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Heuristics Guide the Implementation of Social Preferences in One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments

By: Jillian J. Jordan, Valerio Capraro and David G. Rand
  • Format:Electronic
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Abstract

Cooperation in one-shot anonymous interactions is a widely documented aspect of human behavior. Here we shed light on the motivations behind this behavior by experimentally exploring cooperation in a one-shot continuous-strategy Prisoner’s Dilemma (i.e. one-shot two-player Public Goods Game). We examine the distribution of cooperation amounts, and how that distribution varies based on the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation (b/c). Interestingly, we find a trimodal distribution at all b/c values investigated. Increasing b/c decreases the fraction of participants engaging in zero cooperation and increases the fraction engaging in maximal cooperation, suggesting a role for efficiency concerns. However, a substantial fraction of participants consistently engage in 50% cooperation regardless of b/c. The presence of these persistent 50% cooperators is surprising, and not easily explained by standard models of social preferences. We present evidence that this behavior is a result of social preferences guided by simple decision heuristics, rather than the rational examination of payoffs assumed by most social preference models. We also find a strong correlation between play in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and in a subsequent Dictator Game, confirming previous findings suggesting a common prosocial motivation underlying altruism and cooperation.

Keywords

Human Behavior; Social Evolution; Behavior; Cooperation; Decision Making; Game Theory

Citation

Jordan, Jillian J., Valerio Capraro, and David G. Rand. "Heuristics Guide the Implementation of Social Preferences in One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments." Art. 6790. Scientific Reports 4 (2014).
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About The Author

Jillian J. Jordan

Negotiation, Organizations & Markets
→More Publications

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  • Does Observability Amplify Sensitivity to Moral Frames? Evaluating a Reputation-Based Account of Moral Preferences By: Valerio Capraro, Jillian J. Jordan and Ben Tappin
  • Does Observability Amplify Sensitivity to Moral Frames? Evaluating a Reputation-Based Account of Moral Preferences By: Valerio Capraro, Jillian J. Jordan and Ben Tappin
  • Reputation Drives Morally Questionable Punishment By: Jillian J. Jordan and Nour Kteily
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