting (which favored LEDs, as they were far more efficient than the traditionally-dominant incandescents). In this context, Cree faced a strategic conundrum: Should it focus on its historical expertise in manufacturing LED "chips" and components for use in other manufacturers' applications and screens, where LEDs now had established usage? Or should it instead attempt the risky venture of manufacturing its own LED light-bulbs for direct sale to consumers for general lighting? This case presents the history of Cree and information on the LED and general-lighting markets, as background for a debate on Cree's strategic choice.
Dave Roux, co-founder and chairman of Silver Lake, a private equity (PE) firm specializing in technology investments, was meeting with the firm's investment committee via video conference to discuss options for Silver Lake's future growth. While the private equity market had suffered since the economic crisis in the fall of 2008, Roux believed a number of opportunities still existed. There was significant interest within the firm to continue to offer new asset class investment products and to open additional outposts in foreign countries. Nonetheless, questions had risen internally regarding how much and in which directions to grow. Roux wondered how the firm could take advantage of the market potential while continuing to remain true to its original vision.
Alcacer, Juan, and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company and Pixar Inc.: To Acquire or Not to Acquire? TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 711-451, November 2010.
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Collis, David J. "Ben & Jerry's Homemade Ice Cream, Inc.: A Period of Transition (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 705-044, May 2005. (Revised March 2010.)
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Soon after Robert Iger took over as CEO of the Walt Disney Company in late 2005, he turned his attention toward Pixar, the animation studio with which Disney had worked since 1991 and was responsible for producing hits such as Toy Story and Finding Nemo. Disney's own animated film business had been in decline since Jeffrey Katzenberg left to establish rival studio Dreamworks and the business relied on revenue from its partnership with Pixar to maintain performance. With the Co- Production Agreement between the two studios coming to a close in 2006, Pixar was looking to negotiate better terms with another distribution partner. Could Disney risk losing them?
This note is a primer on the newspaper industry, which has been in decline in the U.S. and Western Europe. The 19th century business model whereby news and editorial content was packaged and delivered to homes daily and paid for by national advertisers has been overturned by the Internet and the corresponding immediate access to global information. The note covers the history of newspapers, industry economics, current news consumption trends, the response of the newspapers to the threat of the Internet, and vignettes highlighting newspaper business models throughout the world.
This four-page update to the case, "The Walt Disney Company and Pixar Inc.: To Acquire or Not to Acquire?" details the Walt Disney Company's acquisition of Pixar, including deal terms, executive appointments, and operating guidelines for the two studios.
In late 2002, global confectionery and beverage maker Cadbury Schweppes needed to decide whether or not to make an acquisition bid for Adams, an underperforming gum company which had been put up for sale by pharmaceutical giant Pfizer. Examining the decision from a strategic perspective, the (A) case provides brief histories of the two companies; traces the global confectionery industry, focusing especially on chocolate and gum; and details the analysis of the merger decision. The (B) case explores the specific identified synergies in-depth and provides an opportunity to judge their viability. The (C) and (D) cases conclude the story and update the case with issues facing the global confectionery leader in 2008.
In late 2002, global confectionery and beverage maker Cadbury Schweppes needed to decide whether or not to make an acquisition bid for Adams, an underperforming gum company which had been put up for sale by pharmaceutical giant Pfizer. Examining the decision from a strategic perspective, the (A) case provides brief histories of the two companies; traces the global confectionery industry, focusing especially on chocolate and gum; and details the analysis of the merger decision. The (B) case explores the specific identified synergies in-depth and provides an opportunity to judge their viability. The (C) and (D) cases conclude the story and update the case with issues facing the global confectionery leader in 2008.
Stephen P. Bradley, David J. Collis, Kevin P. Coyne, Andrei Hagiu, Mikolaj Jan Piskorski, Jan W. Rivkin and John R. Wells
Addresses a common concern among strategy students: "How should I tackle this case?" Describes a process for diagnosing a strategic situation, then generating, evaluating, and choosing among strategic options.
