The Economic Effects of Private Equity Buyouts

Steven J. Davis; John  Haltiwanger; Kyle  Handley; Ben  Lipsius; Josh   Lerner; Javier  Miranda

Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2019

The Economic Effects of Private Equity Buyouts

by Steven J. Davis, John Haltiwanger, Kyle Handley, Ben Lipsius, Josh Lerner and Javier Miranda

Abstract

We examine thousands of U.S. private equity (PE) buyouts from 1980 to 2013, a period that saw huge swings in credit market tightness and GDP growth. Our results show striking, systematic differences in the real-side effects of PE buyouts, depending on buyout type and external conditions. Employment at target firms shrinks 13% over two years in buyouts of publicly listed firms but expands 13% in buyouts of privately held firms, both relative to contemporaneous outcomes at control firms. Labor productivity rises 8% at targets over two years post buyout (again, relative to controls), with large gains for both public-to-private and private-to-private buyouts. Target productivity gains are larger yet for deals executed amidst tight credit conditions. A post-buyout widening of credit spreads or slowdown in GDP growth lowers employment growth at targets and sharply curtails productivity gains in public-to-private and divisional buyouts. Average earnings per worker fall by 1.7% at target firms after buyouts, largely erasing a pre-buyout wage premium relative to controls. Wage effects are also heterogeneous. In these and other respects, the economic effects of private equity vary greatly by buyout type and with external conditions.

Keywords: private equity buyouts; Impact; Private Equity; Economics; Employment; Performance Productivity; Wages;

Language: English

Format: Print

69 pages

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Citation:

Davis, Steven J., John Haltiwanger, Kyle Handley, Ben Lipsius, Josh Lerner, and Javier Miranda. "The Economic Effects of Private Equity Buyouts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 20-046, October 2019.

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The Economic Effects of Private Equity Buyouts

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