The Effects of Endowment Size and Strategy Method on Third Party Punishment

Jillian J. Jordan; Katherine  McAuliffe; David G. Rand

Article | Experimental Economics | December 2016

The Effects of Endowment Size and Strategy Method on Third Party Punishment

by Jillian J. Jordan, Katherine McAuliffe and David G. Rand

Abstract

Numerous experiments have shown that people often engage in third-party punishment (3PP) of selfish behavior. This evidence has been used to argue that people respond to selfishness with anger, and get utility from punishing those who mistreat others. Elements of the standard 3PP experimental design, however, allow alternative explanations: it has been argued that 3PP could be motivated by envy (as selfish dictators earn high payoffs), or could be influenced by the use of the strategy method (which is known to influence second-party punishment). Here we test these alternatives by varying the third party’s endowment and the use of the strategy method, and measuring punishment. We find that while third parties do report more envy when they have lower endowments, neither manipulation significantly affects punishment. We also show that punishment is associated with ratings of anger but not of envy. Thus, our results suggest that 3PP is not an artifact of self-focused envy or use of the strategy method. Instead, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 3PP is motivated by anger.

Keywords: third-party punishment; norm-enforcement; strategy method; economic games; Cooperation; Emotions; Fairness;

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Citation:

Jordan, Jillian J., Katherine McAuliffe, and David G. Rand. "The Effects of Endowment Size and Strategy Method on Third Party Punishment." Experimental Economics 19, no. 4 (December 2016): 741–763.

Article | Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Signaling When Nobody Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment in One-shot Anonymous Interactions

Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand

Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically at stake, such that reputation concerns can shape moralistic outrage and punishment even in one-shot anonymous interactions. We then support this account using data from Amazon Mechanical Turk. In anonymous experiments, subjects (total n = 8,440) report more outrage in response to others’ selfishness when they cannot signal their trustworthiness through direct prosociality (sharing with a third party)—such that if the interaction were not anonymous, punishment would have greater signaling value. Furthermore, mediation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities reduce outrage by influencing reputation concerns. Additionally, anonymous experiments measuring costly punishment (total n = 6,076) show the same pattern: subjects punish more when sharing is not possible. Moreover, and importantly, moderation analyses provide some evidence that sharing opportunities do not merely reduce outrage and punishment by inducing empathy toward selfishness or hypocrisy aversion among non-sharers. Finally, we support the specific role of heuristics by investigating individual differences in deliberateness. Less deliberative individuals (who typically rely more on heuristics) are more sensitive to sharing opportunities in our anonymous punishment experiments, but, critically, not in punishment experiments where reputation is at stake (total n = 3,422); and not in our anonymous outrage experiments (where condemning is costless). Together, our results suggest that when nobody is watching, reputation cues nonetheless can shape outrage and—among individuals who rely on heuristics—costly punishment.

Keywords: signaling; Morality; trustworthiness; anger; third-party punishment; Moral Sensibility; Behavior; Trust; Reputation;

Citation:

Jordan, Jillian J., and David G. Rand. "Signaling When Nobody Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment in One-shot Anonymous Interactions." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 118, no. 1 (January 2020). View Details

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People often punish norm violations. In what cases is such punishment viewed as normative—a behavior that we “should”or even“must”engage in? We approach this question by asking when people who fail to punish a norm violator are, themselves, punished. (For instance, a boss who fails to punish transgressive employees might,herself, befired.) We conducted experiments exploring the contexts in which higher-order punishment occurs, using both incentivized economic games and hypothetical vignettes describing everyday situations. We presented participants with cases in which an individual fails to punish a transgressor, either as a victim (second party) or as an observer (third party). Across studies, we consistently observed higher-order punishment of non-punishing observers. Higher-order punishment of non-punishing victims, however, was consistently weaker, and sometimes non-existent. These results demonstrate the selective application of higher-order punishment, provide a new perspective on the psychological mechanisms that support it, and provide some clues regarding itsfunction.

The social function of witchcraft accusations remains opaque. An empirical study of Chinese villagers shows that the label ‘z hu’ influences who interacts across a social network, but appears not to tag defectors in service of promoting cooperation. An open question thus remains: from witchcraft to gossip, which accusations stick?

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The Effects of Endowment Size and Strategy Method on Third Party Punishment

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