This paper evaluates the role of mobile phone-based advice in improving managerial practices of small-scale cotton farmers in Gujarat, India.  Demand for the service, “Avaaj Otalo,” is strong, even among farmers with very low levels of education. The service dramatically alters farmers information acquisition behavior, with connected farmers relying less on other farmers and agricultural input dealers. Management practices improve: we observe an increase in the adoption of more effective and less toxic pesticides, and farmers plant cumin, a profitable but risky crop, earlier in the season. Farmers appear willing to follow advice without understanding why the advice is correct: the average respondent does not demonstrate improved agricultural knowledge

Using rainfall, public relief, and election data from India, we examine how governments respond to adverse shocks and how voters react to these responses. The data show that voters punish the incumbent party for weather events beyond its control. However, fewer voters punish the ruling party when its government responds vigorously to the crisis, indicating that voters reward the government for responding to disasters. We also find evidence suggesting that voters only respond to rainfall and government relief efforts during the year immediately preceding the election. In accordance with these electoral incentives, governments appear to be more generous with disaster relief in election years.  These results describe how failures in electoral accountability can lead to suboptimal policy outcomes.

This paper uses a series of experiments with commercial bank loan officers to test the effect of performance incentives on risk-assessment and lending decisions. We first show that, while high-powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending, their power is muted by both deferred compensation and the limited liability typically enjoyed by credit officers. Second, we present direct evidence that incentive contracts distort judgment and beliefs, even among trained professionals with many years of experience. Loans evaluated under more permissive incentive schemes are rated significantly less risky than the same loans evaluated under pay-for-performance.