Robin is the George Gund Professor of Finance and Banking at Harvard Business School. At HBS he is the Faculty director of the Behavioral Finance and Financial Stability project, co-chairs the Business Economics PhD program, and serves as Finance Unit Head. He is a member of the Financial Advisory Roundtable of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economics Research.
Robin's research is in behavioral and institutional finance, with a particular focus on "macro-level" market inefficiencies such as asset price bubbles. He has also coauthored research on the role of government and central banks in the debt markets. His research awards include the 2015 Brattle Group Distinguished Paper for an outstanding corporate finance paper published in the Journal of Finance, and the inaugual 2014 Jack Treynor Prize awarded by the Institute for Quantitative Research in Finance.
We document a strong effect of pension and insurance company (P&I) assets on the long end of the yield curve. Using data from 26 countries, the yield spread between 30-year and 10-year government bond yields is negatively related to the ratio of pension assets (in funded and private pension and life insurance arrangements) to GDP, suggesting that preferred-habitat demand by the P&I sector for long-dated assets drives the long end of the yield curve. We draw on changes in regulations in several European countries between 2008 and 2013 to provide well-identified evidence on the effect of the P&I sector on yields and to show that P&I demand is in part driven by hedging linked to the regulatory discount curve. When regulators reduce the dependence of the regulatory discount curve on a particular security, P&I demand for the security falls and its yield increases. These effects extend beyond long government bonds. Our results suggest that pension discount rules can have a destabilizing impact on bond markets that reverses once rules are changed.
Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson, Jeremy C. Stein and Adi Sunderam
We take stock of the post-crisis financial regulatory reform agenda. We highlight and summarize areas of clear progress, where post-crisis reforms should either be maintained or built upon. We then identify several areas where the new regulations could be streamlined or rolled back in an effort to reduce the burden on the financial sector, particularly on smaller banks.
We study the good- and bad-times performance of equity portfolios formed on characteristics. Many characteristics associated with good performance during bad times – value, profitability, small size, safety, and total volatility – also perform well during good times. Stocks with characteristics signifying high liquidity, such as high turnover and low bid ask spreads, perform well during bad times but otherwise underperform. We develop a simple but flexible procedure to recover a “risk neutral alpha” that recognizes a 1% return experienced during bad times as being more valuable than a 1% return generated during good times. We also show how an investor can build a “rainy day” portfolio that minimizes underperformance during bad times.
Reflexivity is the idea that investors' biased beliefs affect market outcomes, and that market outcomes in turn affect investors' beliefs. We develop a behavioral model of the credit cycle featuring such a two-way feedback loop. In our model, investors form beliefs about firms' creditworthiness, in part, by extrapolating past default rates. Investor beliefs influence firms' actual creditworthiness because firms that can refinance maturing debt on favorable terms are less likely to default in the short-run---even if fundamentals do not justify investors' generosity. Our model is able to match many features of credit booms and busts, including the imperfect synchronization of credit cycles with the real economy, the negative relationship between past credit growth and the future return on risky bonds, and "calm before the storm" periods in which firm fundamentals have deteriorated but the credit market has not yet turned.
We develop a model in which capital moves quickly within an asset class but slowly between asset classes. While most investors specialize in a single asset class, a handful of generalists can gradually reallocate capital across markets. Upon the arrival of a large supply shock, prices of risk in the directly impacted asset class become disconnected from those in others. Over the long run, capital flows between markets and prices of risk become more closely aligned. While prices in the directly impacted market initially overreact to the supply shock, we show that prices in related asset classes underreact under plausible conditions. We use the model to assess event-study evidence on the impact of recent large-scale asset purchases by central banks.
We evaluate Eugene Fama's claim that stock prices do not exhibit price bubbles. Based on U.S. industry returns 1926–2014 and international sector returns 1985–2014, we present four findings: (1) Fama is correct in that a sharp price increase of an industry portfolio does not, on average, predict unusually low returns going forward; (2) such sharp price increases predict a substantially heightened probability of a crash; (3) attributes of the price run-up, including volatility, turnover, issuance, and the price path of the run-up, can all help forecast an eventual crash and future returns; and (4) some of these characteristics can help investors earn superior returns by timing the bubble. Results hold similarly in U.S. and international samples.
Greenwood, Robin, Andrei Shleifer, and Yang You. "Bubbles for Fama."Journal of Financial Economics 131, no. 1 (January 2019): 20–43. (Revised October 2017.
Internet Appendix Here.)
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Nicholas Barberis, Robin Greenwood, Lawrence Jin and Andrei Shleifer
We present an extrapolative model of bubbles. In the model, many investors form their demand for a risky asset by weighing two signals: an average of the asset’s past price changes and the asset’s degree of overvaluation. The two signals are in conflict, and investors “waver” over time in the relative weight they put on them. The model predicts that good news about fundamentals can trigger large price bubbles. We analyze the patterns of cash-flow news that generate the largest bubbles, the reasons why bubbles collapse, and the frequency with which they occur. The model also predicts that bubbles will be accompanied by high trading volume and that volume increases with past asset returns. We present empirical evidence that bears on some of the model’s distinctive predictions.
