Visiting Associate Professor of Business Administration
Shai Bernstein is an Associate Professor of Finance at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. He is also a Faculty Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR). His research interests lie at the intersection of corporate finance, entrepreneurship and innovation. He has a PhD from Harvard University, MA from Hebrew university and a BA from Ben Gurion University.
Shai Bernstein is an Associate Professor of Finance at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. He is also a Faculty Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR). His research interests lie at the intersection of corporate finance, entrepreneurship and innovation. He has a PhD from Harvard University, MA from Hebrew university and a BA from Ben Gurion University.
Shai Bernstein, Emanuele Colonnelli, Xavier Giroud and Benjamin Iverson
Citation:
Bernstein, Shai, Emanuele Colonnelli, Xavier Giroud, and Benjamin Iverson. "Bankruptcy Spillovers." Special Issue on Labor and Finance. Journal of Financial Economics 133, no. 3 (September 2019): 608–633.
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Bernstein, S., T. McQuade, and R. Townsend. "Do Household Wealth Shocks Affect Productivity? Evidence from Innovative Workers During the Great Recession." Journal of Finance (forthcoming).
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Do private equity firms contribute to financial fragility during economic crises? We find that during the 2008 financial crisis, PE-backed companies increased investments relative to their peers, while also experiencing greater equity and debt inflows. The effects are stronger among financially constrained companies and those whose private equity investors had more resources at the onset of the crisis. PE-backed companies consequentially experienced higher asset growth and increased market share during the crisis.
Bernstein, Shai, Josh Lerner, and Filippo Mezzanotti. "Private Equity and Financial Fragility during the Crisis."Review of Financial Studies 32, no. 4 (April 2019): 1309–1373. (Earlier version distributed as National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 23626 and Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 18-005.)
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This paper explores the creation and evolution of new stock exchanges around the world geared towards entrepreneurial companies, known as second-tier exchanges. Using hand-collected novel data, we document the proliferation of these new stock exchanges that were created in a large number of countries, attracted a significant volume of global IPOs, were introduced fairly cyclically, and had lower listing requirements when compared to first-tier stock exchanges. We find that increases in demand for entrepreneurial capital—as proxied for by patenting, IPOs, and stock market valuations—led to a higher likelihood of the introduction of second-tier exchanges. We find no evidence that new second-tier exchanges diverted the existing flow of IPOs from established stock exchanges. Shareholder protection strongly predicted exchange success, even in countries with high levels of venture capital activity, patenting, and financial market development. Second-tier exchanges in countries with better shareholder protection allowed younger, less profitable, but faster-growing companies to raise more capital. These results highlight the importance of institutions in enabling the provision of entrepreneurial capital to young companies.
Bernstein, Shai, Abhishek Dev, and Josh Lerner. "The Creation and Evolution of Entrepreneurial Public Markets." Journal of Financial Economics (forthcoming).
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Shai Bernstein, Josh Lerner, Morten Sorensen and Per Stromberg
The growth of the private equity industry has spurred concerns about its potential impact on the economy more generally. This analysis looks across nations and industries to assess the impact of private equity on industry performance. Industries where PE funds have invested in the past five years have grown more quickly in terms of productivity and employment. There are few significant differences between industries with limited and high private equity activity. It is hard to find support for claims that economic activity in industries with private equity backing is more exposed to aggregate shocks. The results using lagged private equity investments suggest that the results are not driven by reverse causality. These patterns are not driven solely by common law nations such as the United Kingdom and United States, but also hold in Continental Europe.
This paper examines the direct private equity investment strategies across sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and their relationship to the funds' organizational structures. SWFs seem to engage in a form of trend chasing, since they are more likely to invest at home when domestic equity prices are higher and invest abroad when foreign prices are higher. Funds see the industry P/E ratios of their home investments drop in the year after the investment, while they have a positive change in the year after their investments abroad. SWFs where politicians are involved have a much greater likelihood of investing at home than those where external managers are involved. At the same time, SWFs with external managers tend to invest in lower P/E industries, which see an increase in the P/E ratios in the year after the investment. By way of contrast, funds with politicians involved invest in higher P/E industries, which have a negative valuation change in the year after the investment.
This paper examines the direct private equity investment strategies across sovereign wealth funds and their relationship to the funds' organizational structures. SWFs seem to engage in a form of trend chasing, since they are more likely to invest at home when domestic equity prices are higher, and invest abroad when foreign prices are higher. Funds see the industry P/E ratios of their home investments drop in the year after the investment, while they have a positive change in the year after their investments abroad. SWFs where politicians are involved have a much greater likelihood of investing at home than those where external managers are involved. At the same time, SWFs with external managers tend to invest in lower P/E industries, which see an increase in the P/E ratios in the year after the investment. By way of contrast, funds with politicians involved invest in higher P/E industries, which have a negative valuation change in the year after the investment.
