Procedural Burden and Patterns in the Monetization of Regulatory Benefits Across the Federal Regulatory State

When do federal agencies provide monetized estimates of regulatory benefits during the regulatory development and review process? Using an original dataset with information on nearly all major rules and their respective regulatory impact assessments between 1996–2016 (n = 713), this paper presents the first empirical analysis of the associations between policy issue areas and the monetization and non-monetization of regulatory benefits across the federal regulatory state. The results demonstrate systemic differences in whether or not federal agencies monetize the benefits of major regulatory proposals based on regulatory policy topics. The paper further introduces the concept of procedural burden—defined as the extent of barriers facing interest groups and citizens in wielding power over regulatory policy formation. The empirical findings combined with this theoretical concept suggest that the patterns in the monetization of regulatory benefits can constitute a form of procedural inequality that weakens pluralist democracy in regulatory rulemaking.