I received my first degree in Economics in 1990 from the Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina and a D.Phil in Economics from Oxford University in 1996. After a short stay in Argentina I joined Harvard Business School in July 1997, where I have taught Business History and courses on the business environment in the first year required curriculum, as well as an elective course on Institutions and Macroeconomics in the second year.
I work on political economy, with a focus on institutional development. One strand of work studies measures of happiness and how they can inform government policies on issues that range from the incidence of inequality to the inflation-unemployment tradeoff. Another part of my research has concerned itself with the causes of illegal behavior, with applications to corruption and crime. Two recent examples include a paper on media bias and government transfers, and another trying to figure out if offenders released from electronic monitoring have lower recidvism rates than those released from prison. Finally, an increasingly important area of research for me has focused on the role of beliefs in economic organization, including reversals of pro-market reform and, more generally, why doesn't capitalism flow to poor countries. My work has been published mainly in academic journals.
We study preferences for government action in response to layoffs resulting from different types of labor-market shocks. We consider the following shocks: technological change, a demand shift, bad management, and three kinds of international outsourcing. Respondents are given a choice among no government action, compensatory transfers, and trade protection. In response to these shocks, support for government intervention generally rises sharply and is heavily biased towards trade protection. Demand for import protection increases significantly in all cases, except for the “bad management” shock. Trade shocks generate more demand for protectionism, and, among trade shocks, outsourcing to a developing country elicits greater demand for protectionism than outsourcing to a developed country. The “bad management” shock is the only scenario that induces a desired increase in compensatory transfers. Effects appear to be heterogeneous across subgroups with different political preferences and education. Trump supporters are more protectionist than Clinton supporters, but preferences seem easy to manipulate: Clinton supporters primed with trade shocks are as protectionist as baseline Trump voters. Highlighting labor abuses in the exporting country increases the demand for trade protection by Clinton supporters but not Trump supporters.
We study a propaganda campaign sponsored by the government against the main political challenger in the days preceding the 2015 Argentine runoff presidential election. Subjects in the treatment group watched an “ad” initially aired during soccer transmissions that was part of this campaign and were then asked about their political views. Relative to subjects in the control group, their declared preference for the challenger drops by 6.5 percentage points. We find no effects of the three types of defenses employed by the challenger (a positive message unrelated to the “ad”, an answer to the accusations in the “ad”, and a counter-attack). The propaganda effect is driven by women.
The case describes Argentina's struggle to establish a credible monetary system under populist pressures and the recurrent use of exchange rate stabilization plans. It focuses on two episodes where there was "too little money" in the economy: during the hyperinflation episodes during the late 1980's—when money demand collapsed and the early 2000's when the supply of money collapsed under a hard currency peg.
Di Tella, Rafael, and Jose Liberti. "Brazil's Messi(as)? The Lava Jato Corruption Scandal, the Recession, and the Rise of Bolsonaro." Harvard Business School Case 719-069, March 2019.
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Rafael Di Tella, Lucia Freira, Ramiro H. Gálvez, Ernesto Schargrodsky, Diego Shalom and Mariano Sigman
We study desensitization to crime in a lab experiment by showing footage of criminal acts to a group of subjects, some of whom have been previously victimized. We measure biological markers of stress and behavioral indices of cognitive control before and after treated participants watch a series of real, crime-related videos (while the control group watches non-crime-related videos). Not previously victimized participants exposed to the treatment video show significant changes in cortisol level, heart rate. and measures of cognitive control. Instead, previously victimized individuals who are exposed to the treatment video show biological markers and cognitive performance comparable to those measured in individuals exposed to the control video. These results suggest a phenomenon of desensitization or habituation of victims to crime exposure.
We present a simple model of populism as the rejection of “disloyal” leaders. We show that adding the assumption that people are worse off when they experience low income as a result of leader betrayal (than when it is the result of bad luck) to a simple voter choice model yields a preference for incompetent leaders even if all leaders have the same underlying probability of betrayal. These deliver worse material outcomes in general, but they reduce the feelings of betrayal during bad times. Some evidence consistent with our model is gathered from the Trump-Clinton 2016 election: on average, subjects primed with the importance of competence in policymaking decrease their support for Trump, the candidate who scores lower on competence in our survey (even amongst Trump supporters). But two groups respond to the treatment with a large (approximately 5 percentage points) increase in their support for Donald Trump: those living in rural areas and those that are low educated, white and living in urban and suburban areas.
Rafael Di Tella, Ricardo Perez-Truglia, Andres Babino and Mariano Sigman
We present results from a “corruption game” (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient’s tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others’ altruism.
We study criminal recidivism in Argentina by focusing on the re-arrest rates of two groups: individuals released from prison and individuals released from electronic monitoring. Detainees are randomly assigned to judges, and ideological differences across judges translate into large differences in the allocation of electronic monitoring to an otherwise similar population. Using these peculiarities of the Argentine setting we argue that there is a large, negative causal effect on criminal recidivism of treating individuals with electronic monitoring relative to prison.
We construct measures of the extent to which the four main newspapers in Argentina report government corruption in their front page during the period 1998-2007 and correlate them with government advertising. The correlation is negative. The size is considerable: a one standard deviation increase in monthly government advertising is associated with a reduction in the coverage of the government's corruption scandals by 0.23 of a front page per month, or 18% of a standard deviation in coverage. The results are robust to the inclusion of newspaper, month, newspaper president, and individual-corruption scandal fixed effects as well as newspaper-president specific time trends.
We show that capitalism is far from common around the world. Outside a small group of rich countries, heavy regulation of business, leftist rhetoric, and interventionist beliefs flourish. We relate these phenomena to the presence of corruption, with causality running in both directions. The paper presents evidence that, within a country, those who perceive widespread corruption also tend to demand more regulation. As regulation is held constant within a country, this finding is hard to explain if one assumes that causality runs only from regulation to corruption. We also find that over time, increases in corruption in a country precede increases in left-wing voting. To explain our findings, we present a model where corrupt capitalists are disliked, and voting for left-wing policies is a form of punishment available to voters even in weak judicial systems. Evidence on emotions supports this explanation: the frequency with which people report experiencing anger is positively correlated with perceived corruption, but this relationship is significantly weaker when business is heavily regulated.
We present a model where a long-run player is allowed to use both money transfers and threats to influence the decisions of a sequence of short-run players. We show that threats might be used credibly (even in arbitrarily short repeated games) by a long-lived player who gains by developing a reputation of carrying out punishments. Particular cases of the model are a long-lived pressure group offering rewards and punishments to a series of targets (public or corporate officials) in exchange for policy favors, or that of a long-lived extorter who demands money in order not to punish. We use the model to analyze the "convicted nonpayor" debate around judicial corruption. The model highlights formal similarities between lobbying and extortion.
