Shikhar Ghosh is a Professor of Management Practice in the Entrepreneurial Management Unit. He currently teaches and is the course head for Founders' Journey in the elective curriculum and is also the Faculty Co-Chair of the HBS Rock Center for Entrepreneurship. He formerly taught and served as co-course head of The Entrepreneurial Manager, required for all 900 1st-year MBAs.
Shikhar has been a successful entrepreneur for the last 20 years. He has been the founder and CEO or Chairman of eight technology-based entrepreneurial companies and was the past Chairman of the Massachusetts Technology Leadership Council (MTLC) and The Indus Entrepreneurs (TIE) - two leading entrepreneurial organizations. He was selected by Business Week as one of the best Entrepreneurs in the US, by Forbes as one of the ‘Masters of the Internet Universe’ and by Fortune as the CEO of one of the 10 most innovative companies in the US. Companies he founded were selected as both the ‘hottest’ and ‘coolest’ emerging companies by business publications.
Shikhar joined the Boston Consulting Group after getting his MBA from HBS in 1980. At BCG he focused on organization and innovation in large organizations. He was elected a worldwide partner of the firm in 1987. Shikhar left BCG in 1988 to become CEO of Appex, an early-stage venture backed company that built the inter-carrier infrastructure for the US mobile phone industry. Appex provided centralized services that enabled independent mobile carriers to operate as a single seamless network. Appex’s services included call forwarding across carriers, fraud prevention services, billing and customer service. Appex was bought by EDS in 1990. By the time Shikhar left in 1993, Appex’s revenues exceeded $100 million with an order backlog of over $1 billion. It was selected by Business week as the fastest growing private company in the US.
Shikhar founded Open Market in 1993. Open Market was one of the pioneering companies in the commercialization of the Internet. It built the first commercial infrastructure for enabling secure commerce on the Internet and provided the software and services that enabled companies like Time Warner and AT&T to offer their services on the Internet. Open Market was one of the first Internet companies to go public. It was selected by numerous business publications as one of the companies that helped to make the Internet what it is today.
Since leaving Open Market Shikhar has been the founder, CEO or Chairman of several companies in the wireless, payment, Internet marketing, and on-line retailing industries. He has worked in all facets of the entrepreneurial process – starting companies with technical teams, providing and raising capital with venture capitalists, buying and selling companies, or taking them public and closing down unsuccessful companies. He has been a keynote speaker in numerous conferences on innovation, entrepreneurship, digital media and on the future of the Internet.
Ghosh, Shikhar, and Marilyn Morgan Westner. "Unifying Divisions: Loop's Mission to Preserve the Planet." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 820-050, October 2019.
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Ghosh, Shikhar. "Dulcie Madden (A)—Growth or Exit? Exercise on Cash Flows." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 820-707, October 2019.
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This is part of a three-case series that follows Dulcie Madden's journey as a founder over five years. Case (A) is about managing growth and cash flow; Case (B) is about the exit decision and conditions on a sale; Case (C) shows Madden dealing with adversity and the choice of “when to quit?”
This is part of a three-case series that follows Dulcie Madden's journey as a founder over five years. Case (A) is about managing growth and cash flow; Case (B) is about the exit decision and conditions on a sale; Case (C) shows Madden dealing with adversity and the choice of “when to quit?”
This is part of a three-case series that follows Dulcie Madden's journey as a founder over five years. Case (A) is about managing growth and cash flow; Case (B) is about the exit decision and conditions on a sale; Case (C) shows Madden dealing with adversity and the choice of “when to quit?” Rest Devices was an early stage company started by a team from MIT. Dulcie Madden decided to drop out of her MBA program at MIT to join Rest Devices as the CEO and use the innovative sensor technology to create a line of smart clothing for babies. A partnership with Babies “R” Us became a strong catalyst to growth but left Rest Devices increasingly constrained by additional capital requirements necessary to deliver the required number of units. As Madden tried to balance the need for capital with the business pressures of delivering a product for a nationwide rollout, she was faced with a series of strategic choices including an unsolicited acquisition offer, a lawsuit, failed financing, and tensions within the team.
The exercises can be used as a follow-up to the Yesware (A) case (#816-039), or in conjunction with any case that involves replacing a founding team member (and/or providing feedback to a top executive). This is a role-playing exercise, and has been carried out in the HBS elective course Founders’ Journey, taught in the second year of the MBA program. Timewise, the exercises can stretch over an entire 80-minute session. On the day before class, students are divided into two groups, and are given the role of either (A) CEO or (B) VP.