Barberis, Nicholas, Robin Greenwood, Lawrence Jin, and Andrei Shleifer. "Extrapolation and Bubbles."Journal of Financial Economics 129, no. 2 (August 2018): 203–227.
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Robin Greenwood, Samuel Gregory Hanson, Jeremy C. Stein and Adi Sunderam
We propose three core principles that should inform the design of bank capital regulation. First, wherever possible, multiple constraints on the minimum level of equity capital should be consolidated into a single constraint. This helps to avoid a distortionary situation where different constraints bind for different banks performing the same activity. Second, while a regulatory framework that relies primarily on minimum capital ratios is appropriate for normal times, such a framework is inadequate in the wake of a large negative shock to the system. Following an adverse shock, it becomes critical to emphasize dynamic resilience, which involves forcing banks to actively recapitalize—i.e., regulation needs to focus on getting banks to raise new dollars of equity capital, rather than just maintaining their capital ratios. Third, the best way to deal with the inevitable gaming of any set of ex ante capital rules is not to propose further rules, but rather to allow the regulator sufficient flexibility to address unforeseen contingencies ex post. We use these principles to suggest a number of modifications to the current set of risk-based capital requirements, to the leverage ratio, and to the Federal Reserve’s stress-testing framework.
We argue that the Federal Reserve should use its balance sheet to help reduce a key threat to financial stability: the tendency for private-sector financial intermediaries to engage in excessive amounts of maturity transformation—i.e., to finance risky assets using dangerously large volumes of runnable short-term liabilities. Specifically, we make the case that the Fed can complement its regulatory efforts on the financial-stability front by maintaining a relatively large balance sheet, even when policy rates have moved well away from the zero lower bound (ZLB). In so doing, it can help ensure that there is an ample supply of government-provided safe short-term claims—e.g., interest-bearing reserves and reverse repurchase agreements (RRP). By expanding the overall supply of safe short-term claims, the Fed can weaken the market-based incentives for private sector intermediaries to issue too many of their own short-term liabilities. And crucially, we argue that the Fed can crowd out private-sector maturity transformation in this way without compromising the ability of conventional monetary policy to focus on its traditional dual mandate of promoting maximum employment and stable prices.
We present a model of the yield curve in which the central bank can provide market participants with forward guidance on both future short rates and on future Quantitative Easing (QE) operations, which affect bond supply. Forward guidance on short rates works through the expectations hypothesis, while forward guidance on QE works through expected future bond risk premia. If a QE operation is expected to be undone in the near term, then its announcement will have a hump-shaped effect on the yield and forward-rate curves; otherwise, the effect may be increasing with maturity. Humps associated to QE announcements typically occur at maturities longer than those associated to short-rate announcements, even when the effects of the former are expected to last over a shorter horizon. We use our model to re-examine the empirical evidence on QE announcements in the United States.
Greenwood, Robin, Samuel Gregory Hanson, and Dimitri Vayanos. "Forward Guidance in the Yield Curve: Short Rates versus Bond Supply." In Monetary Policy through Asset Markets: Lessons from Unconventional Measures and Implications for an Integrated World, edited by Elias Albagli, Diego Saravia, and Michael Woodford, 11–62. Santiago: Banco Central de Chile, 2016. (Working Paper version: NBER Working Paper No. 21750 Here.)
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Robin Greenwood, Samuel Gregory Hanson, Joshua S. Rudolph and Lawrence Summers
Citation:
Greenwood, Robin, Samuel Gregory Hanson, Joshua S. Rudolph, and Lawrence Summers. "The Optimal Maturity of Government Debt." Chap. 1 in The $13 Trillion Question: How America Manages Its Debt, edited by David Wessel, 1–41. Brookings Institution Press, 2015. (Working Paper version Here.)
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We study the link between investment boom and bust cycles and returns on capital in the dry bulk shipping industry. We show that high current ship earnings are associated with high used ship prices and heightened industry investment in new ships, but forecast low future returns. We propose and estimate a behavioral model of industry cycles that can account for the evidence. In our model, firms over-extrapolate exogenous demand shocks and partially neglect the endogenous investment response of their competitors. As a result, firms overpay for ships and overinvest in booms and are disappointed by the subsequent low returns. Formal estimation of the model suggests that modest expectational errors can result in dramatic excess volatility in prices and investment.
We study optimal government debt maturity in a model where investors derive monetary services from holding riskless short-term securities. In a setting where the government is the only issuer of such riskless paper, it trades off the monetary premium associated with short-term debt against the refinancing risk implied by the need to roll over its debt more often. We then extend the model to allow private financial intermediaries to compete with the government in the provision of short-term, money-like claims. We argue that if there are negative externalities associated with private money creation, the government should tilt its issuance more towards short maturities. The idea is that the government may have a comparative advantage relative to the private sector in bearing refinancing risk and, hence, should aim to partially crowd out the private sector's use of short-term debt.
