Publications
Publications
- May 2021
- American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Is No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure
By: Ginger Zhe Jin, Michael Luca and Daniel Martin
Abstract
This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold less favorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but their actions and beliefs suggest that many are insufficiently skeptical about non-disclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback.
Keywords
Communication Games; Disclosure; Unraveling; Experiments; Information; Product; Quality; Communication; Consumer Behavior
Citation
Jin, Ginger Zhe, Michael Luca, and Daniel Martin. "Is No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13, no. 2 (May 2021): 141–173.
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