Bradley, Stephen P., David J. Collis, Kevin P. Coyne, Andrei Hagiu, Mikolaj Jan Piskorski, Jan W. Rivkin, and John R. Wells. "How to Crack a Strategy Case." Harvard Business School Background Note 707-549, March 2007. (Revised February 2009.)
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The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Traces Intel's history and strategy from 1968 to 1997. Examines the company's decision to exit DRAMS and its entry into microprocessors. Focuses on how the company managed to achieve and sustain its competitive advantage in microprocessors, and the threats it faces in the future.
Thomson, a French multinational, went through a decade of dramatic change in the early years of the 21st century. From a state-owned enterprise earning 97% of its revenue from television sets and other analog consumer electronics, Thomson had become a publicly traded company providing digital video services and equipment to major movie studios, broadcast networks, and retailers, as well as satellite, cable, and telecom operators. The Group had just met its financial targets for 2006 and had achieved organic growth of 6% in the first half of 2007. Yet even as he reflected on these successes, CEO Frank Dangeard knew that much remained to be done to secure the company's leadership position against aggressive competition in a rapidly shifting and uncertain technological environment. Traces the evolution and transformation of the company and highlights the difficult choices Thomson faces in an ever-evolving high-tech industry.
The global pharmaceutical industry has gone through substantial changes in the last few decades and pharmaceutical firms face major challenges including headline-grabbing litigation, imminent patent expirations, new technologies, rising drug development costs, generic drug substitution, international competitors, and complex public policy issues. This case describes the pharmaceutical industry in 2006 including: the drug development process; threats from biotech and generics competitors; pharmaceutical manufacturing, selling, and marketing; and pharmaceutical consumption in Europe, the third world, and the U.S. Merck and Pfizer are analyzed in-depth and a contrast between Merck as a research-based firm opposed to mergers and Pfizer as a marketing powerhouse growing through acquisitions is developed. Thirteen exhibits give concrete focus to the issues of the case.
This is a compilation of four analyst reports about the AOL/Time Warner merger of 2001. The first half cites three reports released in 2000, around the time the merger was announced, which give the logic and justifications for the merger. The second half is taken from a report by Lazard Freres & Co., released in February 2006, which champions the break-up of Time Warner (formerly AOL/Time Warner) into four separate companies. Comparing and contrasting the different opinions of the analyst reports yields insights into both AOL and Time Warner, and leads to a better understanding of mergers and acquisitions more generally.
Provides an overview framework for understanding international strategy. Observes that international strategy draws on much of the same theory as corporate strategy. The same tests that can be applied to justify expansion across businesses--the better off and ownership tests--also apply to expansion across borders. What is different about international strategy is that widening a firm's domain to the entire globe introduces substantively different degrees of heterogeneity, scale, and volatility across markets. These three factors create new opportunities and trade-offs for multinationals. Effective international strategy is based on a source of competitive advantage that capitalizes on one of these factors and aligns the configuration of all its activities in support of that advantage. Multinationals need to choose the products they offer, the countries in which they compete, the location of their activities, and their organizational design contingent on their international strategy.
Bob Holland takes over as CEO of this iconoclastic ice cream company in February 1995 when it faces a major crisis. Holland must now develop a strategy that both adapts to the external environment and is consistent with the company's unique heritage.
Collis, David J., and Jan W. Rivkin. "Ben & Jerry's Homemade Ice Cream Inc.: A Period of Transition." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 703-755, February 2003.
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UNEXT has signed agreements with Columbia, Stanford, Chicago, Carnegie Mellon, and the London School of Economics to create online business courses. The company is backed by Michael Milken and Larry Ellison and has four Nobel laureates on its advisory board. Describes UNEXT's history, products, course development and delivery, marketing, costs, and revenues. Also, devotes seven pages to the business education industry and to the e-learning competitive landscape. There is a one-page appendix summarizing Harvard Business School's role in e-learning.
Teaching Note for (9-381-160), (9-381-161), and (9-381-162).
Citation:
Collis, David J. "Corning Glass Works International (A), (B1), and (B2), Teaching Note." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 391-278, June 1991. (Revised December 1998.)