Greenwood, Robin, Samuel G. Hanson, and Jeremy C. Stein. "A Comparative-Advantage Approach to Government Debt Maturity."Journal of Finance 70, no. 4 (August 2015): 1683–1722. (2015 Brattle Group Distinguished Paper for an outstanding corporate finance paper published in the Journal of Finance. Internet Appendix Here.)
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Nicholas Barberis, Robin Greenwood, Lawrence Jin and Andrei Shleifer
Survey evidence suggests that many investors form beliefs about future stock market returns by extrapolating past returns. Such beliefs are hard to reconcile with existing models of the aggregate stock market. We study a consumption-based asset pricing model in which some investors form beliefs about future price changes in the stock market by extrapolating past price changes, while other investors hold fully rational beliefs. We find that the model captures many features of actual prices and returns; importantly, however, it is also consistent with the survey evidence on investor expectations.
We present a model in which fire sales propagate shocks across bank balance sheets. When a bank experiences a negative shock to its equity, a natural way to return to target leverage is to sell assets. If potential buyers are limited, then asset sales depress prices, in which case one bank's sales impact other banks with common exposures. We show how this contagion effect adds up across the banking sector, and how it can be estimated empirically using balance sheet data. We compute bank exposures to system-wide deleveraging, as well as the spillovers induced by individual banks. Applying the model to European banks, we evaluate a variety of interventions to reduce their vulnerability to fire sales during the sovereign debt crisis.
We examine empirically how the maturity structure of government debt affects bond yields and excess returns. Our analysis is based on a theoretical model of preferred habitat in which clienteles with strong preferences for specific maturities trade with arbitrageurs. Consistent with the model, we find that (i) the supply of long- relative to short-term bonds is positively related to the term spread, (ii) supply predicts positively long-term bonds' excess returns even after controlling for the term spread and the Cochrane-Piazzesi factor, (iii) the effects of supply are stronger for longer maturities, and (iv) following periods when arbitrageurs have lost money, both supply and the term spread are stronger predictors of excess returns.
Greenwood, Robin, and Dimitri Vayanos. "Bond Supply and Excess Bond Returns."Review of Financial Studies 27, no. 3 (March 2014): 663–713. (Also earlier version NBER Working Paper Series, No. 13806, February 2008.)
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We analyze time-series of investor expectations of future stock market returns from six data sources between 1963 and 2011. The six measures of expectations are highly positively correlated with each other, as well as with past stock returns and with the level of the stock market. However, investor expectations are strongly negatively correlated with model-based expected returns. The evidence is not consistent with rational expectations representative investor models of returns.
The U.S. financial services industry grew from 4.9% of GDP in 1980 to 7.9% of GDP in 2007. A sizeable portion of the growth can be explained by rising asset management fees, which in turn were driven by increases in the valuation of tradable assets, particularly equity. Another important factor was growth in fees associated with an expansion in household credit, particularly for residential mortgages. This expansion was itself fueled by the development of non-bank credit intermediation (or "shadow banking"). Whether the growth of the financial sector has been socially beneficial depends on one's view of active asset management, the increase in household credit, and the growth of shadow banking. While recognizing some of the benefits of professional asset management, we are skeptical about the marginal value of active asset management. We then raise concerns about whether the potential benefits of increased access to household credit—the main output of the shadow banking system—are outweighed by the risks inherent in this new approach to credit delivery.
We show that the credit quality of corporate debt issuers deteriorates during credit booms, and that this deterioration forecasts low excess returns to corporate bondholders. The key insight is that changes in the pricing of credit risk disproportionately affect the financing costs faced by low quality firms, so the debt issuance of low quality firms is particularly useful for forecasting bond returns. We show that a significant decline in issuer quality is a more reliable signal of credit market overheating than rapid aggregate credit growth. We use these findings to investigate the forces driving time-variation in expected corporate bond returns.
We show that characteristics of stock issuers can be used to forecast important common factors in stocks' returns such as those associated with book-to-market, size, and industry. Specifically, we use differences between the attributes of stock issuers and repurchasers to forecast characteristic-related factor returns. For example, we show that large firms underperform following years when issuing firms are large relative to repurchasing firms. While our strongest results are for portfolios based on book-to-market, size (i.e., we forecast the HML and SMB factors), and industry, our approach is also useful for forecasting factor returns associated with distress, payout policy, and profitability.
Standard theories of corporate ownership assume that because markets are efficient, insiders ultimately bear all agency costs that they create and therefore have a strong incentive to minimize conflicts of interest with outside investors. We argue that if equity is overvalued, however, mispricing offsets agency costs and can induce a controlling shareholder to list equity. Higher valuations may support listings associated with greater agency costs. We test the predictions that follow from this idea on a sample of publicly listed subsidiaries in Japan. Subsidiaries in which the parent sells a larger stake and subsidiaries with greater scope for expropriation by the parent firm are more overpriced at listing, and minority shareholders fare poorly after listing as mispricing corrects. Parent firms often repurchase subsidiaries at large discounts to valuations at the time of listing and experience positive abnormal returns when repurchases are announced.
