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  • 2023
  • Working Paper
  • HBS Working Paper Series

Catching Outliers: Committee Voting and the Limits of Consensus When Financing Innovation

By: Andrey Malenko, Ramana Nanda, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf and Savitar Sundaresan
  • Format:Print
  • | Language:English
  • | Pages:73
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Abstract

We provide novel evidence that a substantial share of venture capital investors in the U.S. use a voting model where a single partner 'championing' an early stage investment is sufficient for an investment committee to do the deal, even if other partners are not as enthusiastic. Their stated reason for this voting rule is to 'catch outliers'. The same VCs also tend towards more conventional 'majority' or 'unaninimity' rules for later stage investments. We analyze this evidence through the lens of several conventional models of information aggregation in committees, and conclude that it points to a model in which different voting partners get signals about different aspects of the project and superstar projects are the ones that excel on some dimensions even if potentially awed on others. In this case, if the distribution of investment returns is sufficiently heavy-tailed, a champions rule is optimal, while for less heavy-tailed distributions, more consensus is optimal. We then show empirically that the distribution of early stage returns have significantly heavier tails than late stage returns, validating the model. In a quantitative example, we find that a majority voting rule in early stage investing reduces the chances of finding the best investments by up to 70% relative to a 'champions' model.

Keywords

Optimal Voting Rules; Innovation and Invention; Venture Capital; Investment; Decision Making; Voting

Citation

Malenko, Andrey, Ramana Nanda, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, and Savitar Sundaresan. "Catching Outliers: Committee Voting and the Limits of Consensus When Financing Innovation." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 21-131, June 2021. (Revise and Resubmit at Journal of Finance. Revised January 2023.)
  • SSRN
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About The Author

Ramana Nanda

Entrepreneurial Management
→More Publications

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More from the Authors
  • House Prices, Home Equity and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from U.S. Census Micro Data By: Sari Pekkala Kerr, William R. Kerr and Ramana Nanda
  • Are Transformational Ideas Harder to Fund? Resource Allocation to R&D Projects at a Global Pharmaceutical Firm By: Joshua Krieger and Ramana Nanda
  • Financing Constraints, Home Equity and Selection into Entrepreneurship By: Thais Laerkholm Jensen, Søren Leth-Petersen and Ramana Nanda
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