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  • March 2020
  • Article
  • Journal of Public Economics

Which Early Withdrawal Penalty Attracts the Most Deposits to a Commitment Savings Account?

By: John Beshears, James J. Choi, Christopher Harris, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian and Jung Sakong
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Abstract

Previous research has shown that some people voluntarily use commitment contracts that restrict their own choice sets. We study how people divide money between two accounts: a liquid account that permits unrestricted withdrawals and a commitment account that is randomly assigned in a between-subject design to have either a 10% early withdrawal penalty, or a 20% early withdrawal penalty, or not to allow early withdrawals at all (i.e., an infinite penalty). When the liquid account and the commitment account pay the same interest rate, higher early withdrawal penalties attract more commitment account deposits. This pattern is predicted by the hypothesis that some participants are partially or fully sophisticated present-biased agents. Such agents perceive that higher penalties generate greater scope for commitment by disincentivizing (penalized) early withdrawals. The experiment also shows that when the commitment account pays a higher interest rate than the liquid account, the positive empirical slope relating penalties and commitment deposits is flattened, suggesting that naïve present-biased agents or agents with standard exponential discounting are also in our sample. Across all of our experimental treatments, higher early withdrawal penalties on the commitment account sometimes increase and never reduce allocations to the commitment account.

Keywords

Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting; Present Bias; Sophistication; Naiveté; Commitment; Flexibility; Savings; Contract Design; Defined Contribution Retirement Plan; 401 (k); Ira; Saving; Behavior; Contracts; Design; Interest Rates

Citation

Beshears, John, James J. Choi, Christopher Harris, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Jung Sakong. "Which Early Withdrawal Penalty Attracts the Most Deposits to a Commitment Savings Account?" Art. 104144. Journal of Public Economics 183 (March 2020).
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About The Author

John Beshears

Negotiation, Organizations & Markets
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More from the Authors
  • Social Salary Setting at Spiber By: Ashley Whillans and John Beshears
  • Nudging: Progress to Date and Future Directions By: John Beshears and Harry Kosowsky
  • Do Physician Incentives Increase Patient Medication Adherence? By: Edward Kong, John Beshears, David Laibson, Brigitte Madrian, Kevin Volpp, George Loewenstein, Jonathan Kolstad and James J. Choi
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