Skip to Main Content
HBS Home
  • About
  • Academic Programs
  • Alumni
  • Faculty & Research
  • Baker Library
  • Giving
  • Harvard Business Review
  • Initiatives
  • News
  • Recruit
  • Map / Directions
Faculty & Research
  • Faculty
  • Research
  • Featured Topics
  • Academic Units
  • …→
  • Harvard Business School→
  • Faculty & Research→
Publications
Publications
  • 1975
  • Working Paper

Information, Efficiency and Equilibrium

By: Jerry R. Green
  • Format:Print
  • | Language:English
ShareBar

Abstract

When economic agents receive information over time concerning future events it is likely that prices for commodities whose value is influenced by these events will fluctuate in response to changes in the state of knowledge. If such events occur periodically, participants in the market will notice that the prices could be used, to some extent, as a proxy for the relevant information. Learning of this type will take place by those agents who do not receive the information directly. Therefore, under stationary conditions, equilibria in this market will be characterized by the endogenous formation of expectations, dependent on the price system. The purpose of this paper is to define and characterize this type of equilibrium under various conditions and to study its efficiency properties. We will allow the choice of whether to receive information directly to be endogenous. The model will hopefully have useful implications for the theories of speculation and temporary equilibrium.

Keywords

Economics; Supply and Industry; Price

Citation

Green, Jerry R. "Information, Efficiency and Equilibrium." Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper, No. 284, December 1975.
  • Read Now

About The Author

Jerry R. Green

Negotiation, Organizations & Markets
→More Publications

More from the Author

    • December 2022
    • Decisions in Economics and Finance

    Two Representations of Information Structures and Their Comparisons

    By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy L. Stokey
    • Social Choice and Welfare

    Assent-maximizing Social Choice

    By: Katherine A. Baldiga and Jerry R. Green
    • January 2011
    • American Naturalist

    Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms

    By: Marco Archetti, Francisco Ubeda, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry R. Green, Naomi E. Pierce and Douglas W. Yu
More from the Author
  • Two Representations of Information Structures and Their Comparisons By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy L. Stokey
  • Assent-maximizing Social Choice By: Katherine A. Baldiga and Jerry R. Green
  • Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms By: Marco Archetti, Francisco Ubeda, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry R. Green, Naomi E. Pierce and Douglas W. Yu
ǁ
Campus Map
Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
→Map & Directions
→More Contact Information
  • Make a Gift
  • Site Map
  • Jobs
  • Harvard University
  • Trademarks
  • Policies
  • Accessibility
  • Digital Accessibility
Copyright © President & Fellows of Harvard College