The exercises can be used as a follow-up to the Yesware (A) case (#816-039), or in conjunction with any case that involves replacing a founding team member (and/or providing feedback to a top executive). This is a role-playing exercise, and has been carried out in the HBS elective course Founders’ Journey, taught in the second year of the MBA program. Timewise, the exercises can stretch over an entire 80-minute session. On the day before class, students are divided into two groups, and are given the role of either (A) CEO or (B) VP.
The case focuses on the initial startup team and Founders’ agreements. In March 2018, Sanchali Pal proposed renegotiating the informal founders’ agreement and equity split she and her co-founders had drafted the previous spring. They had been working together for over a year to solve one of the most complex and urgent problems of our time—global warming. Their company—a technology platform that enabled users to track and improve their carbon footprints on their smartphones in real time—had grown from their individual passion to combat the looming climate crisis.
In the past year, their approach had been validated multiple times at different national clean energy competitions. But beneath external success, internal frictions threatened the team. Differing expectations and overlapping roles and responsibilities sparked frustrations between the co-founders and Pal began spending a considerable amount of time mediating their disagreements instead of focusing on the business. The case ends as the co-founders are meeting to discuss 3 core issues: 1) How to re-divide equity—what changes should they make to their original agreement? 2) How to establish clear roles, titles, and decision-making rights so that they could function effectively as a team. 3) How to allocate spending cash. Each grappled with key questions: Did they still trust one another? Did they feel respected? Could they renegotiate an agreement in a way that everyone could accept?
Ghosh, Shikhar, Haibo Zhao, and Shweta Bagai. "Mobike and ofo: Dancing with Titans (A)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 820-029, September 2019.
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Shikhar Ghosh, Nicole Tempest Keller and Alpana Thapar
This case follows Lebanese entrepreneur, Hind Hobeika, an engineer and competitive swimmer who spends seven years trying to launch a wearable heartrate monitor and motion sensor to help swimmers track their performance while swimming. While the Beirut-based entrepreneur gained initial traction soon after founding her company Instabeat in September 2011, winning $150,000 in prize money from business plan competitions and raising $100,000 from a local venture capital firm, Hobeika soon faced a series of set-backs in trying to manufacture the product. Given the complexity of the hardware product she was trying to build, Hobeika had invested a significant amount of capital in the manufacturing design and had faced continuous delays. In addition, the product was not proving to be economically viable. By early 2016, Hobeika was out of money and had to let her team go. The business issues had also taken a toll on her personal life. However, Hobeika saw a potential path forward. The VC who had originally backed her was closing a new round of funding and was willing to discuss another potential round. More importantly, while in London, she had recently met Alex Asseily, a prominent Lebanese-British entrepreneur who encouraged her to stay the course. He suggested that she relocate to San Francisco, where he would soon be based, and offered to help her. Would it be worthwhile to leave everything behind, relocate, and rebuild the business? Hobeika had to decide—should she continue or not? If so, under what circumstances? If not, what would she do next?
Shikhar Ghosh, Ramana Nanda, Suraj Srinivasan and Terrence Shu
What is the value of a Board, and why does a company need one? The note documents the formal role of a Board of Directors as going beyond simply acting as legal representation of corporate ownership. Moreover, this role changes as the company moves through different stages of growth. The note discusses the structure and composition of a Board (Board Committees, Board Chair and Board Observers), along with best practices for managing the Board process (including what happens before and after each meeting, as well as the meeting itself). Entrepreneurs need to set foundations for Board composition, structure, compensation, and terms, early on in the company’s journey. Many of the qualitative insights in the note are collated from the collective experience of the authors.
The note introduces a framework to consider factors that influence the value of employee equity at early stage ventures. Valuing equity is complex, and it important to account for expected dilution, assess exit potential, and acknowledge the high rate of failure in early stage companies. The note uses a fictional example of a recent HBS graduate who makes a compensation comparison (combined salary and equity) between a startup and consulting firm. In order to determine approximate valuation of common equity, it illustrates steps to factor in pre-money valuations in each round, dilution based on the amount raised, and the probability of success/failure at each stage Ultimately, no path is without uncertainty, and intangible factors such as long-term career potential and personal fulfillment can be weighed against the value of the equity package while making a similar decision.
Ghosh, Shikhar, and Shweta Bagai. "Careem: Base Camp or Mountain Peak? Designing an OS for Scaling." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 819-149, June 2019.