We investigate the relationship between ownership structure of financial assets and non-fundamental risk. We define an asset to be fragile if it is susceptible to non-fundamental trading shocks. An asset can be fragile because of concentrated ownership or because its owners face correlated liquidity shocks, i.e., they must buy or sell at the same time. Two assets are co-fragile if their owners have correlated trading needs, even if the holdings of these owners do not directly overlap. We formalize this idea and apply it to the ownership of U.S. stocks between 1990 and 2007. Consistent with our predictions, fragility strongly predicts future price volatility, and co-fragility predicts cross-stock return comovement.
We argue that time-series variation in the maturity of aggregate corporate debt issues arises because firms behave as macro liquidity providers, absorbing the large supply shocks associated with changes in the maturity structure of government debt. We document that when the government funds itself with relatively more short-term debt, firms fill the resulting gap by issuing more long-term debt, and vice-versa. This type of liquidity provision is undertaken more aggressively: i) in periods when the ratio of government debt to total debt is higher; and ii) by firms with stronger balance sheets. Our theory provides a new perspective on the apparent ability of firms to exploit bond-market return predictability with their financing choices.
We use firm-level data from 34 countries covering the 1995-2006 period to analyze how the characteristics of public markets shape the process by which firms become widely held. Firms in all countries in the sample tend to have concentrated ownership at the time they go public. Decreases in ownership concentration are more likely for firms in countries with stronger protections for minority shareholders, lower block premia, and more liquid stock markets. In these countries, firms are more likely to issue equity when investment opportunities are high, becoming widely held in the process. We find scant evidence, however, that changes in percentage blockholding forecast future returns, inconsistent with market timing theories. Our results suggest that liquidity-based theories of corporate ownership may have been underemphasized in previous cross-country studies.
We propose and test a catering theory of nominal stock prices. The theory predicts that when investors place higher valuation on low-price firms, managers will maintain share prices at lower levels, and vice-versa. Using measures of time-varying catering incentives based on valuation ratios, split announcement effects, and future returns, we find empirical support for the predictions in both time-series and firm-level data. Given the strong cross-sectional relationship between capitalization and nominal share price, an interpretation of the results is that managers may be trying to categorize their firms as small firms when investors favor small firms.
We use mutual fund manager data from the technology bubble to examine the hypothesis that inexperienced investors play a role in the formation of asset price bubbles. Using age as a proxy for managers' investment experience, we find that around the peak of the technology bubble, mutual funds run by younger managers are more heavily invested in technology stocks, relative to their style benchmarks, than their older colleagues. Furthermore, young managers, but not old managers, exhibit trend-chasing behavior in their technology stock investments. As a result, young managers increase their technology holdings during the run-up, and decrease them during the downturn. Both results are in line with the behavior of inexperienced investors in experimental asset markets. The economic significance of young managers' actions is amplified by large inflows into their funds prior to the peak in technology stock prices.
Greenwood, Robin, and Stefan Nagel. "Inexperienced Investors and Bubbles."Journal of Financial Economics 93, no. 2 (August 2009): 239–258. (formerly NBER Working Paper No. 14111, June 2008.)
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Firms can manipulate their stock price by limiting the ability of their investors to sell. I examine a series of corporate events in Japan in which firms actively reduced their float—the fraction of shares available to trade—for periods of one to three months, locking investors into their long positions. Standard theory predicts that the greater are the restrictions, the greater is the impact of trading on price. Particularly severe restrictions are associated with positive event returns of over 30 percent, most of which are reversed when the restrictions are removed. Firms are more likely to issue equity or redeem convertible debt during the restricted period, suggesting strong incentives for manipulation.
Recent work documents large positive abnormal returns around the time that a hedge fund announces its activist intentions with a publicly listed firm. We show that these returns are largely explained by the ability of activists to force target firms into a takeover: In a comprehensive sample of 13D filings by portfolio investors between 1993 and 2006, we find that announcement returns and long-term abnormal returns are high for the subset of targets that are acquired ex-post, but not detectably different from zero for firms that remain independent eighteen months after the initial filing. We show that firms that are targeted by activists are more likely to get acquired than those in a control sample. Finally, we show that the portfolios managed by activist investors perform poorly during a period in which market-wide takeover interest declined.
In the presence of limits to arbitrage, cross-sectional variation in periodic investor demand should be related to the degree of comovement of returns. I exploit the unusual weighting system of the Nikkei 225 index in Japan to identify cross-sectional variation in periodic demand for index stocks. Relative to their weights in a value weighted index, some stocks in the Nikkei are overweighted by a factor of ten or more. Using overweighting as an instrument for the proportionality between demand shocks for index stocks, I find a strong positive relation between overweighting and the comovement of a stock with other stocks in the index, and a negative relationship between index overweighting and comovement with stocks outside of the index. Put simply, overweighted stocks have high betas. The results suggest that excess comovement of stock returns is a consequence of an institutionalized commonality in trading behavior, rather than inefficiencies related to the speed at which index stocks incorporate economy-wide information.
n April 2000, 30 stocks were replaced in the Nikkei 225 Index. The unusually broad index redefinition allowed for a study of the effects of index-linked trading on the excess comovement of stock returns. A large increase occurred in the correlation of trading volume of stocks added to the index with the volume of stocks that remained in the index, and opposite results occurred for the deletions. Daily index return betas of the additions rose by an average of 0.45; index return betas of the deleted stocks fell by an average of 0.63. Theoretical predictions for changes in autocorrelations and cross-serial correlations of returns of index additions and deletions were confirmed. The results are consistent with the idea that trading patterns are associated with short-run excess comovement of stock returns.
