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Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods

By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
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Abstract

Social decision mechanisms that admit dominant strategies and result in Pareto optima are characterized by the class of mechanisms proposed by Groves. The concept of decision mechanisms is generalized and the characterization is shown to extend to these cases.

Keywords

Decision Mechanisms; Game Theory; Economics

Citation

Green, Jerry R., and Jean-Jacques Laffont. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods." Econometrica 45, no. 2 (March 1977): 427–438.

About The Author

Jerry R. Green

Negotiation, Organizations & Markets
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