Publications
Publications
- 2022
The Limits of Decentralized Administrative Data Collection: Experimental Evidence from Colombia
By: Natalia Garbiras-Diaz and Tara Slough
Abstract
States collect vast amounts of data for use in policymaking and public administration. To
do so, central governments frequently solicit data from decentralized bureaucrats. Because
central governments use these data in policymaking, decentralized bureaucrats may face incentives
to selectively report or misreport, limiting the quality of administrative data. We
study the production of a transparency index by measuring the reporting behavior of bureaucrats
in the near-universe of Colombian public sector entities. Using an original audit, we show
that failure to report and misreporting vary systematically in actual transparency practices, revealing
limits to the use of these data. Further, in partnership with a Colombian government
watchdog agency, we implement a large-scale experiment that varies the salience of central
government oversight. Increased salience changed the data bureaucrats reported to the central
government. Similar dynamics across policy areas and regime types are apt to limit the quality
of state information in multiple contexts.
Keywords
Decentralization; Policy-making; Policy/economics; Policy Evaluation; Governance; Government Administration; Government and Politics; Government Legislation; Policy; Public Opinion; Analytics and Data Science; Latin America; South America; Colombia
Citation
Garbiras-Diaz, Natalia, and Tara Slough. "The Limits of Decentralized Administrative Data Collection: Experimental Evidence from Colombia." Working Paper, December 2022.