Skip to Main Content
HBS Home
  • About
  • Academic Programs
  • Alumni
  • Faculty & Research
  • Baker Library
  • Giving
  • Harvard Business Review
  • Initiatives
  • News
  • Recruit
  • Map / Directions
Faculty & Research
  • Faculty
  • Research
  • Featured Topics
  • Academic Units
  • …→
  • Harvard Business School→
  • Faculty & Research→
Publications
Publications
  • Article
  • Economics Letters

Participation Constraints in the Vickrey Auction

By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
  • Format:Print
ShareBar

Abstract

Economic agents are characterized by two privately observable parameters: their willingness to pay for an item being auctioned, and their reservation utility level which must be exceeded, in expectation, to induce them to participate in this auction. This creates a situation in which the distribution of willingnesses to pay among the bidders is endogenous. For the case in which the parameters are jointly uniformly distributed, the existence of an equilibrium is proven and characterized.

Citation

Green, Jerry R., and Jean-Jacques Laffont. "Participation Constraints in the Vickrey Auction." Economics Letters 16, nos. 1-2 (1984): 31–36.
  • Find it at Harvard
  • Read Now

About The Author

Jerry R. Green

Negotiation, Organizations & Markets
→More Publications

More from the Authors

    • December 2022
    • Decisions in Economics and Finance

    Two Representations of Information Structures and Their Comparisons

    By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy L. Stokey
    • Social Choice and Welfare

    Assent-maximizing Social Choice

    By: Katherine A. Baldiga and Jerry R. Green
    • January 2011
    • American Naturalist

    Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms

    By: Marco Archetti, Francisco Ubeda, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry R. Green, Naomi E. Pierce and Douglas W. Yu
More from the Authors
  • Two Representations of Information Structures and Their Comparisons By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy L. Stokey
  • Assent-maximizing Social Choice By: Katherine A. Baldiga and Jerry R. Green
  • Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms By: Marco Archetti, Francisco Ubeda, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry R. Green, Naomi E. Pierce and Douglas W. Yu
ǁ
Campus Map
Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
→Map & Directions
→More Contact Information
  • Make a Gift
  • Site Map
  • Jobs
  • Harvard University
  • Trademarks
  • Policies
  • Accessibility
  • Digital Accessibility
Copyright © President & Fellows of Harvard College