Highfields Capital and McDonalds

Mark  Egan; Robin  Greenwood

Case | HBS Case Collection | February 2020

Highfields Capital and McDonalds

Abstract

McDonald’s reported its fifth consecutive quarter of declining same-store sales growth in early 2015. Despite McDonald’s recent poor performance, Jonathon S. Jacobson, the founder and Chief Investment Officer of Boston-based Highfields Capital Management, had initiated a large position in McDonald’s stock. Jacobson and his team believed that there was enormous upside in McDonald’s stock if management successfully implemented what they perceived to be straightforward operational and financial changes. McDonald’s needed to return to its core competencies of producing quick and reliable burgers and fries. In addition, they believed that financial restructuring could unlock sizable value for investors. Jacobson and his team debated whether to more forcefully articulate their vision for the company and began drafting a letter to Andrew McKenna, McDonald’s Chairman.

Keywords: McDonald's; Stocks; Performance Improvement; Operations; Finance; Restructuring; Value Creation; Financial Services Industry;

Language: English

Format: Print

17 pages

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Citation:

Egan, Mark, and Robin Greenwood. "Highfields Capital and McDonalds." Harvard Business School Case 220-061, February 2020.

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Highfields Capital and McDonalds

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