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Publications
Publications
  • July 9, 2019
  • Article
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Common Knowledge, Coordination, and Strategic Mentalizing in Human Social Life

By: Julian De Freitas, Kyle A. Thomas, Peter DiScioli and Steven Pinker
  • Format:Print
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Abstract

People often coordinate for mutual gain, such as keeping to opposite sides of a stairway, dubbing an object or place with a name, or assembling en masse to protest a regime. Because successful coordination requires complementary choices, these opportunities raise the puzzle of how people attain the common knowledge that facilitates coordination, in which a person knows X, knows that the other knows X, knows that the other knows that he knows, ad infinitum. We show that people are highly sensitive to the distinction between common knowledge and mere private or shared knowledge, and that they deploy this distinction strategically in diverse social situations that have the structure of coordination games, including market cooperation, innuendo, bystander intervention, attributions of charitability, self-conscious emotions, and moral condemnation.

Keywords

Coordination; Common Knowledge; Theory Of Mind; Bystander Effect; Knowledge; Cooperation

Citation

De Freitas, Julian, Kyle A. Thomas, Peter DiScioli, and Steven Pinker. "Common Knowledge, Coordination, and Strategic Mentalizing in Human Social Life." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 116, no. 28 (July 9, 2019).
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About The Author

Julian De Freitas

Marketing
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More from the Authors
  • Unselfish Alibis Increase Choices of Selfish Autonomous Vehicles By: Julian De Freitas
  • Will We Blame Self-Driving Cars? A New Study Finds That People Are Likely to Hold Autonomous Vehicles Liable for Accidents Even When They’re Not at Fault By: Julian De Freitas
  • Summarizing the Mental Customer Journey By: Julian De Freitas, Ahmet Uğuralp, Zeliha Uğuralp, Pechthida Kim and Tomer Ullman
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