I develop a framework to analyze demand curves for multiple risky securities at extended horizons in a setting with limits-to-arbitrage. Following an unexpected change in uninformed investor demand for several assets, I predict returns of each security to be proportional to the contribution of that security's demand shock to the risk of a diversified arbitrage portfolio. I show that securities that are not affected by demand shocks but are correlated with securities undergoing changes in demand should experience returns related to their hedging role in arbitrageur's portfolios. Finally, I predict a negative cross-sectional relation between post-event returns and the initial return associated with the change in demand. I confirm these predictions using data from a unique redefinition of the Nikkei 225 index in Japan, in which 255 stocks simultaneously undergo significant changes in index investor demand, causing more than ¥2,000 billion of trading in one week and large price changes followed by subsequent reversals for all of the reweighted stocks.
The maturity of new debt issues predicts excess bond returns. When the share of long-term debt issues in total debt issues is high, future excess bond returns are low. This predictive power comes in two parts. First, inflation, the real short-term rate, and the term spread predict excess bond returns. Second, these same variables explain the long-term share, and together account for much of its own ability to predict excess bond returns. The results are consistent with survey evidence that firms use debt market conditions in an effort to determine the lowest-cost maturity at which to borrow.
Once a sleepy old boys' club, the U.S. financial sector is now a dynamic and growing business that attracts the best and the brightest. It is tempting to declare the industry a roaring success. But its purpose is to serve the needs of U.S. households and firms, and by this standard its performance has been mixed. The sector's growth has been beneficial for U.S. corporations, which enjoy ready access to the deepest capital markets in the world. Venture capital, for example, and the public equity markets that support it, has channeled money to innovative ideas that have transformed industries and generated new ones. The rest of the economy, however, has not been well served by the financial sector's boom. First, the shift from deposit-based banking to a market-based "shadow banking" system, without adequate regulatory adjustments, has left the financial system vulnerable to crisis. Second, trillions of dollars have been steered into residential real estate and away from more productive investments. Third, the cost of professional investment management is too high, which drains talent from other industries. The financial sector could promote the health and competitiveness of the U.S. economy by increasing capital and liquidity requirements, reorienting the discussion around housing finance reform from keeping mortgage credit cheap to ensuring financial stability, and instituting measures that compel asset managers to compete on the true value of the services they provide.
Samuel G. Hanson, Robin Greenwood, David Scharfstein and Adi Sunderam
In February and March 2009, the U.S. economy was in the midst of a terrifying financial and economic crisis. Between the beginning of 2008 and early 2009, four of the 25 largest U.S. financial institutions had failed, and nine of these 25 institutions had taken extraordinary steps to avoid failure—either receiving one-off government support, merging with another firm, or submitting to heightened regulation to qualify for future government support. Led by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, the government had to quickly devise policies to stabilize the financial system and the economy. The case explores the details of policies, and the decision making process that led to them, that Geithner and his team devised under immense time pressure to stabilize the system. The case features an extended discussion of Geithner’s innovative “stress test,” which would reveal the longer-term health of the country’s largest banks.
Adi Sunderam, Robin Greenwood, Sam Hanson and David Scharfstein
On the afternoon of Monday October 13, 2008, Hank Paulson Jr., the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, walked into the large conference room across the hall from his office in the Treasury Department. Joining him were Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Timothy Geithner, Chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporate Sheila Bair, and the Chief Executive Officers of nine of the largest banks in the United States. This distinguished group had been brought together by the most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Financial panic was pushing the U.S. and European financial systems to the brink of failure. Paulson hoped his meeting with the bank CEOs would be a turning point. U.S. financial markets were closed for Columbus Day, and Paulson was planning to announce the latest government actions to stabilize the financial system before markets reopened on Tuesday.
Ethan Anderson, the CEO of San Francisco–based e-commerce company MyTime, must decide on the company's growth strategy. MyTime’s first product was a website and mobile app that offered consumers a convenient way to book appointments with local merchants throughout the United States. Student must assess the company's growth strategy and develop a model to value a prospective customer to the company's website.
Greenwood, Robin, and Yuhang Vivian Wang. "Vipshop Holdings Limited." Harvard Business School Case 216-033, November 2015. (Revised November 2016.)
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In June 2015 William A. Ackman, the CEO and founder of New York hedge fund Pershing Square Capital, reflects on the success of the fund he has spent over a decade building. Since its inception in 2004, Pershing Square's assets under management had grown from $500 million to well over $18 billion. Ackman is now considering a sizable new portfolio position and must decide how he should raise capital to undertake this new investment. This choice is affected by the recent launch of his new, $6 billion closed-end vehicle, Pershing Square Holdings, as well as the firm's lengthening investment horizon. Although always activist in nature, Ackman and his fund had in recent years become substantively involved in the management of portfolio companies, often working to drive shareholder value by improving operating performance.