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Crafting a Founders’ Agreement is an important component of startup infrastructure as it documents a complex set of decisions that build a company’s roots. Its four key elements are: roles and responsibilities, rights (decision rights, rewards, position on board), commitments (time invested, IP, capital contributions) and contingencies (vesting, stock restrictions etc.). The note indicates how to initiate a conversation with a co-founder, and provides a checklist of questions that can serve as a conversation guide to draft the Founders’ Agreement together. An Agreement is a framework, not a rigid set of rules set in stone, and should be created with flexibility and conditionality. The process of creating and revising the Agreement can bring clarity and commitment to the founding team and enable them to anticipate conflicts before they hurt the business. A Sample Agreement is included.
Citation:
Ghosh, Shikhar, Shweta Bagai, and Sanchali Pal. "Founders' Agreements." Harvard Business School Background Note 819-143, May 2019.
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This case address pacing issues – how fast does a company need to scale? It also examines the role of investors in determining company strategy and exit.
Mobike and ofo were two dominant players in China’s emerging dockless bike-sharing market, that allowed users to unlock bikes using a mobile app, ride the bikes at any time to any place without having to tie them to a stationary dock, and pay on a per-ride basis. From 2016 to 2018, the industry raised billions of dollars in investor capital (including from China’s powerful strategic investors), supplied hundreds of cities with a total of more than 20 million bikes, and expanded aggressively into international markets.
However, oversupply and poor maintenance of bikes led to increasing public criticism and calls for government regulation. Low barriers to entry coupled with fierce competition through user subsidies made investors increasingly skeptical of the industry’s potential for profitability. The winter months from 2018-2019 created a significant decrease in user activity and caution on part of capital providers. Mobike and ofo’s founders (Hu Weiwei and Dai Wei) had to decide the future direction of their companies. Was it time to pursue a merger and put an end to unsustainable competition on user subsidies? Should they sell their companies to strategic players and become part of a larger technology ecosystem? Alternatively, was there a way to remain independent and retain control in an age dominated by incumbent technology titans?
The case presents the challenges of scaling an asset-heavy company (that relies on its operations). It highlights how decisions on the early team impact a company’s ability to scale, linkage between growth and cash flows, as well the organizational impact of high growth. Rajesh Yabaji, Chanakya Hridaya, and B. Ramasubramaniam (Subbu) came together to create BlackBuck, with an aim to reduce inefficiencies in the movement of freight in India. A disconnect between the shippers (demand) and truck owners (supply), had created a layer of intermediaries (brokers) for transporting goods. The founders saw an opportunity in creating an online marketplace for freight—and uniting the truckers and shippers. Following its launch in April 2015, BlackBuck witnessed relentless growth and one year later, its revenue was on track to exceed the forecast by 300 percent. BlackBuck had operations in 200 locations across India and a team of over 1,000 people. The company had raised two rounds of funding (totaling $30 million) from solid investors. However, it was not clear that the business was profitable. Rapid scale had come at a cost. In June 2016, BlackBuck had $5 million in the bank and two months of runway. BlackBuck’s focus had been on raising capital and hiring operational staff to manage the complex service delivery for customers. There was a near absence of strong processes for internal operations such as HR, accounting, credit, invoicing, and collections. During this financial crunch, Flipkart (India’s e-commerce unicorn) offered BlackBuck $20 million in convertible debt that could potentially tide over the company’s short-term losses. The founders wondered whether they should change the approach to growth: Should they slow it down temporarily or maintain the growth rate (and fix operational issues)? There was a high probability that BlackBuck's cash balances would fall to zero. Given that scenario, taking Flipkart's money could save BlackBuck—but at the risk of losing control.
This case focuses on designing a fast growing organization. It is part of a two-case set that is taught together to cover the scaling journey.
Careem, a Dubai-based ride-hailing service aimed to ‘simplify and improve the lives of people, and build an awesome company that inspired.’ Launched in 2012, the company experienced rapid growth of 20-30 percent per month and increased operations to 90 cities across 13 countries in the Middle East. The co-founders laid emphasis on building a company driven by its values and created a culture that was consensus-driven and empowering for everyone. Over the years, Careem raised $500 million from regional and global investors, and its valuation hit $1 billion, making it the first unicorn from the region. By January 2018, it was on track to meet its target of creating one million jobs by year-end.
Rapid growth resulted in several operational and organizational tensions that led the founders to create processes and re-emphasize its culture. The three co-founders changed their priorities, and Mudassir Sheikha assumed role of the CEO. The scaling crisis manifested itself in the organizational structure – a lack of clarity in roles of local markets (mountain peaks) and headquarters (base camp) in Dubai became evident. Careem had differentiated itself from Uber with a local strategy, but needed to leverage benefits of scale, share best practices across markets, and exhibit a consistent brand. Thus, they created the first iteration of an Operating System (OS) to translate Careem’s mission into behaviors of 3,800 people. Sheikha wondered what the CEO’s role ought to be. Should he increase his involvement in operational issues or focus on the long-term vision for Careem?