We provide the first empirical analysis of gubernatorial pay. Using U.S. data for 1950-90, we document substantial variation in the wages of politicians, both across states and overtime. Gubernatorial wages respond to changes in state income per capita and taxes. We estimate that governors receive a 1 percent pay cut fo reach 10 percent increase in per capita tax payments and a 4.5 percent increase in pay for each 10 percent increase in income per capita in their states. There is evidence that the taxelasticity reflects a form of “reward for performance.” The evidence for the income elasticity of pay is less conclusive but is suggestive of “rentextraction” motives. Finally,we find that democratic institutions play an important role in shaping pay. For example,voter initiatives and the presence of political opposition significantly reduce the income elasticity of pay and increase taxelasticities of pay.
We present a model where agents can inflate the cost of goods needed to start an investment project and inflation variability increases monitoring costs. We show that inflation variability can lead to higher corruption and lower investment. We document a positive relationship between corruption and inflation variability in a sample of 75 countries. The effect is robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects, other controls, and 2SLS estimation. The results are economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in inflation variance from the median increases corruption by 12 percent of a standard deviation and reduces growth by 0.33 percentage points. Our paper highlights a new channel through which inflation reduces investment and growth, thus bridging the perception gap over the costs of inflation between economists and the public. We also find evidence that political competition reduces corruption and that corruption is pro‐cyclical.
An important challenge in the crime literature is to isolate causal effects of police on crime. Following a terrorist attack on the main Jewish center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in July 1994, all Jewish institutions received police protection. Thus, this hideous event induced a geographical allocation of police forces that can be presumed exogenous in a crime regression. Using data on the location of car thefts before and after the attack, we find a large deterrent effect of observable police on crime. The effect is local, with no appreciable impact outside the narrow area in which the police are deployed.
We analyze a simple stochastic environment in which policy makers can be threatened by “nasty” interest groups. In the absence of these groups, the policy maker’s desire for reelection guarantees that good policies are implemented for every realization of the shock. When pressure groups can harass the policy maker, good policies will be chosen for only a subset of states of nature. Hence, honest and able leaders might implement bad policies, and needed reforms could be delayed. In order to make good policies more likely, the public will want to increase the cost of exerting pressure for “nasty groups” and provide rents to those in power. This last result can be used to explain the existence of political parties. They play a role resembling that of the supervisor in the literature on collusion in hierarchical agency. A rational public may also choose to ignore negative media reports on a politician’s personal life and, in general, elect “strong” political leaders. The prevalence of coercive methods of influence helps explain why countries may get to be governed by “inept politicians.”
We study the prices paid for basic inputs during a crackdown on corruption in the public hospitals of the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina, during 1996 97. We find a well-defined, negative effect on the measures used to capture corruption. Prices paid by hospitals for basic, homogeneous inputs decrease by 15 percent during the first 9 months of the crackdown. After this period prices increase, but they are still 10 percent lower than those prevailing before the crackdown. Relative to the precrackdown period, higher wages play no role in inducing lower input prices when audit intensity can be expected to be maximal (during the first phase of the crackdown) but have a negative and well-defined effect when audit intensity takes intermediate levels (the last phase of the crackdown). Controlling for fixed effects, we find that the wage elasticity of input prices exceeds .20. These results are consistent with the standard model of bribes of Gary Becker and George Stigler.
Corrupt agents (officials or gangsters) exact money from firms. Corruption affects the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium. The degree of deep competition in the economy increases with lower overhead costs relative to profits and with a tendency toward similar cost structures. Increases in competition may not lower corruption. The model explains why a rational corrupt agent may extinguish the source of his bribe income by causing a firm to exit. Assessing the welfare effect of corruption is complicated by the fact that exit caused by corruption does not necessarily reduce social
welfare.
We present a hold-up model of investment where active industrial policy promotes both corruption and investment. Since corruption deters investment, the effect of industrial policy on investment is lower than when corruption is absent. We find evidence suggesting that corruption is indeed higher in countries pursuing active industrial policies. Policy implications are illustrated by decomposing the total effect of industrial policy into a positive, direct effect, and a negative, corruption-induced effect. In the presence of corruption, the total effect of industrial policy on investment ranges between 84 and 56 % of the direct impact. The magnitude of these corrections suggests that corruption considerations should not be absent from cost-benefit analyses of industrial policies.
Ades, Alberto, and Rafael Di Tella. "The New Economics of Corruption: A Survey and Some New Results."Political Studies 45, no. 3 (summer 1997): 496–516. (Reprinted in Political Corruption, Paul Heywood (editor), Blackwell Publishers 1997. Reprinted (abridged version), in Liberalization and the New Corruption, Barbara Harris and Gordon White (editors), IDS Bulletin 1996.)
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Hernando Santamaría-García, María Luz González-Gadea, Rafael Di Tella, Agustín Ibáñez and Mariano Sigman
Previous studies in adults demonstrated that beliefs and sharing decisions in social scenarios are closely related. However, to date, little is known about the development of this relationship in children. By using a modified dictator game, we assessed sharing behavior and beliefs about others in children between 3 and 12 years old. We performed four studies (N = 376) aimed to assess whether decisions were related to beliefs (Studies 1 and 2) and whether information about the recipient’s forced sharing behavior would shape decisions and beliefs (Studies 3 and 4). Results of Studies 1 and 2 showed that beliefs about others’ generosity were related to children’s sharing behavior. In Studies 3 and 4, we found that only children older than 9 years shared more pieces of candy when they knew that the recipient would be forced to share (cooperative context) than when they knew that the recipient would be forced not to share (noncooperative context). Besides, children older than 6 years did not modify their beliefs about others’ generosity according to these social contexts. These results suggest that normative or preconceived beliefs about the functioning of the social world may guide social behavior in children.
Rafael Di Tella, Ricardo Perez-Truglia, Andres Babino and Mariano Sigman
We present results from a “corruption game” (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient’s tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others’ altruism.
In an influential paper, Alesina and Angeletos (2005)—henceforth, AA—argued that a preference for fairness could lead two identical societies to choose different economic systems. In particular, two equilibria might arise: one with low taxes and a belief that the income-generating process is "fair" because effort is important (an "American" equilibrium) and another with high taxes and the belief that the process is "unfair" because luck prevails. Piketty (1995) had shown that a similar pattern could arise from standard preferences if initial beliefs about the relative importance of effort and luck in generating income differed across the two societies, while Benabou and Tirole (2006) study this issue using more realistic preferences (Buera, Monge-Naranjo, and Primiceri 2011 discuss the evolution of beliefs about economic systems). A key contribution of AA is to obtain these two equilibria from identical societies assuming agents prefer outcomes that are fair, an important modification because fairness considerations seem central in the demand for redistribution, and because in several settings (as in some ultimatum games) such preferences for fairness can lead to large (material) inefficiencies.
In this note we report a difficulty we encountered when interpreting the results in AA: we find multiplicity (and demand for redistribution) even if luck plays no role. In other words, there is multiplicity even if the equilibrium tax rate is independent of the signal-to-noise ratio (a quantity that expresses how important effort is, relative to luck, in the determination of income). This conflicts with the notion that the signal-to-noise ratio plays a central role in generating multiplicity with AA preferences for fairness.
