Tax Elasticities of Top Donors: Evidence from Family Foundations

High net-worth donors who give through a family foundation or donor-advised fund constitute the fastest growing segment of charitable giving in the United States. Using a novel database of foundation tax filings, I document facts about top donors, estimate how they respond to tax incentives over time, and evaluate the welfare effects of policy changes. I focus on two sets of tax incentives: the tax subsidy for a donor's contributions to their foundation, and the tax penalty imposed if a foundation's charitable disbursements average less than 5% of assets. I employ a new approach to identify short-run responses to these tax incentives. I then translate those estimates into dynamic elasticities using a new method. I find that a 1% increase in the tax subsidy for contributions would increase contributions to foundations by 0.67% in present value terms, but would only raise charitable disbursements by 0.37%. Additionally, I find that a one percentage point increase in the 5% minimum payout rate would increase charitable disbursements by 0.33% in present value terms, primarily financed by foundation assets. I discuss how these findings relate to recent legislative proposals regarding the regulation of foundations and donor-advised funds.