The case focuses on the hiring process for a CEO. Kevin Ryan had a solid trajectory as a serial entrepreneur of well-known ventures like Gilt Group, DoubleClick, Business Insider, among others. Ryan tended to involve himself in all aspects of his ventures: ideation, hiring/ managing initial teams, providing seed funding, and finding a CEO to scale the business. Over the years, Ryan refined his process of identifying the most appropriate person to serve as CEO, whom he bestowed with a co-founder title. He often made unconventional choices – but always trusted his instinct. Ryan believed that execution was more important than the idea, and talent determined the efficacy of execution.
The case delves into Ryan’s most recent company Truebird – an innovative, automated coffee café concept. In 2018, Truebird was at the stage at which Ryan typically hired a CEO. The case ends with Ryan mulling over how he should make the choice between the two candidates, and whether the timing was right for the candidates – and for Truebird. Hiring the wrong CEO was a high-risk proposition, and one that Ryan definitely wanted to avoid.
The case examines the focus of an early stage company and how venture capital can distort a founder’s view. It encompasses issues such as financing, understanding the founders’ definition of success/failure, defining and pivoting a business model, and determining the organizational impact of a pivot as well as the role of VCs and boards in outlining company strategy. In 2008, Jason Jacobs, a fitness and technology enthusiast, created RunKeeper—an iPhone app to track a runner’s distance, speed, calories, and route taken. In its initial years, RunKeeper was a fast-growing, profitable company and did not utilize the $1.5 million it raised in its Seed and Series A rounds. As RunKeeper gained momentum, Jacobs created a grand health vision (Health Graph) that would increase the chances of securing VC funding. Heralded as the “Facebook of Fitness,” RunKeeper willed itself to be the one-stop location for all important health information for consumers. Despite raising $10 million, the next few years were turbulent. RunKeeper became allergic to revenue, ramped up its burn, and tried to pursue both the running app and the Health Graph—but did neither well. At the end of the case, the company is almost out of cash, and Jacobs has exhausted his prospects for raising external capital. He needs to revert to his current investors to keep the company afloat. Jacobs’ instinct suggests that refocusing the company on its core product and runner base would be the best way forward. However, the last round was raised on the promise of a big health vision. Jacobs wonders whether his current investors would fund a smaller vision and how onerous the terms would be. Would they push Jacobs to pursue a sale in an over-crowded health app market? Or would they decide that he was not the right person for the company?
Shikhar Ghosh, Christopher Stanton, Allison Ciechanover and Jeff Huizinga
This case is about Tinder. It discusses different business models and ways of structuring the initial team. With a $6 million investment from IAC/Interactive in 2010, Dinesh Moorjani founded Hatch Labs to build mobile apps. His mission was to attract entrepreneurial talent to work on Lab projects which, after gaining traction, could be acquired by IAC or spun out as independent companies. To pitch talent to work at Hatch, Moorjani laid out a framework to compare the expected returns to founding an independent company versus joining an incubator. While Hatch provided lower levels of equity ownership in a single company, Moorjani argued that the complementary inputs provided by the Lab and the diversification from holding equity in the portfolio of Lab projects made the incubator structure attractive. After growing several projects from different teams, at the end of the case, Moorjani faces two critical choices: Should he support a B2B merchant services business or a dating app, Glow (a disguised name for Tinder). Second, should he go forward with a second Hatch Labs? Was the success of the first Hatch experiment replicable?
The case can be supplemented with a startup valuation Exercise (#818-705), and a technical/background note on “Valuing Employee Equity at Early Stage Ventures” (#819-167).
Ghosh, Shikhar, Christopher Stanton, Allison Ciechanover, and Jeff Huizinga. "Dinesh Moorjani and Hatch Labs." Harvard Business School Case 818-026, September 2017. (Revised February 2018.)
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Chai Point is India’s largest organized chai retailer. It has missed its target for retail store openings by approximately 25%, goals that are very important to its investors who are also board members. However, it has developed an exciting new internet-based tea dispenser that has the potential to dramatically increase Chai Point’s market opportunity and growth rate but can be seen as a change in their growth strategy. The founder needs to decide his strategy for his next board meeting. Should he focus on past performance? Or should he spend time outlining boxC.in’s technology and potential, since this will be the first time that the institutional investors will be seeing this new capability?