Argentina privatized most public utilities during the 1990s but re-nationalized the main water company in 2006. We study beliefs about the benefits of the privatization of water services amongst low- and middle-income groups immediately after the 2006 nationalization. Negative opinions about the privatization prevail. These are particularly strong amongst households that did not benefit from the privatization and amongst households that were reminded of the government's negative views about the privatization. A person's beliefs in the benefits of the water privatization were almost 30% more negative (relative to other privatizations) if his/her household did not gain access to water after the privatization. Similarly, a person's view of the water privatization (relative to other privatizations) was 16% more negative if he/she was read a vignette with some of the negative statements about the water privatization that Argentina's president expressed during the nationalization process. Interestingly, the effect of the vignette on households that gained water is insignificant, while it is largest (and significant) amongst households that did not gain water during the privatization. This suggests that propaganda was persuasive when it had a basis in reality.
We describe the evolution of selective aspects of punishment in the U.S. over the period 1980-2004. We note that imprisonment increased around 1980, a period that coincides with the "Reagan revolution" in economic matters. We build an economic model where beliefs about economic opportunities and beliefs about punishment are correlated. We present three pieces of evidence (across countries, within the U.S., and an experimental exercise) that are consistent with the model.
We study the logic of Peronist interventionist polices and the beliefs that support them. Instead of a comprehensive approach, we focus on three elements. First, we study beliefs and values about the economic system present in Peron's speeches during the period 1943-1955. Second, we study survey data for the 1990s on the beliefs of Peronist and non- Peronist voters in Argentina and Democrat and Republican voters in the U.S. While income and education suggest that Peronists (in relative terms) look like the American Democrats, their beliefs and values suggest that Peronists are the Argentine equivalent of the Republicans. Third, given that these beliefs are non-standard (for economists) we present a model formalizing some of their key aspects (for example, the idea that there is something more than a material exchange in labor relations).
We study adaptation to income and to status using individual panel data on the happiness of 7,812 people living in Germany from 1984 to 2000. Specifically, we estimate a "happiness equation" defined over several lags of income and status and compare the long-run effects. We can (cannot) reject the hypothesis of no adaptation to income (status) during the four years following an income (status) change. In the short run (current year) a one standard deviation increase in status and 52% of one standard deviation in income are associated with similar increases in happiness. In the long run (five-year average) a one standard deviation increase in status has a similar effect to an increase of 285% of a standard deviation in income. We also present different estimates of adaptation across subgroups. For example, we find that those on the right (left) of the political spectrum adapt to status (income) but not to income (status). We can reject equal relative adaptation (to income versus status) for these two subgroups.
We observe that countries where belief in the "American dream" (i.e., effort pays) prevails also set harsher punishment for criminals. We know that beliefs are also correlated with several features of the economic system (taxation, social insurance, etc). Our objective is to study the joint determination of these three features (beliefs, punitiveness, and economic system) in a way that replicates the observed empirical patterns. We present a model where beliefs determine the types of contracts that firms order and whether workers exert effort. Some workers become criminals, depending on their luck in the labor market, the expected punishment, and an individual shock that we call "meanness." It is this meanness level that a penal system based on "retribution" tries to detect when deciding the severity of the punishment. We find that when initial beliefs differ, two equilibria can emerge out of identical fundamentals. In the "American" (as opposed to the "French") equilibrium, belief in the "American dream" is commonplace, workers exert effort, there are high-powered contracts (and income is unequally distributed) and punishments are harsh. Economists who believe that deterrence (rather than retribution) shapes punishment can interpret the meanness parameter as pessimism about future economic opportunities and verify that two similar equilibria emerge.
Rafael Di Tella, Sebastian F. Galiani and Ernesto S. Schargrodsky
We study the formation of beliefs in a squatter settlement in the outskirts of Buenos Aires exploiting a natural experiment that induced an allocation of property rights that is exogenous to the characteristics of the squatters. There are significant differences in the beliefs that squatters with and without land titles declare to hold. Lucky squatters who end up with legal titles report beliefs closer to those that favor the workings of a free market. Examples include materialist and individualist beliefs (such as the belief that money is important for happiness or the belief that one can be successful without the support of a large group). The effects appear large. The value of a (generated) index of "market" beliefs is 20 percent higher for titled squatters than for un titled squatters, in spite of leading otherwise similar lives. Moreover, the effect is sufficiently large so as to make the beliefs of the squatters with legal titles broadly comparable to those of the general Buenos Aires population, in spite of the large differences in the lives they lead
The Easterlin Paradox refers to the fact that happiness data are typically stationary in spite of considerable increases in income. This amounts to a rejection of the hypothesis that current income is the only argument in the utility function. We find that the happiness responses of around 350,000 people living in the OECD between 1975 and 1997 are positively correlated with the level of income, the welfare state and (weakly) with life expectancy; they are negatively correlated with the average number of hours worked, environmental degradation (measured by SOx emissions), crime, openness to trade, inflation and unemployment–all controlling for country and year dummies. These effects separate across groups in a pattern that appears broadly plausible (e.g., the rich suffer environmental degradation more than the poor). Based on actual changes from 1975 to 1997, small contributions to happiness can be attributed to the increase in income in our sample. Interestingly, the actual changes in several of the 'omitted variables' such as life expectancy, hours worked, inflation and unemployment also contribute to happiness over this time period since life expectancy has risen and the others have, on average, fallen. Consequently the unexplained trend in happiness is even bigger than would be predicted if income was the only argument in the utility function. In other words, introducing omitted variables worsens the income-without-happiness paradox.
We show how the differences in US and European institutions can arise in a normative model. The paper focuses on the labor market and the government's decision to set unemployment benefits in response to an unemployment shock. The government balances insurance considerations with the tax burden of benefits and the possibility that they introduce adverse “incentive effects” whereby benefits increase unemployment. It is found that when an adverse shock occurs, benefits should be increased most when the adverse incentive effects of benefits are largest. Adjustment costs of changing benefits introduce hysteresis and can help explain why post-oil shock benefits remained high in Europe but not in the US. Desirable features of the model are that we obtain an asymmetry out of a symmetric environment and that the mechanism yielding hysteresis is both simple (requires the third derivative of the utility function to be non-negative) and self-correcting. Empirical evidence concerning the role of corporatism is discussed.
We use a new approach to study questions in political economy that relies on data on the subjective well-being of a large sample of people living in the OECD over the period 1975-1992. Controlling for the personal characteristics of the respondents, year and country fixed effects and country-specific time trends, we find that the data describe social happiness functions for left-wing and right-wing individuals where inflation and unemployment enter negatively. We use these functions to test the root assumption of partisan business cycle models. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that left-wing individuals care more about unemployment relative to inflation than right-wingers. Interestingly, we find that individuals declare themselves to be happier when the party they support is in power, even after controlling for macroeconomic variables. The effect of politics is large. Finally, we find that these partisan differences cannot be traced back to income differences. That is, it is misleading to assume-as it is done in the previous literature-that the poor (rich) behave similarly to the left (right). For example, inflation and unemployment do not have differential effects across rich and poor and the happiness levels of these two groups are unaffected by the identity of the party in power. Our findings are hard to explain using median voter models but are to be expected in a partisan world.
