Publications
Publications
- March 2025
- Journal of Financial Economics
Optimal Illiquidity
By: John Beshears, James J. Choi, Christopher Clayton, Christopher Harris, David Laibson and Brigitte C. Madrian
Abstract
We study the socially optimal level of illiquidity in an economy populated by households with taste shocks and present bias with naive beliefs. The government chooses mandatory contributions to accounts, each with a different pre-retirement withdrawal penalty. Collected penalties are rebated lump sum. When households have homogeneous present bias, β, the social optimum is well approximated by a single account with an early-withdrawal penalty of 1 − β. When households have heterogeneous present bias, the social optimum is well approximated by a two-account system: (i) an account that is completely liquid and (ii) an account that is completely illiquid until retirement.
Keywords
Citation
Beshears, John, James J. Choi, Christopher Clayton, Christopher Harris, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian. "Optimal Illiquidity." Art. 103996. Journal of Financial Economics 165 (March 2025).