Ghosh, Shikhar, Ramana Nanda, and Rachna Tahilyani. "Chai Point: Disrupting Chai." Harvard Business School Case 818-020, September 2017. (Revised March 2018.)
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Ghosh, Shikhar, and Christopher Payton. "Scaling Yesware — The Star Performance Framework." Harvard Business School Case 818-049, September 2017. (Revised October 2017.)
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Shikhar Ghosh, Thomas R. Eisenmann and Christopher Payton
This case provides a platform for discussing mental health and depression in entrepreneurship. Why do entrepreneurs have more mental health issues than other professions? What can an entrepreneur do if they face a situation where their mental well-being is being negatively affected by work? What should a colleague or manager (of someone going through these issues) do?
The case examines the journey of Ryan Greene, a 28-year old high-performing employee at a startup, and his struggles with anxiety and depression. In 2013, after graduating from business school at Harvard, Greene starts working remotely for a Seattle-based startup, Rainier Wearables, as VP of Business Development. The next one year is trying for Greene on many fronts. Following a few failed business meetings due to product demo problems, Greene starts to question his own ability to deliver. Coupled with aggressive and (almost) impossible targets set by an inexperienced CEO, Greene equates failure of the business to a personal failure. A split with his fiancé aggravates his anxiety, and he sets on a downward spiral of self-doubt, low confidence and negative thinking.
On his last day at the company, Greene musters up the courage to make a public announcement of his issues, and receives an immense amount of support. Towards the end of the case, Greene has to decide between four job opportunities: a role at an early startup, a later stage growth company, a large corporation, and the consulting firm he had worked at before business school. Greene has to carefully think about what he should look for in a job—and ensure that he stays on a healthy path going forward.
This case follows two ex-McKinsey consultants, Magnus Olsson and Mudassir Sheikha, who in search of their true purpose decide to found Careem, a Dubai-based ride-hailing service. Following its launch in July 2012, Careem experiences rapid growth of 30% per month in the UAE and other countries in the MENA region, surpassing the co-founders’ expectations. However, as a result of such immense growth, the startup struggles with various operational and cultural organizational tensions. These challenges are described from the perspective of the founders and through the eyes of Deepika Thakur, one of the early employees. By 2014, in order to succeed in Saudi Arabia, the largest and most complex market in the Gulf, Olsson and Sheikha recognize the importance of finding a strong leader to head the Saudi operations. They have their sights on a specific German-Saudi entrepreneur, Abdulla Elyas, but he has so far declined both of their initial proposals to join Careem. In the backdrop, Uber has developed a successful track record in the West, raising close to $2 billion dollars globally, and has a growing presence in the UAE following its launch there in August 2013. Finding themselves at a crossroads, Olsson and Sheikha must figure out how to address several critical organizational issues, decide how to bring Elyas on board, and ensure a robust strategy to maintain its leadership position in the region.
In July 2014, after 18 months and eight unsuccessful product launches, the CEO of Yabbly has agreed to sell his company to a larger, well-funded startup, providing a return of capital for his investors and a home for his team. Two weeks prior to the scheduled closing, the team launches a final experiment based on the results of a customer interview. After creating a quick landing page and announcing the product launch through social media channels, the company finds significant customer interest. With only two weeks of promising data, the CEO must decide whether or not to abandon the planned sale to pursue the new product, and if so, what terms he should offer new and existing investors to finance the next phase of product development.
Thomas Eisenmann, Shikhar Ghosh and Christopher Payton
Sunil Nagaraj, Triangulate's founder had spent a few years trying to launch a dating application that matched users based on their behavior on social media. Based on input from advisors, the company changed its focus from a B2B site to a B2C dating site with a unique value proposition – offering matches using recommendations of friends who knew the person. The product got some initial traction but still did not have the virality necessary to grow profitability. The company pivoted yet again to launch DateBuzz, a fresh approach to dating that asked users to vote on bite-sized elements of potential matches before revealing their full profiles. Initial data from this approach was promising but, by now, the team and investors were tired.
The company had previously raised a $750,000 seed round and Nagaraj, encouraged by the early success of DateBuzz had offered jobs to two experienced business professionals. However, his investors did not share his enthusiasm for the business. Triangulate had less than $200,000 left in the bank and 3-4 months of runway. Should Nagaraj cut the burn rate further by rescinding the offers to the new employees? Should he raise another round from angels, friends and family? He was satisfied that he had built a strong relationship with the lead investors, and felt they would support his decision if he chose to shut down the company. But, had he tried enough to make Triangulate succeed?