Greenwood, Robin, Samuel Hanson, and David Biery. "Pershing Square 2.0." Harvard Business School Case 216-003, September 2015. (Revised September 2017.)
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Washington Mutual issued 6 billion euro of covered bonds in 2006. The objective of the case is to ask whether these bonds are mispriced in late 2008. The case is set in September 2008, and Washington Mutual is facing considerable distress due to mounting losses in its mortgage portfolio. Following investment bank Lehman Brother's Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection filing in mid-September, the price of Washington Mutual's covered bonds has fallen to 75 per 100 of face value. As these bonds are overcollateralized, the case asks students to evaluate the underlying collateral portfolio in the event of liquidation, as well as assessing the likelihood of different outcomes. The case takes place during a period of considerable uncertainty in the global capital markets.
Williams, a Tulsa, Oklahoma-based firm in various energy businesses, must decide whether to accept a financing package offered by Berkshire Hathaway and Lehman Brothers. The proposed one-year credit facility would provide the firm with financial resources in a difficult period.
Coval, Joshua, Robin Greenwood, and Peter Tufano. "Williams, 2002." Harvard Business School Case 203-068, December 2002. (Revised October 2013.)
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Greenwood, Robin, Adi Sunderam, and Jared Dourdeville. "Assured Guaranty." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 213-131, June 2013. (Revised February 2015.)
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This case explores reasons for Blackstone Alternative Asset Management's (BAAM's) growth from 2007-2013, a time when the overall fund of hedge funds industry contracted substantially. Additionally, the case analyzes evolving business models and value propositions within the fund of hedge funds industry. J. Tomilson Hill, CEO of BAAM and Vice-Chairman of The Blackstone Group, is the protagonist. At the time of the case, BAAM was considering two potential directions for future growth: 1) providing hedge fund products for the defined contribution pension space, and 2) beginning direct internal "manufacturing" of investments. In the context of the current fund of hedge funds industry, the case considers challenges and opportunities for these potential new areas for growth.
Greenwood, Robin, Julie Messina, and Jared Dourdeville. "H Partners and Six Flags." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 213-122, May 2013. (Revised January 2015.)
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Greenwood, Robin, Adi Sunderam, and Jared Dourdeville. "Assured Guaranty (CW)." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 213-724, March 2013. (Revised December 2016.)
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Nate Katz at Yokun Ridge Capital Management is evaluating an investment in Assured Guaranty, a municipal bond insurance company that is trading at a discount to book value.
Greenwood, Robin, Adi Sunderam, and Jared Dourdeville. "Assured Guaranty." Harvard Business School Case 213-100, February 2013. (Revised November 2016.)
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Greenwood, Robin, and Luis M. Viceira. "Martingale Asset Management LP in 2008, 130/30 Funds, and a Low-Volatility Strategy (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 211-079, January 2011. (Revised June 2012.)
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In late December 2011, Hayman Capital founder and portfolio manager Kyle Bass was reviewing Japanese government budget projections for 2012. The projections appeared contrary to Hayman Capital's views on Japan, where the fund had built a bearish position. Japan had the world's highest debt burden, whether expressed as a percentage of GDP or government revenue. Guided by recent global events, Bass forecast that Japan would soon experience increases in interest rates, a devaluation of the currency, and eventually, a restructuring of the country's debt.
Greenwood, Robin, Julie Messina, and Jared Dourdeville. "Hayman Capital Management." Harvard Business School Case 212-091, March 2012. (Revised October 2012.)
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Greenwood, Robin, Julie Messina, and Jared Dourdeville. "Hayman Capital Management." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 212-711, April 2012.
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Citigroup faced considerable distress in early 2009. In late 2008, the bank had accepted $45 billion in preferred equity from the United States government via the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Yet, the stock had continued to slide in early 2009. In late February, the company announced that it would convert as much as $50 billion of preferred stock into common stock, at $3.25 per share. The case asks students to evaluate the pricing of preferred stock relative to common stock at this time. As the case takes place during a period of considerable uncertainty in global capital markets, and conventional sources of arbitrage capital have been depleted, the apparent mispricing may not be as attractive as it initially seems. In the B and C cases, students must decide whether their view of the appropriate pricing changes, when the apparent mispricing worsens. A final additional teaching point relates to the formation of a synthetic short position using the options markets.
Citigroup faced considerable distress in early 2009. In late 2008, the bank had accepted $45 billion in preferred equity from the United States government via the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Yet, the stock had continued to slide in early 2009. In late February, the company announced that it would convert as much as $50 billion of preferred stock into common stock, at $3.25 per share. The case asks students to evaluate the pricing of preferred stock relative to common stock at this time. As the case takes place during a period of considerable uncertainty in global capital markets, and conventional sources of arbitrage capital have been depleted, the apparent mispricing may not be as attractive as it initially seems. In the B and C case, students must decide whether their view of the appropriate pricing changes, when the apparent mispricing worsens. A final additional teaching point relates to the formation of a synthetic short position using the options markets.
