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• Article | Marketing Science | July–August 2020

  Price Bargaining and Competition in Online Platforms: An Empirical Analysis of the Daily Deal Market

  Lingling Zhang and Doug J. Chung

  The prevalence of online platforms opens new doors to traditional businesses for customer reach and revenue growth. This research investigates platform choice in a setting where prices are determined by negotiations between platforms and businesses. We compile a unique and comprehensive dataset from the U.S. daily deal market, where merchants offer deals to generate revenues and attract new customers. We specify and estimate a two-stage supply-side model in which platforms and merchants bargain on the wholesale price of deals. Based on Nash bargaining solutions, our model generates insights into how bargaining and competition jointly determine the price and firm profits. Our results show that there is systematic variation in bargaining power between platforms and merchants with different characteristics. By working with a bigger platform, merchants enjoy a larger customer base, but they are subject to lower margins due to less bargaining power during negotiations. Our counterfactual results quantify the value of platforms for merchants and show that merchants with lower bargaining power benefit more by working with a smaller platform. Regarding the impact of price negotiations on platform competition, we estimate that roughly 11% of the deals on a smaller platform are attributable to the platform’s lower level of revenue sharing.

  Keywords: business-to-business marketing; platform competition; Two-Sided Markets; price bargaining; daily deals; structural model; Two-Sided Platforms; Competition; Price; Negotiation;

  Citation:

  Zhang, Lingling, and Doug J. Chung. "Price Bargaining and Competition in Online Platforms: An Empirical Analysis of the Daily Deal Market." Marketing Science 39, no. 4 (July–August 2020): 687–706.  View Details

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• Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2020

  Of Learning and Forgetting: Centrism, Populism, and the Legitimacy Crisis of Globalization

  Rawi Abdelal

  Every order is a bargain with disappointments and trade-offs. Thus is every order an unstable equilibrium. The first era of globalization, circa 1870–1914, created both international prosperity and domestic instability. That instability was fully realized during the interwar years, which were characterized by financial chaos, virulent populist movements, and war. European and American political leaders learned hard lessons from those decades: that the international order must tolerate a diversity of national capitalisms; and that capitalisms within nations must be tamed in order to be made compatible with democracy. A generation later, both scholars and policy makers seemed to have forgotten how important the post-war bargains were for maintaining economic and social stability. Instead, preoccupied by the disappointments of the 1970s, a new pro-market, pro-capital consensus emerged between the center-Left and center-Right. A second post-war international order emerged as a result: a new era of globalization made possible by this “neoliberal” political consensus. The new order was more trans-Atlantic than American, for European political transformations made it possible. This era of globalization created both prosperity and instability, just as the first era had done. Instability took the form again of virulent populism, driven by economic inequality, financial volatility, and a crisis of dignity among those who felt left behind by it. Although we are learning that neither national societies nor the international system can manage the trade-offs of globalization and neoliberalism well enough to avoid a backlash, in fact those lessons were learned once before. The cycle continues: learning, forgetting, and re-learning why these equilibria are unstable.

  Citation:

  Abdelal, Rawi. "Of Learning and Forgetting: Centrism, Populism, and the Legitimacy Crisis of Globalization." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 21-008, July 2020.  View Details

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• Case | HBS Case Collection | November 2019 (Revised June 2020)

  Russia: A Drama In Three Acts

  Rawi Abdelal, Rafael Di Tella, Galit Goldstein and Sogomon Tarontsi

  The collapse of central authority in the Soviet Union in 1991 ushered in a period of revolutionary transformations for the states that emerged in its wake. The leaders of Russia, the USSR's successor, struggled to reestablish central authority while also seeking to avoid further disintegration, establish a democratic polity, and institute a market economy across the next several years. Russia would navigate further economic crisis and a swiftly evolving geopolitical order as it returned to the world stage. The case examines the different governance approaches adopted by Presidents Boris Yeltsin, Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, and concludes with a discussion of Russia’s strategic challenges and opportunities in 2020. The case focuses on problems of state authority; fiscal capacity; institutionalization of political parties; relations between the federal center and provincial governments; relations between the state and big business; economic policy; international relations; and models of economic development.

  Keywords: Business ＆ government relations; developing countries; government policy; policy change; Policy Making; Economic Systems; Economics; Globalization; Emerging Markets; Privatization; Non-Renewable Energy; Governance; Global Strategy; Corporate Governance; Policy; Business History; Lawfulness; Problems and Challenges; Business and Government Relations; Risk and Uncertainty; Strategy; Change Management; Russia; Moscow;

  Citation:

  Abdelal, Rawi, Rafael Di Tella, Galit Goldstein, and Sogomon Tarontsi. "Russia: A Drama In Three Acts." Harvard Business School Case 720-020, November 2019. (Revised June 2020.)  View Details

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