The case is used to illustrate the place of ‘Purpose’ versus financial risk and returns in a founder’s objectives. It also addresses personal risk profile of different founders, and when paired with the Risk Tolerance Exercise , it enables evaluating one’s own appetite for risk and motivations for starting a venture.
In December 2008, Musk’s two companies – Tesla (that produced high-end electric cars) and SpaceX (that built rockets) were on the verge of financial collapse. The year had been tough for Musk – both companies were in trouble, cash was down to nothing, and he was in the middle of an expensive divorce. Thus far, Musk had been able to use his personal funds for the companies, but he was getting close to personal bankruptcy. Musk needed $40 million to keep Tesla afloat. He pieced together $20 million of his own money, and leaned on investors to match the amount. VantagePoint Capital Partners committed to funding, but had recently expressed disagreement with the terms and an intention to withdraw from the round. Moreover, Tesla had missed production deadlines and delivered only 50 (out of the promised 1,200) pre-ordered electric cars. SpaceX had seen three failed launches, followed by a successful rocket launch 10 weeks earlier. It was in the running for a contract with NASA and Musk was confident that they would win.
Ghosh, Shikhar, Julia Austin, and Christopher Payton. "Help Scout." Harvard Business School Case 817-049, September 2016. (Revised May 2017.)
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Kevin Borders and Joe Golden, co-founders and co-CEOs of Collage.com, must decide how to grow their custom photo-products startup in the face of fierce competition. From 2011 through 2016, the business evolved from a hobby to a startup with $22 million in revenue and 45 employees, all of whom worked remotely from home. Customer acquisition was becoming more difficult and repeat purchase rates lagged behind Shutterfly, the industry leader. New hires would help to integrate new products and grow marketing efforts, but several experienced team members wondered whether virtual collaboration could continue to work with an influx of new people.
This case is about making the decision to become an entrepreneur and early challenges in setting up a business model and team. In 2015, Pato Bichara co-founded Collective Academy to create an affordable, three-year undergraduate experience to infuse innovation into Mexico's education system. Despite initial enthusiastic response, Bichara struggled to build the first cohort of students for the blended program. Nothing was what Bichara expected. He found himself single-handedly managing the stress of building the business without co-founders or access to capital. Bichara further believed a pivot in the business model design would be a better way forward. With savings running low, Bichara took a personal loan from his mother to cover daily expenses.
Towards the end of the case, Bichara faced a decision on whether to go ahead with Collective Academy, or evaluate other job opportunities, which had the potential to provide Bichara with a more stable lifestyle. Bichara did not want to renege on commitments made to students, their employers and his investors for Collective Academy. But, how long could he last on no salary? Would he be able to scale the Collective Academy program without funding? If he walked away now, did that imply that Bichara was not cut out to be an entrepreneur?
In May 2012, a young employee at Google's London office, Markus Berger, was thinking whether he should quit his job and go after his dream of becoming an entrepreneur. Berger's idea was to create Dinr, a company that would offer an upscale food ingredient delivery service in London. A customer would choose a recipe on Dinr's website and would receive all premeasured ingredients the same evening at their doorstep. Contrary to many existing similar companies, Dinr would not require a weekly subscription, but would operate one-off orders like other traditional food delivery services. Berger had already carried out an alpha test of the service and completed an in-depth survey of potential customers to explore the market. Most of the feedback was positive, which confirmed Berger's intuition about this market opportunity. Berger had found a more experienced co-founder with technical expertise who was willing to join Dinr part time and gathered £40,000 of initial capital. Yet, making the decision to leave his corporate job and become an entrepreneur was not easy: Was Dinr a good business opportunity? Would it be attractive to outside investors? What were the risks involved?
Joseph B. Fuller, Shikhar Ghosh and Christopher Payton
In this exercise, you will examine the cash flow implications of different operating model assumptions and the effect that this has on financing decisions.
The case provides a vehicle for teaching about both corporate intrapreneurship and the use of lean startup methods. It tells the story of a product manager within Intuit who develops an idea for a new product that spans two of the company's existing business units—professional tax software, sold to accountants and the consumer-focused TurboTax product. The new product—TurboTax Personal Pro—connects consumers with professional accountants online, allowing them to have their taxes prepared by a professional. The cycle of product development transpires within the larger, corporate context of Intuit, where founder Scott Cook has been attempting to transform the enterprise into a leaner, more innovative company. As the project unfolds, many of the barriers that inhibit innovative in large companies—conflicting incentives, competition over decision rights, the inflexibility of core processes—are revealed. The case also describes in detail the lean startup methods used by the new product team, but in a resource-rich environment, unlike an entrepreneurial firm.