Citigroup faced considerable distress in early 2009. In late 2008, the bank had accepted $45 billion in preferred equity from the United States government via the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Yet, the stock had continued to slide in early 2009. In late February, the company announced that it would convert as much as $50 billion of preferred stock into common stock, at $3.25 per share. The case asks students to evaluate the pricing of preferred stock relative to common stock at this time. As the case takes place during a period of considerable uncertainty in global capital markets, and conventional sources of arbitrage capital have been depleted, the apparent mispricing may not be as attractive as it initially seems. In the B and C case, students must decide whether their view of the appropriate pricing changes, when the apparent mispricing worsens. A final additional teaching point relates to the formation of a synthetic short position using the options markets.
This conceptual note describes a series of cases on the investor demand approach to investment strategy and management. The cases demonstrate how and why securities market dislocations are driven by non-fundamental demand. I use the cases to progressively build a decision making framework for active investing in public markets. This note serves as an extended guide to the ideas in the cases, and is aimed at instructors forming their own course in Behavioral Finance or Investment Management.
Case explores the pricing of gold in 2011. Is the pricing justified or are we in a speculative bubble? What data are useful in determining a view on this question?
Rehan Jaffer, the founder of hedge fund H Partners, is considering what to do with his investment in Six Flags. H Partners had invested a significant amount of the firm's capital in the senior bonds of U.S.-based Six Flags, following that company's bankruptcy filing.
Greenwood, Robin. "H Partners and Six Flags (CW)." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 211-715, March 2011. (Revised December 2016.)
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Rehan Jaffer, the founder of hedge fund H Partners, is considering what to do with his investment in Six Flags. H Partners had invested a significant amount of the firm's capital in the senior bonds of U.S.-based Six Flags, following that company's bankruptcy filing.
MacroMarkets co-founder and CEO Samuel Masucci III is meeting with a strategic partner for his firm. Co-founded with Yale University Professor Robert Shiller, MacroMarkets' main innovation is the "MacroShare," which allows investors to take long or short, levered or unlevered, positions based on the value of any index. Both Shiller and Masucci are hopeful that MacroShares can help investors hedge all kinds of macroeconomic risks, including exposure to residential housing. The firm has ”battle-tested” two products—one linked to oil, and one linked to housing—with mixed success and is evaluating its strategy going forward. Specifically, Masucci wonders whether the MacroShare structure might come to replace the ETF as the predominant technology for index trading.
Why do shares in NEC Electronics, a publicly listed subsidiary of Japan conglomerate NEC, trade at a discount to their fundamental value? Can Perry Capital, a U.S. hedge fund, restructure this subsidiary and generate significant returns? This case provides students with an opportunity to analyze Perry's decision to invest in NEC Electronics. In doing so, it asks for the reasons that NEC might take actions that destroy value and shift value away from NECE's minority shareholders. The events covered allow for a discussion of how ownership concentration constrains restructuring alternatives, how hedge fund investors might confront controlling shareholders, and how the mispricing of agency costs can give rise to ownership structures that allow for minority shareholder expropriation.
Foley, C. Fritz, Robin Greenwood, and James Quinn. "NEC Electronics." Harvard Business School Case 209-001, October 2008. (Revised November 2010.)
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Foley, C. Fritz, and Robin Greenwood. "NEC Electronics (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 209-028, March 2009. (Revised November 2010.)
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A New York-based hedge fund must decide whether to invest in TravelCenters of America (TA), a recent spin-off from a U.S.-based real estate investment trust. The case confronts students with the question: To what extent is this spin-off opportunity attractive from a value-investing standpoint? Historically, spin-offs have been attractive investments because of supply-demand dynamics associated with their investor base. The case is an opportunity to ask whether the same dynamics will operate for TA.
Greenwood, Robin, Daniel Jacob Goldberg, and James Quinn. "TravelCenters of America." Harvard Business School Case 209-030, December 2008. (Revised July 2010.)
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Brett Barakett, CEO and founder of Tremblant Capital Group, a New York-based hedge fund, must decide what to do with his fund's position in Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, which has dropped in value by more than 40 percent in recent months. Tremblant is a hedge fund that specializes in forecasting consumer behavioral change, and capitalizes on the disconnect between stock prices and consumer behavior. In the case of Green Mountain Coffee, many other sophisticated investors have taken short positions in the stock, leading Barakett to question whether his fund had the right trade thesis.
Brett Barakett, CEO and founder of Tremblant Capital Group, a New York–based hedge fund, must decide what to do with his fund's position in Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, which has dropped in value by more than 40% in recent months. Tremblant is a hedge fund that specializes in forecasting consumer behavioral change and capitalizes on the disconnect between stock prices and consumer behavior. In the case of Green Mountain Coffee, many other sophisticated investors have taken short positions in the stock, leading Barakett to question whether his fund had the right trade thesis.
Outlines the mechanics of calculating free cash flows from historical and proforma financial statements. Focuses on the mechanical process of transforming numbers from financial forecasts into cash flows.
