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Publications
  • 1978
  • Article
  • Scandinavian Journal of Economics

An Incentive Compatible Planning Procedure for Public Good Production

By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
  • Format:Print
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Abstract

It is only recently that economic theorists have faced the fact that the proposed allocation mechanisms in economies with public goods might have bad incentive properties. In this paper we introduce a new planning procedure such that truthful revelation of the marginal rates of substitution between public goods and the private good is a dominant strategy at each instant along the procedure, i.e. we obtain much stronger incentive properties than in the planning procedures proposed in the literature. We demonstrate the convergence of this new planning procedure for economies with a single public good and explore its properties-finding mixed results-in more general systems.

Citation

Green, Jerry R., and Jean-Jacques Laffont. "An Incentive Compatible Planning Procedure for Public Good Production." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 80, no. 1 (1978): 20–33.
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About The Author

Jerry R. Green

Negotiation, Organizations & Markets
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    • January 2011
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    Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms

    By: Marco Archetti, Francisco Ubeda, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry R. Green, Naomi E. Pierce and Douglas W. Yu
More from the Authors
  • Two Representations of Information Structures and Their Comparisons By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy L. Stokey
  • Assent-maximizing Social Choice By: Katherine A. Baldiga and Jerry R. Green
  • Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms By: Marco Archetti, Francisco Ubeda, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry R. Green, Naomi E. Pierce and Douglas W. Yu
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