In November 2013, with less than 10 months of cash on hand, Tom Leung, the founder and CEO of Yabbly, must decide where to focus his resources. His startup, a question-and-answer application for shopping decisions, had benefited from a strong showing at the SXSW Accelerator competition and had a dedicated and engaged user base. However, Leung knew that the current growth trajectory would not lead them to the milestones needed to receive an additional round of financing. Leung must decide whether to continue pursuing user acquisition experiments, explore other product ideas, or begin searching for a potential acquirer to achieve a "soft landing" for his team and his investors.
Matthew Bellows founded Yesware, a Boston-based tech startup, to solve a problem that he'd encountered as a sales manager: sales people hate entering data, rarely do it accurately, and almost always input data that can't be synthesized in a way that is useful for the manager. Together with a friend, he developed software to solve this problem—while also working towards the goal of founding a company that would be "the best place to work." But as the company grows past $5 million in annual revenue, Bellows faces challenges balancing the dual goals of continuing to scale the company and adhering to the values established for the company.
Shikhar Ghosh, Michael J. Roberts and Christopher Payton
Citation:
Ghosh, Shikhar, Michael J. Roberts, and Christopher Payton. "Sam Martin & Cathy Slater." Harvard Business School Case 816-029, August 2015. (Revised August 2017.)
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The case recounts the process of launching an early stage venture, from idea conception through initial efforts to validate the concept, followed by product launch, and fund raising. It emphasizes the Customer Value Proposition of the business model, and asks – Who is the payer? Who is the user? How do you measure value?
While in college at Harvard University, Jessica O. Matthews and a few friends came up with a way to harness kinetic energy from a soccer ball. The technology would ultimately allow owners of the ball to play with it, and then use the ball to power a small lamp, potentially helping people in countries without access to power. The magic of the ball was instant – Matthews was heralded by the media and celebrities. As Matthews started to turn the product into a company, she realized how difficult it was to go from prototype, to product, to a functioning, profit-making company. Moreover, she was physically and emotionally drained from the constant travel between Boston (where she was attending business school at HBS) and New York (where she was building the company), and by the challenges of manufacturing a product without adequate capital. How she could translate the hype around the company into stable revenues and a positive cash flow?
Towards the end of case (April 2014), Matthews was positive about the viability of the company and its future. She had sponsorships from large companies, and the Nigerian government had expressed interest in a multimillion dollar contract. Moreover, the World Cup in Brazil was nearing, where the company could get more visibility and renewed interest from sponsors. Matthews faced a decision: should she raise money now to get ready for scale, or following the World Cup (with a possibly higher valuation)?
In this note, we examine the extent to which venture capital is adequately positioned for the rapid commercialization of clean energy technologies in the United States. The need for a revolution in clean energy is driven not just by environmental consequences of energy use, but also by the need for energy security, to address growing concerns about a crisis in the balance of payments, and as a potentially important source of domestic jobs. Our premise in this note is that a key aspect of such widespread change is that these issues cannot be "solved" by a single technology. Rather, technological changes will have to be pervasive and will require a whole range of different products and processes to come to market. Some of the technological progress will come from incremental innovations that do not depend on venture capital.
William A. Sahlman, Thomas R. Eisenmann, Joseph B. Fuller and Shikhar Ghosh
The founders of Maricopa, Inc., a startup that sold proprietary hair-care products directly to salons, were preparing a board presentation to address the young company's inability to meet financial projections. While the products had caught on with customers, the financial shortcomings raised some questions about the company's business plan. The company had gone through much of its cash and needed additional funding to continue operating.
At the same time, two VC investors were deciding how to proceed with their investments in Maricopa. The larger VC firm questioned Maricopa's management's decisions and was hesitant to further fund the company. However the Maricopa investment was much more important to the smaller VC firm, and its representative on Maricopa's board worked hard to convince her counterpart from the larger firm that while the firm had struggled, it was a young startup with strong potential. Without the larger firm investing again in Maricopa, the business was at risk of going under.
Thomas R. Eisenmann, Joseph B. Fuller and Shikhar Ghosh
Steven Carpenter reflects on the successes and failures of his recent venture, Cake Financial. Carpenter had just sold the four-year-old startup and was at work on a new business plan. But first, he wanted to understand why Cake Financial, a service that allowed users to access their brokerage accounts on one platform and also see how other users were investing, had not been widely adopted by customers despite positive receptions from technology and financial observers. The startup had also received financial support from prominent angel investors. Carpenter asked himself what he should have done differently with the technology supporting the platform, and how Cake should have better targeted customers and responded to their unique needs. He also wondered whether he had made the right decisions about when, and from whom, to seek funding at various stages of the company's growth.
