Publications
Publications
  • August 2020
  • Article
  • Social Choice and Welfare

Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria

By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo
  • Format:Print
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Abstract

This paper develops a class of equilibrium-independent predictions of competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities. Specifically, we prove an analogue of the “Lone Wolf Theorem” of classical matching theory, showing that when utility is perfectly transferable, any agent who does not participate in trade in one competitive equilibrium must receive her autarky payoff in every competitive equilibrium. Our results extend to approximate equilibria and to settings in which utility is only approximately transferable.

Keywords

Indivisibilities; Matching; Lone Wolf Theorem; Marketplace Matching; Theory

Citation

Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ross Rheingans-Yoo. "Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria." Social Choice and Welfare 55, no. 2 (August 2020): 215–228.

About The Author

Scott Duke Kominers

Entrepreneurial Management
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