Publications
Publications
- 1978
- Scandinavian Journal of Economics
An Incentive Compatible Planning Procedure for Public Good Production
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
Abstract
It is only recently that economic theorists have faced the fact that the proposed allocation mechanisms in economies with public goods might have bad incentive properties. In this paper we introduce a new planning procedure such that truthful revelation of the marginal rates of substitution between public goods and the private good is a dominant strategy at each instant along the procedure, i.e. we obtain much stronger incentive properties than in the planning procedures proposed in the literature. We demonstrate the convergence of this new planning procedure for economies with a single public good and explore its properties-finding mixed results-in more general systems.
Citation
Green, Jerry R., and Jean-Jacques Laffont. "An Incentive Compatible Planning Procedure for Public Good Production." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 80, no. 1 (1978): 20–33.