Publications
Publications
- October 2024
- Journal of Finance
Founder-CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital-Backed Entrepreneurship
By: Michael Ewens, Ramana Nanda and Christopher Stanton
Abstract
We show theoretically that a critical determinant of the attractiveness of VC-backed entrepreneurship for high-earning potential founders is the expected time to develop a startup’s initial product. This is because founder-CEOs’ cash compensation increases substantially after product development, alleviating the non-diversifiable risk that founders face at startup birth. Consistent with the model’s predictions of where the supply of entrepreneurial talent is likely to be most constrained, we find that technological shocks differentially altering the expected time to product across industries can explain changes in both the rate of entry and characteristics of individuals selecting into VC-backed entrepreneurship.
Keywords
Citation
Ewens, Michael, Ramana Nanda, and Christopher Stanton. "Founder-CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital-Backed Entrepreneurship." Journal of Finance 79, no. 5 (October 2024): 3361–3405.