Greenwood, Robin, and David S. Scharfstein. "Calculating Free Cash Flows." Harvard Business School Background Note 206-028, October 2005. (Revised February 2010.)
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Washington Mutual issues 6 billion Euro of covered bonds in 2006. The objective of the case is to ask whether these bonds are mispriced in late 2008. The case is set in September 20008, and Washington Mutual is facing considerable distress due to mounting losses on its mortgage portfolio. Following investment bank Lehman Brother's Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection filing in mid September, the price of Washington Mutual's covered bonds has fallen to 75 per 100 of face value. As these bonds are over-collateralized, the case asks students to evaluate the underlying collateral portfolio in the event of liquidation, as well as assessing the likelihood of different outcomes. The case takes place during a period of considerable uncertainty in the global capital markets.
Bergstresser, Daniel Baird, Robin Greenwood, and James Quinn. "Washington Mutual's Covered Bonds Courseware." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 209-724, March 2009. (Revised November 2009.)
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Bergstresser, Daniel Baird, and Robin Greenwood. "Washington Mutual's Covered Bonds (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 209-130, March 2009. (Revised October 2009.)
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Steel Partners is a U.S.-based hedge fund that has made a large investment in Japan-based wigmaker Aderans. The case is set at the close of the annual meeting in May 2008, when shareholders have voted against all incumbent board members. Steel Partners must act quickly. The case serves as an overview of corporate governance issues in Japan, as well as describing the costs and benefits of the "stakeholder" view of corporate governance.
Why do shares in NEC Electronics, a publicly listed subsidiary of Japan conglomerate NEC trade at a discount to their fundamental value? Can Perry Capital, a U.S. hedge fund, restructure this subsidiary and generate significant returns? This case provides students with an opportunity to analyze Perry's decision to invest in NEC Electronics. In doing so, it asks for the reasons that NEC might take actions that destroy value and shift value away from NECE's minority shareholders. The events covered allow for a discussion of how ownership concentration constrains restructuring alternatives, how hedge fund investors might confront controlling shareholders, and how the mis-pricing of agency costs can give rise to ownership structures that allow for minority shareholder expropriation.
Foley, C. Fritz, Robin Greenwood, and James Quinn. "NEC Electronics (CW)." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 209-711, November 2008.
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Greenwood, Robin, and James Quinn. "Travel Centers of America (CW)." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 209-712, November 2008.
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Greenwood, Robin, and James Quinn. "Kerr-McGee (CW)." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 209-708, August 2008. (Revised August 2008.)
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Philip Goldstein, the principal in a growing hedge fund and prominent activist investor, has taken a position in a Mexico-based closed-end fund. Following a hard-fought proxy contest in which he advocated for management to eliminate the fund's substantial discount, Goldstein earns a seat on the board of directors. Now he and the board are faced with the decision of how best to "unlock value" in the fund by delivering Net Asset Value to shareholders. The case, which provides rich detail on the workings of closed-end funds, invites students to examine the trade-offs among liquidating the fund, converting it to an open-end fund, or carrying out a self-tender offer. It also raises topics of fund selection and investing in country-specific funds such as Mexico.
In 2001, James O'Connell, president of Holyoke Japan, an affiliate of Larson Capital, a distress debt private equity firm, wants to bid on a 90 billion yen loan currently in default by the borrower, Sanjo Enterprises, for a popular wedding and banquet facility with an adjacent office tower in downtown Tokyo. O'Connell has to determine a bidding strategy, consider the competition, and price the deal.
Greenwood, Robin, Arthur I Segel, and Joshua Katzin. "Yamanote Kaikan." Harvard Business School Case 205-084, June 2005. (Revised May 2008.)
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Taka Haneda, a proprietary trader at the Tokyo office of Goldman Sachs, has just learned that the Nikkei 225 will undergo a significant redefinition over the coming week. He faces several billion dollars of customer orders, as well as the opportunity to commit the firm's capital to provide liquidity for the event. He must decide what positions to establish, and at what price he is willing to get out.
Greenwood, Robin, David S. Scharfstein, and Arthur I Segel. "The Pilgrim Assurance Building." Harvard Business School Case 206-078, December 2005. (Revised April 2007.)
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Activist investors Carl Icahn and Barry Rosenstein acquire a stake in Oklahoma-based company Kerr-McGee. They demand two board seats and ask the company to make several operational and financial changes, including the repurchase of equity and divestiture of their chemicals business. The case protagonist, Luke Corbett, CEO, opposes these changes.
The president of Fuji Television must decide how to respond to a competing bid for the shares of Nippon Broadcasting Systems (NBS). Livedoor, the other bidder, is a highly valued Internet company that has been accused of financial wizardry to keep its stock price high.
This case introduces decision analysis. Using a simple example, it illustrates the use of probability trees and decision trees as tools for solving business problems.
Desai, Mihir, Robin Greenwood, Scott Mayfield, and Lucy White. "Subscriber Models." Harvard Business School Background Note 205-061, December 2004. (Revised October 2017.)
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