We study the effect of the level of inequality in society on individual well-being using a total of 123,668 answers to a survey question about “happiness”. We find that individuals have a lower tendency to report themselves happy when inequality is high, even after controlling for individual income, a large set of personal characteristics, and year and country (or, in the case of the US, state) dummies. The effect, however, is more precisely defined statistically in Europe than in the US. In addition, we find striking differences across groups. In Europe, the poor and those on the left of the political spectrum are unhappy about inequality; whereas in the US the happiness of the poor and of those on the left is uncorrelated with inequality. Interestingly, in the US, the rich are bothered by inequality. Comparing across continents, we find that left-wingers in Europe are more hurt by inequality than left-wingers in the US. And the poor in Europe are more concerned with inequality than the poor in America, an effect that is large in terms of size but is only significant at the 10% level. We argue that these findings are consistent with the perception (not necessarily the reality) that Americans have been living in a mobile society, where individual effort can move people up and down the income ladder, while Europeans believe that they live in less mobile societies.
We show that macroeconomic movements have strong effects on the happiness of nations. First, we find that there are clear microeconomic patterns in the psychological well-being levels of a quarter of a million randomly sampled Europeans and Americans from the 1970s to the 1990s. Happiness equations are monotonically increasing in income, and have similar structure in different countries. Second, movements in reported well-being are correlated with changes in macroeconomic variables such as gross domestic product. This holds true after controlling for the personal characteristics of respondents, country fixed effects, year dummies, and country-specific time trends. Third, the paper establishes that recessions create psychic losses that extend beyond the fall in GDP and rise in the number of people unemployed. These losses are large. Fourth, the welfare state appears to be a compensating force: higher unemployment benefits are associated with higher natinal well-being.
We study unemployment benefit provision when the family also provides social insurance. In the benchmark case, more generous State transfers crowd out family risk-sharing one-for-one. An extension gives the State an advantage in enforcing transfers through taxes (whereas families rely on self-enforcement). More generous State transfers lead to more than one-for-one reductions in intra-family insurance, so that total transfers to the unemployed fall as the State's generosity increases. This does not imply that the optimal size of the Welfare State is zero. Our results still hold when families are assumed to be better than the State at monitoringjob search activities of unemployed.
While much empirical research exists on labor market consequences of unemployment benefits, there is remarkably little evidence on the forces determining benefits. We present a simple model where workers desire insurance against unemployment risk and benefits increase the unemployment rate. We then conduct one of the first empirical analyses of the determinants of the parameters of the benefit system. Using data for developed countries for 1971–89, controlling for year and country fixed effects and the government’s political color, we find evidence that the level of benefits falls when the unemployment rate is high. This is consistent with Wright’s tax effect.
In the many years since their introduction, positive theories of inflation have rarely been tested. This paper documents a negative relationship between inflation and the welfare state (proxied by the parameters of the unemployment benefit program) that is to be expected in such theories. Because unemployment benefits make the monetary authority less concerned about the plight of the unemployed, building a welfare state has a similar effect to appointing a conservative central banker. The relationship holds in a panel of 20 OECD countries over the period 1961-1992, a region where Romer finds no evidence of commitment problems. It holds controlling for country and time fixed effects, country-specific time trends, other covariates, and using a decadal panel. Interpreted as causal, the estimated effect is economically large: a 1 standard deviation decrease in benefit duration is predicted to add 1.4 percentage points onto inflation, or 31% of the standard deviation in inflation.
We introduce a new data set on hiring and firing restrictions for 21 OECD countries for the period 1984 –1990. The data are based on surveys of business people in the countries covered, so the indices we use are subjective in nature. Controlling for country and time fixed effects, and using dynamic panel data techniques, we find evidence that increasing the flexibility of the labor market increases both the employment rate and the rate of participation in the labor force. A conservative estimate suggests that if France were to make its labor markets as flexible as those in the US, its employment rate would increase 1.6 percentage points, or 14% of the employment gap between the two countries. The estimated effects are larger in the female than in the male labor market, although both groups seem to have similar long-run coeffcients. There is also some evidence that more flexibility leads to lower unemployment rates and to lower rates of long-term unemployment. We also find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that inflexible labor markets produce “jobless recoveries” and introduce more unemployment persistence.
We study preferences for government action in response to layoffs resulting from different types of labor-market shocks. We consider the following shocks: technological change, a demand shift, bad management, and three kinds of international outsourcing. Respondents are given a choice among no government action, compensatory transfers, and trade protection. In response to these shocks, support for government intervention generally rises sharply and is heavily biased towards trade protection. Demand for import protection increases significantly in all cases, except for the “bad management” shock. Trade shocks generate more demand for protectionism, and, among trade shocks, outsourcing to a developing country elicits greater demand for protectionism than outsourcing to a developed country. The “bad management” shock is the only scenario that induces a desired increase in compensatory transfers. Effects appear to be heterogeneous across subgroups with different political preferences and education. Trump supporters are more protectionist than Clinton supporters, but preferences seem easy to manipulate: Clinton supporters primed with trade shocks are as protectionist as baseline Trump voters. Highlighting labor abuses in the exporting country increases the demand for trade protection by Clinton supporters but not Trump supporters.
We analyze the role of people’s beliefs about the rich in the determination of public policy in the context of a randomized online survey experiment. A question we study is the desirability of government-private sector meetings, a variable we argue is connected to State capacity. Survey respondents primed with negative views about business leaders want fewer meetings as well as higher taxes for the top 1% and more regulation. We also study how these effects change when subjects are (additionally) primed with positive/negative views about government officials. Distrust in the government increases the preferred tax rate on the top 1% only when business legitimacy is low. A model with multiple equilibria helps interpret these findings. In one of the equilibria, meetings are allowed, business legitimacy is high, and people set a low income tax rate for businesspeople. In the other, meetings are forbidden, business legitimacy is low, and people set high taxes to punish the businesspeople for their corrupt behavior.
Andres Babino, Hernan A. Makse, Rafael Di Tella and Mariano Sigman
The coexistence of cooperation and selfish instincts is a remarkable characteristic of humans. Psychological research has unveiled the cognitive mechanisms behind self-deception. Two important findings are that a higher ambiguity about others’ social preferences leads to a higher likelihood of acting selfishly and that agents acting selfishly will increase their belief that others are also selfish. In this work, we posit a mathematical model of these mechanisms and explain their impact on the undermining of a global cooperative society. We simulate the behavior of agents playing a prisoner’s dilemma game in a random network of contacts. We endow each agent with these two self-deception mechanisms which bias her toward thinking that the other agent will defect. We study behavior when a fraction of agents with the “always defect” strategy is introduced in the network. Depending on the magnitude of the biases the players could start a cascade of defection or isolate the defectors. We find that there are thresholds above which the system approaches a state of complete distrust.
