Buying Time? The Vietnam War and Southeast Asia

This article examines the “buying time thesis”—the idea that the American war in Vietnam bought time for the rest of Southeast Asia to build up political, economic, military, and diplomatic defenses against communism. It finds that there is some truth to claims that the Vietnam War strengthened Southeast Asia’s noncommunist states, stimulated the region’s economic growth, and led to the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), all of which left the region more stable and secure. But the war also served as a source of instability. It led the United States to funnel vast quantities of military and economic aid to dictatorial regimes whose repressive practices fueled a resurgence of disloyal political opposition. The economic growth the war stoked reinforced emerging systems of oligarchy that diminished opportunities for peaceful political change. And the war ensured that regional cooperation would be based on rigid sovereigntist principles that impeded ASEAN’s ability to solve long-term problems. Ultimately, it argues that the buying time thesis masks the complexity of the Vietnam War and its contradictory legacies for Southeast Asia.