Intelligent Design of Inclusive Growth Strategies

Robert S. Kaplan; George  Serafeim; Eduardo  Tugendhat

Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2019

Intelligent Design of Inclusive Growth Strategies

by Robert S. Kaplan, George Serafeim and Eduardo Tugendhat

Abstract

Improving corporate engagement with society, as advocated in the Business Roundtable’s 2019 statement, should not be viewed as a zero-sum proposition where attention to new stakeholders detracts from delivering shareholder value. Corporate programs for sustainable and ethical sourcing practices, however, have fallen far short of solving the underlying causes of extreme poverty, extensive use of child labor, and threats to the environment and human health. We identify several causes to explain this disappointing shortfall in societal performance, including traditional company policies and incentives that inhibit the implementation of innovative, inclusive growth strategies. We propose the role for a new actor, a catalyst, to help companies forge new relationships with external funders, local intermediary companies, NGOs, and community leaders. The catalyst aligns the multiple stakeholders from multiple sectors into enduring, mutually beneficial relationships that produce more value than that currently produced when stakeholders connect only by transactional relationships. The catalyst attracts funding from public and private sources to invest in the new ecosystem, which can generate attractive financial returns while alleviating poverty and environmental degradation. Finally, the catalyst engages the multiple participants to collectively co-create explicit strategies and scorecards of metrics, which serve to motivate, create accountability, and enable an enduring governance model for a multi-stakeholder ecosystem.

Keywords: inclusion; sustainability; performance measures; Environmental Sustainability; Social Issues; Strategy; Governance; Corporate Social Responsibility and Impact; Business and Stakeholder Relations;

Language: English

Format: Print

22 pages

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Citation:

Kaplan, Robert S., George Serafeim, and Eduardo Tugendhat. "Intelligent Design of Inclusive Growth Strategies." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 20-050, October 2019.

All organizations now practice some form of risk management to identify and assess routine risks for compliance; in their operations, supply chains, and strategy; and from envisioned external events. These risk management policies, however, fail when employees do not recognize the potential for novel risks to occur during apparently routine operations. Novel risks – arising from circumstances that haven’t been thought of or seen before - make routine risk management ineffective, and, more seriously, delude management into thinking that risks have been mitigated when, in fact, novel risks can escalate to serious if not fatal consequences. The paper discusses why well-known behavioral and organizational biases cause novel risks to go unrecognized and unmitigated. Based on best practices in several organizations, the paper describes the processes that private and public entities can institute to identify and manage novel risks. These risks require organizations to launch adaptive and nimble responses to avoid being trapped in routines that are inadequate or even counterproductive when novel circumstances arise.

Article | Accounting Horizons | March 2020

Voluntary, Self-Regulatory, and Mandatory Disclosure of Oil and Gas Company Payments to Foreign Governments

Paul M. Healy and George Serafeim

Concerns about high rates of government corruption in resource-rich countries have led transparency advocates to urge oil and gas firms to disclose payments to host governments for natural resources. Transparency, they argue, can increase government accountability and mitigate corruption. However, we find a low frequency of voluntary disclosures of payments by oil and gas firms and negative stock price reactions for affected firms at the announcement of regulations mandating disclosure. This suggests that sample firm managers and their investors perceive that such disclosures generate private costs, despite any public benefits. We document that industry self-regulation has generated information to substitute for the gap in voluntary company disclosure and that such disclosures are accompanied by lower country corruption ratings. This suggests that collective action could be an effective way for companies to manage the private costs of disclosure and respond to public pressure for transparency that could provide public benefits.

Keywords: oil ＆ gas; corruption; transparency; self-regulation; industry self-regulation; regulation; disclosure; disclosure regulation; Energy Sources; Crime and Corruption; Corporate Disclosure; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Energy Industry;

Citation:

Healy, Paul M., and George Serafeim. "Voluntary, Self-Regulatory, and Mandatory Disclosure of Oil and Gas Company Payments to Foreign Governments." Accounting Horizons 34, no. 1 (March 2020): 111–129. View Details

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