Hernando Santamaría-García, María Luz González-Gadea, Rafael Di Tella, Agustín Ibáñez and Mariano Sigman
Previous studies in adults demonstrated that beliefs and sharing decisions in social scenarios are closely related. However, to date, little is known about the development of this relationship in children. By using a modified dictator game, we assessed sharing behavior and beliefs about others in children between 3 and 12 years old. We performed four studies (N = 376) aimed to assess whether decisions were related to beliefs (Studies 1 and 2) and whether information about the recipient’s forced sharing behavior would shape decisions and beliefs (Studies 3 and 4). Results of Studies 1 and 2 showed that beliefs about others’ generosity were related to children’s sharing behavior. In Studies 3 and 4, we found that only children older than 9 years shared more pieces of candy when they knew that the recipient would be forced to share (cooperative context) than when they knew that the recipient would be forced not to share (noncooperative context). Besides, children older than 6 years did not modify their beliefs about others’ generosity according to these social contexts. These results suggest that normative or preconceived beliefs about the functioning of the social world may guide social behavior in children.
We study the beliefs and values of Peronism. Instead of a comprehensive approach, we focus on three elements. First, we study beliefs and values about the economic system present in Peron’s speeches during the period 1943–1955. Second, given that these beliefs are nonstandard (for economists), we present two models formalizing some of the key aspects (for example, the idea that there is something more than a material exchange in labor relations). Third, we study survey data for the 1990s on the beliefs of Peronist and non-Peronist voters in Argentina and Democrat and Republican voters in the United States. While income and education suggest that Peronists (in relative terms) look like the Democrats, their beliefs and values suggest that Peronists are the Argentine equivalent of the Republicans.
This article is an introduction to the special collection on Argentine Exceptionalism. First, we discuss why the case of Argentina is generally regarded as exceptional: the country was among the richest in the world at the beginning of the 20th century, but it gradually lost this place of privilege. We discuss that most explanations regarding the hypothesis of Argentine Exceptionalism fall into one or several of four categories. The first explanation is to challenge the exceptionalism hypothesis, either by arguing that the country was not so rich at the beginning of the 20th century or that it is not so poor now. The second explanation states that the country failed to generate growth supporting institutions despite its wealth, thus leading to a relative decline in its income level. The next explanation is that the country faced a series of adverse external shocks that disfavored what had been a successful growth model. Finally, scholars have also stated that exceptionalism is a consequence of poor policy choices, in particular a tendency towards state intervention and isolationism. Next, we introduce the remaining papers of the special collection and how they relate to the aforementioned hypothesis. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks regarding this article.
The study of how crime affects different income groups faces the difficulty that crime-avoiding activities vary across these groups. Thus, a lower victimization rate in one group may not reflect a lower burden of crime, but rather a higher investment in crime avoidance. Moreover, protection activities by one group can displace crime onto another group. We take advantage of a dramatic increase in crime rates in Argentina during the late 1990s to document several interesting patterns. First, the increase in victimization experienced by the poor is larger than the increase endured by the rich. The difference appears large: low-income people have experienced increases in victimization rates that are almost 50% higher than those suffered by high-income people. Second, for home robberies, where the rich can protect themselves (by hiring private security, for example), we find significantly larger increases in victimization rates amongst the poor. In contrast, for robberies on the street, where the rich can only mimic the poor (by not using jewelry, for example), we find similar increases in victimization for both income groups. Third, we document direct evidence on pecuniary and non-pecuniary protection activities by both the rich and poor, ranging from the avoidance of dark places to the hiring of private security. Fourth, we estimate a negative correlation between changes in protection and mimicking and changes in crime victimization. Our findings are consistent with the presence of a negative externality on the poor arising from the protection expenditures of the rich.
We study the correlation between a belief concerning individualism and a measure of luck in the US during the period 1983-2004. The measure of beliefs is the answer to a question related to whether the poor should be helped by the government or if they should help themselves, while the measure of luck is the share of the oil industry in the state's economy multiplied by the price of oil. The correlation is negative, suggesting that more reliance on luck is correlated with less individualism. We provide three short models that help interpret this correlation. One implication of this finding is that societies that depend heavily on oil, and perhaps natural resources more generally, will experience a heavier demand for government intervention. We argue that this is one aspect that the good design of policies on the extraction of oil and mineral resources should take into account.
We test for whether, once "basic needs" are satisfied, there is happiness adaptation to further gains in income using three data sets. Individual German Panel Data from 1985 to 2000, and data on the well-being of over 600,000 people in a panel of European countries from 1975 to 2002, shows different patterns of adaptation to income across the rich and poor. We find evidence that for wealthy Germans, and for the rich half of European nations, higher levels of per capita income don't buy greater happiness. The reason appears to be adaptation. However even for the rich half of European nations such habituation may take over five years so the happiness gains that they experience, while not permanent, can still be relatively long-lasting. Finally we study a cross section of nations in 2005 from the World Gallup Poll and find that the past 45 years of economic growth (from 1960 to 2005) in the rich half of nations has not brought happiness gains above those that were already in place once the 1960s standard of living had been achieved. However in the poorest half of nations we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the happiness gains they have experienced from the past 45 years of growth have been the same as the gains that they experienced from growth prior to the 1960s.
Di Tella, Rafael, and Robert MacCulloch. "Happiness Adaptation to Income beyond 'Basic Needs'." Chap. 8 in International Differences in Well-Being, edited by Ed Diener, John Helliwell, and Daniel Kahneman, 217–247. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
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Di Tella, Rafael, and Ernesto S. Schargrodsky. "Political and Economic Incentives during an Anti-Corruption Crackdown." Chap. 7 in Corrupt Exchanges: Empirical Themes in the Politics and Political Economy of Corruption. Vol. 23, edited by Donatella della Porta and Susan Rose-Ackerman, 118–32. Interdisziplinäre Studien zu Recht und Staat. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002.
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Di Tella, Rafael, and William D. Savedoff. "Shining Light in Dark Corners." Chap. 1 in The Corruption that Compromises Health: Studies of Public Hospitals in Latin America, edited by Rafael Di Tella and William D. Savedoff. Inter-American Development Bank, 2001, Spanish ed.
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Di Tella, Rafael, Alberto Ades, and Mark Carney. "Competitiveness and the New Industrial Policy." World Competitiveness Report (1995): 351–355.
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Book Abstract: At the beginning of the twentieth century Venezuela had one of the poorest economies in Latin America, but by 1970 it had become the richest country in the region and one of the twenty richest countries in the world, ahead of countries such as Greece, Israel, and Spain. Between 1978 and 2001, however, Venezuela's economy went sharply in reverse, with non-oil GDP declining by almost 19% and oil GDP by an astonishing 65%. What accounts for this drastic turnabout? The editors of Venezuela Before Chávez, who each played a policymaking role in the country's economy during the past two decades, have brought together a group of economists and political scientists to systematically examine the impact of a wide range of factors affecting the economy's collapse, from the cost of labor regulation and the development of financial markets to the weakening of democratic governance and the politics of decisions about industrial policy.
