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  • Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance

Cash-for-Information Whistleblower Programs: Effects on Whistleblowing and Consequences for Whistleblowers

By: Aiyesha Dey, Jonas Heese and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos
  • Format:Electronic
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Abstract

Cash-for-information whistleblower programs have gained momentum as a regulatory tool to enforce corporate misconduct. Yet, little is known about how financial incentives affect whistleblowers’ decisions to report potential misconduct to authorities. Similarly, there is no large-sample evidence on the consequences for whistleblowers under these programs. We study these questions using over 5,000 whistleblower lawsuits brought under the False Claims Act (FCA) against firms accused of defrauding the government.

Keywords

Corporate Misconduct; Whistleblowers; Financial Incentives; Ethics; Governance Compliance; Lawsuits and Litigation

Citation

Dey, Aiyesha, Jonas Heese, and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos. "Cash-for-Information Whistleblower Programs: Effects on Whistleblowing and Consequences for Whistleblowers." Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (June 10, 2021).

About The Authors

Aiyesha Dey

Accounting and Management
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Jonas Heese

Accounting and Management
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