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Newell is a $1.5 billion manufacturer and distributor of low-tech home and hardware products, geared to serve volume purchasers. In 1992, Newell is considering two approaches to expand its current product line with the acquisitions of Sanford Corp., a $140 million manufacturer and marketer of writing instruments and office supplies, and Levolor, a $180 million manufacturer of window blinds. The case focuses on Newell's enduring corporate strategy as a guide for selecting appropriate acquisitions to grow the company.
Collis, David J. "Walt Disney Company, The (B): Sustaining Growth (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 795-151, April 1995. (Revised November 1997.)
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Collis, David J. "Walt Disney Company (A), The: Corporate Strategy TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 795-152, April 1995. (Revised November 1997.)
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Focuses on a six-month period in 1994, during which the company experienced a series of dramatic upheavals. The events described include: 1) the sudden death of company president Frank Wells; 2) a health crisis facing Chairman Michael Eisner; 3) the "departure" of filmed entertainment division chairman Jeffrey Katzenberg; 4) the creation of a new corporate unit; 5) network acquisition rumors; and 6) the cancellation of plans for "Disney America."
Lays out some ideas on how to restructure a multibusiness corporation. Identifies sixteen elements of organization design, and then applies contingency theory to argue that these elements need to be aligned with the tasks the corporation uses to create value across its multiple business. The emphasis throughout is on applying recent developments in organizational economics to the design of a corporation's structure, systems, and procedures.
Describes the history of Beatrice Companies from its beginning as a dairy in 1891 to 1985, when the company was a $12 billion conglomerate. Focuses on the corporate strategies that Beatrice followed under each of its CEOs and concentrates on the company's strategic change in the early 1980s, which was introduced by James Dutt.
Montgomery, Cynthia A., and David J. Collis. "Berkshire Partners TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 796-113, January 1996. (Revised May 1996.)
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Collis, David J. "Sharp Corporation: Technology Strategy TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 794-025, August 1993. (Revised January 1996.)
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Collis, David J. "Newell Company: Acquisition Strategy TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 795-132, February 1995. (Revised January 1996.)
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Collis, David J. "Marks and Spencer Ltd. (A), (B), and (C), Teaching Note." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 391-271, June 1991. (Revised January 1996.)
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Collis, David J. "Smashing the Cube: Corporate Transformation at Ciba-Geigy, Ltd. TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 795-140, April 1995. (Revised January 1996.)
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Collis, David J. "Asahi Glass Company: Diversification Strategy TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 795-150, April 1995. (Revised January 1996.)
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Collis, David J. "Birds Eye and the U.K. Frozen Food Industry (A) TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 795-109, February 1995. (Revised January 1996.)
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Collis, David J. "Cat Fight in the Pet Food Industry (A), (B), (C), and (D), Teaching Note." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 391-276, June 1991. (Revised December 1995.)
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Collis, David J. "Cooper Industries' Corporate Strategy (A) and (B), Teaching Note." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 391-281, June 1991. (Revised December 1995.)
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Collis, David J. "Beatrice Companies--1985, Teaching Note." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 391-282, June 1991. (Revised December 1995.)
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Collis, David J. "EnClean: Malcolm Waddell's Story (A) TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 795-071, January 1995. (Revised December 1995.)
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Presents Malcolm Waddell in a question-and-answer session (the actual questions do not appear on the tape) with HBS MBA students following a class in which the case is discussed.
Covers the history of portfolio planning at CIBA-GEIGY, a leading Swiss chemical and pharmaceutical company, beginning with the introduction of the process in the mid-1980s. The discussion extends to the application of portfolio planning techniques to a specific investment proposal: the comprehensive modernization of a plant dedicated to the production of high-quality specialty pigments.
Collis, David J. "Kraft General Foods: The Merger (A) and (B), Teaching Note." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 391-279, June 1991. (Revised June 1995.)
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Describes Philip Morris' acquisitions of General Foods in 1985 and Kraft, Inc. in 1989, focusing on the integration of Kraft and General Foods that forms a $30 billion food subsidiary. Details the steps required to merge these two large companies, emphasizing the managerial, organizational, administrative, and strategic issues engendered by the integration of Kraft and General Foods.