Rawi Abdelal, Rafael Di Tella, Galit Goldstein and Sogomon Tarontsi
The collapse of central authority in the Soviet Union in 1991 ushered in a period of revolutionary transformations for the states that emerged in its wake. The leaders of Russia, the USSR's successor, struggled to reestablish central authority while also seeking to avoid further disintegration, establish a democratic polity, and institute a market economy across the next several years. Russia would navigate further economic crisis and a swiftly evolving geopolitical order as it returned to the world stage. The case examines the different governance approaches adopted by Presidents Boris Yeltsin, Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, and concludes with a discussion of Russia’s strategic challenges and opportunities in 2020. The case focuses on problems of state authority; fiscal capacity; institutionalization of political parties; relations between the federal center and provincial governments; relations between the state and big business; economic policy; international relations; and models of economic development.
Abdelal, Rawi, Rafael Di Tella, Galit Goldstein, and Sogomon Tarontsi. "Russia: A Drama In Three Acts." Harvard Business School Case 720-020, November 2019. (Revised June 2020.)
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Vincent Pons, William Mullins, John Masko, Annelena Lobb and Rafael Di Tella
In 2020, Chileans would head to the ballot box to decide their country’s future. Many international observers credited Chile’s decades of neoliberal governance with turning the country into Latin America’s “Tiger,” a prosperous, diversified economy on its way to becoming the continent’s first developed country. But in October of 2019, a mass protest movement ground the country to a halt and shocked its political class, showing the world a different Chile—one defined by inequality, social distrust, and a young generation of political activists. As Chile prepared to vote in the fall of 2020 on whether to adopt a new constitution, could it sculpt a more equitable society while remaining “the exception” on a continent known for its political instability? Or would Chile’s prosperity go the same way as its neoliberal experiment?
Pons, Vincent, William Mullins, John Masko, Annelena Lobb, and Rafael Di Tella. "Unrest in Chile." Harvard Business School Case 720-033, April 2020. (Revised April 2020.)
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Following a contentious presidential race, Donald Trump’s 2016 election destabilized America’s status quo. Academics, journalists, politicians and the public at large examined why Trump had won. Many Americans, inside and outside the government, asserted that a state-led Russian disinformation campaign had influenced the election’s outcome. The leaders of major social media companies, including Twitter and Facebook, also conceded that state actors had gamed their platforms to influence American politics. Trump himself made conflicting statements, while Russian politicians asserted that American elites had rhetorically weaponized the issue of election interference to justify an unwillingness to work with their country internationally. It was hard to parse where reality ended and political rhetoric began. Post-election, the future of U.S.-Russia relations remained unclear, and the United States grappled with how to regulate cyberspace. Analyzing the 2016 election and its aftershocks helps students confront interrelated questions about business regulation, international relations, cultural identity, strategic communications, political will and the Internet. The case encourages students to consider the boundary between narrative and reality and examine subjectivity, objectivity, and power in the public and private sectors.
During the 2016 U.S. election, long-time politician Hillary Clinton, a Democrat, and celebrity billionaire Donald Trump, a Republican, faced off in a contentious race for president. In the primaries, candidates from both major political parties used anti-establishment messaging to appeal to the electorate, a theme that had been on the sidelines of U.S. political discourse for decades. Trump, in particular, played into the rising anti-establishment sentiment as he embraced a populist platform and emphasized his position as a Washington-outsider. He proved to be an unpredictable and incendiary candidate on the campaign trail, garnering much media attention and creating divisions within the traditional Republican base, yet his directness and promise to “Make America Great Again” resonated with several segments of the population. While many experts predicted a Clinton victory, Trump was ultimately elected president in November 2016. During his first 100 days in office, Trump tested the boundaries of the U.S. government, and observers looked on with uncertainty as he took an unconventional and unpredictable approach to policymaking.
Founded in 1945, Grupo Clarín expanded over several decades to become Argentina’s largest media conglomerate. With leading positions in newspapers, broadcast television, broadcast radio, cable television, and Internet services, Grupo Clarín caught the attention of U.S.-based investment bank Goldman Sachs, which acquired an 18% share of Grupo Clarín for US$500 million in 1999. While Grupo Clarín struggled during the economic crisis from 2001 to 2002, it was well positioned to grow as the economy began to recover in 2003, in part due to government policies that helped stabilize the media industry. Now in October 2007, Grupo Clarín was preparing to make an IPO in London and Buenos Aires, and fund managers at Goldman Sachs were reevaluating their position. What price would the IPO reach and how much, if any, of their stake should they sell? What was the return Goldman Sachs would obtain if it sold its entire position, or just one part?
In 2012, Argentine media conglomerate Grupo Clarín and President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner were embroiled in what some called “the mother of all battles.” Grupo Clarín was one of the preeminent media companies in Argentina, with leading newspapers, cable television and Internet services, and broadcast television and radio stations. Some critics contended the company had prospered over several decades by managing relationships with governments of varying political color, such as with Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007), the popular president who helped lead the country out of the financial crisis. But its relationship with the government changed in 2008 when a divisive agricultural export tax sparked a conflict between Grupo Clarín and President Cristina Kirchner, Néstor Kirchner’s wife and successor. Then in 2009, in a call for “democratizing” the media, Cristina Kirchner introduced a media reform law that would significantly limit Grupo Clarín’s operations. By 2012, the conglomerate had delayed the law’s implementation through the courts, but would likely have to restructure to accommodate the new regulatory environment. The case allows students to consider the assumptions that underlie media regulation and to debate the role of media in society. It can also be used to discuss how to evaluate a business decision in an uncertain regulatory environment.
Over the past several decades, rapid growth in Chinese investment and trade has created for Africa a new development partner. China represents an alternative to U.S. and European nations whose past imperialism, resource avarice, and economic dictates—through the conditionality of IMF and World Bank lending—remain a negative legacy. This case uses the story of Zambia's Chambishi copper mine, which was purchased in 1998 by the state-owned China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Corporation, to illustrate China’s growing interest and involvement in the African continent. While many in Africa welcome the substantial Chinese investment, resentment over labor abuses, low pay, and substandard working conditions at some Chinese-owned enterprises fuels anti-China sentiment. At Chambishi copper mine, a 2005 explosion, caused by management's shoddy adherence to safety standards, killed nearly 50 miners and sparked outrage among Zambians. The explosion marked the first in a long series of protests and safety violations that would unfold at Chambishi over the next ten years.
Israel enjoyed the highest concentration of technology start-ups in the world per capita. Despite regional instability, the country maintained strong economic growth and was considered a high-tech powerhouse. But not all Israelis benefited. Between the 1980s and 2010s, income distribution had widened. By 2015, 20 business groups—nearly all family owned—controlled one in four listed companies through corporate pyramids. Public anger over the high cost of living, which many believed was due to a lack of competition, led to a series of protests. Some academics and members of the Knesset (Parliament) called for reforms to limit the activities of corporate pyramids.
