Victoria Ivashina is the Lovett-Learned Chaired Professor of Finance at Harvard Business School. Professor Ivashina is also the faculty chair of the Global Initiative for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. She is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), a Research Fellow at the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), and a Visiting Scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and the European Central Bank. She co-heads the Harvard Business School’s Private Capital Initiative and Private Equity and Venture Capital (PEVC) executive education program. Professor Ivashina serves an Associate Editor of the Journal of Financial Economics and the Journal of Financial Intermediation.
Professor Ivashina’s research spans multiple areas of financial intermediation including corporate credit markets, leveraged loan market, global banking operations, asset allocation by pension funds and insurance companies, and value creation by private equity. Her research has been published in the top journals in Finance and Economics and is regularly cited in media outlets. Professor Ivashina is the author of Patient Capital: The Challenges and Promises of Long-Term Investing and Private Equity: A Case Book. Since 2010, she has been teaching Private Equity Finance (PEF), an elective course in the Harvard Business School MBA program.
Professor Ivashina holds a Ph.D. in Finance from the NYU Stern School of Business and a B.A. in Economics from Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
Companies are scrambling for cash in the wake of the pandemic. Unfortunately, for structural reasons they are unlikely to get the cash they need from their traditional lenders, even though the financial system is in relatively good shape and there are reserves of cash that could potentially be tapped. Government intervention will be required to help release the private capital available, but what is on the table with the CARES Act needs some amendments if the government is to get the cash where it’s needed.
This essay was submitted as comments in connection with the Federal Reserve Board’s corporate loan purchase facilities collectively called the Main Street Lending Program (“MSLP”.)
There has never been a greater need for long-term investments. And it is increasingly unlikely that the public sector will be willing or able to fill the gap. Those best positioned to address the long-run needs are likely to be the pools of capital in the hands of pensions, insurers, sovereign wealth funds, endowments, and families. In addition to their long time frames, these institutions command enormous sums. Yet, in many cases, despite abundance of capital and substantial needs for returns, long-term investments have been problematic at best. Building on recent academic research, our own work, and many discussions with practitioners, this book outlines the key challenges facing long-term investments and suggests ways to address them. Over the past several decades, “private equity” has been the primary way in which longer-term illiquid investments have been made. In dissecting the motivations and actions of the key actors in the world of long-run investing, we will have a careful look at traditional fund models, but we will also analyze other ways to pursue concentrated and long-term investments.
Foreign banks’ lending to firms in emerging market economies is large and denominated predominantly in U.S. dollars. This creates a direct connection between U.S. monetary policy and EME credit cycles. We estimate that over a typical U.S. monetary easing cycle, EME borrowers experience a 32-percentage-point greater increase in the volume of loans issued by foreign banks than do borrowers from developed markets, followed by a fast credit contraction of a similar magnitude upon reversal of the cycle. Consistent with a risk-driven credit-supply adjustment, we show that the spillover is stronger for riskier EMEs, and, within countries, for higher-risk firms.
In the past thirty years, defaults on corporate bonds have been substantially higher than the historical average. We show that this increase in credit risk can be largely attributed to an increase in the rate at which new and fast-growing firms displace incumbents (a phenomenon sometimes referred to as ‘disruptive innovation’). Industries with a lager presence of firms newly listed on the stock market, as well as industries that receive funding from venture capital, have a higher loss of revenue market share for established firms and subsequently see a rise in corporate bond defaults. Patent filings by individuals as opposed to corporations also predict defaults. These results are not affected by inclusion of controls for industry exposure to offshore manufacturing.
This book is a collection of cases and notes that have been used in Private Equity Finance, an advanced corporate finance course offered in the second year of the Harvard Business School’s MBA curriculum, over several years. The goal of the book is to provide a detailed insight into the sources of value creation, and the process of the deal making in the private equity industry.
Reaching-for-yield—investors’ propensity to buy riskier assets in order to achieve higher yields—is believed to be an important factor contributing to the credit cycle. This paper presents a detailed study of this phenomenon in the corporate bond market. We show that insurance companies, the largest institutional holders of corporate bonds, reach for yield in choosing their investments. Consistent with lower rated bonds bearing higher capital requirement, insurance firms’ prefer to hold higher rated bonds. However, conditional on credit ratings, insurance portfolios are systematically biased toward higher yield, higher CDS bonds. Reaching-for-yield exists both in the primary and the secondary market, and is robust to a series of bond and issuer controls, including bond liquidity and duration, and issuer fixed effects. This behavior is related to the business cycle, being most pronounced during economic expansions. It is also more pronounced for firms with poor corporate governance and for which the regulatory capital requirement is more binding. A comparison of the ex-post performance of bonds acquired by insurance companies shows no outperformance, but higher systematic risk and volatility.