Discusses the recent decision to blend the previously separate Kraft and General Foods units into one operating company with a focus on the creation of a single massive sales force.
Collis, David J. "Cabot Corporation's Liquefied Natural Gas Business TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 795-161, April 1995. (Revised May 1995.)
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Describes analyses that determine the appropriate limit to the scope of the firm. Examines both the production cost justification for firm diversification--economies of scope and shared resources, and the governance cost justification for including transactions inside the hierarchy rather than contracting for them on the market--transaction costs and agency theory. Concludes by identifying the line between corporate strategy and firm scope.
Collis, David J. "General Motors' Automotive Components Group (A), Teaching Note." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 391-280, June 1991. (Revised April 1995.)
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Describes the development of a successful corporate strategy based on the acquisition and subsequent consolidation of low-technology manufacturing companies. Starting with a company history and discussion of current business segments, the case goes on to detail the innovation of corporate headquarters in strategy formulation and operations. Highlights the synergistic possibilities in alike acquisitions and addresses the issue of long-term value creation in acquisition-oriented firms. Emphasis is placed on the systems and procedures installed to implement the corporate strategy.
Provides a conceptual framework for the study of corporate strategy. First describes previous perspectives on corporate strategy and then develops a framework of four elements: resources, tasks, structure, and industries. This framework can be used to explain the value corporations add to their businesses, how they should be organized, and the limit to the scope of the firm. Finally, describes four steps involved in the formulation of a corporate strategy.
Describes the history and diversification strategy of the Japanese manufacturer Asahi Glass Co. The company has diversified through internal growth, acquisition, and joint ventures from its origin in flat glass to a broad glass-materials, chemical, and electronics manufacturer. It has also vertically integrated and expanded internally to become the leading global glass manufacturer. In 1993, Asahi Glass is reviewing its future direction, particularly whether it should divest its electronics business.
IBP, the largest U.S. beef and pork processor, is facing deteriorating earnings and undertakes a fundamental strategic review in 1990. Having grown from its founding in 1961 to its current position as a low cost, innovative producer of boxed beef, and more recently pork, IBP's competitors have pursued very different corporate strategies that appear to be more successful. IBP must reevaluate its own corporate strategy and decide whether its distinctive competence is still relevant, and where it should be active in the three dimensions of product, geography, and vertical integration.
Saatchi & Saatchi, founded in 1970, became the world's largest advertising agency in 1986. It then diversified into consulting and other managerial areas before crashing in 1989. Under a new CEO, the company restructured and refocused on its advertising agencies.
Teaches the evolution of the corporate strategy of Sharp Corp., Japan. Sharp Corp., a second-tier assembler of TV sets and home appliances, gradually and consistently improved performance by developing expertise in electronic device technologies such as specialized ICs and LCDs and used these technologies to develop innovative end products. As a result, the company was regarded as a world leader in opto-electronics and was becoming a premier comprehensive electronics company. Teaching Objectives: Explores how the company identified, developed, and leveraged its lay technologies. Also discusses how the company coordinated across multiple businesses, and its organizational capabilities.
Describes, in the words of its cofounder, the history of EnClean, an industrial and environmental services company, from its origins in 1984. The company grew rapidly and diversified into new businesses and new geographies both through acquisition and internally. It went public in 1989 but then suffered major losses in 1992 and 1993. The founder must now decide how to respond to a secret board ultimatum.
CIBA-GEIGY is a large, diversified multinational corporation that transforms itself in the 1990s through a massive structural and cultural change. The case describes the changes implemented and the processes used to effect change in portfolio, people, and structures. By the middle of 1994 CIBA is assessing how effective the transformation has been and whether it has gone too far, or not far enough.
Collis, David J. "Major Home Appliance Industry in 1984 (Revised) and Maytag in 1984, Teaching Note." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 391-272, June 1991. (Revised March 1995.)
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Collis, David J. "Saatchi and Saatchi Company PLC: Corporate Strategy TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 795-094, January 1995. (Revised March 1995.)