Xi Jinping assumed his position as head of China's fifth generation of leaders in 2012. Xi was head of both the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party, which had ruled China since 1949. Xi inherited a country far more unequal than the one that Mao Zedong, Communist China's first leader, had left behind in 1978. The growth of markets had made China much wealthier, but also generated many social problems, including inequality, corruption, and social protests. This case discusses China's political and economic development in the 20th century to situate Xi's—and China's—contemporary challenges.
Xi Jinping assumed his position as head of China's fifth generation of leaders in 2012. Xi was head of both the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party, which had ruled China since 1949. Xi inherited a country far more unequal than the one that Mao Zedong, Communist China's first leader, had left behind in 1978. The growth of markets had made China much wealthier, but also generated many social problems, including inequality, corruption, and social protests. This case discusses China's political and economic development in the 20th century to situate Xi's—and China's—contemporary challenges.
Di Tella, Rafael, Meg Rithmire, and Kaitlyn Szydlowski. "Inequality and Growth in the 'Chinese Dream'." Harvard Business School Case 714-440, March 2014.
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In late October 2011, after losing 1 billion of dollar reserves in one month, the Argentine government began imposing a series of currency controls, limiting the ability to buy foreign currency. As of October 2011, Argentina's tax collection agency AFIP had been granted the power to approve or reject all requests to buy dollars with pesos in Argentina's banking system. By June 2012, AFIP had removed "saving" as a legitimate explanation. While the official exchange rate was approaching six pesos to the dollar, the black market was demanding almost ten pesos to the dollar—a nearly 65% difference.
These were not the first currency restrictions that Argentina had imposed on its citizens.
This case describes Latvia's transition from a Soviet republic into an EU member, its economic boom and subsequent bust in 2008, and its policy response. After implementing significant economic and political reforms in order to qualify for EU membership in 2004, Latvia had turned its sights toward joining the single-currency eurozone, pegging its currency to the euro in 2005 as a step toward that goal. From 2000 to 2007, Latvia achieved faster GDP growth than any EU state. However, when large inflows of capital suddenly dried up in 2008, Latvia had to obtain a financial rescue package from the IMF, World Bank, EU, and several regional countries in order to avoid a full-blown financial and currency crisis. Latvia then adopted an aggressive economic adjustment program centered on maintaining its currency peg, which meant competitiveness would have to be restored by reducing domestic prices, wages, and public expenditures in order to drive down the real exchange rate. Latvia's policy program and initial results are discussed in the case.
This case describes the economic development problems faced by the small Caribbean-island country of Jamaica over most of the past half-century. The Jamaican economy showed relatively strong growth in the 1960s but stagnated in the 1970s. By the end of that decade, Jamaica was forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for balance-of-payments support. Over the 1980s and early 1990s, the unpopular policy conditions associated with IMF loan programs made the Fund a lightning rod for criticism over Jamaica's lack of economic progress. Jamaicans celebrated the end of IMF borrowing in the mid-1990s, but a severe financial crisis later that decade created a new layer of economic problems. In 2010, in the context of the global economic downturn, Jamaica once again returned to the IMF for financing support. This case allows students to explore the complicated economic difficulties faced by Jamaica, which remains burdened by a self-reinforcing set of interrelated factors, including high public debt, a sluggish private sector, an inefficient public sector, poverty, and crime, among others.
Instructors may also obtain a Teaching Note, written by this case's author, that provides suggestions for using this case effectively in the classroom.
How the International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines and carries out its mandate has evolved considerably since 1944, when it was founded to serve a vital but narrow function in maintaining the global foreign exchange system and thus enabling international trade. This note gives an overview of the IMF's evolution by describing key phases in its history, including the Bretton Woods system and its collapse, the international debt crisis of the 1980s, the Washington Consensus era, and reform efforts in the 2000s.
In 2010, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), the largest private prison operator in the U.S., was considering expansion options. The company's largest customers, federal and state governments, were under economic pressure to reduce the incarceration rate and lower operating costs, potentially jeopardizing CCA's profits. Should CCA follow its competitor's footsteps and expand overseas? Or could it count on an ever-increasing population of U.S. prisoners to fuel continued growth?
This Case describes a controversial 2010 decision by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and alludes to some of the broader challenges of building international institutions. The case briefly highlights certain milestones in international relations preceding the ICC's formation; provides an overview of the ICC and its activities as of March 2010; and outlines Kenya's post-election crisis in 2007–2008 and the ICC's decision to intervene. The ICC's involvement was a divisive issue: some argued it would destabilize Kenya, while others claimed it was an important step towards lasting peace. The Kenya scenario presents many aspects for consideration, including the wisdom of the ICC's involvement (given the complex historical, economic, and cultural issues underlying the 2007–2008 crisis), as well as the likelihood that Kenyan officials will cooperate with the ICC. Students can also weigh the broader implications for the ICC as it seeks to establish itself as a legitimate, fair, and just institution.
New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer faced a decision about how to stop wrongdoing committed by major Wall Street firms during the Internet boom. The equities analysts of Merrill Lynch and other Wall Street firms were charged with objectively advising retail investors whether to buy or sell publicly traded stock. The analysts had rated some stock a strong buy, while at the same time disparaging it in Internet emails as "a piece of junk" or a "powder keg." Spitzer concluded that the analysts sometimes issued such buy ratings on stock of companies because of a conflict of interest: the Wall Street firms the analysts worked for were making handsome fees for underwriting the companies' stock offerings and providing other services. The usual procedure when an enforcement agency such as the Federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) discovered such a situation would be to complete its investigation and negotiate a resolution privately with the financial firm. If it could not resolve the matter, the agency would formally file suit against the firm in court. This option was open to Spitzer, but the 1921 New York statue gave him an alternative. Even before filing suit in court--and while continuing to investigate the firm further--he could broadcast his findings to warn the public and brand the firm with wrongdoing. This case investigates the decision Spitzer made, and its long-term implications for U.S. financial regulation and financial industries.
What caused the 1997-98 Asia Crisis: Asian nations' poor economic management, international financial contagion, close "crony" relations between local politicians and capitalists? This case examines how the crisis erupted in Thailand and spread in a chain of events that no one-neither Asian financial authorities nor Western economists-had foreseen. The crisis raises questions about how competently financial institutions, such as mutual funds, managed their global capital investments. It raises questions about how effective the International Monetary Fund's package of reforms was-and to what extent the IMF acted in the interest of Wall Street rather than developing nations. And the crisis raises questions about the development policies of Asian nations: Did too-close "crony" relations between politicians and owners of major banks or firms pave the way for crisis?