Eisenmann, Thomas R., Joseph B. Fuller, and Shikhar Ghosh. "Steven Carpenter at Cake Financial (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 814-054, January 2014.
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In late 2012, the management team of Myomo, a startup which had designed a unique myoelectric arm brace for patients with dysfunctional arms, was deciding which of the three sales models the company had tested to pursue as its sales strategy going forward. Each model had its own unique merits and risks. The team planned to fully examine each strategy to determine how to best get the brace into the hands of those who needed it most, the patients, and identify which one enabled Myomo to grow.
Neven Murugan is developing FanMode, an app that allows sports fans all over the world to broadcast their reactions in real time into stadiums where their team is playing. It also provides social networking across sports fans. The company is growing, and its founders face the questions of where to locate their headquarters and how to structure their company, and the legal issues surrounding these decisions, including intellectual property regulations, tax laws, and ownership structure. This case provides an example of a company that, due to the nature of its product, has had to operate globally from its earliest days and establish itself in many locations simultaneously.
The case provides a sense of motivations of venture capital firms, the pivotal role that founders play, and explores the limits of founder-driven growth.
CrossFit (CF) describes the approach taken by its founder Greg Glassman in setting up one of the most successful chains of gyms in the world. Glassman rejects institutional money, focuses on the needs of trainers rather than customers, breaks all the rules of franchising and charges the ‘least rent’ possible. Why did this approach succeed? What does his success teach us about entrepreneurship?
In 2012, CrossFit was growing rapidly with over 5,000 'boxes' in operation. The founder’s ex-wife sold her 50 percent stake in the business to Anthos Capital, a VC/PE firm for $20 million and the deal was subject only to court approval. Glassman had to decide whether or not he should oppose this transaction, and take the risk of incurring $20 million in debt. What would be best for the company, the affiliates and the CF community?
Ghosh, Shikhar, Ali Huberlie, and Christopher Payton. "CrossFit (A)." Harvard Business School Case 815-089, February 2015. (Revised February 2016.)
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Ghosh, Shikhar, Joseph B. Fuller, Thomas R. Eisenmann, Alex Godden, and Andrew Sandoe. "MuMaté: Funding Growth." Harvard Business School Case 814-063, January 2014. (Revised January 2014.)
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Paul W. Marshall, Thomas R. Eisenmann, Shikhar Ghosh and Lauren Barley
Provides background information for a negotiations exercise in which students will represent either Keurig, a startup that has developed an innovative "portion pack" coffee brewing solution, or Green Mountain Coffee Roasters (GMCR), a fast-growing premium coffee roaster interested in licensing Keurig's technology. The negotiation will determine the royalty to be paid to Keurig by GMCR, which will bear capital expenditures, and whether GMCR secures exclusive distribution rights to Keurig's system.
Thomas R. Eisenmann, Shikhar Ghosh and James K. Sebenius
Case provides confidential information for students assuming the role of senior executives of Keurig, a startup that has developed an innovative "portion pack" coffee brewing solution, in a negotiation to license technology to Green Mountain Coffee Roasters (GMCR). The negotiation will determine the royalty to be paid to Keurig by GMCR, which will bear capital expenditures, and determine whether GMCR secures exclusive distribution rights to Keurig's system.
Thomas R. Eisenmann, Shikhar Ghosh and James K. Sebenius
Case provides confidential information for students assuming the role of Green Mountain Coffee Roasters (GMCR) senior executives in a negotiation to license technology from Keurig, a startup that has developed an innovative "portion pack" coffee brewing solution. The negotiation will determine the royalty to be paid to Keurig by GMCR, which will bear capital expenditures, and determine whether GMCR secures exclusive distribution rights to Keurig's system.
Ted Morgan, the founder of Skyhook Wireless just received a call from Steve Jobs of Apple asking for a meeting. Ted must decide how to prepare for a meeting that could finally give Skyhook an anchor customer. Ted and his team have worked for three years to build a new approach to location based services that uses WiFi rather than the well-established satellite based GPS technology. Skyhook's approach is more accurate than GPS in urban areas and, unlike GPS, it works indoors. Yet, large device manufacturers are reluctant to be the first ones to use it. Skyhook has no customers. The board and investors are getting restless. Should Ted offer Steve Jobs a free license, or pay him for Apple's user base—or should he insist on a substantial license fee? The case examines the challenges faced by entrepreneurs in creating a technology-based company and in getting market traction against an established standard.