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Updates developments in the industry. Included among these are GE's reinvestment program, GE and Whirlpool's bidding war for Roper, Sears' expansion into selling brand names, Whirlpool's expansion into the European markets, and a number of other examples of this kind of consolidation, globalization, and expansion. May be used with Maytag in 1984.
Highlights Maytag's unique position in the industry in 1984. Maytag, a much smaller player than its competitors has prior to 1984 been successful in producing high quality merchandise and charging a premium for it. By 1984 Maytag is also attempting expansion. Traditionally a producer of laundry equipment, Maytag has made two key acquisitions--expanding its product line to include kitchen appliances. Reviews this situation an also discusses its two closest competitors, GE and Whirlpool. Provides a follow-up to Major Home Appliance Industry in 1984 (Revised) and its Supplement, Major Home Appliance Industry in 1988.
Describes the forty-year evolution of the U.K. frozen food industry, and traces the emergence, dominance, and the decline of Birds Eye. Its success is as a vertically integrated producer, distributor, and marketer of frozen foods that pioneers the industry in the U.K. Its decline as other firms enter all stages of the value chain is seen as a result of its earlier success that yields it an unsustainable strategic position. Examines vertical integration as a strategy, the analytic rationale to be vertically integrated, and the disadvantages of vertical integration.
Describes important developments in the pet food industry in 1989, 1990, and 1991, focusing on competitive dynamics among the industry's major players.
Describes the pet food industry in the mid-eighties prior to the breakout of a major competitive battle as manufacturers fight for share. Illustrates how when there are benefits to play in multiple markets, competitors will take action in one market to preserve their position in other markets. An example of multimarket competitive interaction. Covers competitor analysis and prediction, and economies of scope.
Describes significant developments in the pet food industry in 1987 and 1988, focusing on the competitive interactions among the industry's major players.
The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
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Bob Gigile, Chairman and CEO of Cooper Industries, describes the company's philosophy behind acquisitions and his corporate strategy. He then answers questions raised by the case discussion.
The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
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The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
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The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
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Looks at the magazine development at Time Inc. in light of the growing dominance of the video group and the modern management of the 1980s. Highlights the firm's magazine development during 1989.
The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
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The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
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The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
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The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
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The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
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The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
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The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
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Describes the economic theory that was behind the view that resources are central to the creation of value in multibusiness corporations and identifies tests that resources must pass to become part of a firm's "distinctive competence". Describes how those resources can be leveraged, built, or altered.
The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
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The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
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Collis, David J. "General Electric: Consumers Electronics Group, Teaching Note." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 391-275, June 1991.
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The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
View Details
The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
View Details
The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
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Highlights the General Electric takeover of RCA and the consolidation of the two companies' consumer electronic groups. Starting first with a history of the television industry in the United States, Europe, and Japan, and then a brief discussion of the main competitors from each of these areas, the case goes on to describe the strategy the new group pursued in terms of sourcing, manufacturing, distributing, and overall technology changes. Highlights the concept of scope advantage--the advantage you get by competing in many different markets (in this case many different geographic markets).
The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
View Details
The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
View Details
The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
View Details
The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
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For use on the second day of a two-day sequence on the U.S. chain saw industry. Describes the evolution of the industry since 1974. Illustrates issues in industry evolution, the forces causing evolution, and the strategic issues raised by evolution. The discussion can center around understanding the 1974-78 time period, and then on an analysis of the future. The class can be asked to take the perspective of different major competitors.
The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
View Details
The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
View Details
The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
View Details
The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
View Details
The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
View Details
The first ten pages of this case are comprised of the company's history, from 1923 to 2001. The Walt years are described, as is the company's decline after his death and its resurgence under Eisner. The last five pages are devoted to Eisner's strategic challenges in 2001: managing synergy, managing the brand, and managing creativity. Students are asked to think about the keys to Disney's mid-1980s turnaround, about the proper boundaries of the firm, and about what Disney's strategy should be beyond 2001.
Rukstad, Michael G., and David J. Collis. "The Walt Disney Company: The Entertainment King (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 713-475, April 2013.
View Details