Why do managers become corrupt? Does corruption ever pay? When do friendly relations cross into bribery? How can CEOs manage and prevent outbreaks of corruption? These and other questions are raised by three short case studies of corruption in Germany: at the global engineering firm Siemens, the automaker VW, and the chemical giant BASF. While German law not only permitted overseas bribery but even made it tax deductible until 1999, it was not welcomed in some nations where Siemens did business such as the United States-or in Germany after 2000-but old practices continued. Cooperative management-labor relations, often seen as key to the post-World War II German industrial powerhouse, went sour at VW, as a top manager secured key concessions by paying for union leaders' lavish foreign travel and visits to prostitutes. After vitamin prices sagged in the late 1980s, BASF and the Swiss chemical firm Hoffmann-La Roche plotted a global cartel that lasted a decade and raised the prices of many vitamins 50 percent or more. In the end, even after record criminal fines and jail time for some executives, some observers argued, such practices were likely to recur.
Abdelal, Rawi E., Rafael Di Tella, and Jonathan Schlefer. "Corruption in Germany." Harvard Business School Case 709-006, July 2008. (Revised June 2012.)
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Set in 1996, when ABC, NBC and Microsoft, and Fox all announced that they will challenge Cable News Network's near monopoly position in the 24-hour cable news channel market. The focus is on the interaction of the strategies likely to be adopted by each player given their relative resources, leadership, and interests.
Anand, Bharat N., Rafael M. Di Tella, and Dennis A. Yao. "CNN and the Cable News Wars." Harvard Business School Case 707-491, November 2006. (Revised July 2007.)
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Provides a broad overview of economic and political developments in Spain from the 1940s to the present day. Examines the emergence of Spain from the Franco dictatorship and its convergence into a vibrant democracy, as reflected in the surprising election results of 2004. Also describes the economic transformation of Spain and permits discussion of the interrelationships between the economic and political dynamics. Highlights the role the European Union (EU) played as an inspirational goal and institutional constraint on how Spain developed both economically and politically. Discuses in greater detail the Spanish labor market and the evolution of unemployment levels in Spain. Also looks at the role of terrorism in a society such as Spain's, with reference to both the Basque separatist terrorism of ETA and the international terrorism associated with the Atocha station bombings in 2004.
Shortly after Infosys was founded in 1981, its managers faced a major turning point when they made a decision to operate without giving in to the petty corruption rife in the Indian economy. Within just a few years, that decision had truly defined the company. Over the next 25 years, Infosys managers went to extraordinary lengths to avoid even the most modest of practices that they considered inappropriate. Explores the practices and methods that Infosys adopted instead, considers their costs, benefits, and generalizability, and contextualizes the problem within Indian political and economic institutions that continue to evolve.
Official data that suggest economic inequality has been mounting in the United States on various dimensions since 1979. Many causes of such inequality have been postulated: technological change, globalization, demographic factors, and changes in public policy (notably changes in taxation during the Reagan presidency). Whether rising inequality is even a cause for concern is an open question. Some dimensions of inequality may be of concern, whereas other dimensions may be viewed as less problematic. To the extent that rising inequality is seen as a social problem that needs to be addressed, various policy proposals have been advocated.
There are many options for a country in the management of monetary policy. At the most basic level is the decision of whether to adopt a fixed or a floating exchange rate. Introduces the economics behind exchange rates and the debate between fixed vs. floating regimes.
Di Tella, Rafael M., and Ingrid Vogel. "Exchange Rate Regimes." Harvard Business School Background Note 704-038, May 2004. (Revised June 2005.)
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Describes the political and economic development in Argentina from 1900 to 1989, with a focus on the role of Peron and populism. A rewritten version of an earlier case.
Describes the political and economic development in Argentina from 1989 to 1995, with a focus on the role of the currency board. Culminates in Argentine policy makers (Menem in particular) contemplating how to respond to the tequila crisis in the middle of 1995. Focuses on the tradeoff between a fixed exchange rate to maintain price stability and the required high interest rates that impact financial stability. A rewritten version of an earlier case.
At the end of 2001, Argentina's economy and society both appeared on the verge of collapse. Furious about controls imposed on the convertibility of their bank deposits into cash (the "corralito") and huge proposed government spending cuts amidst high unemployment and deteriorating social services, Argentines from all economic backgrounds took to the streets in protest. In violent rioting, stores were looted, buildings burned, and more than 22 people killed. The entire government was forced to resign. A succession of increasingly ineffectual presidents shuffled through the presidential palace, each seemingly more powerless to confront the crisis than the last. Meanwhile, the country's economic situation continued to deteriorate, and Argentina soon defaulted on its $141 billion in foreign debt outstanding in the largest sovereign default in history. On January 2, 2002, Eduardo Duhalde was selected interim president by Argentina's Congress—and would serve as Argentina's fifth president in two weeks. At the helm of Argentina's flailing economy, he had a number of important decisions to make. Among these were what to do with Argentina's decade-long peg to the dollar under the Convertibility Plan.
Rafael M. Di Tella, Huw Pill, Miguel Lopez de Silanes Gomez, Cinthia Fernholz Violand and Ingrid Vogel
Describes the economic stabilization program implemented by the Bolivian government in 1985 to 1986 and its impact on the development process in Bolivia.
Rafael M. Di Tella, Tarun Khanna, Huw Pill, Alexandra de Royere and Ingrid Vogel
Describes the development of Argentina's financial system after the "Tequila Crisis" that came about as a result of the speculative attack on the Mexican peso's peg to the U.S. dollar in December 1994. Although Argentina's banking system was strengthened overall due to changes implemented to address the crisis, most of the country's domestic private banks were either taken over by foreign banks or failed. Focuses on how in the year 2000, in an effort to remain Argentine owned, the last remaining large domestic private bank adopts a share offer considered by some--particularly a vocal member of one of the bank's controlling families--to be unfair to minority shareholders.
Discusses the largest electric distribution company in Chile and one of the five largest private Chilean companies. Introduces the exercise of operating control in order to improve the profitability of the investments, privatization, and international expansions.
Argentina has flourished under a fixed exchange rate system, yet there are large income and employment fluctuations. The social cost of unemployment is threatening the viability of the economic model. Building a welfare state is one alternative, but this may be a return to the populist policies of the past.
We study a model in which agents experience anger when they see a firm that has displayed insufficient concern for the welfare of its clients (i.e., altruism) making high profits. Regulation can increase welfare, for example, through fines (even with no changes in prices). Besides the standard channel (i.e., efficiency), regulation affects welfare through two other channels. (i) Regulation calms down existing consumers, because a reduction in the profits of an unkind firm increases total welfare by reducing consumer anger. (ii) Individuals who were out of the market when they were angry in the unregulated market decide to purchase once the firm is regulated.
In the 2016 United States presidential election, candidates from both major political parties used anti-establishment messaging to appeal to Americans, a theme that had been on the sidelines of US political discourse for decades. Donald Trump, in particular, played into the rising anti-establishment sentiment, embracing a populist platform and emphasizing his position as a Washington outsider. Why did his message resonate with voters? Rafael Di Tella discusses how many Americans felt betrayed by the educated “elite” view on globalization, and looked to Trump as a president who would put American workers and values first.
